Essays on financial systems, banking crises and emerging markets by Moheeput, Ashwin
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
Permanent WRAP URL:
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/80917
Copyright and reuse:
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it.
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
 i 
 
 
******************************************************************* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, BANKING   
CRISES  
AND EMERGING MARKETS 
 
    
 
                                             Submitted By 
 
 
                                           ASHWIN MOHEEPUT     
 
 
              FOR THE REQUIREMENTS OF FULFILLING A DOCTOR OF     
PHILOSOPHY 
(PhD) DEGREE IN ECONOMICS 
 
                                                   
 
 
                                         
 
                 Department of Economics, University of Warwick  
     Oct 2009 
                                              
 
 
        
 
****************************************************************** 
 ii 
          To Shweta 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
Declaration          x 
 
Acknowledgements         xi 
 
Abstract (Non-Technical)        xii  
 
 
Chapter 1:   Introduction To Thesis 
 
1.1      Comprehensive Review of Our Contributions: What is New ?   1 
 
1.2      How do the Chapters Link ?        35 
 
 
Chapter 2:    General Literature Review 
 
2.1       Introduction         36 
                                                                                                                
2.2       Liquidity Insurance Provision       42                                                                                          
2.2.1    Policy Implications       47                                                                                  
2.2.2    Robustness of Liquidity Insurance Models    50 
 
2.3       Models with Multiple Financial Intermediaries     53 
2.3.1    Direct Link Models       55 
2.3.2.1    Robustness       57 
 2.3.2 Models with Informational Spillovers     62 
 2.3.3 Models with Asset Price Changes     66 
 
2.4       Models of Financial Intermediaries and Financial Markets   68 
 2.4.1 Asset Markets as Liquidity Providers – Homogenous Banks  70 
  2.4.2.1    Robustness       72 
 2.4.3 Asset Markets as Liquidity Providers – Heterogenous Banks  77 
  2.4.3.1    Robustness       80 
 
2.5       Macro-Systemic Risks        84 
 2.5.1 Financial Accelerator       84 
 2.5.2 Credit Channel of Monetary Policy     88 
 
2.6       Conclusion         95 
 
 
 
Chapter 3:    Financial Fragility and Informational Spillovers 
 
3.1 Introduction         100 
 
3.2 Unearthing the Transmission Mechanism      102 
 3.2.1 Direct Link Models  - Contagion vs Interdependence vs Correlation 102 
 
3.3 Brief Summary of Our Model       105 
 
3.4 The Model         111 
 iv 
 3.4.1 Returns Structure and Each Bank’s Investment Technologies  111 
 3.4.2 Dominance Regions       114 
 3.4.3 Payoff Structure to Depositors in Each Bank    116 
 3.4.4 Structural Parameter Restrictions and Qualitative Features  120 
 
3.5 Information Structure        121 
 3.5.1 Private Signal Structure       121 
 3.5.2 Public Signal Structure       125 
 
3.6 Taxonomy of the Dynamic Bayesian Game     127 
 
3.7 Conclusion         129 
 
 
Chapter 4:    Theoretical Characterisation of Banking Equilibrium  
 
4.1 Introduction         134 
 
4.2  Equilibrium Characterisation       137 
 4.2.1 Strategy Profiles       137 
 4.2.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of Dynamic Game    139 
 4.2.3  Characterisation of Trigger Equilibrium     144 
 4.2.4 Mechanics of Beliefs Updating      147 
 
4.3 Conclusion         150 
 
 
Chapter 5:    Modelling Banking Contagion as a State-Contingent Change in 
Cross-Bank Correlation 
 
5.1 Introduction         153 
  
5.2 Financial Contagion as State-Contingent Change in Correlation   159 
 
5.3 Public Informational Dominance vs Private Informational Dominance  169 
5.3.1 Properties of Contagion and Correlation as Equilibrium Phenomena 174 
 
5.4 Practical Relevance and Applications      177 
 5.4.1 Demystifying Important Puzzles      177 
5.4.2 Regulatory Mechanism       179 
5.4.3 The Credit Crunch Crisis of 2007/2008 – The Special Case of Northern  
Rock         183 
 
5.5 Conclusion         190 
 
 
Chapter 6:    Financial Fragility in Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) : Some 
Afterthoughts 
 
6.1       Introduction         194 
 
6.2       The Model         202 
6.2.1 Banking System       202 
 v 
6.2.2 Foreign Exchange Market      205 
6.2.3 Central Bank        205 
6.2.4 Timeline of Events       206 
 
6.3 Conclusion         208 
 
 
 
Chapter 7:    Information-Induced Banking Failures in Emerging Market 
Economies (EMEs): An Analytical Afterthought 
 
7.1       Introduction         209 
 
7.2       Mechanism Design for an EME       215 
7.2.1 First-Best Allocation (Central Bank as Social Planner)   218 
7.2.2 Second-Best Allocation (Central Bank as Social Planner)  221 
7.2.3 Banking Contract Allocation      222 
7.2.4 Anatomy of Financial Fragility      223 
 
7.3 Dynamics of Financial Crisis       228 
 7.3.1 No Interventionist Policy      229 
 7.3.2  Welfare Implications of Information-Induced Bank Runs   231 
 7.3.3 Interventionist Policy – Lender-of-Last-Resort (LOLR)   233 
 
7.4 Some Applications        238 
             7.4.1 Special Case for LOLR – A Multi-Period Hypothesis with Many Banks 238 
             7.4.2 Economics of Capital Controls      241 
 
7.5       Conclusion         246 
 
 
 
Chapter 8:   Devaluation-Induced Banking Failures in Emerging Market 
Economies (EMEs): An Analytical Afterthought 
 
8.1       Introduction         249 
 
8.2       Mechanism Design for an EME       256 
8.2.1 Anatomy of Financial Fragility      257 
8.2.2 Second-Best Allocation (Central Bank as Social Planner)  258 
8.2.3 Banking Allocation       259 
 
8.3 Dynamics of Financial Crises       262 
 
8.4 Some Applications        270 
 8.4.1 Revaluation and the IMF Recipe     270 
 8.4.2 Economics of Contingent Liabilities – Optimal Taxation Rules  270  
 
8.5 Design of Exchange Rate Regimes      272 
 
8.6 Conclusion         286 
 
 
 vi 
Chapter 9:    Conclusion and Critical Appraisal      290 
 
 
Bibliography         313 
 
 
Appendix (Technical and Supplementary Notes): 
 
A.1 Additional Notes for Chapter 3       325 
A.2 Appendix (Technical) for Chapter 3      329 
A.3 Appendix (Technical) for Chapter 4      330 
A.4 Appendix (Technical) for Chapter 5      339 
A.5 Additional Notes for Chapter 5       342 
A.6       Appendix (Technical) for Chapter 7      343 
A.7       Supplementary Notes for Chapter 7      351 
A.8 Supplementary Notes for Chapter 8      352 
A.9       A Theoretical Model of Twin Crisis      353 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii 
 
 
List of Charts, Graphs and Figures 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Figure 1.1: Skeletal Outline of All Chapters       4 
Figure 1.2: Key Questions and Answers (Chapters 3, 4 and 5)    21 
Figure 1.3: Illustrations: What is New ?       22 
Figure 1.4: Key Questions and Answers (Chapters 6, 7 and 8)    33 
Figure 1.5: Illustrations: What is New ?       34 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Figure 2.1: Roadmap of Micro-Systemic Risks Taxonomy    39 
Figure 2.1(b): Systemic Risk Transmission (UK)      41 
Figure 2.2: Consumption Profiles Under Different Institutional Regimes   46 
Figure 2.3: Policy Implications: Summary      49 
Figure 2.4: Dasgupta (2004) vs Allen and Gale (2000)     58 
Figure 2.5: Dasgupta (2004) vs Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)    59 
Figure 2.6: Models with Multiple Banks       67 
Figure 2.7: Incentive Efficiency vs Constrained Efficiency    74 
Figure 2.8: Vicious Circle in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)     87 
Figure 2.9:  Bank of England (Financial Accelerator(i))     91 
Figure 2.10: Bank of England (Financial Accelerator(ii))     92 
Figure 2.11: Phases of the Credit Crunch      94 
Figure 2.12: Financial Crises Sources       97 
Figure 2.10: Financial Crises Triggers       98 
Figure 2.11: Policy Implications                    99 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Figure 3.1: How Different is Our Approach to the Existing Literature?   110 
Figure 3.2: Returns Structure of Risky Portfolio      112 
Figure 3.3:  Segregation of Idiosyncratic Fundamental Space into Weak and   Strict Dominance 
Regions         115 
Figure 3.4(a): The Relationship between Idiosyncratic Fundamental, Common Macroeconomic 
Fundamental and Risky Returns Technology for a Typical Bank  116 
Figure 3.4 (b): Common Macroeconomic Fundamental going into Bad State  131 
Figure 3.4 (c): An increase in Parameter z      132 
Figure 3.4 (d): An increase in Parameter ‘delta’       133 
Figure 3.5: Net Payoff to Staying       120 
Figure 3.6: Depositor Net Payoff Structure       122 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Figure 5.1:       Idiosyncratic Thresholds for Banks A and B    160 
 viii 
Figure 5.2(a):  Threshold Equilibria and Financial Contagion    163 
Figure 5.3:       Informational Attributes of Depositors     171 
Figure 5.4(a):   Balance Sheets of Banks A and B      188 
Figure 5.4(b):   Consolidated Balance Sheet      188 
Figure 5.4(c):   Northern Rock Balance Sheet (simplified)    188 
Figure 5.5(a):   Performance Space when State of Common Fundamental is  Good 192 
Figure 5.5(b):   Negative Contagion dominates Negative Correlation    192 
Figure 5.5(c):   Positive Contagion dominates Positive Correlation   193 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
Figure 7.1:   Parametric Restrictions       217 
Figure 7.2:   Consumption Profile under Second-Best Allocation    222 
Figure 7.3:   Proportion of (foreign) depositors who receive full contractual payments under 
Sequential Service Constraint      227 
Figure 7.4:   Payment Structure        231 
Figure 7.5:   Parametric Restrictions for LOLR to result in contagious flow  237 
Figure 7.6:   Parametric Restrictions for LOLR to result in contagious flow  238 
Figure 7.7:   Intertemporal Substitution of Banking Crisis    240 
Figure 7.8:   Transmission Mechanism from Banking Crisis to Currency Crisis  241 
Figure 7.9:   Term Structure of Payment to Depositors (case A)    243 
Figure 7.10: Term Structure of Payment to Depositors (case B)    244 
 
 
Chapter 8 
 
 
Figure 8.1:   The Shadow Exchange Rate Concept     261 
Figure 8.2:   Optimal Consumption Profile under Second-Best Plan   261 
Figure 8.3:    Proportion of early withdrawals as a function of exchange rate  262 
Figure 8.4:    Performance Space when Interim Information is about Idiosyncratic      
Fundamentals Only       264 
Figure 8.5:    Performance Space when Interim Information is about Shadow   
Exchange Rate Only       265 
Figure 8.6:   Transmission Mechanism from Banking to Currency Crisis   268 
Figure 8.7:    Performance Space in the Presence of Stochastic Idiosyncratic   
Fundamentals and Stochastic Exchange Rate    268 
Figure 8.8:    Performance Space  - Graphical Representation of Contagion from  Foreign 
Exchange Sector to Banking Sector     269 
Figure 8.9:    Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes     274 
Figure 8.10:  Simplified Mundell-Fleming Model     275 
Figure 8.11:  Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes (i)     279 
Figure 8.12:  Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes (ii)     289 
     
     
 Chapter 9 
 
Figure 9.1:     A Quick Analytical Afterthought about Implementing Our Paradigm of Chapters 
3, 4 and 5 in Practice       312 
 
 ix 
 
 
Summary of Technical Appendix  
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Proof of Remark 3.1         329 
Proof of Remark 3.2           329 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.1         330 
Proof of Proposition 4.2(a)        332 
Proof of Proposition 4.3         335 
Proof of Proposition 4.4         336 
Proof of Proposition 4.5         337 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Proof of Property 5.3         175 
Proof of Property 5.4         176 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
Proof of Claim 7.1         343 
Proof of Claim 7.2         343 
Proof of Lemma 7.1         345 
Proof of Lemma 7.2         347 
Proof of Proposition 7.1         347 
Proof of Corollary 7.4         348 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
 
 
Declaration 
 
 
 
 
This thesis entitled: “Essays on Financial Systems, Banking Crises and Emerging Markets” has 
grown out of a series of papers written over my PhD years at the University of Warwick, U.K. 
 
I am submitting this PhD Thesis according to the rules and regulations regarding doctoral work 
submission at the University of Warwick, U.K.  I certify that the papers produced in each section, 
are mine and are the result of my own research work. Where necessary, I have included proper 
referencing when making quotes from other work, published or otherwise.  
 
 
A „Library Declaration Form‟ and a Form regarding „Submission of Doctoral Thesis at the 
University of Warwick‟ are attached.  I certify that this Thesis has not been submitted for a degree at 
any other University. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Signed:   Ashwin Moheeput  (Revised version submitted in  October 2009) 
 
 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xi 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
I am very immensely grateful to Professor Marcus Miller and to Professor Sayantan Ghosal for 
providing highly spirited guidance and unwavering support during my PhD and for exercising their 
supervisory role with professional panache. Marcus has taken great strides in ensuring that I am well 
supported, financially or otherwise, and in ensuring that I am successful in any endeavours I have set my 
mind upon. He has also shown great patience and resilience in raising challenging issues related to my 
doctoral work in our discussions and has always raised the level of academic issues littering my doctoral 
pathway -- so that I may develop the temerity and astuteness required of an all-rounder scholarly 
maverick. 
     
 
 I also gratefully acknowledge financial support, in the form of a Warwick Postgraduate Research 
Fellowship (WPRF) and an Overseas Research Scholarship (ORS) award for the first three years of my 
PhD tenure. I am indebted to the Department of Economics at Warwick University for the former 
(especially Norman Ireland, Nathan Morris and Marcus Miller) and to Universities UK for the latter. I 
pay gratitude to the former Head of the Department of Economics at Warwick University, Professor 
Mark Harrison, for awarding to me a Teaching Fellowship position in the last two years of my doctorate. 
This PhD research work would not have materialised without the providential financial help of the 
aforementioned sources. I am also grateful to the Department of Accounting and Finance at the London 
School of Economics (LSE) for having given me generous hospitality, in the form of a Visiting Research 
Scholar position, in Lent Term 2006. I have greatly benefited from discussions of my research papers 
with Amil Dasgupta and Satoshi Kawanishi. 
     
 
 I pay customary obeisance to the Bank of England for the PhD internship position I undertook in the 
Financial Stability Area, Market Infrastructure Division, in Summer 2005. I have benefited from working 
with Victoria Saporta, Misa Tanaka, Gregor Irwin in a project involving financial stability and systemic 
risks. The key insights I received on the literature of systemic risks, are unrivalled. I would also thank the 
National Economic Research Associates (NERA) Economic Consulting, London, for the PhD internship 
position in the Competition Policy Division in Summer 2006. My purpose for working at NERA was to 
understand competition and regulatory issues so that I may benefit from understanding how these 
economic issues apply to banking and financial systems. My special thanks go to Mark Williams and 
Barbara Veronese for recognising my scholarly aptitudes and for being sensitive to my needs in this 
realm.   
 
Over the years, I have had many opportunities to present my work in seminars and conferences and have 
availed of the comments of many leading economists. In particular, I thank Daniel Seidmann, of the 
University of Nottingham, for discussing my work on financial contagion to an audience congregated for 
the Leverhulme Centre for Globalisation and Economic Policy (GEP) conference in 2005. At the same 
token, I pay tribute to participants at various Economic Theory workshops organised at the University of 
Warwick (2004, 2005, 2006) and at the Bank of England (January 2007) and at the Bank of Canada 
(January 2008) for their challenging comments on my presentation. 
     
 
No acknowledgement would be complete without mention of family (and divine) support. Finally, I have 
in mind my wife, my best friend at University, all my personified objects of entertainment, as well as a 
figure of the Indian Cinema industry, whom I hail as an inspirational role model for me and whose 
career achievements have rekindled in me, the thought and belief that, with ritualised dedication and 
passion to anything held dearly at heart, any form of hard work will eventually be recognised by the 
general public. 
     
 xii 
                                  
                      Abstract (Non-Technical) 
 
 
 
This thesis is divided into eight main chapters and makes contributions to the area of financial crises and 
international finance. The first chapter provides a general introduction to the thesis and highlights the 
main contributions of our work. The second chapter is a literature review which provides a well-defined 
structure to organise our thoughts about the literature on micro-systemic risks and Central Bank policy. 
The chapter initially reviews the literature for single-bank crises. It then proceeds on to provide a 
succinct account of multiple-bank crises and of financial crises that result from the interaction between 
banks and financial markets. The main value-added of this chapter is that it helps us identify those areas 
in the literature in which research work is missing. This provides legitimate foundation for building new 
models to address these issues. The subsequent chapters of this thesis have emerged to bridge these 
missing gaps identified in our literature review.  
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 deal with banking panic transmission in two-bank scenario. With common 
investments affected by the same macroeconomic fundamental, a crisis that spreads from one bank to 
another has contagious and correlated elements. The purpose of these chapters is to provide a robust 
theoretical account that can enable us distinguish between these two elements in probability terms. We 
embed a two-bank model within a dynamic Bayesian setting and use the global games approach to derive 
the existence of trigger equilibrium in each bank. Chapter 3 provides an overview of our banking 
environment. Chapter 4 makes a contribution to derivation of the equilibrium concept and shows the 
equivalence between Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of our game and trigger equilibrium. Chapter 
5 encapsulates all results. We show the existence of contagion as one of `excess correlation' between 
banks. This allows us to depart from existing theoretical papers which explain contagion as 
interdependence. Furthermore, we show that whether contagion or correlation occurs is a function of the 
relative importance depositors attach to private vs public signals. The chapter ends by identifying some 
puzzles (zero-link, clustering and avoidance) which our paradigm can explain and throws light on ways 
(which are not captured by single-bank models) Central Banks should implement prudential policy 
measures.  
 
Chapters 6, 7 and  8 deal with financial crises in open economies. An important limit of existing bank 
run models is that they are developed without taking into account the level of economic development of 
the economy in which they occur. We are interested in studying how financial crises occur in an 
Emerging Market Economy (EME) and, most importantly, how the nature of their occurrence differs 
when the exogenous macroeconomic constraints of an EME are duly accounted for. Chapter 6 
introduces the main banking environment we study in the subsequent two chapters. Important among the 
assumptions are that all depositors in the banking system are foreign investors (the economy is fully 
liberalised) and that banks have balance sheets characterised by liability dollarisation. We use the 
mechanism design approach to show the existence of a pecking order in allocation of resources and 
liquidity. In particular, we show that a banking allocation is weakly Pareto- inferior to that of a Planner 
who observes all structures of the economy but its stochastic fundamentals and who achieves second-best 
allocation.  Once this banking allocation is derived, Chapter 7 studies the nature of the transmission 
mechanism from a banking crisis to a currency crisis. We show that under certain parametric restrictions, 
Lender-of-Last Resort (LOLR) policies may be a conduit that generates a currency crisis. In a multi-bank 
setting, LOLR may even be sub-optimal since it may induce devaluation-based bank runs at other banks. 
Chapter 8 studies the reverse causation from a currency crisis to a banking crisis. Both chapters 7 and 8 
offer useful guidance to policy. The success of a policy measure depends on its ability to restore the 
Planner's second-best. A number of policy options (e.g state-contingent controls) are studied and 
suggestions for design of exchange rate regimes, based on ability to ward off the twin crises, are offered 
as well. 
     
 
 
Chapter 1
Introduction To Thesis
1.1 Comprehensive Overview of Our Approach
and Contributions: What is New ?
The purpose of this thesis is to study the following two key questions in the
areas of banking crises and international nance:
FIRST QUESTION How can we develop a model that can endogenously
distinguish between banking contagion and correlation in probability terms, given
that they co-exist in a given banking panic transmission with two banks that have
correlated investments?
SECOND QUESTION - How can we embed a model of banking crisis
within an Emerging Market Economy (EME) framework in a way that enables
us to carry out a theoretical analysis of the transmission mechanism between a
banking crisis and a currency crisis ?
We arrive at these two questions after a comprehensive review of the relevant
literature (chapter 2) which helps us identify key loopholes in the existing
literature. The models we develop in the subsequent chapters of this thesis have
been constructed to provide satisfactory answers to these two questions, so as to
address these gaps in the existing literature. For the rst question, our objective
is to construct a theoretical model that:
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO THESIS 2
[1] develops a new methodological approach to analysing contagion;
[2] o¤ers a new interpretation for the concept of nancial contagion;
[3] clearly distinguishes between contagion and correlation in equilibrium;
[4] explains contagion from micro-foundations of informational interplay;
[5] satises a number of stylized facts of empirical contagion;
[6] o¤ers new insights on policy-making.
The paradigm we develop to answer the rst question is enshrined in chap-
ters 3, 4 and 5. The new banking environment is developed rst in chapter
3 by embedding a two-bank Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework within
a dynamic Bayesian setting. We allow the interplay between private signals of
depositors and an endogenously determined public signal to explain crisis trans-
mission across banks. The banking environment is designed so to allow for the
application of the global games approach. An innovative element of our work
is the development of a new methodological structure for our banking environ-
ment, which we do in chapter 4. Since the dynamic Bayesian setting requires
the development of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) and the global games
methodology warrants the development of a trigger equilibrium, a key issue that
we study is the link between the PBE concept and the trigger equilibrium. We
are interested in showing whether a trigger equilibrium can be replicated as a
PBE. This provides the cornerstone of our methodological structure for the rst
question. Building on this novelty, we study the main results of our ndings for
the rst question in chapter 5. More details about the rst question will follow
at a later stage in this introduction. For the second question, our objective is
to construct a model that:
[1] provides an interpretation of how the operation of the banking system
will be a¤ected by the exogenous macroeconomic constraints imposed by an
EME;
[2] o¤ers a welfare-theoretic interpretation of banking crises;
[3] provides a theoretical analysis of the circumstances under which a bank-
ing crisis will lead to a currency crisis;
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[4] o¤ers new insights on nature of policy interventions for banking crises in
an EME;
[5] provides an analysis of the circumstances under which a currency crisis
will lead to a banking crisis;
[6] contributes to the debate about choice of exchange rate regime based on
fragility of nancial systems.
While the aforementioned objectives for the second question are self-explaining,
it is important to note that the main banking environment is developed in chap-
ter 6. The key idea is to embed a one-bank Allen and Gale (1998) setup within
a Chang and Velasco (2000a) environment and to use the mechanism design ap-
proach to study the optimality of resource (and liquidity) allocation for agents
(Central Bank, commercial bank and forex market) in the nancial system.
Building on this innovative framework, chapter 7 studies the link from a bank-
ing crisis to a currency crisis. The mechanism design methodology for addressing
that particular link is developed and results discussed. In chapter 8, we use
our banking environment to study the reverse causation link. The methodology
for studying that link is developed and other results are also discussed in that
chapter. More details about the second question will also follow at a later stage
in this introduction.
At this stage, we are interested in providing the reader with an overview of
our aims, objectives, approach, methodology and brief overview of our results.
Please turn over for an illustration of Figure 1.1 which provides a skeletal outline
of all chapters in this thesis, classied according to environment, methodology
and results. In the material that follows Figure 1.1, we shall provide a compre-
hensive review of all chapters in this thesis by putting emphasis on the novelty
of our work and by contrasting between our ndings and those of the existing
literature where necessary.
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We now intend to provide a detailed overview of our exact contributions to
the literature in each chapter and to provide a comprehensive discussion of how
our approach (including environment, methodology and results) improves on
that of existing models.
The occurrence of a major nancial crisis every decade, makes the study
of nancial systems and of banking failures, a fascinating topic. Each nan-
cial turmoil episode that had plagued industrialised and emerging markets alike
since 1970s, had confronted policymakers and academics with a new set of chal-
lenges. This thesis - the research work contained therein began in 2004 - was
written with the East Asian crisis of the mid 1990s in mind. But at the time of
writing up, a major nancial disaster originating from the default of subprime
mortgages in the US in 2007-2008, had begun to send shockwaves throughout
the banking systems of the major nancial centres of the world and had threat-
ened to plunge the world economy into a depression similar to that witnessed in
1930s. In academic circles, the conventional macroeconomic paradigm was being
challenged and new calls were being made for the development of a new frame-
work, deeply rooted in microfoundations of nancial markets and of nancial
intermediation, to o¤er better explanations for the occurrence of such events.
The work contained in this thesis may help provide some useful contributions
and illuminating guidance in that respect.
We have taxonomised our research thesis to reect our broad interests in
areas of banking and international nance, as diverse as nancial contagion and
fragility of banking systems in emerging markets. All papers are highly theoret-
ical and most of the economic models developed therein, have been constructed
to reect some empirical facts in the literature. However, by keeping the struc-
ture of a model architecture within connes of established stylized facts, we
hope that we have raised key issues that may help stimulate the thinking of
academics who will have the wherewithal to take the material to the forefront
of exciting new research. We also trust that our ndings may help cast light
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on policy issues that may be pertinent to leading institutions such as Central
Banks or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and help practitioners better
understand why events unfold the way they do. Chapter 9 which will conclude
the thesis, will summarise all contributions that we make to economic knowl-
edge and a contrast will be made with the existing literature so as to provide
clear guidance to the reader about the novelty of our work.
We begin our research work with a comprehensive literature review which
provides a novel approach to organise the existing literature. This enables us
perform a SWOT-type analysis1 of the literature and to identify key unanswered
questions in those areas in which research work is missing. As a result, the lit-
erature embodied in chapter 2 provides a valuable springboard for developing
subsequent chapters of this thesis. Our aim here is to identify a taxonomy that
will enable us organise our thoughts about the literature on nancial instabil-
ity and banking crises. The theoretical and empirical literature on banking
crises are rife with examples and illustrations of crises. While existing work
in the literature takes di¤erent approaches, there is no well-dened way to or-
ganise our thinking about these approaches. Most single-bank papers focus
on mutually-exclusive issues such coordination failure problems (Diamond and
Dybvig (1983)), others focus on market failures, on informational asymmetries
(Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Allen and Gale (1998)) and on the contrac-
tual system of demand-deposit systems inherent in banking models (Jacklin
(1987), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Peck and Shell (2003), Green and Lin
(2003)). Others try to juxtapose coordination failure with informational prob-
lems (Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)). The literature for multi-bank models has
been developed on a completely di¤erent pedestral since that literature focuses
only on the nature of the transmission conduit linking banks. Eminent papers
in that area include Allen and Gale (2000), Dasgupta (2004) and Chen (1999).
The analysis o¤ered by chapter 2 is innovative in that it endeavours to
harness the rich literature on single-bank and multi-bank crises and to tax-
1SWOT - Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats.
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onomise it according to some well-dened structure. We motivate the rationale
for chapter 2 by identifying a crisis from an anatomical perspective: a crisis
has an initiator and a propagator. We begin with the literature on initiators by
reviewing the single-bank scenario cases and focus on the various contributions
that have been made in this area since the seminal work of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983). The literature of the one-bank case can be bifurcated into ine¢ cient
bank run theories (contributions that highlight the existence of runs as emanat-
ing from coordination failure problems generated by sunspots) and e¢ cient
bank run models (models that highlight bank run problems as being generated
from informational asymmetry problems about, say, the banks fundamentals).
What triggers a banking crisis is unpredictable in the former case (bank runs are
a cause of banking failures) but may be predictable in the latter case (bank runs
are a result of imminent banking failures) depending on how the informational
process is generated. Shin (2009) argues that the most recent banking crisis to
have hit the UK economy, the Northern Rock crisis of 2007-2008, is of the latter
type. We move on to analyse the propagation side of our proposed structure.
Here, we are essentially concerned with the literature of banking crises and sys-
temic risks. We propose two ways of organising our thoughts about systemic
risks.
The rst approach is to survey the literature of contributions that highlight
multiple bank runs but no nancial markets. Here, we identify several sources
of connections across banks:
[1] (Network models of nancial contagion) Banks may engage in direct
balance sheet connections in that they may cross-insure deposits as insurance
against negatively correlated liquidity shocks (Allen and Gale (2000), Dasguta
(2004)) or may engage in interbank lending (Rochet and Tirole (1996)) - mean-
ing that banks hold interbank claims on each other. These models rely on simple
networks2 of banks that have symmetric or asymmetric exposure to each others
2The choice of network structure is exogenous in these models.
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claims. In a more recent contribution, Gai and Kapadia (2008) try to provide an
understanding as to how nancial intermediaries connect as networks by apply-
ing statistical techniques from network theory, to arrive at a more general model
of contagion with complex nancial systems. Since balance sheet connectivity
may be further complicated by interractions between nancial intermediaries
and nancial markets and by the development of new nancial products such as
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) or Credit Default Swaps (CDSs), Gai
and Kapadia (2008) try to study the relationship between nancial connectivity
and contagion, by providing a network structure that can isolate idiosyncratic
shocks from aggregate shocks in a given systemic risk.
[2] (Informational channel of nancial contagion) The informational chan-
nel provides another conduit that connects banks. A crisis in one bank may
cause a condence crisis among depositors of other banks and cause them to
reassess their beliefs of their banks fundamentals. As a result, a crisis erupts
with systemic proportions (Chen (1999), Archarya and Yorulmazer (2008)).
[3] (Commonality of investors or in holders of claims and obligations) Here,
banks may have common investors. A crisis in one bank prompts investors to
reassess their portfolio and a¤ect their risk-taking appetite. This may mean
investors withdrawing from other banks (Vaugirard (2004), (2005)).
[4] (Commonality in investment or homogeneity in the structure of balance
sheets ) This channel of connectivity across banks originates from the asset
side. Balance sheet commonality may also be classied under this channel.
Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin (2005) argue that the e¤ect of default in banks,
may trigger a series of defaults in other banks that are forced to write down
the value of their assets. A decline in the value of these assets may a¤ect the
balance sheet of otherwise healthy banks as well. As a result, contagion on
the claims or obligation side of their balance sheet (due to depositors running
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on their banks) is reinforced by contagion from the asset side. An illustration
of this phenomenon comes from industrialised economies in which banks have
common exposure to real estate. A collapse in house prices generally a¤ects
banks that have commonly invested in the housing sector. The nancial crisis
of 2007-2008 in the developed countries can be used as an example to showcase
the importance of this channel, although the presence of other complex factors in
the recent turmoil, dwarf this channel as possible explanation. In the developing
world, an example of homogeneity in the balance sheet structure comes from the
fact that banks may engage in liability dollarization i.e they have a balance sheet
structure with assets denominated in home currency and liabilities denominated
in dollars. A currency devaluation here a¤ects all banks in a similar way.
The second approach to modelling systemic risks is to consider the interac-
tion between banks and nancial markets. A notable tendency in the literature
is to consider banking systems with homogenous banks or with heterogenous
banks. Homogenous banks may use nancial markets to trade their illiquid
assets, to issue claims against the illiquid asset (securitization) and to act as
a contingency providing insurance against aggregate risks that they face. We
identify the main sources of market failure that may prevent full provision of
liquidity by nancial markets to banks e.g incomplete information setup and
market structure factors like abuse of dominance and monopoly. Heterogenous
banks may use the interbank market for the same purposes as highlighted for
nancial markets. However, the sources of market failure in the interbank mar-
ket di¤er. The literature on interbank markets as a mechanism of providing
liquidity to banks suggests that the interbank market fails with the presence
of positively correlated shocks across banks. Similarly, Goodhart and Huang
(2005) and Rochet and Vives (2004) argue that it cannot be relied upon as
a source of liquidity provision if there are coordination failure problems and
free riding in liquidity provision. An important result in the existing literature,
is to identify the conditions under which (nancial) market failures may lead
to ine¢ cient liquidity allocation to banks and to explore the circumstances in
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which this may be welfare reducing. Using conditions akin to the First and Sec-
ond Theorems of Welfare Economics, Allen and Gale (2004) show that, while
demand deposit contracts o¤ered by banks are incomplete contracts (and thus
non-contingent), the interaction between banks and nancial markets leads to
ine¢ cient allocation of resources and liquidity if the nancial market is incom-
plete. In the presence of a complete nancial market but incomplete demand
deposit contracts, the allocation becomes only constrained e¢ cient. The contri-
bution by Allen and Gale (2004) is important since it provides a welfare theo-
retic measure that can be used to assess the welfare properties of any prescribed
policy measure.
In a nutshell, apart from providing a comprehensive review of the literature,
the main contribution of chapter 2 is to form a taxonomy that enables us to
situate the contribution of relevant papers in the literature within a well-dened
context. The useful benet of having a well-dened taxonomy is that it provides
a SWOT-type analysis of the context within which existing work has been done.
This puts us in a pole position to identify those key areas in which theoretical
work is missing and which could potentially be areas for future research work.
All subsequent chapters that embody the essence of the main contributions
of this thesis to economic knowledge, have, in fact, been written to provide
answers to some of the missing areas we identied in chapter 2. In the main
parts of the thesis, we provide a detailed account of the questions we are trying
to answer, the main scientic approaches adopted as economic methodology and
a thorough discussion of our innovative results. Where necessary, we provide
a contrast between our contributions and those of the existing literature by
highlighting on some of the weaknesses of existing models and by documenting
how our paradigm succeeds in addressing these frailties. It must be stressed
out that, while all subsequent chapters after chapter 2 deal with bank run
models, the nature of the bank run is di¤erent. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 deal with
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) type of banks. The nature of coordination failure
and multiple equilibria are highlighted in each bank but we embed the global
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games approach of Morris and Shin (1998) in this banking environment in order
to get rid of equilibria multiplicity. The three chapters following chapter 5
deal with bank runs of the Allen and Gale (1998) type and are not plagued
by coordination failure problems. They contain an information device that
coordinates the decisions of depositors and that makes any decision (i.e either
to stay or withdraw) a dominant strategy.
In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 , the complex issues of multiple banks, informa-
tional spillovers and nancial contagion and correlation, are addressed. In an
economic environment in which banks are preceived to be commonly connected
to some risky technology, a given banking panic transmission has contagious
and correlated elements. Both concepts are inextricably linked and the liter-
ature lacks a theoretical model that can help distinguish between them. In
chapters 3, 4 and 5, we are interested in building a microfounded model that
enables us distinguish between these two elements in probability terms. We
proceed by adapting a dynamic Bayesian setting to a two-bank environment,
with banks having risky investments that are perceived to be connected to some
common macroeconomic fundamental. Depositors of either bank are assumed
to observe their banks idiosyncratic fundamental through some noisy signal
technology but those who move at a later stage, have the added advantage of
observing the event in the rst bank. They may thus strategically use the event
in the rst bank to make stochastic inferences about the state of the common
macroeconomic fundamental. The informational spillover that results from this
strategic inference, provides the conduit that transmits a crisis from one bank
to the other and that fundamentally alters the dynamics of the outcome of the
game.
Chapter 3 introduces the main theoretical paradigm and develops the en-
vironment in which banks operate. We have two Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
banks and no nancial markets. The banks have common investment in a risky
portfolio and the risky portfolio is a¤ected by some macroeconomic fundamental.
Banks are modelled essentially as deposit-taking institutions and the concept
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of a banking crisis is analysed mainly from the point of depositors withdraw-
ing their deposits from their banks prematurely. The novelty of chapter 3,
compared to existing work in the literature, is to juxtapose the Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) framework with the global games methodology, as a way of elim-
inating coordination failure problems. Morris and Shin (2000) study the global
games approach within a one-bank context but their contribution was merely
meant to analyse the circumstances under which multiple equilibria or a unique
equilibrium will result.
Our approach di¤ers from Morris and Shin (2000) in several ways. Unlike
Morris and Shin (2000) who focus on partial strategic complementarities in pay-
o¤ structure, we introduce global supermodularities or strategic complementar-
ities in depositorspayo¤ structure. Since we intend to study the global games
approach as a means to an end rather than as an end in itself, this enables us
to rationalise the global games approach in a context with more intricate payo¤
structure (such as ours), without being bogged down by the extra theoretical
considerations developed by Athey (2000)3 . At the same time, we allow depos-
itors to receive a noisy information of their banks risky fundamental and to
have some prior belief of the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental.
For the banksinvestment portfolio, we also develop the dominance regionas
a function of risky investment parameters - which is vital for the global games
approach to work in our setup. While the development of the concept of dom-
inance regionis common in global games analysis, a novel element in our work
is to distinguish between weak and strict dominance regions. The former
depicts a case where a dominant strategy exists in depositorsactions, depend-
ing on the realisation of the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental.
The latter describes a case where this dominance arises, irrespective of the state
3Athey (2000) identied two conditions that must be satised for the global games approach
to work in the absence of global supermodularities in the payo¤ structure: [1] Single-Crossing
Property in payo¤ structure and [2]Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property in the noisy element
of the signal.
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of the common fundamental. The distinction is important when we show the
existence of a trigger equilibrium. Furthermore, in Morris and Shin (2000), the
noisy information concerns the deposit payo¤s whereas in our case, it concerns
realisations of the risky investment.
The most important di¤erence between our method and that of other global
games models that study banking, is that we introduce a sequential structure
in depositorswithdrawing decisions and we allow for strategic interactions be-
tween depositors of di¤erent banks. We assume that, in the interim period,
depositors of one bank rst take their decision as to whether to stay or with-
draw. The event in that bank becomes public knowledge (the bank either fails
or succeeds). Then, depositors of the other bank move to take their decision.
Depositors of the second bank thus observe the public information regarding
the event about the rst bank as well as their own private information about
their own bank. They may thus strategically use the public signal about the
event in the rst bank to complement their private signals. In Morris and Shin
(2000), there is one bank only. Thus, strategic interractions between depositors
of di¤erent banks are absent. Dasgupta (2004) also studies two banks but there
are no strategic interractions between depositors of the two banks. Thus, the
development of the equilibrium concept in Dasgupta (2004) is undertaken, as-
suming only one bank. Chen (1999) studies multiple banks but does not use
the global games approach.
Our banking environment is rich and departs radically from other papers in
the literature. The common exposure of banks to the macroeconomic funda-
mental is new and creates strategic inferences for depositors of the second-mover
bank. The sequential approach that we adopt, puts us in a strong position to
analyse the dynamics between private information ows and public information
ows, as a way of triggering banking crisis transmission. In chapter 4, we
aim to characterise the equilibrium properties of depositorswithdrawing game,
given the banking environment we develop in chapter 3.
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The main contribution of chapter 4 is to rationalise the adoption of the
global games methodology to our set-up and to show the existing of trigger
equilibria in depositors strategies. Doing so, enables us to eliminate several
uncertainties in subsequent analysis. One of the key problems in the existing
literature, with multiple equilibria embedded in bank run models, is that the
outcome of the game is unpredictable. An important problem with equilibria
multiplicity in a model with several banks, is that it becomes very di¢ cult
to pin down the exact cause-e¤ect relationship. If the outcome at one bank
is uncertain, how can we realistically make predictions about how a banking
crisis will spread from one bank to another? Thus, the main motivation and
innovation of chapter 4, consist of nding a solution to that conundrum. The
global games approach that we use for that sake, has its advantages. In addition
to removing multiple equilibria (and thus unpredictability), it endogenises the
probability of a given outcome. This feature will prove crucial when we discuss
the merits and innovations of chapter 5.
While the global games methodology has been used in several areas of ap-
plied nance and has embraced static games of incomplete information (Morris
and Shin (1998), (2000), Dasgupta (2004)4 , Vaugirard (2004), (2005)), adopting
the approach to a dynamic setting with strategic interractions between cohorts
of agents moving at di¤erent points of time, is somewhat trickier. The theoreti-
cal literature in the area of dynamic global games is still at embryonic stage and
has, so far, only studied the circumstances under which multiple equilibria will
result (as opposed to unique equilibrium), by incorporating learning mechanisms
within sequential move games with incomplete information. Notable contribu-
tions to this literature come from Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006), (2007).
Rather than studying the nature of equilibrium with a stylized approach, the
theoretical contribution embodied in chapter 4, studies a di¤erent question
4Again, Dasgupta (2004) studies two banks but there is no strategic interraction between
depositors of these two banks. Hence, the equilibrium concept is derived, as if there is only
one bank.
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which has, hitherto, not been addressed in the literature of banking and of dy-
namic global games: the connection between the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE) concept and global games approach. The innovative contribution of this
chapter is manifold: we use the global games approach to pin down the exis-
tence of a trigger equilibrium in each banks idiosyncratic fundamental space.
Most importantly, we are able to establish a connection between the Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) concept - which provides the solution concept for
a dynamic Bayesian setup - and the trigger equilibrium. This result allows us fo-
cus on trigger equilibrium throughout and has the added advantage of enabling
us endogenise the probability of events in each bank.
We start chapter 4 by characterising the equilibrium strategy of each depos-
itor in terms of trigger strategies. This chapter provides the main methodolog-
ical treatment for solving the equilibrium in the paradigm we consider for the
rst question. For depositors of the rst bank, their information set is their pri-
vate information about their own banks fundamentals and a prior belief about
the common macroeconomic fundamental. For those of the second mover bank,
their information set is their private information and a posterior belief about
the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental. The posterior belief is
created essentially by Bayesian mechanics. We then move on to analyse the
equilibrium properties of the game. Due to its sequential nature and incom-
plete information, we characterise the PBE of the game. As aforementioned,
our approach is complicated in that we have a cohort of depositors taking their
decisions simultaneously. In this respect, a legitimate contribution of chapter
4 (which is completely new to the existing literature) is that it shows that the
PBE of depositorsgame across the two banks, can be represented as a trigger
equilibrium in each bank. Our approach di¤ers from Angeletos, Hellwig and Pa-
van (2006), (2007), in that they focus on deriving the conditions for multiplicity
of equilibria in a dynamic game setting with the private and public information
being on the same random evolutionary variable. By contrast, in our work,
the private signals are on di¤erent variables (idiosyncratic fundamentals of each
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bank for each group of depositors) and the public signal is on an endogenous
event rather than on some fundamental. Our approach has an appealing feature
in that it enables us to parcel out the performance space of each bank and to
characterise in probability terms, the event taking place in each bank.
Building on this exciting and innovating result, chapter 5 takes the reader
to appreciate the qualities and contributions of our paradigm on di¤erent fronts.
The intuition behind banking panic transmission becomes clear. When a bank
has failed and the event becomes public news, depositors of the other bank will
strategically use that event to infer about the state of the common macroeco-
nomic fundamental. That inference is what creates informational spillovers in
our model. While these depositors will base their decisions on their private in-
formation as well, they observe the public event in the rst bank (say, a bank
failure), make strategic inferences about the state of the common fundamental
(from Bayesian mechanics, their posterior estimate is that the common macro-
economic fundamental is more likely to be in its bad state) and the interplay
between their private information and the public information will bias their de-
cision towards staying or withdrawing. If they stay, it means that their private
information was strong enough to o¤set the impact of the public news of the rst
banks failure on their inference. If they withdraw, there are two possibilities:
either their private signal was low as well and was thus complemented by the
public news of the failure of the rst bank; or their private signal was strong
but was more than o¤set by the impact of the public news. This interaction
between private signals and public information, as a way of transmitting a crisis
across banks, is a fundamental novelty of our approach - and has, hitherto, not
been discussed in any dynamic models of banking contagion. Hellwig (2002)
derives the parametric restrictions that lead to uniqueness as opposed to mul-
tiple equilibria in a static game of incomplete information, as a function of the
interplay between private and public signals. Our result may thus be viewed as
a dynamic adaptation of the Hellwig (2002) approach, to a multi-bank world.
Thanks to the global games methodology, we get the new insightful result of
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being able to distinguish between nancial contagion and nancial correlation as
equilibrium phenomena and to make each of these two events, a distinct result
of the interplay between private signals and public signals.
We are in a position to bifurcate a given banking panic transmission event
into two events which are inseparable from each other: nancial contagion and
nancial correlation. We present contagion as an event in which the failure of
one bank causes the failure of the other, when no such failure would have occured
to the other bank otherwise. In the performance space highlighting the event in
each bank, we are capable of distinguishing between contagion and correlation
in probability terms and of showing contagion as an event in which the second
bank fails (or succeeds) if and only if the rst bank fails (or succeeds). In so-
doing, we arrive at three sub-conclusions about our results, which constitute the
essence of the contributions we make to the literature:
[1] In the event space of each bank, we come with the conceptually innov-
ative result of being able to distinguish between contagion and correlation, by
showing contagion as a case of excessive correlation in some states of the world.
This idea departs radically from the existing literature which explains contagion
from the narrower perspective of interdependence. If nancial contagion exists,
then it is essentially represented as a case of excess correlationbetween banks.
Our work constitutes the rst theoretical attempt to model banking contagion
as excess correlation . The main papers in the existing literature (e.g Allen
and Gale (2000), Dasgupta (2004), Chen (1999)) describe contagion mainly from
the vantage point of interdependence: In an empirical work on contagion in -
nancial markets, Pesaran and Pick (2007) explain why constructing models of
nancial contagion based on this narrow version of interdependence, may not
lead to empirically plausible results. In the main text, we highlight why such
an approach is implausible and why, in our opinion, our concept of contagion
as a state-dependent case of excess correlationis more robust. Our contribu-
tion may thus be viewed as a theoretical vindication of the empirical results of
Pesaran and Pick (2007);
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[2] A theoretically appealing feature of our setup is that we are capable of
explaining contagion vs correlation as a function of the relative importance de-
positors attach to private vs public information. For instance, we show that
contagion is always characterised by public informational dominance in deposi-
torsinformation set. In a given banking panic transmission across banks, which
outcome is going to prevail is dependent on the relative importance of private
information to public information for depositors of the second bank. We show
that, if the public information is relatively more important in depositorsinfor-
mation set, a given banking panic transmission is characterised as contagion.
We pioneer the concept of Public Informational Dominance to explain this. Al-
though similar in insight to the herding result of Banerjee (1992), contagion is
not herding in our model because there is no loss of information aggregation in
our setup and depositors do not ignore their private information at any point.
In the performance space, we distinguish between contagion and correlation in
probability terms. Any event in which banking panic transmission is avoided,
is one characterised by Private Informational Dominance i.e depositors of the
second bank give relatively more importance to their private signals than to the
public news and the private signals about their banks fundamentals, are strong.
[3] Our results are new in that we can distinguish between positive and
negative contagion and between positive and negative correlation. We can show
that, with the same mechanism used for Bayesian inference, contagion cannot
just be viewed as a case of bank failures but may also be viewed from the vantage
point of bank successes. The analysis for successes across banks is based on the
same mechanics as for bank failures.
Chapter 5 ends by showing the contribution of our paradigm to the world
of policy-making. On the empirical side, our setup is appealing in that we are
able of simultaneously explaining three important puzzles (zero-link, clustering,
avoidance puzzles) in the literature of banking contagion. We rst document
the empirical validity of our model construction by showing that our setup sat-
isfactorily explains all these puzzles in the literature of nancial contagion (
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that existing bank run models cannot explain). We show that our approach
can explain why banking crises may spread among banks that are completely
unrelated (zero-link puzzle), why they may cluster among identical banks only
(clustering puzzle) and why some identical banks may avoid the crisis trans-
mission whereas others cannot (avoidance puzzle). The ability to resolve key
puzzles is not only an important contribution to the literature, but also, an
indicator that our model construction framework and structure, are robust.
By distinguishing between contagion and correlation in probability terms, we
are capable of dening the dividing line between microprudential and macropru-
dential banking regulation. If a given banking panic transmission in an economy,
is characterised as correlation rather than contagion, our model advocates the
use of macroprudential regulation as policy measure. In the reverse case, our
model would advocate the use of existing microprudential measures but, given
the informational spillover channel embedded in our framework, we rationalise
the case of condence safeguards to be adopted throughout the entire banking
system of a country. An innovative feature of our paradigm - that makes it
stand out of the crowd on the policy front - is that we can capture strategic in-
terractions between di¤erent banks by allowing for sequential moves for cohorts
of depositor groups. This gives us the advantage of introducing the concept
of policy externalities i.e a microprudential policy measure administered at a
crisis-catalyst bank may have positive or negative spillover e¤ects on behaviour
of depositors in other banks. We rationalise the adoption of generalised con-
dence safeguards throughout the rest of the economy, as potential insurance
mechanism to contain these externalities.
What exactly justies the adoption of such generalised safeguard measures ?
We pioneer the concept of intertemporal banking crisis substitutionwhich may
occur when a policy action implemented at a crisis-catalyst bank is wrongly
interpreted by depositors of other banks, and leads to a crisis at these other
banks. This idea is new and o¤ers fresh insights on how Central Banks must
intervene to administer policy at a crisis-catalyst bank - in ways that are not
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captured by single-bank models. In the existing literature which focuses on
contagion from the narrower perspective of interdependence, microprudential
measures at the crisis-catalyst bank are enough to ward o¤ a crisis transmission
across banks, in that they help to preserve the balance sheet of the crisis-catalyst
bank. Thus, the conduit that links one bank to the other, prevents a crisis
from being transmitted contagiously throughout the system. In our model,
due to informational channel, a policy administered at one bank may create
informational externalities of its own on the rest of the economy. Depositors in
other banks, may give di¤erent interpretations to policy measures administered
at one bank. As such, it becomes imperative to accompany microprudential
measures by generalised condence safeguards as an economy-wide insurance
mechanism to prevent intertemporal substitution of banking crisis.
Although written with the East Asian turmoil in mind, we endeavour, where
possible, to relate the contributions of our research work to the contemporary
nancial crisis of 2007-2008. The Northern Rock crisis in the UK in 2007
is used as example in chapter 5 to illustrate how our framework (embodied
in chapters 3, 4 and 5) can be used to rationalise the occurrence of certain
events that had occurred in the current nancial turmoil. Shin (2009) explains
how the Northern Rock banking crisis of 2007-2008 in the UK o¤ers a di¤erent
perspective on the nature of bank runs, compared to that o¤ered by banking
crisis models such as Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The case of the Northern
Rock crisis of 2007 in the UK illustrates well the point that depositors in an
economy are sensitive to particular measures adopted by a Central Bank in
favour of any bank experiencing nancial trouble. We complete chapter 5
by providing a reconciliation of Shins (2009) views on the Northern Rock crisis
with the main ndings of our work. [Please refer to next couple of pages (Figures
1.2 and 1.3) for a pictorial representation of a contrast between our work and
the existing literature and for a summary of the main contributions embodied
in chapters 3, 4 and 5].
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In the chapters following chapter 5, we are interested in a rather di¤er-
ent question. Banking models in the literature have been developed without
taking into account the macroeconomic environment in which these banks are
operating. For instance, macroeconomic constraints that are adopted for some
exogenous reason, may ostensibly impinge on the ability of the banking system
to fulll its liquidity insurance role e¤ectively. The presence of these constraints
may a¤ect the occurrence of banking crises in a way that is fundamentally
di¤erent to what is normally proposed by current models that ignore these con-
straints. This augurs a di¤erent approach to policymaking for these economies,
compared to what is currently being suggested. In chapters 6, 7 and 8, we
study an open-economy version of a banking system with a number of Emerging
Market Economy (EME) macroeconomic constraints and, in particular, we in-
tend to focus on the relationship between a banking crisis and a currency crisis.
Important among the assumptions are that all depositors in the banking system
are assumed to be foreigners who are endowed with dollars (i.e foreign currency)
and that banks have balance sheets characterised by liability dollarisation (i.e
have assets denominated in home currency and liabilities denominated in dol-
lars).
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 study a fundamental question of a completely di¤er-
ent nature. In these chapters, we deal with bank run models of the Allen and
Gale (1998) type. One of the interesting facts about these bank run models is
that they are developed without taking into account the specicity of the eco-
nomic system in which the banks operate. In general, bank run models such as
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Allen and Gale
(1998), (2004), were developed to answer theoretical issues in liquidity insur-
ance provision and the optimal form of nancial contractual systems and risk
sharing. They do not make allusion to possible exogenous constraints that may
be imposed on the operation of the banking system, by macroeconomic features
of the economy. A banking crisis in a developing country has features that are
di¤erent to those occurring in a developed country. An emerging market frame-
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work, for instance, imposes certain macroeconomic features that we highlight in
chapter 6, as stylized facts of an emerging market economy. In particular, we
document that emerging market economies have nancial systems that are of-
ten characterised by soft pegs, short-term capital inows intermediated through
the banking system as deposits, banks characterised by liability dollarisation in
their balance sheets and deposit insurance systems acting as implicit guaran-
tees of depositorsinvestments. These exogenous macroeconomic features make
traditional banking models obsolete in terms of answering key issues that may
arise from nancial crises present in emerging economies.
As a result, in Chapter 6, we develop an environmental framework that is
new to the literature and that embeds an open economy version of the bank-
ing system of Allen and Gale (1998), into a framework that takes into account
the list of macroeconomic features of an emerging market. Our aim, in the
two chapters that follow, is to examine what challenges these exogenous con-
straints will present to the operation of the banking system and to study the
circumstances under which a nancial crisis will inexorably ow from one sector
(say, banking system) to another (say, foreign exchange market) and vice versa.
Our approach to modelling the economic environment is similar to Chang and
Velasco (2000a), in that the nancial system acts as a collective mechanism
designed to implement allocation of resources. The nancial system consists
of a Central Bank, commercial banks of the Allen and Gale (1998) type and a
foreign exchange market. Our modelling structure of the environment, however,
di¤ers from Chang and Velasco (2000a) in that we do not deal with multiplicity
of equilibria and about whether particular exchange rate regimes help contain
the twin crisesphenomenon. Rather, as the subsequent chapters suggest, we
are interested in the issue of causation of nancial crises from a banking sector
to foreign exchange sector and vice versa in an emerging market version of a
banking system faced with a number of exogenous macroeconomic constraints.
This idea of developing a theoretical model that addresses the issue of cau-
sation, is new and bridges the gap that exists in the existing literature, which,
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albeit extensive, has focused essentially on the empirical side of panic transmis-
sion in open economies. Chapter 6 develops an analytical structure in which
all depositors are assumed to be foreign investors. They have an endowment
of one dollar each and they invest their dollar in their banks as deposits. The
banks are responsible for honouring their debt obligations to depositors in dol-
lars, whenever payment is due. However, we assume that banks invest in assets
denominated in a local currency (denoted as pesos), say, housing sector. The
exchange rate regime is initially assumed to be a credible soft peg. This charac-
terisation leads to an extra feature for banksbalance sheets: in addition to the
standard asset-liability maturity mismatch, banks have balance sheets plagued
by asset-liability currency mismatch or liability dollarisation.
Chapter 7 takes the theoretical paradigm developed in chapter 6 to ex-
amine the nature of the transmission process from a banking crisis to a currency
crisis. As aforementioned, the Central Bank, commercial banks and the foreign
exchange market participants act a collective mechanism designed to implement
Pareto optimal allocation of resources and optimal provision of liquidity to con-
sumers. The rst part of the chapter studies the circumstances under which
e¢ cient provision of liquidity and allocation of resources, are provided by di¤er-
ent types of mechanisms. A new contribution to the literature on EME nancial
system allocation. is that, using the mechanism design approach, there is a gen-
eral pecking order in the implementation of resource allocation. In particular,
we show that a banking allocation results in a weakly Pareto-inferior allocation
to that of a Planner who is assumed to control all ows of resources across time
and states but who cannot observe the stochastic fundamentals of the economy.
When bank runs occur with positive probability, the allocation is strictly infe-
rior. When they are prevented, the resulting allocation replicates that of the
Planner in achieving the Second-Best provision of liquidity. In this state, the
banking allocation can only insure depositors against the liquidity needs but
not against aggregate risks in the economy due to the presence of stochastic
fundamentals. As a result, the banking allocation results in a state-contingent
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term structure of payments to depositors.
The rst mechanism we study, is that of the Central Bank as a social Planner
who can observe the true realisation of the risky fundamental. Using the Revela-
tion Principle, we show that by having complete information about the structure
of the economy across time and across di¤erent states, the Central Bank o¤ers a
direct incentive-compatible mechanism that achieves a First-Best solution. The
term structure of payment to depositors results in a non-contingent allocation
for depositors. In this First-Best scenario, the Central Bank o¤ers a risk-sharing
incentive compatible mechanism that o¤ers fully insurance against all liquidity
and aggregate risks in the economy. Banking crises and currency crises (hence-
forth dubbed, the twin crises) are also prevented. The second mechanism we
study is that of the Central Bank as social Planner but here we introduce the
more realistic assumption that the Central Bank is unable to observe the re-
alisations of the risky fundamental of the banking system.We show that this
mechanism can only achieve the Second-Best allocation of resources in that the
Central Bank can o¤er a mechanism that is only approximately incentive com-
patible and that can only approximately achieve risk sharing allocation. The
Central Bank can be shown to be able to hedge against liquidity risks in the
nancial system only but not against aggregate risks. This leads to a state-
contingent demand deposit payment to depositors. In the second-best scenario,
the twin crises are pre-empted as well.
We then move away from the idealist world of Central Bank as Planner and
study the allocation of resources and liquidity under a commercial banking sys-
tem o¤ering demand deposit contract. Since we are not interested in equilibria
multiplicity, we get rid of the problem by assuming that depositors receive a
perfect signal of their banksidiosyncratic risky fundamentals. As in Allen and
Gale (1998), we are able to pin down the existence of an equilibrium threshold in
the banks risky fundamental above which it is dominant for depositors to stay
and below which it is dominant to withdraw. We show that banking crisis may
occur with positive probability, depending on the realisation of the banks risky
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fundamental. When no banking crisis occurs, the banking system replicates the
allocation of the planner under the Second-Best outcome. In instances in which
a banking crisis occurs, the outcome is strictly Pareto inferior to that of the
planner under the Second-Best solution. Thus, from a mechanism design per-
spective, our contribution shows that when the probability of banking crisis is
duly accounted for, a banking system allocation is weakly Pareto inferior to that
of the Planner when the risky technology of the banking system has stochastic
returns that are not observed by agents and authorities alike.
An interesting aspect of this result is to study the consequences of banking
crises (when they occur with positive probability) and the potential spillover
e¤ects to other sectors of the economy. This is the treatise of the second part
of chapter 7. Using a welfare theoretic approach to modelling banking crises
in EMEs, has the appealing feature that it enables us to study the welfare
implications of potential policy measures designed to solve a banking crisis, as a
way of restoring the Planners Second-Best allocation of resources and liquidity.
We begin with the assumption that the exchange rate regime is a soft peg. A
bank run, in these circumstances, will occur if depositors receive bad news of
their banksassets (i.e information-driven).
In addition to modelling welfare properties of a banking allocation as op-
posed to that of a Planner through the mechanism design approach, important
contributions to the literature that we make, come from a detailed analysis of the
circumstances under which a crisis will contagiously ow from one sector (say,
banking) to another (say, foreign exchange). An important part of our work
concerns the application of Lender-of-Last-Resort (LOLR) in an EME. Our
structure enables us study the implications of Lender-of-Last-Resort (LOLR)
policies in an EME and to add some new insights over the (stylized) closed
economy results of Goodhart and Huang (2005) and Rochet and Vives (2004).
A contribution we make to the literature, is that with no interventionist policies
such as LOLR designed to bailout the crisis-catalyst bank, a crisis in the bank-
ing sector will never spread to the foreign exchange market and that the Central
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Bank will always have enough dollars to fund those running on the bank. How-
ever, with foreign exchange reserves designed for the twinned task of defending
a soft peg and of bailing out an illiquid bank, we show that a banking crisis may
result in a currency crisis under certain parametric restrictions. These paramet-
ric restrictions are documented in the main text and must be fullled in order
for a banking crisis to lead to a currency crisis. The idea is intuitive: when a
crisis occurs at a bank, LOLR measures designed to rescue it may siphon o¤ the
dollar reserves of the Central Bank. If the Central Bank runs out of reserves,
it has no option but to withdraw from the foreign exchange market and let the
currency be dictated by market forces (currency crises).
In a similar line of thought as in chapter 5, an interesting issue that we pio-
neer is the notion of intertemporal substitution of banking crisis in a multi-bank
setup with several periods. We conjecture that, if a Central Bank intervenes
with its LOLR measures at a crisis-catalyst bank (information-induced), that
intervention may drain the foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank and
may lead to a currency devaluation which, in turn, may a¤ect otherwise healthy
banks characterised by liability dollarisation in the economy. Thus, attempts
to solve an information-based bank run in an emerging market economy char-
acterised by liability dollarisation, may lead to a devaluation-induced banking
crisis in other banks in the economy. As a result, LOLR measures may have neg-
ative spillover e¤ects throughout the banking system. We do a cost-benet com-
parison of the welfare implications of intervening at a crisis-catalyst bank and
we show that, through LOLR, the costs in terms of future devaluation-induced
bank runs outweigh the benets of resolving current information-induced bank
runs. Thus, LOLR is suboptimal in emerging markets because it may create a
contagious channel of its own. This nding is completely new to the literature
and augments the closed-economy arguments of Goodhart and Huang (2005)
and Rochet and Vives (2004) who argue that, under certain circumstances,
Central Banks may not nd it optimal to intervene with LOLR. The chapter
ends by considering the e¤ectiveness of crisis management measures like capi-
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tal controls, in making nancial systems more robust and resilient to nancial
crises. The aim of these state-contingent safeguard measures is to help avoid
banking crises (and their associated spillover e¤ects, where relevant) and to help
restore the second-best solution that the Planner can achieve.
Chapter 8 considers a similar question but analyses the transmission process
from currency crisis to banking crisis. As in the previous chapter, the banking
environment is drawn from chapter 6. The innovative approach of chapter 8
is in its modelling structure and in its implications for the governments public
nance. Here, depositors of the banks are assumed to receive a perfect signal of
the economys shadow exchange rate ( i.e the exchange rate that would have
prevailed if the regime was a oating one). As we mentioned in the main text,
our concept of shadow exchange rateis di¤erent from that adopted by Flood
and Garber (1984) in that we do not allow for time-variations in exchange rate.
However, as in the previous chapter, we begin by assuming a credible soft peg.
We augment the Allen and Gale (1998) framework by characterising depositors
equilibrium in terms of the shadow exchange rate. In our knowledge, there are
no papers in the literature that attempt to model devaluation induced bank
runs explicitly and chapter 8 is intended to bridge this gap.
Here again, we use the mechanism design approach to show that a banking
system allocation is weakly Pareto inferior to the planners second-best solu-
tion when the shadow exchange rate cannot be observed. In the absence of a
currency devaluation, the banking allocation coincides with that of the plan-
ner. But when such devaluation occurs with positive probability, the banking
system allocation is strictly inferior to that of the planner.We then proceed to
study the dynamics of the crisis (when devaluation occurs with positive prob-
ability) and the resulting potential transmission of a currency devaluation to
the banking system. We show that there is a trigger equilibrium in the shadow
exchange rate above which the currency is devalued (all depositors withdraw
and a devaluation-induced bank run occurs) and below which the soft peg is
maintained (depositors withdraw according to their true liquidity needs only
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO THESIS 30
and a devaluation-induced run is prevented). Thus, given this specicity, a de-
valuation always leads to bank runs in this model of an EME characterised by
liability dollarisation. However, under what circumstances will a devaluation-
induced bank run lead to a banking crisis ? We construct values for the banks
stochastic asset returns which will be necessary to preserve the balance sheet of
the bank and that will successfully ward o¤ the e¤ects of a currency devaluation
on depositorsdecision to withdraw. We show, in a performance space similar
to that of chapter 5, a range of the banksidiosyncratic fundamentals in which
a currency devaluation will always lead to a banking crisis when no such crisis
would have existed otherwise. A natural consequence of a currency devaluation
in this setup, is that it may lead to contingent liabilities for the government if
the latter needs to intervene in some states in the world in which a devaluation
results in a banking crisis. The chapter ends by conjecturing the implications
of these contingent liabilities for the design of an optimal bailout scheme fully
funded by a tax system.
The last parts of chapters 7 and 8 study the design of prudential policy
options for EME. We come with certain proposals that have so far not been
identied in the literature but, which we believe, are crucial given the ndings
of our framework. One of the appealing features of our paradigm is that it is
rooted in microfoundations of nancial intermediaries. As a result, we can con-
tribute in a novel way to the debate on the design and choice of exchange rate
regimes in EMEs, based on the ability of the system to minimise the likelihood
of banking and currency crises (twin crises) occurring. This departs radically
from the current macroeconomic paradigm that makes the choice of exchange
rate regimes, a function of the ability to control and mitigate some exogenous
factor, say, ination. Why is the choice of exchange rate regime important for an
EME ? Our model has two opposing forces that, according to the conventional
macroeconomic paradigm, have contrasting e¤ects on the choice of exchange
rate regimes. On the one hand side, our banking system is characterised by
nancial liberalisation i.e is well integrated in world nancial system in that
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all depositors are foreign investors. Financial liberalisation warrants a exible
regime since a xed regime would lead to unnecessary speculative pressures on
the currency and lead to monetary sovereignty loss . On the other side, our
banking system is characterised by liability dollarisation. This warrants a xed
exchange rate regime due to the fear of oatingargument. Due to these con-
trasting e¤ects, conventional macroeconomics will fail to o¤er any suggestions
about the appropriate design of an exchange rate regime.
We endeavour to contrast the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent scenarios, depending
on the aim of the policymaker. In particular, our model suggests that if the
aim of the policymaker is to keep exchange rate stable, it may do so by using
interest rate policy rather than foreign exchange reserve policy to defend the
peg. While both forms of policy intervention succeed in keeping the exchange
rate xed, they do so at the cost of destabilising the banking system. Using
interest rate to keep the exchange rate xed may keep the exchange rate sta-
ble, at the cost of triggering an information-induced bank run if interest rate
uctuations a¤ect a banks idiosyncratic fundamentals. Using foreign exchange
intervention to keep the exchange rate xed may achieve the same aim, at the
cost of draining reserves and of eventually leading to future devaluation-induced
bank runs. Since we show that an information-induced bank run is less costly
than a devaluation-induced bank run, it follows that managing a xed exchange
rate system in an emerging market economy, is better achieved by using interest
rate rather than foreign exchange reserves.
If the aim of the policymaker is to pre-empt the occurrence of banking
crisis, it may adopt a xed exchange rate regime juxtaposed with appropriate
capital controls as way of ensuring stability of banking system. While this
measure succeeds in preventing a banking crisis, it may not necessarily replicate
the Planners Second-Best solution. We show that the ability to generate the
Second-Best solution of the Planner, depends on the order in which depositors
have presented themselves to the bank. Conversely, if the policymaker wants
to design an exchange rate regime that has an imbedded mechanism to thwart
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both crises (i.e eliminate the likelihood of both crises), some state-contingent
structure in the exchange rate regime is important. The aim of the state-
contingent structure is to enable restore the Planners Second-Best allocation.
A few propositions are studied e.g state-contingent crawling peg systems, state-
contingent capital controls, managed oating regime.
The last chapter, chapter 9, concludes the thesis. Chapter 9 summarises
the main ndings of all chapters of this thesis and points out all the new con-
tributions to the literature. Our main contributions are duly explored and a
contrast is made with the existing banking crisis models in the literature. Some
limitations of our approach are highlighted and potential avenues for future re-
search work are mentioned as well.[The pictorial representations on next couple
of pages (Figures 1.4 and 1.5) shows the essence of the build-up of the paradigm
constructed in chapters 6, 7 and 8. The specic questions we are trying to
answer and our exact contributions to the literature, are also provided].
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Chapter 2
General Literature Review
2.1 Introduction1
There is no one-size ts alldenition of what constitutes nancial instability.
Many observers will view a nancial system as being stable if it shows much
resilience and ability to resist a crisis due to a shock to either one institution
within the system or to the whole system, within which all institutions operate.
The pitfall with this doctrine is that nancial instability is merely viewed as an
egg from which crises are hatched what resilience and ability to resist
a shock mean, are not carefully dened. Thus, this stripped-down version
is primarily viewing nancial instability from the vantage point of a nancial
crisis. From this perspective, any systemic event that causes economic loss of
value that is strong enough to cause serious disruption to real economy, will be
categorised as instability.
Haldane, Hall, Saporta and Tanaka (2004) argue, such a denition ignores
the other possible ways nancial instability may manifest itself. They argue
that three non trivial issues would be absent from such a narrow perspective:
1The literature review section of this thesis originally circulated as a document entitled:
"Financial Systems, Micro-Systemic Risks and Central Bank Policy: An Analytical Taxon-
omy". Please refer to Moheeput (2005) for more.
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[1] the initiator of a crisis; [2] the propagator of the crisis and [3] the existence
of nancial frictions which magnify the amplitude and frequency of crises, in a
way that systematically alters the dynamic path of the economy. Haldane et al
(2004) propose a holistic version of nancial instability that nests the notion of a
crisis within these three issues. If the essence of a nancial system is to allocate
resources e¢ ciently across time, across states of nature and to ensure smooth
and e¢ cient nancing of investment projects and e¢ cient pricing of risk, then a
nancial system will be viewed as nancially stable if it guarantees the fullment
of these functions, even in the presence of a shock. Financial fragility will thus
be viewed as one in which one or more of these functions become dismantled,
due to shocks to the system. In the presence of nancial frictions, these shocks
alter the dynamics of a crisis and give well dened shape to its anatomy.
This holistic version of nancial fragility encompasses the analysis of sys-
temic risks involving nancial intermediaries or banks. There are two aspects of
systemic risk that the literature identies: microsystemic risks and macrosys-
temic risks. The former can be dened2 as: risks to the nancial system that
occur when the interaction of a bank with other banks or with nancial markets,
can propagate an initially localised shock to the whole nancial system, by sub-
jecting the derived analytics of the crisis, as an endogenous part of the theory.
It is this particular form of systemic risk with which we are concerned in this
chapter. The di¤erence between the di¤erent interacting units that make up the
nancial system is important and any macroeconomic variable is taken as given
or xed. Macrosystemic risks, on the other hand side, can be dened3 : risks
occurring when, through the presence of nancial frictions or imperfections,
a nancial systems interaction with the macroeconomy, can magnify the fre-
quency and intensity of crises and have a more entrenched impact on key macro
variables (e.g real business cycle) . With macrosystemic risks, the di¤erence
between di¤erent nancial intermediaries is immaterial. It is thus theoretically
2Quoted from Moheeput (2005)
3Quoted from Moheeput (2005)
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possible to consider nancial intermediaries as a single unit. What matters is
the impact that nancial intermediation has on macroeconomic variables and
how, the presence of nancial frictions can a¤ect macroeconomic variables .
The need to mitigate systemic risks in a nancial system is one of the most
important reasons behind the enactment of prudential banking regulatory poli-
cies. Measures may be implemented either ex-ante, as part of systemic-risk
prevention or ex-post, as part of systemic-risk management. While the former
concerns the institution of rules or standards that makes the nancial system
more crisis-proof, the latter concerns the instigation of policy measures to stall
a crisis once the symptoms of its occurrence start to appear. It is worthwhile
mentioning, though, that policy measures designed to stall a systemic crisis, are
not without pitfalls. While they may be benign in preventing the fully blown
impact of a system-wide crisis on output and on nancial intermediation, they
may cost a lot in terms of taxpayersmoney and have an adverse impact on
incentives of key stakeholders in the nancial system.
Thus, if the costs of preventing a system-wide crisis are higher than the costs
that the banking crisis entails to output and intermediation, then the case to
regulate or impose policy measures, becomes weak. To be able to assess this cost
and benet of policy mitigation in a systematic way, we need a framework that
juxtaposes both issues in one setup and that assesses the net benet of policy
measures in a welfare-theoretic sense. Fortunately, microeconomic analysis is
helpful at providing that insight and helps assess how successful di¤erent policy
measures are at tackling system-wide risks and whether they help restore the
First-Best allocation of resources.
Figure 2.1 (please turn over for illustration) provides a pictorial synopsis of
the approach we intend to adopt throughout the rest of this chapter. Following
the aforementioned denition for microsystemic risks, this chapter is organised
as follows: we initially start with nancial crisis initiators. Here, the literature
for nancial fragility and coordination failure for the one-bank case, is reviewed
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in section 2.2. Because models of systemic risks involving bank runs, almost
always start with a technological or liquidity shock occurring at one bank, it
is useful to have an overview of the implications of this literature for policy
mitigation. We then deal with propagators of a crisis. Here, we go beyond
the connes of the one-bank scenario to include cases involving multiple banks
(section 2.3) or involving an interaction between banks and nancial markets
(section 2.4).
In these models, there exist several avenues through which a bank failure
may spread to other banks. Banks are often connected through the existence
of overlapping nancial contracts such as the interbank market in deposits or
loans. Sometimes, they can interact with nancial markets as well. In the
absence of market failures, the interbank market or the nancial market will
allocate resources e¢ ciently. Cash-strapped banks will always be able to get
their way out of liquidity troubles. If markets failures exist though, liquidity
provision by the interbank market or by nancial markets in general, may be
inadequate. The illiquidity problem at one bank may contagiously spread to
other banks connected to it through nancial contracts or the illiquidity prob-
lem may turn into an insolvency one. In both cases, the existence of market
failures will warrant a case for Central Bank intervention as a way of mitigating
these crises amplications. It is the purpose of this chapter to categorise the
literature therein, unearth the market failures responsible for the crisis propaga-
tion and assess how successful policy measures are in mitigating micro-systemic
risks. Section 2.5 summarises the literature for macro-systemic risks. Finally,
section 2.6 concludes for chapter 2. Figure 2.1(b) (please turn over for il-
lustration) illustrates a systemic risk transmission map for the UK economy, as
depicted in a Bank of England report4 .
4Bank of England (BoE) Financial Stability Report, July 2006, Issue 20, pp 46.
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2.2 Liquidity Insurance Provision
Financial systems ( incorporating nancial markets and nancial intermediaries
such as banks) play a fourfold-role in the economy (Allen and Gale (2003)): they
channel savings from where they are in excess to where they are in need; they
allow for intertemporal smoothing of consumption by households and expendi-
ture by rms; they provide intratemporal insurance against liquidity shocks to
households and rms by enabling them to share risks; they allow for the e¢ cient
nancing of protable investment projects.
Ever since the special critique of Fama (1980) about the specialness of banks
or nancial intermediaries as to their relevance in an Arrow-Debreu setup, a
huge body of the literature has surged, validating the role of banks by stressing
on their role in alleviating di¤erent forms of market imperfections (Freixas and
Rochet (2002)). As dealers in non-marketable nancial contracts of di¤erent
forms, the nature of a banks activities exposes it to panics or runs, which oc-
cur mainly when depositors, fearing that the bank will be unable to meet its
contractual obligations, decide to withdraw their funds from the bank. Bank
runs remain an accute issue today. While Europe and the United States have
experienced a large number of bank runs in the 19th century and beginning
of the 20th, many emerging markets have experienced severe episodes of bank-
ing crises in recent years. Latin America seems to su¤er from these episodes
once every decade (Chile (1980s), Argentina (mid 1980s, 2002), Mexico (mid
1980s). Other spectacular accounts of banking crises include the South East
Asian u (1997) and the banking distress that plagued the Eastern European
countries (Baltic countries (1992), Bulgaria (1997)). As Gorton and Winton
(2002) note in a recent survey on nancial intermediaries, even countries that
have never experienced bank runs strive hard to pre-empt the likelihood of a
banking crisis from developing by adopting tough lines on regulatory measures,
the costs of contagious e¤ects of banking crises in terms of loss output, nancial
dis-intermediation, dismantling of the payments / settlement system and public
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outlays needed to revamp the banking system, being far too high.
Banks act as intermediaries between rms that are cash-strapped and that
need to borrow (issuers of nancial securities) and investors, who have excess
cash and who wish to part with that excess liquidity temporarily (recipients of
nancial securities). The nature of a banks activities means that it is linked
to its stakeholders through heterogenous contracts. The features that these
contractual arrangements have for the banks balance sheet, are categorised as
follows:
[1] Maturity mismatch - assets (e.g loans) are illiquid and liabilities (e.g
deposits) are liquid.
[2] Liquidity-protability mismatch - the more illiquid the assets, the higher
the return on the asset.
[3] High gearing and relatively low capitalisation - deposits being very high
relative to equity.
[4] Creditors (i.e. depositors) are actually the banks clients.
These features distinguish a bank from a number of other institutions and
expose it to an array of risks . Consumers deposit their endowments in the
bank but face uncertainty about the timing of their consumption. The problem
that banks face is to try to match the structural features described above with
the uncertainty about the timing of consumption by depositors. By o¤ering
demand deposit contracts, they can do that. Since the work of Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) on bank runs and liquidity provision, there has been a surge in the
literature of bank runs and on panic transmission. Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
contributed signicantly to our understanding of banking activities because their
seminal work was to analyse bank failure from the intrinsic characteristics of a
banks balance sheet, as detailed above.
In this model, banks are seen as intermediaries that accept deposits from
households, pool these resources and invest them in technologies to which de-
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positors individually do not have access to, and o¤er depositors a better com-
bination of returns and liquidity services. The bank o¤ers depositors demand
deposit contracts that basically allow depositors to withdraw their deposits to
meet any pressing liquidity needs.
Coordination failure has been rationalised as potential explanation for the
behaviour of depositors. In a setting with the existence of a storage technology,
a long term asset that can be liquidated prematurely and a sequential service
constraint, each depositor of a given bank is concerned with what other deposi-
tors of the same bank are doing. Thus beliefs about each others actions become
important in decision making. This belief generated mechanism has a strong
self-fullling element, such that multiple equilibria results.
The model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is as follows: There are three
periods, time 0, 1, 2. In time 0, depositors invest their endowments in the
bank. The latter invests the endowment in a short term liquid technology and a
long-term illiquid technology and o¤ers a demand deposit contract that depicts
the amount the depositor will receive, following withdrawal of deposit. The
illiquid technology yields a non-stochastic return of R in period 2. If liquidated
prematurely (i.e time 1), it yields a return of r (< 1), thus representing a cost
involved in early liquidation. There is also a short term liquid technology which
yields a return of 1 (for every unit of endowment invested therein). Depositors
are assumed to face a liquidity shock in period 1, which is independently and
identically distributed among depositors. With probability , they may be
impatient (i.e wish to consume early) and probability 1 , they may be patient
(i.e wish to consume late). The distribution of liquidity shocks is common
knowledge, but the private realisation of the liquidity shock is private knowledge.
To see the improvement in consumption allocation, it is important to make
a contrast between the three: in autarky, each individual is bound by his budget
constraint and the absence of any markets whatsoever, means that he consumes
less or equal to 1 if he is an impatient consumer and less or equal to R if he
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is a patient consumer. With a nancial market allowing for the possibility of
trading assets, a consumption stream of (1; R) would be possible. Thus if the
individual is impatient, he will sell his holdings of the long asset and consume
the proceedings. If he is patient, he use the amount invested in the short tech-
nology to buy assets, which he can hold until period 2. Given equilibrium price
for the nancial asset, it can be seen that the market allocation coincides with
the uppermost allocation, namely (1; R). This represents a Pareto improvement
over the autarky but has a setback. At period 0, each agent would prefer a con-
sumption plan that trades some period 2 consumption for period 1 consumption.
Thus, agents would like to receive some insurance against the risk of being im-
patient. The nancial market cannot o¤er perfect insurance against the risk of
being an impatient consumer. The rationale is that the set of markets being
allowed for is incomplete. There is no market for contingent claims, on which
the individual can trade liquidity for delivery in the interim period, contingent
on his type.
Financial intermediaries can be seen to full that liquidity insurance role,
through demand deposit contracts. The crucial point is that, while individual
depositors face the uncertainty in period 0 as regards their liquidity needs, a
bank does not face such uncertainty. By the Law of Large Numbers (LLN),
these idiosyncratic liquidity shocks will be mutualised and the proportion of
early (late) withdrawals that the bank will face is exactly equal to  (1   
respectively). Thus, if the bank follows a fractional reserve system, it becomes
clear that it will earmark a proportion of  of deposits to the short asset and a
proportion of 1    to the long asset. These results are summarised in Figure
2.2 (turn over for an illustration).
If the bank faces excess early withdrawals (i.e withdrawals that cannot be
met by the short assets alone), it will be forced to liquidate the long asset in
period 1 in order to provide for the liquidity needs of those who withdraw early.
Patient depositors know that since the long asset is liquidated, they may get
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a lower amount than promised by the demand deposit contract. They may
therefore all have an incentive to withdraw early, thereby prompting a run on
the bank .
2.2.1 Policy Implications in Liquidity Insurance Models
Banks o¤ering xed demand deposit contracts achieve the optimal risk-sharing
allocation. But such a contract is very much susceptible to runs by cohorts of
depositors, for reasons that have to do with extraneous variables (or sunspots),
not explained within the model. In the case of runs, the allocation is inferior to
autarky. This trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and stability that is inherent in the
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) setup, has prompted research into possible ways to
achieve the optimal (rst-best) solution, whilst mitigating nancial instability.
Possible reform proposals have ranged from institutional reforms (as ex-ante
measures) and specic governmental policy measures like deposit insurance (as
ex-ante measure) or suspension-of-convertibility (as ex-post measure).
Institutional reforms concern the re-designing of the features of a banks
balance sheet, so that, it no longer faces the dangers of nancial instability. If,
through demand deposit contracts, banks become fragile once they face large
premature withdrawals, one important remedy would be to try to match the
banks structural features to the statistical predictability of the time pattern of
withdrawals. The concept of narrow bankingdoes exactly that. With narrow
banks, the maturity structure of assets is perfectly matched with the maturity
structure of deposit contracts. Thus, the amount that the bank earmarks to
the short liquid asset (e.g its reserves), is su¢ cient enough to meet payments to
depositors, should they all decide to withdraw early. This form of institutional
arrangement can help to prevent bank runs, but it does not achieve the optimal
risk-sharing allocation. As Wallace (1988, 1996) argues and quoted by Freixas
and Rochet (1997), the solution to the optimisation problem for the narrow
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bank is even dominated by that of autarky or that of a bank engaged in maturity
transformation.
Government regulatory response may take the form of deposit insurance
schemes or suspension-of-convertibility. Deposit insurance basically concerns
the scheme designed to protect the interests of depositors, in the face of bank
runs. Depositors are too small and diverse to be able to monitor the perfor-
mance of bank managers. Furthermore, they may face high monitoring costs.
This means that, left on their own, there will be an incentive for depositors to
free-ride on each othersattempts to monitor. The resulting underestimation
of monitoring, means that there must be some agency to look after deposi-
torsinterests, in case of bank failures. There are still questions in the litera-
ture surrounding the design of the most appropriate deposit insurance scheme .
Suspension-of-Convertibility (SOC) concerns the formal prohibition of the bank
to serve more than a certain threshold of proportion of early withdrawals. By
preventing the long asset from being liquidated or traded, it guarantees that
a certain amount is still available for payment in the nal period. The actual
results are subsumed in Figure 2.3 (please turn over for an illustration).
The e¤ectiveness of deposit insurance and SOC depends crucially on whether
there are aggregate risks (about the aggregate proportion of early withdrawals)
or not in the setup. In the absence of aggregate uncertainty, they achieve the
same results: they both eliminate the possibility of having bank runs and help
maintain the optimum outcome. With aggregate uncertainty, the equivalence
between the two schemes break down. SOC still eliminates bank runs, but it is
not e¢ cient as a risk-sharing instrument. The reason is that, with uncertainty
about the pattern of aggregate withdrawals, there may be either of the following
two scenarios: if the proportion of early withdrawals is too high compared to the
threshold for SOC, those withdrawing early will be rationed and get a smaller
amount than has been promised. If it is too low, it means that those deciding
to withdraw in period 2, are too numerous, and again, will receive less than has
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been promised. In other words, SOC does not allow for contingent allocation.
Deposit insurance, on the other hand, makes allocations contingent on aggregate
shocks. In the special case in which the deposit insurance scheme is publicly run
and nanced by an appropriate tax system, the government can vary the tax
rate based on actual realisation of early withdrawals, and achieve the optimal
risk-sharing allocation.
2.2.2 Robustness of Liquidity Insurance Models
Thus, demand deposit contracts are seen to achieve optimal risk-sharing, but
are also seen to be unstable. The natural question that comes to mind is: why
are deposit contracts then issued by banks? Since Diamond and Dybvig (1983),
the literature on bank runs has evolved and many di¤erent avenues have been
explored in a way that literally helps to answer this question from di¤erent per-
spectives. Jacklin (1987), for instance, argued that equity contracts can some-
times do better than demand deposit contracts for certain specications of the
utility function. In this model, consumers are equity holders rather than depos-
itors in the bank. Whilst achieving the same (optimal) consumption allocation
as a deposit contract, these equity contracts are not susceptible to bank runs.
The rationale is that equity contracts are coalitionally incentive compatible (i.e
immune to withdrawals by coalitions of individuals) while deposit contracts
are only individually incentive compatible . For more general specications of
utilities, deposit contracts dominate equity contracts, thereby unearthing the
inverse relationship between e¢ ciency and stability again. Other papers have
endeavoured to rationalise the case for actual contracts taking the form of de-
mand deposit contracts with the possibility of withdrawals on demand, rather
than some other form (See Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan
(2001a)).
A trend of the literature on bank runs has also considered the other viewof
bank runs and have related the performance of the banks assets to the business
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cycle. These models allow the return on the long technology to be stochastic.
This second view reects empirical studies by Gorton (1988), Calomiris and
Gorton (1991), which show that bank runs are not random events but intimately
related to the business cycle. These models have important policy implications
that help add a new dimension into our thinking as to how policymakers should
e¤ectively conduct policy.
Allen and Gale (1998) conrm the ndings of studies by Gorton et al, by
showing that the business cycle plays an important role in triggering banking
crises. In a model in which the long technology is subject to stochastic returns
and cannot be liquidated early, they show that bank runs are optimal in that
they help achieve rst-best optimal risk-sharing! Banks achieve the optimal
outcome through o¤ering xed deposit contracts, with bank runs providing the
optimal contingencies that help achieve rst best result.
Another contribution which relates banking performance to business cycles is
the one by Goldstein and Pauzner (2005). One of the setbacks of the Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) framework, is that there is nothing within the model to
explain what exactly triggers bank runs and coordination failure problems. The
collection action problem means that each depositor is better o¤ withdrawing
conditional on other depositors withdrawing, even though, collectively, they
would be better o¤ if they did not withdraw. What drives these beliefs is not
within the realm of the model and can be attributed to extraneous variables
like sunspot phenomenon. Hellwig (2002) and Morris and Shin (1998) attribute
this indeterminacy to two elements: common knowledge of fundamentals and
higher order beliefs certainty. Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) are able to pin
down unique equilibrium in models involving bank runs, using the global games
approach. They nd the endogenous probability of bank run occurrence and
relate it to the demand deposit contract. By trading o¤ benets of risk-sharing
vis-à-vis the probability of bank runs, they characterise the optimal contract and
show that it does not achieve rst best. By getting rid of the indeterminacy
inherent in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), they argue that it is technically possible
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to compute the e¤ectiveness of alternative policy measures. In other words, if
the model is no longer silent about the probability of bank runs, it becomes
convenient to estimate how successful di¤erent policy measures will be to pre-
empt these runs.
Zhu (2001) develops a two-stage banking model in the same spirit as Gold-
stein and Pauzner (2005) and attempts to examine the welfare properties of
policy mitigation. He nds that SOC is both ex-ante and ex-post ine¢ cient
in preventing bank runs because it cannot distinguish between those with true
liquidity needs and those who are simply running on the bank. Thus, even
if bank runs are prevented, it is likely that some agents facing true liquidity
needs cannot withdraw their deposits, while those without true liquidity needs
get their money back. Deposit insurance is ex-post e¢ cient in preventing bank
runs but ex-ante ine¢ cient, due to moral hazard reasons. Because the deposit
insurance authority cannot monitor banks decision, banks have an incentive
to behave opportunistically. The paper suggests that replacing full-coverage
deposit insurance by interest-cap deposit insurance , can overcome the moral
hazard problem and help the economy achieve socially optimal outcome. The
imposition of capital requirements is an e¢ cient way to prevent bank runs. As
capital requirements increase, the market equilibrium converges to the socially
optimum outcome.
Another trend has included moral hazard in models of bank runs. Since the
work of Calomiris and Kahn (1991), in a setup that includes moral hazard and
aggregate uncertainty, several papers have attempted to include moral hazard
considerations in bank run models and explore the properties. Cooper and Ross
(1998) attempt to examine the trade-o¤ between risk sharing and moral hazard
associated with the design of banking regulations. They show how regulatory
instruments (like deposit insurance and capital requirements) can be used to
control bank runs in an environment in which banks can act opportunistically
by making imprudent investments and depositors can monitor the bank. Their
paper is a synergy of similar work in the literature, including Matutes and Vives
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(1996), Besanko and Kanatas (1993), Holmstrom and Tirole (1993). The main
policy implications of the Cooper and Ross (1998) setup are as follows: in Di-
amond and Dybvig (1983), publicly nanced deposit insurance can be e¤ective
as protection against expectations-driven bank runs. But moral hazard consid-
erations are ignored. Deposit insurance avoids bank runs but has a two-pronged
impact on incentives: on one hand, depositors are not willing to monitor the
banksperformance and, on the other, bank managers are willing to act oppor-
tunistically in order to maximise the option value of the deposit insurance. By
taking this moral hazard consideration into account, they characterise the trade-
o¤ that helps derive the optimal degree of deposit insurance. Complete deposit
insurance is not su¢ cient to support the rst best outcome, because depositors
will not have adequate incentives for monitoring. This outcome can nonetheless
be reached through a combination of policies. Capital requirements, when cou-
pled with partial deposit insurance, can eliminate this incentive problem and
help achieve the rst best allocation again.
2.3 Models with Multiple Financial Intermedi-
aries
Several episodes of nancial crises are characterised by nancial contagion among
banks. The term nancial contagion is taken here to mean, in broad terms, the
spread of a banking crisis from one bank to another. The spread of a nancial
crisis from one bank to another can be through several channels. Contagious
bank failures can be the result of either informational spillovers or contractual
arrangements that connect banks or common exposure to some fundamental.
Informational externalities arise when depositors perceive the banks to be
similarly a¤ected, even though there may be no direct form of contracts that
connect banks. Thus, depositors at one bank view the event taking place at
another bank, and update their beliefs about their own bank, so that their bank
shares the same fate as the rst bank.
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Contractual arrangements may take the form of direct links such as inter-
bank market in deposits or loans or may take less explicit direct form links (e.g
through asset prices or through the settlement / payment system). In the former
case, banks engage in cross-holdings of interbank deposits as a way of insuring
against regional liquidity shocks. When one region su¤ers a banking crisis, the
other regions su¤er a loss because their claims in the troubled region fall in
value. If the spillover e¤ect is strong enough, it can cause trouble to banks in
adjacent regions. In the worst case scenario, the trouble may spread from bank
to bank and, may indiscriminately, a¤ect all banks in the economy. In the latter
case, when there is excess demand for liquidity, banks liquidate their long assets
and this drives asset prices down. This drop in prices cause some banks to go
bankrupt and this leads to further sales and further price drops. Bankruptcy
spreads through the market for long asset. If the magnitude of asset price fall
is large, this may prompt a chain of multiple bank insolvencies. Even if the
initial shock is small, the spillover e¤ects through banks, may be cumulative
and strong enough to warrant multiple bank failures.
Common exposures take the form of two banks being similarly and symmet-
rically exposed to the same fundamental. Hence, a change in the fundamental
value will a¤ect both banks, thereby prompting some form of ex-post correla-
tion in their underlying asset. The concept of nancial contagion has important
implications for public policy activities of Central Banks as part of their crisis
prevention and crisis management activities. More importantly, the multiple-
bank setting involves aspects that spread beyond the connes of individual banks
and that enable us summarise the resulting implications for Central Bank policy
as follows:
[1] What is the nature of the dividing line between microprudential and
macroprudential policy measures ?
[2] How e¤ective are public policies in making the nancial system more
robust?
[3] How should central banks design the network structure underpinning
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nancial systems in a way that best makes the nancial system resilient to
shocks?
The sources of market failures responsible for transmitting a risk conta-
giously from bank to bank lie directly in the mechanism connecting the banks.
Whilst this mechanism is responsible for channelling liquidity from liquidity-
abundant banks to liquidity-strapped banks, it is also the channel through which
trouble spreads in times of di¢ culties. Thus, the market failures directly respon-
sible for spreading contagious risks are the externalities (and di¤erent forms they
assume) that various channels create at times of trouble. It is important to note
that, in this section, we will not be focusing on how market failures, per se, pre-
vent the e¢ cient workings of the various channels. This will be the focus of the
next section.
2.3.1 Direct Link Models
Allen and Gale (2000) study a multiple bank version of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), in which banks are connected by an overlapping network of interbank
deposit claims. The economy consists of a number of regions. The number
of early and late consumers (who are assumed to have complete information
about their environment) in each region uctuates randomly, but the demand
for aggregate liquidity is xed. This opens the way for inter-regional insurance
as regions with liquidity surpluses provide liquidity to regions experiencing liq-
uidity shortages. The implication of constant aggregate demand for liquidity,
is that regional liquidity shocks are negatively correlated across regions. While,
in the interim period, some banks face excess demand for liquidity, others face
excess supply of liquidity. In the subsequent period, the patterns for liquidity
demands are reversed. One possible way of insuring against regional liquidity
shocks is to engage in an ex-ante cross-holding of deposits through the interbank
market. The interbank market is one way of implementing risk-sharing among
banks.
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While cross-holding of deposits are useful for reallocating liquidity within
the banking system, they cannot increase the total amount of liquidity. If the
total demand from consumers is greater than the stock of the short asset, the
only way to meet this excess demand, is to liquidate the long asset. Allen and
Gale (2000) show that, based on cost considerations, banks prefer to liquidate
the short asset rst, then their holdings of deposits in other banks and, lastly,
their long asset. With the presence of an unanticipated aggregate liquidity shock
(this condition has been shown to be necessary and su¢ cient for the analysis
of nancial contagion in the model), banks facing excess demand for liquidity,
are forced to claim back their deposits held in other banks. If the amount
received is small, the bank will be forced to liquidate its long asset to meet
excess demand for liquidity. If doing so means violating incentive compatibility
constraint (which technically makes returns to second period withdrawals higher
than returns to rst period withdrawals), there is a run on that bank and it may
be forced into bankruptcy. Such an event reduces the equilibrium value of claims
on that bank. Thus, other banks that hold deposits in it, will su¤er a fall in
their asset value. They may su¤er from the same fate if this fall in asset value
(i.e the spillover e¤ect) is large.
Whether contagion occurs or not depends on the pattern of interconnected-
ness that shapes the interbank market structure. Allen and Gale (2000) assert
the existence of three possible types of networks connecting banks: complete, in-
complete or disconnected. A completenetwork is one in which each bank holds
claims on all other banks. An incomplete interbank market is one in which
banks hold deposits at banks in the adjacent region only. A disconnected
structure is one in which there may be no direct links between banks.
The incomplete interbank market is more susceptible to contagious e¤ects
than a complete interbank network. A complete network would ensure that the
spillover e¤ects of bank failure in one region evenly spreads out to all banks in
other regions. Thus, a given size of unpredictable aggregate liquidity shock, is
distributed uniformly across all banks. The greater the number of banks, the
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more spread out the spillover e¤ects will be, and the greater will be the ability of
the banks to meet uncertain liquidity shocks, without prompting bank runs. An
incomplete network achieves the opposite results. The spillover e¤ect becomes
larger as the crisis spreads from one bank to another. The larger the number of
banks, the larger will be the spillover e¤ects. Contagion will inevitably occur in
this realm. If banks are disconnected, the spillover e¤ect is thwarted and does
not a¤ect the value of claims in other banks. No contagion occurs.
Robustness and Policy Implications
Various attempts have been made to test the robustness of the Allen and Gale
(2000) model with varying degrees of success. Dasgupta (2004) uses the global
games approach to study a two-bank version of contagion. In his setup, banks
invest in a long term technology that yields a stochastic return (i.e one that
is dependent on some independently and identically distributed fundamental).
Depositors are assumed to observe the idiosyncratic fundamental of their bank
with some noise and the timing in terms of decision-making is assumed to be
structured and dynamic:
Depositors at one bank make their decisions before depositors of the other. In
addition, in period 1, the banks face a regional liquidity shock that is negatively
correlated across banks. In the spirit of Allen and Gale (2000), banks cross-
hold a fraction of their deposits, in period 0, as a way of insuring against these
regional shocks. Thus, given the realisation of the regional liquidity shock, the
bank facing high withdrawals will claim back its deposits from the bank facing
low withdrawals. Thus, there is a spillover e¤ect in that, the value of one
banks deposits in the other bank depends on the nancial performance of the
other bank . As in Allen and Gale (2000), this provides the mechanism that
propagates a crisis from one bank to the other.
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Figures 2.4 highlights the main lines of contrast between Dasgupta (2004)
and Allen and Gale (2000). Exposure through the interbank market means that,
while the degree of regional insurance against liquidity shocks is higher, the
possibility of having contagious ows is also higher. The intensity of contagion
increases with the size of interbank connections, provided by the ex-ante cross
holdings of deposits. Figure 2.5 (please turn over for illustration) highlights the
main di¤erences between Dasgupta (2004) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005).
Dasgupta (2004) shows that it is not necessary to have unanticipated liq-
uidity shocks for contagion to exist as an equilibrium phenomenon. This goes
against the philosophy of Allen and Gale (2000). Furthermore, he shows that,
with the interbank market providing ex-ante liquidity insurance against regional
shocks, the structure of connections, spanned by the interbank market, does not
matter. Even with complete markets, contagion may still occur as an equilib-
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rium event.
It is interesting to point out how the two models vary in terms of their impli-
cations for welfare and use of policy for mitigating contagious risks. As ex-ante
measures, Allen and Gale (2000) suggest the reform of the network architecture
connecting banks. Since the complete network is more robust at mitigating
the spillover e¤ect than the incomplete network, it is highly suggestive for pol-
icymakers to ensure that the structure of overlapping interbank claims is as
complete as possible. By preventing contagion, the appropriate design of the
network system guarantees that the rst-best allocation is reached. A similar
conclusion is reached by Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000). In this model, the
source of uncertainty is assumed to be location shocksi.e ex-ante, depositors
are unaware as to where they should consume. It is only in the interim period
(i.e period 1) that they will know the nature of this location shock. Decisions
to withdraw are made in period 2. The network connecting banks depends very
much on the pattern of travel. There are two travel patterns in the setup: a
credit chain lending pattern and a diversied lending pattern. The paper
also investigates the robustness of the di¤erent types of travel patterns to the
possibility of contagion. The diversied lending pattern is shown to be more
robust and less susceptible to contagious e¤ects than the credit chain pattern.
With a credit chain pattern, the credit risk is concentrated on a few banks
only. Thus, while a few banks take the hit, the e¤ect at individual bank level may
be strong enough to warrant closure of next bank. With diversied structure,
the credit risks are more evenly spread across banks. When the number of banks
is large, it is completely diversied so that no contagion exists.
In Allen and Gale (2000), the standard one policy tools, that can restore rst-
best in the one bank case, will work. But the timing and implications of central
bank intervention will depend crucially on the interbank market structure, as
discussed above, connecting banks. Only in the special case of an incomplete
network, will policy intervention be necessary. Because the origin of the banking
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panic transmission is an initial liquidity shock at one bank, it follows that ex-post
measures (such as Suspension of Convertibility (SOC)) at that bank, will help.
The main point is that the interbank connection creates a direct link between
the balance sheet of banks and constitutes the main channel for transmitting a
crisis across banks. As long as the crisis is prevented at the crisis-catalyst bank,
the balance sheets of all banks will be preserved. Thus, these policy measures do
not create an externality of their own, on other banks. All arguments regarding
policy measures in the one-bank setup, will apply. Contagion will be prevented
(since none of the banksclaims are a¤ected).
The concept of Lender-of-Last-Resort (LOLR) needs elaboration. LOLR is
typically carried out when, it is feared that a bank that is experiencing tempo-
rary liquidity problem, may potentially become insolvent and the policymaker
cannot easily make the distinction between illiquidity and insolvency, due to
informational problems. LOLR is also administered when it is feared that an
illiquidity problem at a bank, can spread across banks amplifying all along the
way, until it becomes degenerate. Since the Allen and Gale (2000) framework
deals overwhelmingly with assessing channels that connect banks constitute the
main externalities during times of troubles, it is obvious that LOLR, in such
models, should be viewed more from (2), rather than (1). By providing emer-
gency funding to banks facing illiquidity problems, LOLR ensures that there is
no need for the bank to liquidate its long asset which prevents the value of
claims that other banks hold in it to fall. Thus the spillover e¤ect is thwarted.
It is important to note that agents in the Allen and Gale (2000) setup have
complete information about their operating environment. In real world though,
the analysis of LOLR, is conducted in an environment in which the central bank
has incomplete information about the liquidity and solvency positions of banks.
In this case, it will be optimal for the central bank to intervene if doing so entails
benets (in terms of preventing multiple collapse) that outweigh the costs ( in
terms of taxpayersmoney), so that, from a more generalised perspective, it is
welfare improving, from societys point, to do so.
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Not many papers adopt the same perspective. Rochet and Tirole (1996)
argue that, in a multiple bank setting, contagion may be good and no policy
intervention whatsoever is needed, because it helps promote peer monitoring
among banks and achieves market discipline. They study a system in which ex-
post lending may be allowed to mitigate systemic risk, while still preserving the
benets of ex-ante monitoring. If no monitoring is allowed, then bank managers
have an incentive to act opportunistically and undertake activities that may not
necessarily be in the interest of other stakeholders. To prevent this behaviour
which leads to moral hazard, some form of monitoring technology is used.
In the Rochet and Tirole (1996) model, banks face heterogenous liquidity
shocks. Those that cannot raise liquidity are forced to stop their projects and
go bankrupt. To prevent this, banks with excess liquidity can lend to banks
facing liquidity shortage and monitor the borrowing banks, provided the costs
of so-doing, are not too high. Under incentive-compatible interbank lending, the
performance of the lending bank must be dependent on the performance of the
borrowing bank, but not vice versa. Only under this condition, will the lending
bank have an incentive to monitor the borrowing bank. This suggests that,
sometimes, it may be good to close down a solvent bank with exposures to illiq-
uid bank. It may be good to allow contagious e¤ects resulting from bank failures
to spur optimal monitoring. An optimal public policy will present a trade o¤
between the benets of allowing contagious e¤ects ( e.g greater monitoring and
market discipline) against the costs of so-doing.
2.3.2 Models with Informational Spillovers
Models with informational spillovers mainly focus on the spread of a crisis from
one bank to another, in a setup in which the banksfundamentals are believed
to be correlated. There is no direct link connecting the banks, in the form
of contractual arrangements such as interbank market in deposits and loans.
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Nonetheless, the underlying fundamentals are perceived to be correlated, in a
way that invites correlation in payo¤s of depositors of both banks. Hence events
at one bank provide information to depositors of other banks and the failure of
one bank leads depositors of the other bank to adjust their expectations in such
a way that their bank su¤ers from the same fate as the rst bank.
Chen (1999) studies a multiple bank setup in which the existence of demand
deposit contracts coupled with informational spillovers, leads to some form of
strategic complementarity and hence create conditions for contagious banking
crises. Banks basically invest in risky assets, with the returns to risky asset,
being positively correlated across banks. In each bank, a fraction of patient
depositors observe the return to the risky asset perfectly. In addition, these
depositors do not observe their signals at the same time: depositors of a subset
of banks move rst (i.e take their decision rst) and then, depositors in the
remaining banks act. Depositors in the latter group are assumed to noisily
observe the number of bank failures in the rst group of banks. They may run
on their own banks, even before observing their signals about their own banks
project realisations.
Chen (1999) goes on to show that, given demand deposit contracts, there
exists a critical threshold in the number of failures among the rst mover bank.
If the actual number exceeds the critical threshold, then all depositors in the
remaining banks will run on their banks. The specic features of the contract
are also analysed. The optimal deposit contract is inuenced by any possibility
of bank panic. Bank panics become more likely, the higher the prior probability
about the state of the economy being bad and the higher the period 1 (i.e interim
period) deposit payment.
Robustness and Policy Implications
Chen highlights an important attribute of models involving contagion from in-
formational spillover e¤ects: that information transparency is important in mit-
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igating the spread of crises. The same can be said about Dasgupta (2004). By
increasing the precision of signals and coordinating beliefs on the proper out-
come, the contagion spread can be minimised, thereby mitigating the onset
of a crisis spread. Archarya and Yorulmazer (2008) reach a similar conclusion.
They extend the informational spillover approach by constructing a model of
systemic risk involving banks, with informational contagion existing on banks
liabilities side, and bank loan correlations existing on the asset side. The inter-
action between the two enables them study the ex-post and ex-ante aspects of
systemic risk. In their model, the return to bank loans has two components: a
systematic component and an idiosyncratic component. Depositors can observe
the overall realisation of bank loan returns, but not the actual decomposition.
So, when one bank fails, depositors of the other bank think that signals send
bad news about the overall performance of the economy, and use Bayes rule to
update their priors. The rate of return on deposits (or borrowing) to staying in
the second bank, is adjusted in such a way that it shares a similar fate to the
rst bank. To mitigate this informational spillover resulting from one banks
events on another banks borrowing costs, both banks engage in ex-ante herding
( i.e endogenously choose correlated portfolios) in order to maximise the pos-
sibility of joint survival. The model has policy implications that share similar
tenets to those of Chen (1999): as long as a policy instrument succeeds in mak-
ing the interest rate on deposits (or borrowing) insensitive to bank events, no
informational spillover occurs and the ex-post cost of mitigating contagion will
be minimised. Informational transparency would, for example, make the dis-
tinction clear between the systematic and the idiosyncratic component of bank
loan returns. If depositors of the second bank know that the bad performance
of the rst bank has been due to idiosyncratic poor performance of loans of
the rst bank and not due to overall bad performance, then they will not be
tempted to run on their own bank. Thus, no informational spillover results.
Other approaches in the literature consider the interaction between infor-
mational spillover e¤ects and aggregate liquidity position: Aghion, Bolton and
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Dewatripont (2000) show how, in the presence of imperfect information about
banksliquidity , a liquidity problem at one solvent individual bank level, may
have widespread contagious e¤ects.
If banks are subject to uncertainty in the timing of realisations of their
long asset returns, a liquidity shock could lead to a high proportion of cash-
strapped banks (banks that are faced with the prospects of delayed returns and
high short term deposit withdrawals) relative to cash-abundant banks (banks
that are faced with the prospects of immediate returns realisations and low
short term deposit withdrawals). If the cash-abundant banks can service the
cash-strapped banks through the interbank market, there is no need for public
policy intervention. Should the amount required be beyond the reach of cash-
abundant banks altogether, then there will be aggregate liquidity shortage, with
some cash-strapped banks being rationed (the interbank lending rate is xed)
whereas others are forced to liquidate their long assets. By observing other bank
failures, depositors think that this may be due to aggregate liquidity shortage.
Fearing the worse about their own bank, they withdraw. The inability of the
interbank market to function e¤ectively means that there is a case for public
policy intervention. In a similar spirit, Diamond and Rajan (2001) consider how,
through an interplay between illiquidity and insolvency, an aggregate liquidity
shortage leads to contagion. Their paper is closely related to Aghion, Bolton and
Dewatripont (2000), but stresses that banks facing liquidity problems usually
try to issue new deposits to bridge the liquidity gap. To do so, they must
raise interest on deposits. This reduces the value of bank assets and leads to
insolvencies.
Policy implications have similar traits to those of informational spillover
models of Chen (1999) and Archarya and Yorulmazer (2008). Increased trans-
parency will enable depositors to distinguish between aggregate liquidity stance
and their own banks liquidity position. As a result, they will be able to make
more reasonable judgements about their own banks position. Injection of liq-
uidity into the system can be carried out, but there are questions that will
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inevitably come up as to whether the liquidity injection should be applicable
to cash-strapped banks only. Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripont (2000) investi-
gate the costs and benets of having an unregulated banking system. While
the absence of public safety nets provides incentives for peer monitoring and
eliminates moral hazard among banks, it also fails to block the channel through
which aggregate liquidity shocks are channelled throughout the banking system.
This brings questions about what the optimal public safety net should be.
How about standard Central Bank policy measures ? An interesting contra-
diction with the models of contagion based on direct links as above, is that here,
the expectations of depositors are explicitly modelled. Thus, the e¤ectiveness
of policy measures administered at the bank experiencing the initial shock, will
depend crucially on how depositors react to these policy measures. Generally,
such measures applied to the initial bank, will create an externality (positive or
negative) on other banks. As such, policy measures, by themselves, may create
a distortion between privately optimal and socially optimal outcomes and beg
in questions as to whether these measures should not be more general( i.e ap-
plied to those banks that are considered to be most vulnerable to informational
spillover e¤ects, rather than to banks that experience the liquidity shock in the
rst instance).
2.3.3 Models with Asset Price Changes
Amongst others, Schnabel and Shin (2003) nd evidence of high asset price cor-
relation for di¤erent assets in Europe, during times of nancial distress. The
obvious explanation is aggregate liquidity shortage. Cifuentes, Ferrucci and
Shin (2005) show that, with a pattern of interconnectedness generated by a rich
structure of cross-holdings, coupled with the existence of regulatory solvency
constraints, the demand for illiquid assets is less than perfectly elastic, so that
asset sales to meet liquidity demands by institutions will largely depress asset
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prices. Many studies nd evidence for an asset price channel, as potential ex-
planation of a spread of a crisis from one bank to another. The main policy
implications are illustrated in Figure 2.6.
The determination of asset prices, in equilibrium, will depend on the avail-
ability of liquidity in the system . If banks have access to e¢ cient markets for
liquidity provision, then there will be no need to liquidate assets, and, asset
prices will not be a¤ected. In the event in which illiquid banks are forced to
liquidate their assets in order to meet demand for liquidity, the price of such
assets may fall  thereby a¤ecting the value of portfolios of all banks in the
nancial system. We shall refer more explicitly as to why the prices fall dur-
ing liquidation and what corrective mechanisms may be taken to mitigate asset
price changes in the next section.
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2.4 Financial Intermediaries and Financial Mar-
kets
Banks facing illiquidity problems usually have recourse to nancial markets or to
the interbank market in order to alleviate their temporary illiquidity problems.
It is the purpose of this section to consider what market failures may inhibit
the smooth operation of the nancial market or the interbank market, thereby
preventing banks from getting access to much needed funding, and explore what
policy measures may help restore the e¢ cient operations of the markets. De-
nial of funding in times of trouble may lead to insolvencies, with system-wide
implications.
Till now, as far as homogeneous banksare concerned, we have kept nancial
intermediaries and nancial markets as separate from each other. A bank can
use nancial markets in three main ways:
[1] It can use nancial markets as a way of insuring against aggregate risks
 here, risks are taken to mean uncertainty about the distribution of early
withdrawals or uncertainty about the realisation of investment returns in the
long technology.
[2] It can use nancial markets to trade the long asset. The illiquid asset
may thus be liquidated in order to meet liquidity demands that cannot be met
from the short asset alone.
[3] It can use nancial markets as a basis to issue claims against the long
asset (securitization).
Integrating nancial intermediaries and nancial markets in a micro based
model has important implications for systemic risk and nancial fragility. Gale
(2004) argues that introducing these markets into models of nancial interme-
diaries, has important implications for the welfare properties of the model: on
one hand side, bankruptcy involves no ine¢ ciency ex-post resale prices sim-
ply represent transfers rather than deadweight losses. On the other hand side,
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ex-ante risk sharing is optimal if there exists a complete set of Arrow securities
for hedging against these aggregate risks.
Banks, so far, have been assumed to liquidate their assets through some ex-
ogenous technology, with the price of the asset and the supply of liquidity, being
taken as given. This is a rather strong assumption. By trading their assets, the
price at which the asset is traded, is no longer exogenous, but rather, set by
equilibrium forces of demand and supply in the bond market. This provides
important insights into analysis of asset price volatility and endogenous liquid-
ity provision. In the presence of market failures such as incomplete markets for
hedging against aggregate uncertainty or incomplete trading opportunities, a
banks interaction with the nancial market, may lead to excess price volatility
for the asset, in such a way that this jeopardises the ability of the bank to meet
liquidity demands and full contractual obligations. This provides important
insights into the phenomenon of nancial fragility i.e a situation in which small
shocks can have wide impact on the nancial system. The weakest link in this
interplay between banks and nancial markets is often the crucial role of liquid-
ity in the determination of asset prices. In the presence of incomplete markets
and aggregate uncertainty, nancial intermediaries are forced to sell assets in
order to obtain liquidity. But since holding liquidity involves an opportunity
cost, the suppliers of liquidity can only recoup this cost by buying assets at
resale prices in some states of the world this private provision of liquidity by
nancial markets is always inadequate to ensure complete asset price stability
which therefore reects failure of the market mechanism to allocate resources
e¢ ciently to the banking system and calls forth, the need for public policy
intervention.
Heterogenous banksmay engage in the interbank market, through ex-post
interbank lending or ex-ante cross holding of deposits, as crisis prevention mea-
sure against liquidity shocks. The interbank market was covered in the previous
section. However, we were then more concerned with the role of interbank mar-
ket connections as representing possible externalities propagating a crisis from
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one bank to another. In this section, we shall not be concerned with how in-
terbank market failures may spread a crisis across banks but rather, with what
the di¤erent possible forms of interbank market failures are, and how to elimi-
nate them. Goodfriend and King (1998) argue that if the interbank market is
e¢ cient, then any solvent but illiquid bank will always get the funding it needs
at times of di¢ culty. In that case, there would be no need for the central bank
to intervene and its activity will be limited to monetary stability only.
In case of ine¢ ciency though, a solvent bank facing temporary illiquidity
problems may turn out to be insolvent if it does not receive adequate funding.
Public policy interventions, such as lender-of-last-resort, would be highly de-
sirable. Even if government intervention is justied in the presence of market
failures, there remains key questions about the desirability of such policies and
the particular forms they may take.
2.4.1 Homogenous Banks and Financial Markets
Donaldson (1992) develops a model in which the monopoly power of some banks
may lead to signicant underprovision of liquidity. Banks facing a temporary
illiquidity problem, sell securities or claims on their long illiquid assets. There
are two sides of the market: institutions that demand liquidity (i.e cash-strapped
banks) and suppliers of liquidity to the banks (i.e reserve agents). Banks issue
these claims to reserve agents, with the price of these claims being determined
by competition among reserve agents. When the demand for liquidity is low or
no reserve agents enjoy market power, then the securities will trade at normal
or fair prices. Conversely, if the demand for liquidity is high or there is some
form of monopoly power among reserve agents, these securities will trade at
prices below their fair value. If the reserve agents are interpreted as banks that
have excess liquidity, then their monopoly power depends on: their proportion
relative to the total number of banks and the distribution of excess liquidity is
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more favourably biased towards some banks only, so that the other cash rich
banks have resources that are not enough to meet total liquidity demand in the
economy.
Suppose there is some exogenous productivity shock that a¤ects a fraction
of banks only: this shock causes the rate of return on illiquid assets to fall below
the level promised to patient depositors. These depositors will run on the bank.
The latter will be forced to issue securities on its long asset in order to meet
any excess demands for withdrawals.
If the demand for liquidity is strong enough that it almost inevitably a¤ects
price of securities negatively, this makes it costly for all banks to obtain liquidity.
Thus, technology shocks a¤ecting liquidity position of some banks only have
implications for asset prices of all banks, and, correspondingly may a¤ect the
solvency of other banks as well. Thus, nancial contagion arises.
Allen and Gale (1998) extend the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) setup by
considering complete illiquidity of the long asset technology and by making
the return to the long technology stochastic, dependent on economic factors.
By doing with the assumption of complete asset illiquidity, any form of panic-
based bank runs, is eliminated. It also implements the optimal risk-sharing
allocation, which is achieved by making consumption in the interim period (i.e
period 1) dependent on the stochastic return of the long technology. From
that perspective, bank runs can be seen to play an equilibrating role: Since
there will always be something left for patient depositors to consume in period
2, early withdrawals by some patient depositors positively a¤ects the payo¤
to period 2 withdrawals and lowers the return to period 1 withdrawals. Even
though bank runs occur with positive probability, they are only partial i.e they
involve only a fraction of late depositors withdrawing early (unlike Diamond-
Dybvig (1983), which involves all late depositors withdrawing early). In the
model, bank contracts together with the occurrence of bank runs, can be seen
to provide the right contingencies that allow the rst best allocation to occur.
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Allen and Gale (1998) then relax the assumption of complete illiquidity of
the long asset by allowing for incomplete trading opportunities: the bank is
allowed to trade securities through the issue of claims on the banks long assets.
This allows the endogenous determination of the long asset price and endoge-
nous supply of liquidity to the bank. The deposit contract promises to pay a
certain xed amount to depositors wishing to withdraw early. If the amount
provided does not su¢ ce, the bank is forced to sell its long asset, so that those
depositors who withdraw early, share the liquidation value of the bank. If the
price at which the asset is trading in the nancial market, is equal to its long
term value, then, even with bank runs, the allocation is optimal. This price
is, however, shown to be below its long term value, suggesting that the mar-
ket underprovides liquidity when the bank is facing a run. There is a resulting
redistribution of resources from depositors to potential buyers of assets or spec-
ulators. While still satisfying the objectives of liquidity provision to the bank
(though underprovided), nancial markets break the possible advantages asso-
ciated with bank runs as possible equilibrating mechanism because the optimal
risk-sharing allocation is not achieved. On the other hand, buyers of assets
benet greatly because they are able to buy the long asset for a price which is
below its long term value.
Robustness and Policy Implications
For nancial markets, one of the main points we focused on, was the fall in
asset prices that results, following a desperate attempt by the bank to meet its
contractual liquidity obligations. This asset price fall is intimately related to
the supply of liquidity. In the case of incomplete markets, this supply may not
be enough to ensure full asset price stability. In models involving monopoly
power as principal source of market failure and liquidity underprovision, market
structural features were also an important contributor. What is needed is a
mechanism to prevent the price from falling when banks attempt to sell assets.
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Public policy intervention, in the form of central bank nance, could prove
helpful here. If the Central Bank provides a repurchase agreement ( i.e one in
which it buys the illiquid asset at its face price from the bank at the time the
bank needs liquidity, and, sell it back to the bank at the same price later), could
help. By preventing the asset price from falling, the Central Bank successfully
achieves its twin goals of liquidity provision during times of nancial distress
and prevention of systemic risk.
In some cases, liquidity provision is seriously impeded by coordination fail-
ure problems. For example, it may be costly for cash-abundant banks to pro-
vide funding to cash-strapped banks. There may be incentives for each cash-
abundant bank to free ride in provision of liquidity whenever the amount of
liquidity demanded is beyond the reach of each individual member but within
the reach of a fraction of cash-abundant banks. In all cases, as remniscent of
models of coordination failure, there are multiple equilibria with a goodequi-
librium depicting adequate liquidity provision and a badequilibrium, depicting
inadequate liquidity provision. This provides a clear case for a central bank to
intervene so as to reorganise banks and coordinate beliefs on the right outcome.
In Donaldson (1992), the monopoly power is higher the more concentrated the
supply of liquidity is among a few banks only, and, within this category of cash-
abundant banks, the more biased the distribution of liquidity is among a few
banks. Banking regulation, in the form of a well articulated competition policy
in the banking industry, may be helpful in eliminating this threat of monopoly
abuse, although Donaldson (1992) does not make clear, what specic form this
competition policy may take . In cases in which the amount desired falls be-
yond the means of any individual bank, intervention in the form of lender-of-last
resort, may be desirable.
Allen and Gale (2004) build on their previous studies (Allen and Gale (1998),
(2000)) to provide su¢ cient conditions for ensuring e¢ ciency in markets, through
properties similar to those related to the fundamental theorems of welfare eco-
nomics. Their argument can be summarised in Figure 2.7 (please turn over). In
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a setup with nancial intermediaries and nancial markets, what justies policy
intervention, is simply whether markets for aggregate risks are complete or not.
Rationalising the case for nancial intermediaries based on limited participation
of agents in markets for contingent commodities, they point out that allocation
is incentive e¢ cient if nancial intermediaries issue complete contracts. In
the case in which market for risk is complete but banks are restricted to using
non-contingent deposit contracts, default introduces a degree of contingency
that may be desirable from the point of view of optimal risk sharing. Far from
being best avoided, nancial crises are desirable in order to achieve constrained
e¢ ciency, but this does not imply a market failure. This means that there is
no justication for regulation by public authorities. In order for regulation to
be justied, it is imperative that markets are incomplete. As in standard the-
ories of government regulation, it is rst necessary to identify a market failure
in order to analyse intervention.
This approach was used by Gale (2004), in considering the optimal bank
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capital structure. Bank capital usually serves two purposes: it acts as a bu¤er
against unexpected declines in bank asset values and it acts as a mechanism
that discourages excess risk-taking behaviour from the part of bank managers.
In the presence of deposit insurance, depositors have no incentive to monitor
bank managers and the latter have an incentive to pursue a risk-reward strat-
egy (gamble for resurrection) in order to maximise the option value of the
deposit insurance. Bank capital is required in order to check this possibility of
moral hazard. Whether deposit insurance is a su¢ cient condition for justifying
regulation of bank capital or not, is highly debatable. Hellman, Murdock and
Stiglitz (2000) develop a model that allows for the e¤ect of higher charter value
and capital adequacy requirements on risk-taking incentives. Control of inter-
est rates, together with capital adequacy requirements, are necessary to achieve
a Pareto-e¢ cient allocation of resources.These interest rate controls increase
charter value and provide extra instrument for controlling risk taking. A Pareto
improvement is possible even in the absence of deposit insurance.This requires
that the need to justify bank capital regulation, must ultimately be down to
market failures. If banks can fully internalise the full costs and benets of cap-
ital requirements, then the privately optimal level of capital will coincide with
the socially optimal level  then, there would be no need for policy interven-
tion. For there to be a role for public policy regulation of bank capital, it must
be shown that the capital requirement level chosen at one bank level imposes
welfare-relevant pecuniary externalities on other banks.
In an Arrow-Debreu economy with complete markets, capital structure is ir-
relevant and the standard Modigliani-Miller theorem result holds. The privately
optimal level of capital coincides with the socially optimal level and there is no
justication for regulation. Complete markets act as a perfect substitute for
capital. In the case in which markets are no longer complete, capital structure
becomes determinate but the privately optimal level of capital still coincides
with the socially optimal level. So, the case for public regulation of capital
is again absent. In order to make a case for regulation, heterogeneity must
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be introduced among nancial institutions, for example, banks facing di¤erent
regional liquidity shocks. E¢ ciency would require cross-sectional (interbank)
risk sharing, in which banks basically cross-insure each other against regional
liquidity shocks.
In the absence of complete markets, this e¢ cient cross insurance cannot be
attained. Thus, there is a case for public policy intervention. Irwin, Saporta and
Tanaka (2005) extend the Allen and Gale (2004) setup, by considering a model
of the nancial system with heterogeneous banks and investment fund, within
which nancial crises can arise endogenously. Banks are subject to idiosyncratic
and aggregate risks only whereas investment funds are subject to aggregate risks
only. Banks and investment funds interact through nancial markets but the
authors assume that nancial markets for trading assets are incomplete which
prevent the nancial intermediaries from o¤ering state-contingent contracts that
can replicate complete markets outcome. In the paper, due to di¤erent risk
appetite for investment fund customers and bank customers, investment funds
can be seen as mechanisms that increase the welfare of banks by improving the
risk-opportunities for the banks customers. For high levels of risk aversion,
banks face excessive risks but investment funds face too little risks. For low
levels of risk aversion, the risk proles are inverted across banks and investment
funds.
The consumption allocation does not match the (Pareto optimum) consump-
tion allocation under a complete market thereby leaving scope for welfare im-
proving policies. The focus of the paper is on optimal policies that can be used
to achieve the Pareto optimum consumption prole and to mitigate nancial
instability. Lump sum taxes and transfers between nancial intermediaries can
replicate the complete markets outcome for reasonable degrees of risk aversion,
if they are contingent on the aggregate liquidity.
Liquidity requirements, however, cannot achieve Pareto-e¢ cient consump-
tion allocation . The intuition is steadfast: under reasonable ranges for risk
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aversion coe¢ cient, banks face excess consumption risks whereas investment
funds face too little risks. Increasing banksholdings of liquid assets will re-
duce price volatility and expose bank customers to lower consumption risk, at
the expense of decreasing expected utility of investment funds customers that
would prefer more rather than less consumption risk. Thus, liquidity require-
ments cannot achieve the rst-best outcome. The paper goes on to show how,
regulation of one institutions liquidity position can lead to an inferior welfare
outcome whereas regulation of both institutionsliquidity position can lead to
a higher population-weighted utility.
Pagratis (2005) considers the interaction between liquidity requirements and
LOLR, in a setup in which the central bank performs both, the LOLR activity as
well as designing appropriate regulatory policy. Prudential liquidity regulation is
considered to be a quid pro quo for emergency lending assistance by the central
bank where prudential liquidity is considered to be an implicit insurance to
banks in return for LOLR insurance. In the presence of funding constraints and
possibility of information-based bank runs, the conditions under which liquidity
requirements would be socially desirable, are examined. It follows that liquidity
requirements serve as rst line of defence against banksliquidity problems that
allow the central bank to maintain zero expected cost of LOLR intervention,
while counteracting excessive risk-taking. Thus, the more debt-constrained the
banking sector is, the higher prot opportunities are and the less stable the
deposit base is, the more prudential liquidity regulation is regarded as socially
desirable.
2.4.2 Heterogenous Banks and the Interbank Market
So far, we have been focusing our analysis, in this section, at the case in which
one bank dealt with a nancial market and, how that interaction may lead
to nancial fragility. The essence of the analysis would stay if we focused on
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homogeneous banks. In the presence of heterogeneous banks though, provision
must be made to allow for the presence of the interbank market as a means
of liquidity provision and liquidity shock insurance. As shown in the previous
section, one possible way of interpreting the heterogeneity of banks, would be
to allow for the presence of regional shocks that are negatively correlated across
banks.
The focus of this subsection will be on the market imperfections that may
impinge on the ability of the interbank market to channel resources e¢ ciently
among banks. If there is no aggregate uncertainty and no market imperfec-
tions plaguing the interbank market, there is nothing that prevents an e¢ cient
allocation, as Goodfriend and King (1998) argued. Should any of these imper-
fections arise, the interbank market no longer provides perfect insurance and an
illiquidity problem may turn into insolvency, with system-wide implications.
One source of market imperfection is informational asymmetry banks in the
interbank market may not lend to cash-strapped banks if they do not perfectly
observe the composition of the borrowing banksbalance sheet or if the amount
to be borrowed is too large compared to resources of the lending banks. This
arises because this lack of observation makes it di¢ cult to distinguish between
a case of insolvency and a case of illiquidity. As a result, interbank market
may be channelling loans to cash-strapped banks, against the promise of the
banksassets. But the banks may be willing to liquidate all bad loans (non
performing) from their portfolio, so as to keep the good (performing) ones.
The amount lent by the interbank market may not be su¢ cient to generate their
value in the interbank market.
Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) develop a model in which informational asym-
metry exists among banks, as regards each banks asset composition and the
size of liquidity shock that each bank faces. They show that, in the presence
of such market imperfections, each bank will have an incentive to free-ride on
the holding of liquid assets, since holding liquid assets is costly. The interbank
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market leads to underprovision of liquidity due to free-rider problems. They
allow for interbank lending, in the absence of aggregate risk. The existence of
the interbank market, is to allow banks to borrow and lend to each other.
A banks liquidity and investment needs are private information, observable
to the bank alone. In equilibrium, both type of banks hold the same amount
of reserves the only uncertainty is about the need for liquidity to meet early
withdrawals. Either type of bank may not truthfully reveal its type in the inter-
bank market. If interbank rate is lower than the rate of return on illiquid asset,
the optimal deviation is for both types of banks to borrow from the interbank
market. Since holding liquid assets is costly and, under model parameters, the
return on interbank loan is lower than that of long term investment, there will
be liquidity shortages at the aggregate level, even in the presence of the inter-
bank market. Banks will free-ride on each other for liquidity and underinvest
in liquid assets.
Bhattacharya and Fulghieri (1994) extend the Bhattacharya and Gale (1987)
model, by allowing for uncertainty in the timing of short asset payo¤s. While
the long asset pays o¤ only in period 2, the short asset may pay o¤ in period
1 or 2. Thus, with some positive probability, it may not pay o¤ in period 1
in which case, banks holding it will face a liquidity shortage. The incentive-
constrained second best solution requires that the return on interbank lending
is higher than the return on the long term asset. Thus, banks that have excess
liquidity, will always be compensated for giving away that excess liquidity to
cash strapped banks, through high interest rates. As a result, banks that have
excess liquidity are protable, despite the fact that holding liquid assets is costly.
In equilibrium, banks may over or under-invest in the liquid asset.
Alger (1999) allows a multiple-bank setting, with the presence of credit risks,
as market imperfections, in the interbank market for lending. The model is
very identical to the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) framework, but with the added
feature that the returns to the long technology is stochastic and the illiquid
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asset returns are correlated across banks. In addition, banks are subject to
a probability of being solvent or insolvent, with this possibility of insolvency
being independent of the liquidity shock realisation. The properties of interbank
lending are analysed when banks have rst best level of reserves, in the presence
of credit risks. Following the realisation of liquidity and solvency shocks, there
will be two types of banks: liquid and illiquid banks. A liquid bank that is
insolvent will always lend to an illiquid bank, in a desperate attempt to maximise
the option value associated with its assets. A solvent and liquid bank will only
lend if credit risk is low and the probability that it gets paid back, is high.
Thus, in the presence of a market imperfection in the form of a credit risk,
the interbank market may fail to allocate resources e¢ ciently to cash-strapped
banks.
Robustness and Policy Implications
In this section, we have focused on the inability of the interbank market to
provide funding e¢ ciently due to the existence of nancial frictions or market
imperfections. The ine¢ ciency that result may be strong enough to force other-
wise solvent but illiquid banks into insolvency, with system-wide consequences.
The type of contracts that exist in each model are pre-specied: in Bhattacharya
and Gale (1987), banks write contracts beforehand i.e prior to observing the liq-
uidity shock. In Alger (1999), banks write the contracts after the realisation of
the liquidity shock and turn to the lending markets only ex-post.
In the interbank market for lending, the rst best solution is reached when
the optimal level of liquid reserves can be achieved. If this requirement can be
attained ex-ante, then any form of trading in the interbank market can maintain
it ex-post. In the case of non enforcement of this optimal level of liquid reserves,
the second best is reached. In that case, some form of noisy monitoring, would
constitute some form of Pareto improvement. Bhattacharya and Gale (1987)
thus o¤er a rationale for o¢ cial monitoring of liquid asset holdings by banks,
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suggesting that liquidity shortages may arise as a result of banksincentives to
free ride on interbank liquidity, rather than holding liquid assets themselves.
In the presence of credit risks in the interbank market for liquidity provision,
the rst best level of liquid reserves, no longer guarantees e¢ ciency. As seen in
Alger (1999), banks may be unwilling to lend if credit risks are deemed to be
too high. Possible policy solutions include introducing mechanisms that allow
trade to take place in the interbank market, for example, through central bank
credit lines.
The case for LOLR should also be put into perspective. As aforementioned,
LOLR serves two purposes: [1] prevention of the contagious transmission of an
illiquidity problem across banks and [2] prevention of illiquidity problem at a
crisis-catalyst bank from turning into a bankruptcy one. Regarding the role
of LOLR in dealing with banking crises, Goodfriend and King (1988) argue
that solvent banks could perfectly insure against the possibility of bank runs
via a sophisticated interbank market, suggesting that Central Banks should
focus on maintaining a su¢ cient amount of liquidity in the system, rather than
providing the LOLR facility. However, as we have seen, various forms of market
imperfections prevent the interbank market from operating e¢ ciently and may
turn an illiquidity problem into an insolvency one.
The argument by Donaldson(1992), that cash-abundant banks may abuse
their monopoly power and charge above competitive rates, suggests that there
is a clear cut case for LOLR. Goodhart and Huang (2005) argue that, if the
amount of funding needed is beyond the reach of the interbank market or if the
interbank market is plagued by coordination failure, it will be unable to provide
liquidity to cash strapped banks. They also argue that the interbank market
may not be able to provide insurance against liquidity shocks if these shocks
happen to be systemic, a¤ecting the whole banking system. To quote:
"......(some economists) believe that providing LOLR to individual banks,
rather than to the market as a whole (via open market operations (OMO)), is
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fundamentally misguided.....such economists believe that Central Banks should
not lend to individual banks, e.g., through a discount window; the market is as
well or better informed than the Central Bank about the relative solvency of a
bank short of liquidity. Given an aggregate su¢ ciency of high-powered money,
illiquid (but solvent) banks will be able to borrow in the interbank market, whereas
potentially insolvent banks will be driven out of the system..... direct intervention
may divert the Central Bank from achieving its primary goal of controlling the
monetary aggregates so as to achieve price stability....
......(the rst counterargument to this point ) is the potential for market
failure. For example, when the Bank of New York computer malfunctioned
in 1985 and would not accept incoming payments for bond market dealings, the
resultant illiquidity position soon ballooned to a point where no one counterparty
bank could take on the risk of making a su¢ ciently large loan. It would have
required a coordinated syndicate, but such syndicates take time to organize, and
time was scarce. An even more dramatic example is given by the recent events
of September 11, 2001. The functioning of many markets had been severely dis-
rupted. In this crisis, the Federal Reserve System hugely expanded its discount
window lending to many individual banks ..... Most Central Banks would also
argue that their supervisory role  or their ready access to supervisory infor-
mation should give them additional information, not available in the market.
Moreover, as in the case of the Bank of New York, when there is any large-scale
need to redirect reserves, there must be a "coordination problem". No one
commercial-counterparty can single-handedly assume the credit risk, and there
is no incentive for a single commercial bank to take on the time, e¤ort and
cost of coordinating the exercise of sorting out the problem......" (Goodhart and
Huang5 (2005))
According to Goodhart and Huang (2005), coordination failure may thus
be dened as "a condition where a bank, (or, as in the case of 9/11, a set
5Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol 29, Issue 5, pp 1059-1082 (pp 2-4)
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of banks), is solvent, but illiquid, but the market cannot resolve this di¢ culty,
which would be temporary if resolved quickly" (pp 4). This may be because
of aggregate correlated shocks in the system or credit counterparty limits that
prevent any single banking institution from undertaking the necessary lending.
The latter requires co-ordinated lending from a syndicate of potential lenders.
The syndicate may likewise be unwilling to undertake the transaction costs of
acting as co-ordinator due to system-wide under funding or because markets
themselves are shut, or malfunctioning as on 9/11 or for a variety of other
potential reasons.
Rochet and Vives (2004) argue that, under certain circumstances, LOLR
may be welfare improving. It prevents ine¢ cient liquidation of a banks assets
and improve welfare if the Central Bank has perfect information about banks
fundamentals (i.e can distinguish between a liquid and an illiquid bank). In
most cases, imperfect information may mean that public authorities will be
confronted with a situation in which they do not observe the solvency of banks
they are trying to save through emergency funding. In these instances, they may
face the dilemma open to all policymakers in the face of imperfect information:
that of either providing funding to illiquid banks that are actually insolvent or
that of refusing funding to illiquid banks that are actually solvent. In most
instances, in the face of imperfect information, policymakers need to weight the
benets of providing funding (in terms of preventing illiquidity from turning
into bankruptcy or preventing the spread of a crisis from bank to bank) against
the costs of so-doing (in terms of bailing out insolvent banks, moral hazard costs
and absence of peer monitoring), and come up with an optimal plan. Ostensibly,
this may mean that the optimal plan varies from case to case.
Repullo (2003) also provides conditions under which a LOLR would be wel-
fare improving, by discussing the e¤ect of LOLR activity on holdings of liquid
assets by banks. Due to high costs involved in holding liquid assets, LOLR
may prompt banks to lower their holdings of liquid assets, thereby leading to
more e¢ cient outcomes. Naqvi (2007) shows that, if the supervisory process
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is subject to noise, then the ex-post gains in e¢ ciency, resulting from holding
a lower stock of liquid assets, may be outweighed by the ex-ante ine¢ ciencies
induced by moral hazard, which is conducive to lower rates in the economy.
2.5 Macroeconomic Issues
2.5.1 Financial Accelerator Models
The recent credit crunch crisis of 2007-2008 has highlighted the prominent role
of nancial intermediaries in a¤ecting the real output of the economy. At the
time of writing up this thesis, macroeconomists around the globe, were pon-
dering about the best ways to accommodate the microfoundations of nancial
intermediaries within the conventional macroeconomic paradigm . Indeed, the
pivotal importance of banks in the nancial crisis of 2007-2008, has been suc-
cintly described by Adrian and Shin (2008) as follows6 :
"....Financial intermediaries have been at the centre of the credit market dis-
ruptions that began in year 2007. They have borne a large share of the losses
including securitized subprime mortgages, even though securitization was in-
tended to parcel out and disperse credit risk to those investors who are better
able to absorb the losses. The capacity to lend has su¤ered as intermediaries
have attempted to curtail on their exposure to a level that can be more comfort-
ably supported by their capital. The credit crisis has dampened real activities
such as housing, and has the potential to induce further declines. The events
of the last twelve months have posed challenges for monetary policy and have
given renewed impetus about the interconnections between nancial stability and
monetary policy.
6"Financial Intermediaries, Financial Stability and Monetary Policy" , by Tobias Adrian
and Hyun Sond Shin, Proceedings of the 2008 Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Sympo-
sium at Jackson Hole, August 2008.
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The current credit crisis has the distinction of being the rst post-securitization
crisis in which the banking and capital market have been closely linked. Histori-
cally, banks have always reacted to changes in the external environment expand-
ing lending when the economic environment is benign. However, the increased
importance of intermediaries that mark balance sheets to market both sharpens
and synchronises the responses, giving more impetus to the feedback e¤ects on
the real economy. The potential for adverse real e¤ects are especially strong
when banks respond to credit losses or the onset of more turbulent conditions
by cutting their exposures, reducing lending, and charging higher risk premi-
ums. Prudent risk management dictates such actions, and the script is well
rehearsed...." (pp 1)
While new research is currently under way to try to juxtapose models of
banks and nancial intermediaries within macroeconomic frameworks, the cur-
rent literature focuses on Financial Accelerator models. Financial Accelerator
models deal with the relationship between a nancial system and the real econ-
omy. Unlike models we have seen so far in this chapter, most models under
the realm of nancial accelerator, abstract from nancial intermediation (i.e
do not subject the analytics of the Savings-Investment nexus as part of the
model). Rather, the focus is on how, in the presence of frictions (in the form
of informational asymmetries or limited commitment), nancial systems prop-
agate shocks to the real economy and amplify real business cycles. The result
is excess volatility and larger swings in business cycles, relative to the situation
that would prevail with no frictions. Most nancial accelerator models focus
on the health of debtorsbalance sheets or debtorsnet worth, as the main ve-
hicle through which informational asymmetries propagate a shock to the real
economy.
These nancial accelerator models are taxonomised as thus:
DEBT DEFLATION THEORY The debt-deation theory was advocated by
Irving Fisher in 1930s in the wake of the Great Depression. It highlights the
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importance of (xed) nominal debt as the main propagating mechanism of large
and persistent swings in business cycles. An unexpected deation would cause
an arbitrary redistribution of income from those who have borrowed money in
xed nominal terms to those who have lent money because the amount owed
in real terms is higher. Debtors have higher marginal propensity to consume
than creditors. Thus, the decrease in income that results for debtors exceeds the
increase in income available to creditors. The decline in net worth of borrowers
lead them to cut back on current spending and all future commitments, sending
the economy down further. At an aggregate level, the economy is worse o¤ with
real output declining.
BERNANKE AND GERTLER MODEL (1989, 1990)7 This model considers
optimal nancial contracts in the presence of moral hazard. There is informa-
tion asymmetry in the form of agency costs that lenders have to pay in order
to monitor borrowers accurately. Because it is costly to align the interests of
lenders and borrowers, lenders demand a higher share of the returns from their
investment projects, relative to the case when there is no informational asym-
metry. Thus, external nance is costly relative to any form of internal nance.
The higher internal nance, the lesser the extent to which external nance is
needed and the lower is the external nance premium. This negative relation-
ship, between internal nance and the external premium (cost of investment),
creates some form of mechanism that amplies business cycles when there is
some initial shock. For instance, assume that there is a negative technological
shock that reduces the current and future cash ows of rms . This induces a
greater need for external nancing while raising the rms external funds pre-
mium, and consequently, the costs of new investments. Reduction in investment
will lower economic activity and future cash ows, amplifying and propagating
through time, the e¤ects of the initial technological shock.
KIYOTAKI AND MOORE MODEL (1997) (Refer to Figure 2.8 on next page
7 In the bibliography section, I have included this reference as Bernanke and Gertler (2005).
Both papers were mentioned in the 2005 reference.
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for illustration). In this model, nancial assets act as collateral and also, as
inputs used in the production process. This twinned role of nancial assets
determines the debt limit of borrowers (i.e net worth) and the interaction be-
tween these two roles, creates an implicit asset-price channel. Lenders demand
borrowers to post collateral in order to prevent them from defaulting strategi-
cally. The value of assets as collateral determines the maximum amount that
borrowers can borrow. This debt limit will, in turn, determine the amount of in-
vestment that cash-constrained rms must undertake and, by correspondence,
the demands for factors of production. Since assets also act as inputs, their
prices will be a¤ected. This a¤ects debt capacity and the vicious circle process
goes on.
There are three facts about nancial accelerator models:
[1] The nature of debtorsbalance sheet lies at the heart of the model. In
the debt-deation theory, xed nominal debt determined borrowersnet worth.
In Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990), it is the external nance premium. In
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), it is the value of collateral.
[2] In all cases, the rm undertaking the investment project is cash-constrained.
Thus, the need for external nance arises naturally given that internal nance
alone would not su¢ ce to fund investment projects.
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[3] Business cycles have an asymmetric nature in that they tend to be more
pronounced in downturns than in upturns. Crucially, the stronger the need to
rely on external funds, the stronger the nancial accelerator. During downturns,
an increasing number of rms become cash-strapped because of the direct impact
that downturns may have on their liquidity positions. The need for external
nance is thus strong during economic slowdowns. During upturns, the external
premium decreases and the rms debt capacity increases as the rms balance
sheet improves. Firms rely less on external funds in economic recoveries. The
potency of the nancial accelerator thus varies with the business cycle being
fundamentally strong during recessions and weak during recoveries / booms.
Interestingly, this means that downward swings are larger and exhibit more
persistence than upward swings. This asymmetric nature of swings retains a
powerful implication for the appropriate shape and design of monetary policy.
In those economies in which rms are cash-constrained, the Central Bank needs
to be more aggressive at relaxing monetary policy during downturns than at
tightening monetary policy during upturns.
2.5.2 Banking (Credit) Channel of Monetary Policy
The previous section dealt with how asymmetric information and costly enforce-
ment of contracts create agency problems in nancial markets. As aforemen-
tioned, an external nance premium, which is a wedge between the costs of funds
raised externally (by issuing debt or equity) and the opportunity cost of funds
raised internally (by retaining earnings), has an important role in economic ac-
tivities. The size of the external premium reects the degree of imperfections
in credit markets that drive a wedge between the expected return received by
lenders and the costs faced by borrowers.
It is important to note that, in addition to its e¤ect on interest rates, mon-
etary policy will also a¤ect the external premium in a complementary fashion.
CHAPTER 2. GENERAL LITERATURE REVIEW 89
Thus, the direct e¤ect of monetary policy on interest rates, will be amplied by
changes in the external premium. This supplementary e¤ect helps explain the
potency of monetary policy e¤ects on real output. In particular, two mecha-
nisms have been delineated as linkages between monetary policy and the external
premium: the balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel.
BALANCE SHEET CHANNEL This channel has its roots in the basic
mechanism underpinning the Bernanke and Gertler model (1989), (1990) out-
lined earlier. A more recent contribution is that of Adrian and Shin (2008). In
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), (1990), a borrowers net worth is inversely related
to the external nance premium. Thus, monetary policy will a¤ect the external
premium, through its e¤ects on borrowersnet worth. Through this mechanism,
the quality of debtorsbalance sheet will a¤ect their terms of credit. As a result,
their investment and spending decisions will be a¤ected.
Shifts in policy a¤ect the nancial health of borrowers in several ways. Tight-
ening monetary policy by raising interest rates will directly reduce the net cash
ows of borrowers and dent their investment spending commitments. These high
interest rates are associated with declining asset prices, which may a¤ect bor-
rowerscollateral value and hamper borrowerscredit limits with real e¤ects
on output if borrowers have to cut back on future investment projects. Lesser
collateral also a¤ects lenders since their ability to give loans will be restricted.
There will be adverse selection problems in the lending market with the increase
in market interest rates due to monetary policy tightening in that, only poor
quality borrowers will be willing to borrow at higher rates. Lower net worth
and lesser collateral will also encourage moral hazard from borrowers because
they will have a greater incentive to engage in risky investment projects. Since
taking on riskier investments makes it more likely that lenders will not be paid
back in probabilistic terms, a reduction in the rms net worth will lead to a
decrease in lending and subsequently, in investment spending.
More recently, Adrian and Shin (2008) show how the balance sheet of market-
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based nancial institutions, may provide the key transmission mechanism for
monetary policy through the capital market. They show that monetary policy
that e¤ectively anticipates future deleveraging processes, has a role to play to
prevent the decline in economic activity that accompanies nancial instability
that surrounds deleveraging. The short-term interest rate is an important deter-
minant of the cost of leveraging and interracts with the leverage constraints of
nancial intermediaries. It may prove crucial in determining the size of the bal-
ance sheet of a market-based nancial intermediary. High balance sheet growth
tends to be followed by low interest rate and slow growth in balance sheet tends
to be followed by high interest rate. Adrian and Shin (2008) argue that during
episodes of nancial stability, the short-term interest rate tends to accentuate
uctuations in the size of balance sheets. Thus, this provides a theoretical ra-
tionale for the interconnections between the nancial stability role of a Central
Bank and monetary policy.
BANK LENDING CHANNEL The bank lending channel works on the asset
side of banks and begins with the premise that monetary policy shifts a¤ect the
external nance premium through shifts in the supply of bank loans. Bernanke
and Blinder (1992) nd that, in addition to the traditional e¤ect on interest
rates which works through bank deposits, the transmission of monetary policy
works through bank loans as well. This view recognises the important role
that banks play in channelling funds to small and dispersed borrowers who
often lack access to alternative sources of nance from capital markets. This
speciality of banks to small borrowers give them a comparative advantage in
deriving economies of scope between their borrowing and lending businesses . If
the supply of loans is disrupted, bank dependent borrowers may be shut o¤ from
credit. Thus, decreasing the supply of loans is likely to increase the external
premium and reduce real economic activity. Figures 2.9 and 2.10 (please turn
over for illustration) use illustrations from the Bank of England report8 to depict
how shocks a¤ect the banking system of the UK economy and the real economy.
8Bank of England (BoE) Financial Stability Report, April 2008, Issue 23, pp 50-51.
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Several conditions must hold if there is to be a distinct bank lending channel.
First, bank loans and any alternative source of funding (e.g bonds) must be im-
perfect substitutes among bank assets and for business capital. This assumption
creates a distinct role for bank loans and suggests that they are qualitatively
di¤erent from bonds; second, there exists cash-constrained borrowers who are
too small to borrow in the capital markets and who thus rely extensively on
bank loans for nance; third, the Central Bank is assumed to be able to inu-
ence banksability to lend through appropriate monetary policy; Fourth, there
are imperfect price adjustments in order to allow monetary policy to have real
e¤ects on output.
The credit view is important for several reasons: it highlights the fact that
monetary policy can a¤ect real output without much variation in market in-
terest rates. Since there is a well-determined e¤ect on banksassets, it o¤ers a
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fresh and innovative insight into how improvement in banking system can a¤ect
the e¢ ciency and e¤ectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism. Fur-
thermore, the credit channel can explain the distributional e¤ects of monetary
policy on lenders and borrowers, while the alternative sources of transmission
mechanism (e.g exchange rate channel, asset price channel, interest rate channel
etc) cannot.
In a nutshell, the credit channel highlights the view that bank loans are
di¤erent from alternative sources of nance. Because of banksspecial ability
to deal with small borrowers who lack alternative sources of funding, they can
best cope with any problem of informational asymmetries that may be pertinent
to small borrowers. Thus, any tightening of monetary policy that reduces the
supply of bank loans will starve small borrowers of cash. Ultimately, investment
projects will have to be postponed and real output cut back.
A description of the credit channel will be incomplete without mentioning
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the credit crunch crisis of 2007-2008. What is the relevance of the credit chan-
nel for the credit crunch of 2007-2008 ? An interesting fact about this crisis
is that it concerns nancial intermediaries and nancial markets at the initial
phases but embeds nancial accelerator e¤ects at the latter phases. Through
the securitization process, banks in the US and in Europe engaged in nancial
dis-intermediation by setting up o¤-balance sheet Special Investment Vehicles
(SIVs) that made leveraged investments in asset-backed securities (ABS) and
other structured form of nancing. Securitization was initially praised for slic-
ing, dicing and transferring credit risks to those agents who had a strong risk-
taking appetite and who were ready to handle them. Figure 2.11 (please turn
over for illustration) comes from the Bank of England report9 and intends to
illustrate the transmission mechanism throughout the crisis.
The key starting point of the crisis was a rise in default on US subprime
mortgages which created substantial losses for these SIVs. The next phase
was a general de-leveraging process as mounting losses of condence were re-
ported globally on the true value of ABSs. Due to complex nancial engineering
process, it was hard for policymakers or key observers of the nancial system, to
form an objective opinion about the value of these securities. As risks were re-
intermediated in the banking system, banks found it increasingly hard to borrow
from each other in the interbank market, partially due to hoarding process. The
money market tightened signicantly as rates on short-term borrowing mounted
in the interbank market and cash-strapped banks found it di¢ cult to raise short-
term funding to meet their contractual payment obligations. As a result of being
unable to secure liquidity, banks had to cut on their lending policies. This signif-
icantly a¤ected rms that relied on bank nancing for their investment projects
and, through apparent nancial accelerator e¤ects, engendered a real collateral
damage on the economy.
9Bank of England (BoE) Financial Stability Report, October 2007, Issue 22, pp 41.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we identied the key market failures responsible for creating and
propagating a crisis across banks. Using a well dened taxonomy as depicted in
chart 2.1, we have analysed the resulting implications for policy mitigation. The
proposed categorisation enables us to round up the main arguments as follows:
[1] For models of nancial contagion involving multiple banks and direct bal-
ance sheet links, the theoretical literature suggests that Central Bankers must
pay attention to the network structure as ex-ante crisis prevention measure. If
network structure is inappropriate and contagion occurs, then policy measures
can be administered at the bank experiencing the initial liquidity shock. Be-
cause the contagious e¤ect manifests itself purely from balance sheet links, these
policy measures do not represent an externality to other banks in the setup. By
preserving the balance sheet of the cash-strapped bank, they preserve the bal-
ance sheet of the whole system.
[2] When nancial contagion involves multiple banks and informational ex-
ternalities, increased transparency seems to be the key ex-ante measure. Ex-post
policy measures may work in pre-empting a crisis at the crisis-catalyst bank but
they may have an externality on other banks.
[3] Asset price volatility can act as major transmission channel or source of
nancial fragility, especially if the market for hedging against risks, is incom-
plete. Excess asset price uctuations at a time when banks need liquidity the
most, may result in an undersupply of liquidity to cash-strapped banks. In this
case, repurchase agreements by the Central Bank can be helpful as a corrective
mechanism designed to keep asset prices stable.
[4] For models of nancial fragility based on imperfect information in inter-
bank market, the nature of liquidity underprovision depends crucially on the
form of the market imperfection. According to the existing literature, policy
measures should commensurate with the particularities of these market imper-
fections.
CHAPTER 2. GENERAL LITERATURE REVIEW 96
The innovative approach embedded within the taxonomy that we have adopted,
also enables us to put LOLR activity into perspective. As mentioned in the
main parts of this chapter, LOLR may be carried out either to prevent a cri-
sis at one bank from taking systemic proportions or to prevent an illiquidity
problem from turning into insolvency. The former argument assumes complete
information and can be justied in our taxonomy in the scenario in which banks
are contractually linked through the interbank market in deposits. The latter
argument takes place in a setting in which there is asymmetric information and
can be justied in our taxonomy, where the interbank market may undersupply
liquidity to cash-strapped banks due to market imperfections. In some cases, a
cost-benet analysis must be carried out as the Central Bank may be lending to
banks that are actually insolvent and illiquid while banks that are solvent but
illiquid, may not get the much desired nance.
We have also come across arguments in this chapter showing that, under cer-
tain circumstances, nancial crises can be benign. They may be good because
they discipline bank managers against acting opportunistically (Calomiris and
Kahn (1991)); they provide a commitment device to bankers to use their loan
negotiation skills on behalf on depositors rather than using these skills for their
own personal advantage (Diamond and Rajan (2001a)); they provide contingen-
cies that allow the risk sharing allocation to be achieved (Allen and Gale (1998),
(2004)); (in case of multiple banks) they provide a mechanism that induces peer
monitoring among banks in the interbank market (Rochet and Tirole (1996)).
The main point is that if the by-product of an e¢ cient nancial system is a
nancial fragility or crisis, any attempt to tackle the crisis will impinge on the
ability of the nancial system to operate e¢ ciently. The material embedded in
this chapter will help serve as a valuable screening device for identifying key
topics in the literature in which research work is missing. This will provide an
important springboard (and motivation) for developing models, which we will
do in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, as a way of trying to ll the gaps
identied in the literature.
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Chapter 3
Introduction to Financial
Fragility
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter and in the next two, we will be concerned with addressing the rst
main question we considered in the introduction of this thesis. As a reminder,
the question we are considering is the following: "How can we develop a model
that can endogenously distinguish between banking contagion and correlation in
probability terms, given that they co-exist in a given banking panic transmission
with two banks that have correlated investments?" We will introduce the formal
environment for our banking model in this chapter. The methodological struc-
ture of our equilibrium concept will be developed in chapter 4 and we will
discuss the main ndings in chapter 5.
In settings involving multiple banks with common exposure to a risky sector,
a collapse of all banks will legitimately carry symptoms of bank failures due to
cross-bank positive correlatedness (correlated bank failures) and of banks failing
exclusively because others have failed (contagious bank failures). The concepts of
nancial contagion and correlation occur simultaneously and are siamese twins
in the process of multiple bank collapse. So far, the literature has failed to
100
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provide a robust theoretical account that can realistically enable researchers
and practitioners to distinguish between these two fundamental concepts in a
given banking panic transmission. Our contribution is meant to close that gap.
We are interested in building a model that enables us to detect in probabilistic
terms, how far a given banking collapse event can be attributed as one in which
the collapse occured solely because the banks are commonly linked to some
common fundamental and how far it is one in which one banks performance
has caused the behaviour of depositors of another bank to change so that the
other bank fails. When the notion of causation exists, the transmission of a
crisis from one bank to another is dubbed nancial contagion1 .
What motivates our goal to build such a theoretical model ? Globalisation
of banking activities is a recent trend that highlights the importance of distilling
contagious bank ows from correlatedness. The East Asian crisis of 1997-1998
and the credit crunch crisis of 2007-2008 provide stellar evidence of the fact that
banks have common exposure to risky assets and that a given banking failure
can assume systemic proportions. While our model is a closed-economy ver-
sion of a nancial system, the following example may be used to help illustrate
the intuition behind the motivation of our work: From the point of an indi-
vidual bank, greater geographical dispersion tends to be associated with better
share price performance and better management of idiosyncratic risks. However,
while cross-border diversication of banks seems to be associated with greater
stability and better risk management practices, the nancial system as a whole,
may not become more stable with the potential linkages across countries having
increased. For economies that have correlated macroeconomic performances,
this represents an important aspect of nancial fragility especially if they are
characterised by heavy cross-bank penetration. In the event of a nancial crisis
across countries, an ostensible challenge for its policymakers, as part of its over-
all nancial stability programme, will be to dissociate the contagious impact of
bank failures from the correlated element of such failures since each element will
1See Note C in Appendix (Section A.1) - after the bibliography section at the end of thesis.
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warrant a di¤erent policy action. The issue of di¤erentiating between correla-
tion and contagion will be a major crux that will be further developed in the
subsequent two chapters.
It is the purpose of this chapter to introduce the formal environment of
our framework and to highlight the di¤erences between our approach and that
adopted by other papers in the literature. In section 3.2, we review some no-
table contributions in the existing literature and we provide additional insights
by specically stessing on the di¤erences and novelty of our approach compared
to the existing literature. Section 3.3 provides an overall synopsis of the bank-
ing environment we develop and Section 3.4 develops the formal environment.
Finally, section 3.5 concludes and provides the build-up for subsequent chap-
ters.
3.2 Unearthing the Transmission Mechanism
3.2.1 Contagion vs Interdependence vs Correlation
Real contagionor direct-linkmodels of banking purport that banks are di-
rectly connected through the interbank market, either through the exchange
of interbank deposits or through the exchange of interbank loans or through
the payments and settlements infrastructure. Alternatively, banks may be com-
monly exposed to some fundamental which directly a¤ects their asset perfor-
mance. An example of the latter case is the recent deterioration of credit quality
of the U.S subprime mortgage market in 2006-2007. With signicant number
of banks investing in structured mortgage credit products in America, signs of
deterioration in credit quality of the subprime segment of the U.S housing sector
may deepen and spread to the structured mortgage sector and ultimately a¤ect
these exposed banks contagiously. A third branch of real contagion models focus
on otherwise dissimilar countries or banks but sharing the same investors (port-
folio rebalancing). Most theoretical models of banking contagion with direct
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links, have been focusing on the rst branch.
Leaving aside the banking world, real contagion captures the spread of nan-
cial crisis across countries linked through trade and nancial ows. Important
as these conduits of nancial disasters are, these direct linkages were nonethe-
less weak in contagion of the Tequila crisis from Mexico to Argentina and Brazil
in 1994-95, countries in East Asia a¤ected by the crisis of 1997 and the ripple
e¤ect of the Russian default in 1998 on many emerging market economies. This
inability of real contagion models to explain the recent propagation of nan-
cial crises across emerging markets, makes the case for pure contagionmodels
stronger as natural candidate o¤ering pertinent explanation of these events.
Models of pure contagionstress on the di¤erent uses of information, as pos-
sible channel explaining how a failure may propagate from one bank to another,
even though banks are not directly linked through fundamentals. The basic
mechanism propagating shocks across banks is the shift in investor sentiment
through changes in perceptions. Some of the leading explanations for nancial
contagion, especially after the Russian default of 1998, are based on changes
in psychology, attitude, investor behaviour. In fact, many economies that
have experienced nancial contagion recently had strong macroeconomic fun-
damentals and blame the contagious e¤ects they have su¤ered on the harmful
and corruptinginuence of investor psychology in other countries.
The interested reader is requested to read chapter 2 of this thesis for an
idea of pure and real contagion papers in the literature of banking theory. A
natural conundrum in building theoretical models of nancial contagion is to
elaborate on the precise concept of contagion to be adopted. The latter is cru-
cial for explaining the nature of the transmission mechanism and for the design
of key policies required to contain the undesirable e¤ects. There is considerable
ambiguity concerning the precise denition of contagion and di¤erent interpre-
tations of contagion have been provided in the literature. There is no theoretical
or empirical denition on which economists agree.
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Direct-link theories stress on a fundamental-based denition of contagion,
often interpreted as the propagation of shocks through direct linkages connect-
ing banks. This denition nonetheless stresses on the existence of an underlying
transmission mechanism that remains the same in all states of the world: non-
tranquil states and tranquilstates. Thus, direct-link models will describe the
transmission of a a crisis from Brazil to Argentina, for example, as a case of
contagious ow. The Argentinean stock market rose and fell with the Brazilian
market during the crisis of 1999. Brazil and Argentina are located in the same
geographical region, are at the same stage of economic development, have many
similarities in terms of their market structure and in their trade and nancial
links patterns. In all states of the world, these two economies remain strongly
connected. Thus, it is not surprising that a negative shock in Brazil is strongly
passed on to Argentina. If such a transmission represents merely a continua-
tion of the same cross-market linkages that exist in tranquil and non-tranquil
times, then this crisis does not represent contagion, but rather interdependence.
Nonetheless, direct-link theories will describe this as a case of contagion.
In an empirical study of European interest rates, Pesaran and Pick (2007)
highlight the importance of distinguishing between interdependence and con-
tagion for econometric purposes. The distinction between these two concepts
has not been considered by theoretical models of contagion. In Allen and Gale
(2000) and Dasgupta (2004), banks cross-hold deposits as insurance against re-
gional liquidity shocks. The main channel of panic transmission is the interbank
market in deposits and cross-bank linkages remain the same before and after a
crisis. The main point of such interdependenceis that in tranquil periods, the
interbank market provides the channel for cross-regional insurance but in crisis
periods, the interbank market provides the main conduit that spreads a crisis
from bank to bank..
We construct a microfounded model of contagion that is a theoretical adap-
tion of the observation of Pesaran and Pick (2007) and we bypass key con-
ceptual problems by adopting a modelling structure that yields contagion as a
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concept that approaches the spirit of shift contagion, concocted by Forbes and
Rigobon (2002). Working on observed trends in Latin America depicting a high
degree of comovement within Latin American economies and across emerging
markets in general, especially the bonds market, Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
describe contagion as one in which the cross-market linkages across countries
increase during a crisis period compared to that of a normal period - the notion
of shift contagion. Thus, in a world with comovements in asset prices, conta-
gion will only be taken to represent the case when there is an increase in this
correlatedness in certain states of the world (crisis periods) as compared others
(normal periods). Cases in which the cross-market linkages remain una¤ected
and continue to exist in all states of the world, are cases which merely illustrate
interdependence not contagion2 . Our approach intends to be a major tour-de-
force in the literature of banking panic transmission by providing a state-of-art
account of contagion a¯-la Forbes and Rigobon (2002), while addressing a number
of economic issues that have been conned to oblivion - and which we believe,
are at the core of any study of banking panic transmission.
3.3 Brief Summary of our Banking Environment
The banking environment can be summarised as follows: there are two banks in
the economy, each of which spans a particular region of the economy. At the ini-
tial period, t = 0; depositors in both regions invest their endowment in the bank
of their region. These depositors face liquidity shocks of the Diamond-Dybvig
(1983) type and can consume early or late. There is no aggregate uncertainty
about liquidity shocks in the model. In return for accepting deposits, banks
o¤er depositors demand deposit contracts that allow depositors to withdraw
either in the interim period t = 1 or the nal period t = 2; depending on
the realisation of the liquidity shock (which is only known at the beginning of
2See note F in Appendix (Section A.1).
CHAPTER 3. INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL FRAGILITY 106
period t = 1): Both banks invest in a hedge fund, which consists of two risky
portfolios, one for each bank, at t = 0: The performance of each banks portfolio
depends on the banks idiosyncratic fundamental (e.g the quality of the banks
management) as well as a common macroeconomic fundamental to which both
banks are positively exposed.
Each banks idiosyncratic fundamental and the common macroeconomic fun-
damental are not common knowledge, although their probability distributions
are at time t = 0. Depositors in each bank noisily observe their banks idiosyn-
cratic fundamental through some private signal structure. For each depositor of
a given bank, this private signal contains information about his banks idiosyn-
cratic fundamental as well as strategic information on the behaviour of other
depositors of the same bank. For the sake of simplicity, we shall denote this
coordination game between depositors, as  A;t=1and  B;t=1 for bank A and B
respectively.
Furthermore, in the spirit of dynamic Bayesian games, nature picks up at
random the rst movers of the game. We will assume that depositors in bank
A move rst and depositors in bank B move second. The latter depositors ob-
serve a public information encapsulating the event in bank A. Depositors are
Bayesian agents. Due to incomplete information of the game structure (de-
positors in bank B do not know whether those in bank A do not observe the
common fundamental), we assume that they use the public information about
bank A as a strategic learning tool to update their beliefs about the state of
the common macroeconomic fundamental. Along the equilibrium path, each
group of depositors plays a best-response action. Those in bank A play a best
response after observing their private signals about their banks idiodyncratic
fundamentals and after taking into account the prior probability of the common
macroeconomic fundamental. Those in bank B play a best response after ob-
serving their private signals and the event in the rst bank. The event in the
rst bank actually leads them to update their prior beliefs about the state of the
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common macroeconomic fundamental so that their bank may face a similar fate
as the rst bank. The mechanics of beliefs updating by depositors of the second
bank, constitutes the informational spillover mechanism in our setup. In the
presence of correlated risky investment, an interesting aspect of this approach
is to consider the circumstances in which bank B will if and only if bank A has
failed. In subsequent two chapters, we use this foundation to develop a theoret-
ical paradigm that enables us distill between the contagious and the correlated
elements in a given banking crisis transmission process.
Our approach di¤ers from the existing papers of banking contagion in the
literature on a number of fronts. Like in Dasgupta (2004), we consider a banking
environment with two banks and we use the global games approach to charac-
terise the existence of a trigger equilibrium. Allen and Gale (2000) and Chen
(1999) do not use the global games approach to pin down the existence of equi-
librium. Dasgupta (2004) considers two uncorrelated banks that are essentially
linked through the interbank market channel. Our modelling structure is di¤er-
ent because there are no direct links (like interbank market) across banks and
we allow banks to be naturally correlated from their portfolio investment. An-
other di¤erence with Dasgupta (2004) is that we allow for strategic interractions
between depositors of the two banks. The presence of dynamic Bayesian struc-
ture with private signals for depositors of each bank and a public signal that
enables strategic inferences for depositors in the second bank, allows for such
strategic interractions. We model the public signal as a strategic informational
spillover mechanism for depositors of the second bank. In Dasgupta (2004),
the event in the rst bank is not a publicly observable variable to depositors
of the second bank. Thus, there are no informational spillovers. This leads to
the absence of strategic interractions between depositors of the two banks. An
important consequence of this is that the derivation of the equilibrium is done
in Dasgupta (2004), assuming there is only one bank. Thus, even though there
are two banks, the nature of the game is similar to that of a static coordination
game of incomplete information. Our dynamic approach is more complicated
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due to the presence of strategic interractions across banks and we are bound to
consider the links between a dynamic equilibrium concept and trigger equilib-
rium. Studying these notional issues of equilibrium, by itself, constitutes an
important contribution that we make to economic theory and, is the treatise of
chapter 4.
Our equilibrium concept is di¤erent to Dasgupta (2004). Like in Allen and
Gale (2000), Dasgupta (2004) explains contagion as an event that takes place
across banks through the interbank market channel. Thus, the concept of con-
tagion is explained from the perspective of interdependence. Our approach
explains contagion from the perspective of excess correlation, which has been
shown to be a more robust concept of contagion, following the work of Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) and of Pesaran and Pick (2007). Furthermore, our in-
novative approach enables us to simultaneously explain three puzzles in the
literature of contagion which we will explain in details in chapter 5. These
puzzles include: [1] (zero-Link puzzle) contagion spreads across banks that are
not connected directly; [2] (clustering puzzle) contagion tends to be clustered
among identical banks only; [3] (avoidance puzzle) among identical banks, some
can avoid a contagious failure whereas others cannot. Allen and Gale (2000)
and Dasgupta (2004) cannot explain the three puzzles since, by construction,
the banks in these models (all identical) are always connected by the interbank
market. Furthermore, compared to single-bank models like Diamond and Dyb-
vig (1983), Allen and Gale (2000) and Dasgupta (2004) do not add additional
insights to the nature and design of policies that Central Banks should imple-
ment at crisis-catalyst banks. Our dynamic approach with interractions across
banks and informational spillovers, allows us to contribute to the debate about
the nature of policymaking in a way that is not captured by single-bank models.
We conjecture that, in a two-bank setting, the presence of public signals may
mean that policy implemented at one bank, leads to intertemporal substitution
of banking crisis in the economy. We conjecture that this contribution places
our model very well to explain the recent Northern Rock nancial crisis of 2007,
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compared to alternative models in the literature.
Another important work in the existing literature is the work of Chen (1999).
The latter considers informational spillovers through Bayesian updating across
two banks. Our paradigm di¤ers from Chen (1999) on a number of fronts. Chen
(1999) does not use equilibrium selection techniques to get rid of multiplicity
of equilibria. As we explained in chapter 1, allowing for multiplicity of equi-
libria poses a problem for modelling nancial contagion. If a model is silent
about the occurrence of a particular outcome in one bank, it cannot explain
how an event will ow from one bank to another as an equilibrium event. Chen
(1999) uses strong assumptions to get rid of this problem. While acknowledging
the existence of multiple equilibria in the rst bank, the model analyses the
transmission of a crisis based on informational spillovers while assuming a given
event in the rst bank. Our approach is more robust since we are capable of
getting rid of multiplicity of equilibria automatically through the global games
approach. Furthermore, unlike Chen (1999), we have a dynamic Bayesian struc-
ture with strategic interractions across banks. Finally, our rigorous theoretical
underpinning enables us endogenously distinguish between the correlated and
contagious elements of a given crisis in probability terms. Chen (1999) does
not consider this distinction. Finally, our approach enables us to make events
across banks (correlation vs contagion), a function of the vital interplay between
private signals and the public signal. We are capable of relating a contagious
event to some underlying informational structure in the banking system. This
is completely new to the literature of banking contagion3 .
Figure 3.1 (please turn next page) summarises these main di¤erences between
our approach and that of other key contributions in the literature.
3Hellwig (2002) considers a similar question in a stylized static coordination game of in-
complete information. We will turn to this idea in more details in chapter 5.
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3.4 The Model
The economy is divided into two ex-ante identical regions, A and B. The re-
gional structure can be a spatial metaphor. There are three periods, t = 0; 1; 2:
Each region contains one commercial bank which accepts deposits of money
from consumers and invest the proceedings in di¤erent technologies. There is a
continuum of risk-neutral consumers having strictly increasing and linear pref-
erence functions, and, being depositors in the bank of their region. As in the
literature of bank runs, the set of depositors can be represented by a unit inter-
val [0; 1] with measure equal to one and the fraction of agents in any subset can
be represented by its Lebesgue measure. Each agent lives for three periods only
and is endowed with one unit of a homogeneous good at t = 0 and deposits his
endowment in the bank of his region at t = 0. The alternative to investing in the
bank would be for each depositor to costlessly invest in some external storage
technology that yields a return of 1 at time t + 1 unit for each unit deposited
at time t. We assume that there is no Central Bank and no nancial markets
in the model and that only banks have a comparative advantage in providing
liquidity.
3.4.1 Returns Stucture and Banks Investment Technolo-
gies
Each bank can either invest in a safe-and-liquid technology or in a risky-and-
illiquid technology. One unit deposited at t yields exactly one unit at t +
1 under the safe-and-liquid technology. This technology could represent cash
reserves that the banks have to keep (by statutory liquidity requirements) to
meet demand for early withdrawals4 . The risky-and-illiquid technology could be
viewed as a hedge fund and its returns structure is more extricate: we assume
that the hedge fund consists of two risky portfolios and each bank invests in
4Thus, the banking system we are referring to here is a fractional reserve system.
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one of the risky portfolios. The returns of each portfolio in the hedge fund, will
be assumed to be positively related. More specically, the portfolio of bank i
yields a return of ~Ri in period t = 2; where i is regarded as the idiosyncratic
fundamental of bank i: Thus, for banks A and B, returns ~RA and ~RB will be
realised in period t = 2 under their risky technologies, and ~RA and ~RB , will be
assumed to be positively linked to some exogenous macroeconomic fundamental,
u. Each banks risky investment technology is divisible and can be liquidated
in the interim period to meet, say, the excess demand for early withdrawals.
We assume that if bank i liquidates its portfolio in period t = 1; it obtains an
exogenous return of r (< 1) from the liquidated portfolio 5- meaning that there
are costs to early liquidation. Furthermore, for bank i; the returns from the risky
portfolio of the hedge fund, can be 0; Rmax; ~Ri;depending on the relationship
between model parameters. This is nicely summed up in Figure 3.2:
FIGURE 3.2: Returns Structure of the Risky Portfolio for Bank i
If investment is liquidated prematurely, the return is: r < 1 at time
t = 1
If investment is carried on till time t = 2
~Ri =
8>>><>>>:
Rmax if i > u + zi
~R(i; u) u  i  u + zi
0 i < u
9>>>=>>>;
where 0 < ~Ri < Rmax
Interpretation:
5Thus, our emphasis on the positive link between ~RA and ~RB , holds in period t = 2 only.
If bank A prematurely liquidates its portfolio and earns r, this does not mean that bank B
will have to liquidate its asset in the hedge fund as well.
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Let j = fG;Badg denote fGood State; Bad Stateg and i = fA;Bg denote
fBank A, Bank Bg :
[1] We distinguish between two fundamentals that are relevant for our analy-
sis: each banks idiosyncratic fundamental and a macroeconomic fundamental
that is common to both banks. Parameter i simply denotes bank is idiosyn-
cratic fundamental. We assume that it is drawn randomly from some uniform
density on a unit interval. Each depositor in bank i can only noisily observe i
but the underlying probability distribution supporting i is common knowledge
to all depositors. We also make the important assumption that, once a value
for i is realised at t = 0, it does not change throughout the whole experiment.
We return to a more formal analysis of each banks idiosyncratic fundamental
in section 3.1.
[2] Parameter u represents the state of some macroeconomic fundamental
that a¤ects each bank: It is independent of a banks idiosyncratic fundamental,
i. The two distinguishing features of u are as follows: (i) it represents either
a Good (denoted G) or Bad (denoted Bad) macroeconomic state that a¤ects
each bank . If a particular state of the world occurs, it a¤ects both banks in the
same way. For e.g, if the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental is
bad, it will be so for both banks. The exact realisation of the state of the com-
mon macroeconomic fundamental is not observed by depositors but the (prior)
probability distribution underlying the binary states is common knowledge. For
simplicity, we assume that P (uBad) = 1   P (uG) = k; with uBad > uG: The
common macroeconomic fundamental is realised at t = 0 and we assume that its
realisation (which is never observed) remains stationary throughout the exper-
iment6 ;(ii) because of the assumption enshrined in (b) (i), it follows that there
is an implicit positive linkage between the returns of ~RA and ~RB in that, both
~RA and ~RB ; move in the same direction with the common fundamental.
6The state of the common fundamental can never shift between good and bad throughout
our experiment.
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[3] Parameter z denotes the loss caused by premature early withdrawals of
deposits from the bank, where the proportion of early withdrawals by patient
depositors is denoted by i, 0  i  1: The greater z is, the greater the disrup-
tion caused and the greater is the likelihood that u + zi is high relative to the
particular realisation of i for bank i. Note that, by adopting the specication as
in Table 1, one can see that, for extreme values of the idiosyncratic fundamental
i;the returns to the long asset depend exclusively on the value of the idiosyn-
cratic fundamental i: Before moving further, we make the following structural
assumptions about parameter values: [a:1] uG > 0; [a:2] uBad + z < 1; [a:3]
uBad < uG + z; [a:4] P (uBad) = 1   P (uG) = k; [a:5] P (uBad) > P (uG) with
uBad > uG:
3.4.2 Dominance Regions
A worst casescenario is one in which the state of the common macroeconomic
fundamental is bad (uBad) and everybody withdraws money from the bank
( = 1); if i is high enough that it exceeds {uBad+zg; then Figure 3.3 suggests
that the returns to the investment project should be Rmax: This suggests that
even in the worst case scenario when every depositor withdraws prematurely,
i is strong enough to be dominant ( i.e determines long term returns.) In the
best case scenario (i.e one in which the state of the common fundamental is
good (uG) and nobody withdraws prematurely (i.e i = 0), the risky project
for bank i may still fail if the value of i is so low that it lies below uG: These
case scenarios depict an important result for the returns structure of the risky-
and-illiquid technology: Regions

i : [i > u
Bad + z] [ [i < uG]
	
depict those
segments of the i   space for which i is strictly dominant i.e can always
ruin or save the risky project and become the overriding determinant of the
risky technology. The intermediate region

i : u
G  i  uBad + z
	
rules out
any possibility of i dominance and an interraction between di¤erent model
parameters will determine the outcome of the project.
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Given assumptions [a:1]  [a:5] above, we summarise the following features
of ~Ri for any bank i: [a] 8 i < uG; ~Ri = 0; [b] 8 i > uBad + z; ~Ri =
Rmax; [c] 8 i s.t fu  i  u+ zg ; where either states of u may be realised, ~Ri
has the following properties: [c:1] For xed i; ~Ri decreases with the common
fundamental getting into its bad state (see Figure 3.4 (b) at the end of this
chapter) - what this is saying is that, for some bank i, moving from a good state
(uG) to a bad one (uBad) will lower returns, other factors remaining xed ; [c:2]
for a xed realisation of the common macroeconomic fundamental, ~Ri increases
with i in the relevant range of fundamentals being considered (see Figure 3.4
(a) on next page); [c:3] for xed i and xed state of the common fundamental,
~Ri rotates downwards with z (see Figure 3.4 (c ) at the end of this chapter);
[c:4] for xed i; a decrease in the proportion of early withdrawals by depositors,
i; will rotate ~Ri upwards (see explanation on Figure 3.4 (d) in the graphical
appendix); [c:5] for a given state of the common macroeconomic fundamental ,
as i ! 0; ~Ri ! 0 i¤ i ! u ; as i ! 1; ~Ri ! Rmax i¤ i ! u + z . [Figures
3.4 (b)-(d ) in the graphical notes that appear at the end of this chapter, show
the relationship between the returns structure of bank is risky portfolio and
di¤erent fundamentals.]
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3.4.3 Payo¤ Structure to Depositors in Each Bank
As in all models of bank runs, we assume that depositors in each bank face
liquidity preference shocks i.e each of the depositors can consume early ( i.e at
t = 1) with probability  and late ( i.e at t = 2) with probability 1 : There is
a privately observed uninsurable risk of being patient or impatient, with there
being no aggregate liquidity uncertainty in the economy. The probability dis-
tribution of liquidity preference shocks is assumed to be common knowledge.
Ex-ante, each depositor has an equal and independent chance of being of impa-
tient type. Thus, for each bank, the proportion of impatient depositors is  and
the proportion of patient depositors is 1   : It is at the beginning of period
t = 1 that depositors learn their type.
In return for accepting depositorsmoney endowments, each bank o¤ers de-
mand deposit contracts to depositors. There are two states of the world to be
contrasted for modelling these contractual obligation payments. Before pro-
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ceeding to a formal analysis of these states, lets turn to characterisation of the
banks optimal investment plan at time t = 0 under the assumption that there
is no bankruptcy. We temporarily assume that the deposit contract promises to
pay c1 to impatient depositors and a stochastic amount c2 to patient depositors.
We also assume that by adopting this term structure of demand deposit pay-
ments, the bank implicitly satises the participation constraints of depositors
and induces them to invest their endowments in period t = 0 in the bank rather
than in some external storage technology. Each bank has an asset portfolio com-
prising a fraction of y being earmarked to its short-and-liquid asset and x to
its long-and-illiquid asset. The portfolio satises the constraint that x+ y = 1:
While depositors face uncertainty ex-ante about their liquidity needs, banks do
not face such uncertainty. The liquidity needs for depositors are mutualised so
that, by the law of large numbers, the banks can reasonably expect a fraction
 of depositors to withdraw early and a fraction 1   to withdraw late. Thus,
each bank chooses its portfolio plan such that, in period t = 1, c1 = y: Absent
bank runs, the amount paid to impatient depositors must satisfy the participa-
tion constraint provided by the external storage technology7 i.e c1 = 1. Due to
the resulting equivalence between  and y , each bank can earmark a fraction
 to its liquid asset and a fraction 1   to its illiquid asset8 .
What if there is not enough cash available to meet the demand for with-
drawals in period t = 1 ? In this case, the bank is compelled to liquidate its
risky asset and to divide the resulting proceeds of the liquidated asset equally
among those who have chosen to withdraw early. We consider some denitions
before engaging in formal analysis of deposit payments.
Denition 3.1 (Banking Crisis) The bank enters a state of crisis if it is
forced to liquidate its long-and-risky asset.
7Given our earlier assumption on risk neutrality, the need to provide insurance to impatient
depositors disappears.
8For the rest of the paper, we shall drop c1 and c2; and replace them directly by the
amounts that these parameters command from the banks balance sheet.
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Denition 3.2 (Bankruptcy Zone) Bank i stops being a going-concern
at t = 2 if and only if it is in a state of crisis as per denition 1 and if
f+ i(1  )g > f+ r(1  )g i.e if i > r in the rst period:
Denition 3.3 (No Bankruptcy Zone) A bank that is in crisis as per
denition 1, continues to be a going-concern in period t = 2 if i  r9 in the
rst period:
Following the previous discussion, a proportion  of depositors in bank i
is impatient. Suppose that a proportion i of the patient depositors wants to
withdraw at t = 1: The total demand for liquidity that bank i faces is thus
f+ i(1  )g :Where does the bank draw its supply of liquidity to meet high
early demand? It has  in the liquid technology. It may also draw upon its
illiquid technology and use the resulting proceeds to meet high demand for
early withdrawals. The total supply of liquidity is thus f+ r(1  )g 10 : If the
total demand for early withdrawals exceed the available pool of assets that the
bank can make available, then the bank is technically bankrupt at t = 1: This
helps us characterise the bankruptcy threshold of the bank.
The importance of the bankruptcy threshold is that it determines the term
structure of payments allocation for depositors as well as the liquidationrule
for the risky asset. The concept of liquidity rule is self-explanatory. In the
bankruptcy zone, the whole risky asset is liquidated when patient depositors
choose to withdraw early. Thus, there are no leftovers for those who have
chosen to stay till period t = 2: In the no-bankruptcy zone, only a fraction of
the risky asset is liquidated. The remaining portion is carried forward till period
t = 2: Suppose that i > r (i.e Bankruptcy condition). Depositors who choose
to withdraw early appropriate the whole proceeds that the bank can generate
at t = 1. Each depositor gets an amount +r(1 )+i(1 ) ;with utility U
h
+r(1 )
+i(1 )
i
:
Since i > r, clearly,
+r(1 )
+i(1 ) < 1. Utility functions, being an increasing
9Thus, a bank in crisis may still carry on operation provided it has enough to pay all those
who claim back their deposits.
10Technically, the amount supplied should be represented as fy + r(1  y)g :
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function of payo¤s, this implies U
h
+r(1 )
+i(1 )
i
< U(1): The depositor is worse
o¤than when he received his full endowment back. Those patient depositors who
do not choose to imitate the impatient ones and who have chosen to withdraw
at t = 2, get a payo¤ of zero, with utility U(0):
Suppose now that i  r (i.e No-Bankruptcy condition). Those depositors
who claim early withdrawals get their whole endowment back with utility U(1).
With this condition, to satisfy the demand for early withdrawals, only a pro-
portion of illiquid assets has to be liquidated and is i(1 )r : The leftover of
illiquid assets that is carried on till t = 2 to nance the withdrawals of pa-
tient depositors is thus:
n
(1  )  i(1 )r
o
~Ri. Each of the patient depositors
shares this leftover, appropriated by the exact proportion of depositors who are
claiming this leftover. Each depositor thus gets
n
(1 )  i(1 )r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)

with utility
U
n
(1 )  i(1 )r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)

. To summarise, the payo¤ structure for each depositor
of bank i takes the following form:
Demand Deposit Contract Payments in a Banking Crisis State:
Bankruptcy (i > r ) vs Non-Bankruptcy Zone (i  r )
 For impatient depositors and the proportion of patient depositors who
choose to withdraw early:
Ut=1 =
8<: U(1) i  rU h +r(1 )+i(1 )i i > r
9=;
 For the proportion of patient depositors who withdraw late:
Ut=2 =
8><>: U
n
(1 )  i(1 )r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)

i  r
U(0) i > r
9>=>;
Demand Deposit Contract Payments in a Non-Banking Crisis State:
 For impatient depositors,
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Ut=1 = U (1)
 For patient depositors
Ut=2 = U (Ri)
The following table summarises the relationship between the net payo¤ to
staying for a typical depositor of a bank as a function of the two states of the
world:
FIGURE 3.5 : Net Payo¤ to Withdrawing
No Banking Crisis Banking Crisis Banking Crisis
NBC BC
 = 011   r  > r
Staying U (R) U
f(1 )  (1 )r g ~R
(1 )(1 )

U(0)
Withdrawing U (1) U(1) U
h
+r(1 )
+(1 )
i
Net Payo¤
U (R)
 U (1)
U
f(1 )  (1 )r g ~R
(1 )(1 )

 U(1)
U(0)
 U
h
+r(1 )
+(1 )
i
3.4.4 Structural Parameter Restrictions and Features of
Payo¤ Structure
Under the Bankruptcy-Condition (BC) with i > r, U
h
+r(1 )
+i(1 )
i
> U(0):
This result holds sway because of the feature that 0  +r(1 )+i(1 )  1. The
net payo¤ to staying as opposed to withdrawing is therefore negative in the BC
threshold.
11No patient depositors withdraw early and no risky asset is liquidated prematurely.
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Under the No-Bankruptcy-Condition (NBC) with i  r, the relationship
between U
n
(1 )  i(1 )r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)

and U(1);depends on the location of i in the
NBC segment. More precisely, there exists a #
0@equal to r

R 1


R r
1A ; at which
U
n
(1 )  i(1 )r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)

= U(1): For 0   <
r

R 1


R r
; U
n
(1 )  i(1 )r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)

>
U(1): Thus, it is strictly preferable to stay. For
r

R 1


R r
  < r; U
n
(1 )  i(1 )r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)

<
U(1): Here, it is strictly preferable to withdraw12 . The relationship between the
payo¤ to staying and payo¤ to withdrawing, can be shown in Figure 3.6 (please
turn over for illustration).
3.5 Information Structure
3.5.1 Private Signal structure
As mentioned before, we assume that depositors cannot observe the idiosyncratic
fundamental of their bank and do not observe the actual realisation of the
common macroeconomic fundamental. While impatient depositors in each bank
have a dominant strategy of withdrawing in period t = 1, patient depositors face
a coordination problem in period t = 1 as regards their decision of whether to
stay or withdraw. Their decision is based on their informational endowment at
12Here is the proof: Since U [:] is linear and strictly increasing, condition
Ui
"n
(1 )  i(1 )
r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)
#
= Ui(1) implies that
n
(1 )  i(1 )
r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i) = 1: Making i subject of
formula, will lead to the following: # =
r

R 1


R r
: Since Ui
"n
(1 )  i(1 )
r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)
#
is decreas-
ing in i; it follows that for i < #; Ui
"n
(1 )  i(1 )
r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)
#
> Ui(1): A similar analysis
will show that Ui
"n
(1 )  i(1 )
r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)
#
< Ui(1) if i > #
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the time of acting. From now onwards, we drop the subscript i from all relevant
variables (except for i) because the analysis is same for either bank.
Each patient depositor noisily observes the idiosyncratic fundamental of his
bank, i: A depositors private signal can be viewed as his private heterogeneous
information available to him regarding his opinion about the long term viability
of the banks investment project. We motivate the construction of the signal
space by focusing on that part of the space that allows for strategic interraction
among depositors i.e each agent receives a signal s that forms part of interval
[sL; sU ]; where sL denotes the lower bound of the signal space and sU denotes
the upper bound13 . The point behind such formalisation is that it enables us
di¤erentiate between the segment of idiosyncratic fundamental in which the
behaviour of depositors can be anticipated for sure and the part that allows for
strategic interraction between depositors.
Each agents signal s is assumed to be independent and identically distrib-
uted, conditional on i: Thus, s denotes the type of the depositor . To keep the
analysis simple bearing in mind the above features, for bank i; we shall model
the relationship between s and i as follows: s = i + " where " denotes the
noise technology. We assume that the noise technology is common knowledge
and is uniformly distributed on a closed interval [ ";+"]: Each element of " is
independent of i and of other disturbance elements. Let sL denote the signal
that corresponds to uG   " and let sU correspond to uBad + z + ": There ex-
ists a tripartite classication of the s   space ( i.e the signal space) such that
s 2 fs : suntable [ smod erate [ sstableg where suntable =

s : 0  s < uG   "	 ;
smod erate = fs : uG   "  s  uBad + z + "g; sstable =

uBad + z + " < s  1	 :
The interpretation of that tripartite classication is self-explanatory: suntable =
13Formally, let  denote the set of all lower bound ; where  =

uG; uBad
	
: Since
uBad > uG; the greatest lower bound is the realisation of  that corresponds to state uG:
Similarly, we dene 0 as the set of upper bound ; where 0 = fuG + z; uBad + zg: Since
uBad + z > uG + z; the greatest upper bound is the realisation of  relating to uBad + z:
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
s : 0  s < uG   "	 denotes the (unstable) region in which the depositors of
a given bank always withdraw, no matter what others of the same bank do;
sstable =

uBad + z + " < s  1	 denotes the (stable) region in which the de-
positors always stays; smod erate = fs : uG   "  s  uBad + z + "g denotes
the middle segment which typies that the bank is sound but is vulnerable
to a large attack that triggers a regime change. Because of uniform distribu-
tion of i and of "; it turns out that the an idiosyncratic fundamental in the
range 0  i < uG   2"; is a guarantee that all agents receive signals in the
suntable =

s : 0  s < uG   "	 zone. Similarly, a fundamental in the range
uBad + z + 2" < i  1; is a guarantee that all agents receive signals in the
sstable =

uBad + z + " < s  1	 zone. We make the following remarks14 about
the choice of s in the signal range:
Remark 3.1: (No-Dominance signal segment) Attention will be re-
stricted to the segment of the signal space in which there is strategic interraction
(i.e Dominance is ruled out). This means that s lies in interval [sL;sU ] ; where
sL  uG   " and sU  uBad + z + ".
Remark 3.2: (Uniformity of Prior and Posterior distribution)While
the prior distribution of the idiosyncratic fundamental is common knowledge and
follows the uniform distribution law, the posterior distribution of the idiosyn-
cratic fundamental, through specic restrictions on the degree of precision of
the signals, will also follow the uniform distribution law. The necessary and
su¢ cient condition for that restriction on the noise structure is: 2" < uG:
Proof: In Technical Appendix (section A.2).
It is important to note that, in our framework, it is impossible for depositors
of a given bank to meet, share their information and learn the true value of i
through the Law of Large Numbers (LLN).
14These follow from Morris and Shin (1998). We adapt them in the context of our model
here
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3.5.2 Public Information Structure
Dene  i;t=1; i = fA;Bg ; as the stage game for withdrawal decision by patient
depositors of bank i in period t = 1: For patient depositors acting in  B;t=1, in
addition to their private signal sB about their banks idiosyncratic fundamental
B , they observe a (non-empty) set of (historical) events that have taken place in
 A;t=1. Let 
A be the space of events in bank A15 . The event 
A = fSA; FAg 
fSuccess of Bank A, Failure of Bank Ag is commonly observed by all depositors
who act in  B;t=1 and forms part of their informational endowment. Some
qualitative features of the public signal include:
[1] The public event in the rst bank can be used as a learning mechanism
by depositors in  B;t=1to update beliefs about the state of the common macro-
economic fundamental. Since the game structure is assumed not to be common
knowledge, depositors in  B;t=1are assumed not to know whether those who act
in  A;t=1 observe the realisation of the common macroeconomic fundamental.
This informational deciency creates a natural leeway for making stochastic
inferences on the posterior state of the macroeconomic fundamental.
[2] All depositors in  B;t=1observe the public signal independently of each
other. The public signal is identical for all depositors in bank B and confers the
same qualitative information about the event that has taken place in bank A.
[3] The event space, 
A = fSA; FAg; provides information to those depos-
itors playing in  B;t=1 of the actions of depositors in  A;t=1: Since events in
bank A are triggered essentially as a coordinated response by depositors who
act in  A;t=1, these events are informative of the (coordinated) actions of depos-
itors in  A;t=1: Hence events communicate (coordinated) actions in our set-up.
15Technically, 
A comprises a (non-empty)set of k events, where k = f1; ::::::::::; ng, with
each event denoted as k: We assume that the folllowing properties hold: P ([nk=1k) = 1
and P (\nk=1k) = 0 i.e the events are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. In
our setting, the events spanning  A;t=1 can be either a Success (SA) or Failure (FA). Thus,
k = 2 and 
A = f1;2g; with 1 = SA and 2 = FA:
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If bank A fails (FA is observed), then it is clear to successors that all patient
depositors in  A;t=1have chosen to withdraw (W ) early rather than Stay (S).
Subsequently, the private signals for each depositor in  A;t=1 and  B;t=1
characterise the incompleteness of information within each coordination game,
 A;t=1 and  B;t=1 respectively. Beliefs that each depositor has about the idio-
syncratic fundamental of his own bank are driven essentially by his private
signal. Even though events communicate actions of predecessors, they do not
say anything about what caused such actions. For depositors playing in  A;t=1;
only the prior belief about that fundamental is taken into account (in addition
to their private signals) to compute the expected net payo¤s of staying. The
event in bank A may be driven by realisations of A or by the state of the
common fundamental going from one state to another.
A is specic to bank A and is not observed by those playing in  B;t=1: The
only other relevant variable that may have caused the event in bank A and that
will a¤ect the payo¤s of depositors playing in  B;t=1 is the state of the common
macroeconomic fundamental. Upon observing 
A, depositors in  B;t=1 will use
this extra information strategically to form a re-assessement of the probability
distribution of the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental. Thus,
one of the possible reasons for depositors in  B;t=1 to rationally update their
prior beliefs of the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental is that, this
fundamental is the only variable that is relevant for bank A and that also a¤ects
their payo¤s. While our modelling structure achieves the task of keeping payo¤s
across banks separate, the bayesian reassessment of macroeconomic fundamental
priors by depositors of bank B, provides a legitimate informational spillover
channel that a¤ects the behaviour of depositors playing in  B;t=1: We assume
that all depositors in  B;t=1update their beliefs in the same way.
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3.6 Taxonomy of the Dynamic Bayesian Game
Armed with the conceptual pillars we have developed in the previous subsec-
tions, we are now ready to provide an illuminating synopsis of the sequential
game that is being played between depositors of the 2 banks. Some additional
assumptions follow the discussion.
An important part of the sequential game with incomplete information is
who determines the rst-mover of the game. Since both banks are otherwise
completely identical to each other, it makes no di¤erence as to which bank shall
move rst. In line with good economic theory and not to abuse the literature
of sequential move games with incomplete information, we shall be assuming
that nature chooses at random and, with equal probability, the rst mover of
the game. Lets assume that depositors in bank A are chosen to act rst16 . The
sequence of events that form part of the dynamic Bayesian game, is depicted
next.
16Given the features of the payo¤ structure of each bank and the assumption of complete
homogeneity, it does not matter as to which banks depositors move rst. For ease of expo-
sition, we simple label the rst-mover bank as bank A and the second-mover bank as bank
B. Issues like First-Mover Advantagesare not present in our set-up. They could be present,
though, in models in which the banks are directly connected to each other through the inter-
bank market ( in deposits or loans). In this case, regional liquidity shocks would mean that
one bank is a debtor and the other bank is a creditor at a given period of time. See Dasgupta
(2004) for more.
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With homogeneity in the structural features of banks and in their operating
environment, the only parameter that links the payo¤s for each stage game is
change in perceptions of the common macroeconomic fundamental. By assum-
ing that payo¤s of depositors across banks are unrelated, our setup enables us
to focus on how the ow of information a¤ects the dynamics of coordination in
each bank, based on the changes in the perceptions about the common macro-
economic fundamental. We depart from Allen and Gale (2000) and Dasgupta
(2004) by abstracting any other form of direct linkages represented, say, by an
overlapping network of nancial contracts in the payo¤ structure of banks. In
a richer model with regional liquidity shocks and the existence of some form of
contingency plan provided by the interbank market, such form of direct link in
the payo¤ structure would have existed.
3.7 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the formal environment for our
banking setup. We began our analysis by highlighting our mission statement
for this chapter and the subsequent two. Our aim is to develop a theoretical
model that enables us to distinguish (in probabilistic terms) between the two
related concepts of banking contagion and correlation in a given banking panic
transmission. For banks that have common exposure to a risky asset, mutiple
bank failures will carry symptons of both elements and they occur simulta-
neously. However, to our knowledge, the existing literature fails to provide a
robust framework that enables researchers to distil between contagion and corre-
lation in one setting and, crucially to distinguish between the two as equilibrium
phenomena. Our contribution is meant to bridge that lacuna.
Our setup di¤ers from the existing literature on several fronts: In addition to
extending the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework to embrace two banks, we
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allow an interraction of three factors to dene the novelty of our environment:
[1] a sequential move game among depositors of both banks, [2] an interplay
between private and public signals as informational attributes of depositors
and [3] the global game methodology as way of circumventing the problem of
equilibria multiplicity. We will build on this framework in chapters 4 and 5.
In chapter 4, we will focus on equilibrium characterisation of our dynamic
Bayesian structure and chapter 5 will document the results of our ndings.
Please turn over for an illustration of (supplementary) Figures 3.4 (b), (c) and
(d).
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Chapter 4
Banking Equilibrium
4.1 Introduction
This chapter builds on chapter 3 and outlines the equilibrium characterisation
of the dynamic Bayesian game between depositors of bank A and bank B.
As a reminder, our banking environment consists of three periods, two banks
(banks A and B) and a cohort of depositors from each bank being called upon
to take a decision as to whether to stay or withdraw their money from their
respective banks in the interim period. The banks have common investments
in risky assets (whose returns are a¤ected by stochastic idiosyncratic funda-
mentals which follow a uniform distribution) and are perceived to be connected
positively to some common macroeconomic fundamental. The exact state of
the macroeconomic fundamental is unknown but it follows a known Bernoulli
probability distribution function. Depositors of bank A act rst (i.e take a de-
cision as to whether to stay or withdraw.) The event in bank A becomes public
information. Then, depositors in bank B are called upon to act. We assume
that all depositors receive a noisy private signal of their own banks idiosyncratic
fundamental.
The novelty of the chapter is that it establishes the Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium (PBE) for two cohorts of depositors rather than for individual agents
134
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(which is the general textbook case) and, most importantly, establishes a con-
nection between the PBE concept and the trigger equilibrium concept. A new
contribution that has, hitherto, not been discussed in the pure theoretical liter-
ature, is the link between these two equilibria concept. Unlike Dasgupta (2004)
and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) who, both, establish the existence of a trigger
equilibrium in a static game setting with incomplete information, our focus is
essentially dynamic: we show that along the dynamic equilibrium pathway pre-
scribed by the PBE as a general rule, a trigger equilibrium can be rationalised
as a PBE. This novelty enables us to focus on trigger equilibria throughout since
we will be in position in chapter 5 to characterise events in probability terms.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2.1 describes the strategy
proles for each depositor in both banks. We assume that each depositor fol-
lows a switching strategy in his private signal space he stays on his bank if
his signal is above a threshold signal and withdraws otherwise. For those act-
ing in bank A, the informational attributes that dene their type space is their
private signals and the prior probability of the state of the common macro-
economic fundamental. For those acting in bank B, their type is dened by
their private signals, the public signal about the event that had taken place
in bank A (i.e whether it has succeeded or failed) and, most importantly, the
posterior probability of the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental
upon observing the event in bank A. For depositors of bank B, the mechanics of
updating the statistical assessment of the state of the common macroeconomic
fundamental from prior state to posterior state, is undertaken using Bayesian
updating process. Before describing the learning mechanism that is embodied in
the Bayesian reassessment process, section 4.2.2 derives general rules for the
best-response correspondences that underpin the PBE of the dynamic game be-
tween cohorts of depositors of bank A and those depositors of bank B. We show
that, if the event in bank A is used for Bayesian updating about the state of the
common macroeconomic fundamental, the PBE can be described as a trigger
equilibrium in depositorsstrategies. The rst section of section 4.2.3 shows
CHAPTER 4. BANKING EQUILIBRIUM 136
another important theoretical contribution of our paradigm: we show that, for
depositors of each bank, such a trigger equilibrium, in fact, exists. We are able
to establish the existence of a trigger equilibrium in each banks idiosyncratic
fundamental (which is dependent on the common macroeconomic fundamental
state) as a PBE.
The main anatomical feature of our dynamic Bayesian game consists of two
coordination games (one for depositors of bank A and one for those of bank
B), with each coordination game being linked strategically by the Bayesian me-
chanics tool that constitutes the informational spillover channel. Given this
structure, the private signals for depositors of either bank, constitute the coor-
dination device for depositorsbehaviour and hence, a¤ect the determination of
depositorsnet payo¤ to staying. This payo¤ function determines the location
of the equilibrium trigger threshold for either bank. The public event in bank
A, will a¤ect the posterior beliefs of depositors of bank B about the state of
the common macroeconomic fundamental. Thus, for bank B, the location of
the equilibrium trigger threshold is a¤ected by the Bayesian reassessment of the
common macroeconomic fundamental. Section 4.2.3 describes this process in
details and describes how this Bayesian reassessment constitutes the informa-
tional spillover channel in our model. Upon observing a failure of bank A, for
instance, depositors infer that the probability that the state of the common fun-
damental is bad, is higher than what would have been suggested by the prior
probability of that state. This a¤ects the depositors expected net payo¤ to
staying and biases their decision towards withdrawing.
This trigger equilibrium denes the probability of a bank succeeding or fail-
ing in the banks performance space. An important result of our approach is
that, for depositors of bank B, the mechanics of Bayesian updating has a non
trivial impact on the probability of bank successes and failures, by a¤ecting the
location of the trigger equilibrium. The material embodied in this chapter will
be taken further ahead in chapter 5, to characterise the concepts of nancial
contagion and correlation.
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4.2 Equilibrium Characterisation
We start this sub-section by allowing the strategy proles in the coordination
games,  A;t=1and  B;t=1 to take a switching form; the expected net payo¤
structure to staying for the marginal depositorin each bank is then explicated.
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is dened and formally related to our
model. One interesting result is that the PBE satises the trigger equilibrium.
That simplies the analysis greatly and enables us to focus on trigger equilibrium
when it comes to explicating the model results.
4.2.1 Strategy Proles
First-mover depositors ( i.e depositors in bank A ) do not observe a history
of past events, when they are called upon (randomly by nature) to move in
 A;t=1: Their informational endowment when they act in  A;t=1;thus consists of
their private signal (which denotes their type), the prior probability distribution
of the state of the macroeconomic fundamental and the history set depicting
the set of action proles by predecessors, which in this case, is equal to the
null set. Formally, let At=1denote the informational endowment of a typical
patient depositor in bank A at  A;t=1: Then, conditional on playing in  A;t=1;
At=1 = fsA; ; H A;t=1g1 : So, for each depositor acting in  A;t=1;the equilibrium
strategy prole takes the following mapping:  : At=1 ! a 2 A = fW;Sg : We
will be focusing on switching strategies throughout the analysis, which we dene
as follows:
Denition 4.1 (Switching Strategy for depositors in  A;t=1 ) A depos-
itor of bank A, when acting in  A;t=1; is said to be following a switching strategy
1where sA denotes the private signal of the typical depositor about A (with all the associ-
ated features of the private signal as discussed before),  is the prior probability distribution
over the common macroeconomic states and H A;t=1 = fg denotes the history of actions for
depositors in  A;t=1
CHAPTER 4. BANKING EQUILIBRIUM 138
if he changes his action prole, depending on whether the private signal he re-
ceives is below or above a signal threshold, s. If  : At=1 ! a 2 A = fW;Sg
holds where At=1 = fsA; ; H A;t=1g, then a switching strategy will take the
following form:
(
A
t=1) =
8<: W if s  sS if s > s
9=;
As mentioned in the last section, depositors playing in  B;t=1 will form
a re-assessement of the probability distribution of the state of the common
macroeconomic fundamental . The updated (posterior) probability distribution
spanning the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental is denoted as 0.
Thus, formally, if Bt=1denotes the informational endowment of depositors who
move in  B;t=1, then Bt=1 = fsB ; 0;H B;t=1g where sB denotes the private
signal on B , 0 is the (posterior) re-appraisal of the prior probabilities of the
states of the common macroeconomic fundamental andH B;t=1 is the history set
which contains the events that occurred in bank A: In a similar line of reasoning
as for depositors in  A;t=1, we argue that strategies for each depositor acting
in  B;t=1 take the following mapping:  : Bt=1 ! a 2 A = fW;Sg ; and that
all depositors follow switching strategies around some signal threshold. The
trigger strategy for those acting in  B;t=1 is dened in an analogous way to that
of depositors playing in  A;t=1, except that here, the informational attributes
of depositors are augmented in this case in order to account for updated re-
assessment of common probability distributions and inclusion of a non-empty
historical set.
Denition 4.2 (Switching Strategy for depositors in  B;t=1) A depos-
itor of bank B, when acting in  B;t=1; is said to follow a trigger strategy with the
following mapping,  : Bt=1 ! a 2 A = fW;Sg ; if his behaviour is dened as
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follows: (Bt=1) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
W if ( 
A = fFAg) \ ( s  s)
S if ( 
A = fSAg) \ ( s > s)
S or W if
8<: either
 
( 
A = fSAg) \ ( s  s)
or
 
( 
A = fFAg) \ ( s > s)
9=;
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
where Bt=1 = fsB ; 0;H B;t=1g
This denition of switching strategy for depositors in  B;t=1 provides a
straightforward characterisation of the behaviour of these depositors. Deposi-
tors stay if they observe the public information of the success of bank A (i.e

A = fSAg) and their private signals exceed a certain threshold in their pri-
vate information space ( i.e s > s): With the reverse ordering, they will
choose to withdraw. The behaviour of depositors in  B;t=1; will be inde-
terminate otherwise. One of such possibility is the occurrence of, say, event 
( 
A = fFAg) \ ( s > s) : Here, observing the failure of bank A is likely to
bias the depositors decision towards withdrawing but a strong private signal is
likely to have the opposite e¤ect. In this case, the decision as to whether to stay
or withdraw, will depend on comparison of the expected payo¤ to staying with
the payo¤ to withdrawing.
4.2.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of Game Be-
tween  A;t=1 And  B;t=1
Denition 4.3 ( Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium) A Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium (PBE) in the game between  A;t=1 and  B;t=1, is an assessment of
strategy proles for depositors of each group f : At=1 ! a 2 A = fW;Sg in
 A;t=1 and  : Bt=1 ! a 2 A = fW;Sg in  B;t=1g and a set of beliefs f; 0g
where  is the set of prior beliefs about the common fundamental and  0 is the
posterior belief such that:
[1] Given his beliefs about the common fundamental (either  or 0 ) and
after every possible history H i ;t=1; i = fA;Bg ; each depositors strategy is
rational for each of his signals (i.e is a best-response to any possible moves by
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all depositors of the same bank) given that these other depositors also play this
maximising game.
[2] With the history of past events occuring with positive probability, then
the beliefs system f; 0g should be optimal given the strategies of depositors of
banks A and B, namely (At=1) and (
B
t=1) respectively : This means that 
0
is derived from  using Bayes Rule.
The above formal denition of the PBE in the game between  A;t=1and
 B;t=1translates into the following criteria / requirements:
Criterion 4.1: (Beliefs Formation) Each depositor with the move has
some belief about the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental (repre-
sented by some probability distribution)
Denote (u j Bt=1) as the process of of updating beliefs about the com-
mon macroeconomic fundamental from its prior state  to the posterior state
0 for each depositor in  B;t=1: For depositors in  A;t=1; there is no such up-
dating process. Since depositors in  A;t=1 move rst and their information set,
At=1contains an empty historical set, it is not hard to realise that (u j At=1)
is the same as the prior probability over states denoted as  .
Criterion 4.2: (Sequential Rationality) Given his beliefs about the com-
mon macroeconomic fundamental (as per criterion 1) in his information set,
each depositors strategy must maximise his payo¤s, given that other depositors
of the same bank will also play this optimising game.
This idea of rationality needs more elaboration, given the complex nature
of our payo¤ function and given that, unlike most sequential move games with
incomplete information, we do not have one individual moving at a time, but a
continuum of individuals doing so.
(The following analysis is valid for depositors of either bank, except where
otherwise stated). Each depositor playing in  i;t=1 faces a uniform posterior
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belief over i, conditional on observing his private signal s: Our former assump-
tions about the signal space allow us to focus on that segment of the space that
allows for strategic interraction between depositors and to model the posterior
distribution of i , conditional on observing signal s , as  j s  Uniform[s  ";
s+ "]; "  s  1  ". Assuming that all other depositors play by the switching
strategy as highlighted earlier, then the proportion of early withdrawals can be
modelled as:
[; s] =
8>>><>>>:
1  < s   "
1
2 +
(s )
2" s
   "    s + "
0  > s + "
9>>>=>>>;
In particular, the net payo¤ to staying for depositor in  i;t=1 can be
represented as: (; s) =
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d; where (; [; s]) relates to
U
f(1 )  (1 )r g ~R]
(1 )(1 )

  U(1) if   r and U(0)   U
h
+r(1 )
+(1 )
i
if  > r
: First, we move with the characterisation of the Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium (PBE) of the dynamic game between  A;t=1 and  B;t=1;by starting
with the decision problem of depositor in  B;t=1: For the marginal depositor
in bank B, the payo¤ structure denoted as (; s) =
Z s+"
s "
(; (s; )) d
and the depositor observes the actions of those in bank A. He adjusts his
beliefs of the probability of the common macroeconomic fundamental from 
to 0: His expected utility to staying as opposed to withdrawing will depend
on this posterior belief 0 of the common fundamental, his posterior belief
of the idiosyncratic fundamental conditional on observing his private signal
s and the strategy of successors in the continuation game. Since the with-
drawal game ends after  B;t=1; there are no successors in this game. For-
mally, the expected utility to staying as opposed to withdrawing is modelled as:
EU [s; 0] = P
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d + (1  P )
Z s
s "
(; (s; ))d
where  0 is the posterior belief of the common macroeconomic fundamen-
tal based on the event in bank A; P denotes some probability that bank B
succeeds, given the strategies pursued by depositors in bank A and as before,
CHAPTER 4. BANKING EQUILIBRIUM 142
Z s+"
s
(; (s; )) d denotes the positive part of the net payo¤ to staying
and
Z s
s "
(; (s; )) d denotes the negative part. Since
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))
d =  
Z s
s "
(; (s; )) d;then EU [s; 0] can be re-written as :
EU [s; 0] = [2P   1]
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d
The expression we give for EU [s; 0] is very intuitive. The expected util-
ity to staying for any depositor playing in  B;t=1 depends on the actions of
other depositors in  B;t=1: The associated payo¤s
Z s+"
s
(; (s; )) d andZ s
s "
(; (s; )) d; respectively depict the ex-post payo¤s to the depositor in
 B;t=1 when all depositors stay and withdraw respectively, given their switching
strategy around s. Thus, one can see that (s; ) a¤ects the probability of
success or failure in bank B and also the expected net payo¤ to staying for an
individual depositor: (s; ) (=
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d): For example, when
(s; ) is su¢ ciently high, the expected net payo¤ to staying for a marginal de-
positor, given that all other depositors are playing a switching strategy around
s, will be given by
Z s
s "
(; (s; )) d (< 0). Thus, more weight is given to
the negative element of the expected net payo¤. Conversely, for low proportion
of early withdrawals, (s; ); more weight is given to the positive element of the
expected net payo¤: to staying is positive i.e
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d > 0: To know
exactly which value (s; ) will take, depends on the optimising strategy of de-
positors of bank B. Each depositor in  B;t=1 who receives some signal s chooses
an action that maximises his expected utility, given the optimising actions of
other depositors in the same bank: Taking into account the beliefs updating
process as well as the best reponse of other depositors, the best-response func-
tion for each depositor in  B;t=1 who receives some signal s; can be expressed
as follows:
	B(:) = maxa 2 A[2P   1]
Z s+"
s
(; (s; )) (u j Bt=1)d where the net
payo¤ function has been augmented to allow for posterior beliefs about the state
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of the common fundamental.
For each depositor in  A;t=1 who receives a signal s, the payo¤ structure
can be expressed as (; s) =
Z s+"
s "
(; (s; )) d assuming that all other
depositors in bank A follow a switching strategy around s: In a way analoguous
to the analysis carried out for depositors in  B;t=1, we dene the best response
function for those in  A;t=1 as:
	A(:) = maxa 2 A[2P   1]
Z s+"
s
(; (s; )) (u j At=1)d where the net
payo¤ function has been augmented to allow for prior beliefs about the state of
the common fundamental. (As argued before, since the history set is nil, (u j
At=1) is the same as prior beliefs about the state of the common fundamental
for depositors playing in  A;t=1:
Criterion 4.3: (Bayesian Updating Process) The beliefs updating process
by depositors of bank B from the prior state of the common macroeconomic fun-
damental to the posterior state is undertaken using Bayesian updating.
The idea is that while depositors of bank A have some prior beliefs about
the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental, depositors in bank B use
the public information about bank A to update their beliefs about the state
of the common fundamental. As per criterion 2, they use this posterior belief
to compute their expected payo¤s. We focus on the exact mechanics of the
updating process in the next subsection. For the moment, it just su¢ ces to
believe that, with no information set being o¤ the equilibrium path given the
equilibrium strategies of the game, any updating process that conforms with
Bayes rule will still keep us along the trajectory pathway prescribed by the
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concept.
We next want to show that all equilibrium proles that satisfy the PBE
concept must also be a trigger equilibrium . This will enable us simplify the
analysis of the dynamic equilibrium pathway considerably and to focus attention
on trigger equilibria throughout the whole experiment.
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Proposition 4.1: If the event in Bank A is used for Bayesian updating
only, then the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the dynamic game between
 A;t=1 and  B;t=1 can be represented as a trigger equilibrium.
Proof: In Technical Appendix at end of Thesis (Section A.3).
4.2.3 Characterisation of Trigger Equilibrium
We have shown in the previous section that a PBE of the game between  A;t=1
and  B;t=1 can be represented as a trigger equilibrium. In this section, we show
that such a trigger equilibrium actually exists and we explore its properties in
more details.
Proposition 4.2(a): (Existence of a Trigger Equilibrium) In each
depositors game, there exists a threshold s such that he withdraws if s  s
and stays if s > s
Proof: In Technical Appendix at end of Thesis (Section A.3).
Put simply, the expected net payo¤ to staying for the marginal depositor
who receives a signal of s (assuming that all depositors follow the trigger strat-
egy) is given by (s; ) =
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d = 0 ( where (; (; s))
is dened in the proof of proposition 4.2(a)). Let the expected net payo¤ to
staying for any depositor who receives some signal s be given by: (s; ) =Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d: We have shown in proposition 2(a) that, by the assump-
tion of continuity of the net payo¤ structure in s, when s  s; (s; ) <
(s; ) = 0: The intuition is that when we integrate the payo¤ function over
the [s  "; s+ "] range, we add more to the negative element of the payo¤ and
substract a signicant part of the positive element of the payo¤. Thus, when
s  s; the overall net payo¤ to staying is negative i.e depositors will choose
to withdraw rather than stay. Similarly, when s > s; (s; ) > (s; ) = 0:
A similar logic will show that in this case, integrating the payo¤ function over
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[s  "; s+ "] range will mean adding more to the positive element and sub-
stracting the negative element of the payo¤. When s > s;the overall net payo¤
to staying is positive i.e depositors will choose to stay rather than withdraw.
This leads us to another important result which we relate to parameters of the
model:
Proposition 4.2(b): (Uniqueness of s) If s exists, then it is unique.
Proof: From proposition 4.2(a).
Following from propositions 4.2(a) and 4.2(b), it follows that depositors of
either bank stay if s > s and withdraw if s  s: The above derivations did
not specically explicate how  varies with structural changes in parameters
that characterise the returns structure of the illiquid-and-risky technology. We
next turn to the existence of  and extol on its main qualitative feature.
Proposition 4.3: (Existence and Features of ) Following propositions
4.2(a) and 4.2(b), there exists a threshold in each bank, above which the bank
succeeds and below which the bank fails. In addition, for either bank, the location
of  has the property that : (uBad) > (uG) with uBad > uG:
Proof: In Technical Appendix at end of Thesis (Section A.3).
The derivation of the unique threshold for each bank can also be found in
other models in the literature. Dasgupta(2004) obtains similar results, albeit
with a more complex payo¤ structure. The existence of the overlapping net-
works structure of nancial contracts that tie the banks together ( through the
interbank market in deposits) can explain contagion as a unique phenomenon.
The failure of bank A means that depositors in  B;t=1;su¤er a loss of claims
due to them. As a result, their behaviour changes. Other papers in the liter-
ature do get the uniqueness result: Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) endogenise
the probability of bank runs and relate that probability to the features of the
demand-deposit contract. In their paper, as second-best solution, the optimal
contract is featured by a trade-o¤ between risk-sharing (e¢ ciency) and the en-
dogeneous probability of bank runs (instability).
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Corollary 4.1: (Characterisation of Trigger {sA; 

A (u)g in  A;t=1
and of fsB ; B (u)gin  B;t=1)
Given (At=1) ! a  A = fW;Sg and (Bt=1) ! a  A = fW;Sg for
depositors in  A;t=1and in  B;t=1 respectively, we can summarise the algorithm
that traces the equilibrium values of fsA; A (u)g and of fsB ; B (u)g as follows:
Algorithm tracing equilibrium values of sA; 

A (u) ; s

B ; 

B (u) :
For depositors in  A;t=1;
(At=1) =
8<: W if s  sS if s > s
9=;
and A (u) solves8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
A(; s
) = 0
and [; s] =
8>>><>>>:
1  < s   "
1
2 +
(s )
2" s
   "   < s + "
0   s + "
9>>>=>>>;
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
For depositors in  B;t=1;
(
B
t=1) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
W if ( 
A = fFAg) \ ( s  s)
S if ( 
A = fSAg) \ ( s > s)
S or W if
8<: either
 
( 
A = fSAg) \ ( s < s)
or
 
( 
A = fFAg) \ ( s > s))
9=;
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
and B (u) solves8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
B(; s
) = 0
and B [; s] =
8>>><>>>:
1  < s   "
1
2 +
(s )
2" s
   "   < s + "
0   s + "
9>>>=>>>;
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
We can rationalise the existence of a unique equilibrium in the coordination
game facing depositors, with the presence of strategic complementarities in de-
positorsdecisions. The uniqueness result of Carlsson and VanDamme(1993)
and Morris and Shin (1998), which was obtained in non-banking models, nec-
essarily relies on the existence of (global) strategic complementarities / super-
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modularities in the payo¤ structure. An important di¤erence between existing
models of banking in the literature (Dasgupta (2004), Goldstein and Pauzner
(2005)) and our model, is that we have supermodularities in the payo¤ structure
of depositors. Banking models in the existing literature, are not characterised
by supermodularities in the payo¤ structure - above some threshold, decisions
become strategic substitutes. Nonetheless, the innovative approach of Das-
gupta(2004) and of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) is that they show, through
the existence of a single-crossing property in the payo¤ structure and of an er-
ror technology that satises the Monotone-Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP),
that a unique result can exist even in the absence of strategic complementarities.
We can bypass these technicalities for our proof of the uniqueness result.
4.2.4 Mechanics of Beliefs Updating
The re-assessment of the beliefs mechanism of the state of the common macro-
economic fundamental from the prior distribution to the posterior distribution,
was constrained to some general form of Bayesian updating process, without ex-
plicit reference to the intrinsic stochastic properties of the updating process. In
this section, we will add statistical structure to the updating process, elaborate
on the stochastic properties of the resulting informational generating process.
The updating process does not focus on depositorsprivate signals because each
depositor in  i;t=1 receives his private signal only once in  i;t=1and there is no
evolution of private signals over time. Furthermore, by the assumption that
2"  min [uG; 1  uG   z] of remarks 3.1 and 3.2 of the previous chapter; each
depositor has a private signal which is of minimal precision.
The updating mechanism concerns only parameter u. The actual realisation
of u is not apriori known to depositors in  A;t=1 and  B;t=1 : But upon observ-
ing the public event in bank A, depositors in  B;t=1 have an extra information
on the state of the common fundamental u , which we shall dub the learning
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mechanism. Since they do not observe what is triggering the event in bank
A, they face a statistical inference problem. Any revised version of the state
u, conditional upon observing the event in bank A, constitutes this learning
process.
To keep the model analytically tractable, we shall place a few restrictions
on the apriori distribution. As a reminder, P (uBad) = k and P (uG) = 1   k
and  is the space that contains this prior probability distribution. Dene
the partitioned space events, SA and FA as follows: SA : fA > A (u)g and
FA : fA  A (u)g. Since A is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]; it follows that
Prob(A > 

A (u)) = 1 A (u) and that Prob(A  A(u)) = A(u) . With the
property that, uBad > uG; we know, by proposition 4.3, that (uBad) > (uG):
The following conditional probability assessments subsequently hold:
Pr ob(FA j u = uBad) = A(uBad)
Pr ob(FA j u = uG) = A(uG)
Pr ob(SA j u = uBad) = 1  A(uBad)
Pr ob(SA j u = uG) = 1  A(uG)
with A(u
Bad) > A(u
G) and 1   A(uBad) < 1   A(uG): In the previous
section, we denoted (u j Bt=1) as the process of of updating beliefs about
the common macroeconomic fundamental from its prior state  to the posterior
state 0 for each depositor in  B;t=1 with informational endowment Bt=1: Here,
we add structure to the exact nature of (u j Bt=1): Using Bayesian rule, we
have the following revision estimates for depositors in bank B, conditional upon
observing an event in bank A:
Pr ob(u = uBad j FA) = P (FAju=u
Bad)P (u=uBad)
P (FAju=uBad)P (u=uBad)+P (FAju=uG)P (u=uG)
=
k:A(u
Bad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k)A(uG)
Similarly, Pr ob(u = uBad j SA) = P (SAju=u
Bad)P (u=uBad)
P (SAju=uBad)P (u=uBad)+P (SAju=uG)P (u=uG)
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=
k:(1 A(uBad))
k:(1 A(uBad))+(1 k)(1 A(uG))
Analoguously, Prob(u = uG j SA) = 1  Pr ob(u = uBad j SA)
=
(1 k)(1 A(uG))
(1 k)(1 A(uBad)) + k(1 A(uG)) and Prob(u = u
G j FA) = 1   Pr ob(u =
uBad j FA) = (1 k)

A(u
G)
(1 k)A(uG) + kA(uBad) : This yields a proposition:
Proposition 4.4: (Learning Mechanism) Upon observing the failure of
bank A, the probability that the common macroeconomic fundamental was in
its bad state is more likely than unconditionally. Thus, [1] Pr ob(u = uBad j
FA) > Pr ob(u = u
Bad) > Pr ob(u = uBad j SA) . Similarly, conditional on
observing the success of bank A, the probability that the common macroeconomic
fundamental was in its good state is more likely than unconditionally. Thus,
[2] Pr ob(u = uG j SA) > Pr ob(u = uG) > Pr ob(u = uG j FA):
Proof: In Technical Appendix (Section A.3).
The di¤erent possibilities of an event in bank A being associated with an
event in bank B can be represented by a set of equations that characterise
the probability of the events taking place . If we represent fFA;FB ; SA; SBg
analoguously to what we have done before in the previous section, then we may
represent the probability of a failure in bank A being associated with a failure
in bank B as follows: Pr(FB j FA) = Pr(B  B(u) j A  A(u)); where
Pr(FB j FA) denotes the probability of bank B failing, given the observed failure
of bank A. This can be represented as follows: Pr(FB j FA) = Pr(FB j fu =
uBadg\FA) Pr(fu = uBadg j FA)+ Pr(FB j fu = uGg\FA) Pr(fu = uGg j FA):
Since we know the values of Pr(fu = uBadg j FA) and Pr(fu = uGg j FA); we can
replace these values in the above expression and get a much simplied version of
Pr(FB j FA) where Pr(FB j FA) =
n
kA(u
Bad)B(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)B(uG)
kA(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)
o
:
Similarly, Pr(FB j SA) = Pr(B  B(u) j A > A(u)); where Pr(FB j SA)
denotes the probability that bank B fails, given that it is observed that bank
A has survived an attack before. This probability can be expressed as Pr(FB j
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fu = uBadg\SA) Pr(fu = uBadg j SA)+ Pr(FB j fu = uGg\SA) Pr(fu = uGg j
SA):We can it as Pr(FB j SA) =
n
k(1 A(uBad))B(uBad)+(1 k)(1 A(uG))B(uG)
1 kA(uBad) (1 k)A(uG)
o
after appropriate substitutions. : Events Pr(SB j FA) and Pr(SB j SA) can be
derived analoguously in terms of parameters of our model. The interested reader
will nd that Pr(SB j FA) = 1  Pr(FB j FA)
= 1  
n
kA(u
Bad)B(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)B(uG)
kA(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)
o
and that Pr(SB j SA) = 1  
Pr(FB j SA)
= 1 
n
k(1 A(uBad))B(uBad)+(1 k)(1 A(uG))B(uG)
1 kA(uBad) (1 k)A(uG)
o
: The technical appen-
dix contains a section that summarises all conditional and unconditional prob-
ability associated with events in the two banks.
Proposition 4.5: The posterior estimates of the state of the common macro-
economic fundamental by depositors of bank B retain all mathematical properties
of propositions 4.2(a), 4.2(b) and 4.3. Furthermore, observing the failure (suc-
cess) of bank A pushes the trigger of bank B upwards (downwards), such that
FAB (u) > 

B(u)

SAB (u)  B(u) respectively

: Thus, bank B now fails for
larger (smaller) realisations of its own idiosyncratic fundamentals.
Proof: In the Technical Appendix (Section A.3).
4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we build on the banking environment described in chapter 3,
and endeavour to characterise the equilibrium of the dynamic Bayesian game
between depositors of banks A and B. We dene each depositors strategy as a
trigger strategy and build on the PBE in terms of best-response correspondences
for depositors in each bank. An interesting nding of our approach, is that the
PBE can be described as a trigger equilibrium. We move on to show that this
trigger equilibrium threshold does exist in each banks performance space. An
interesting result is on the interplay between the trigger equilibrium threshold
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and the informational spillover channel that is embodied in the Bayesian up-
dating mechanics for depositors in bank B. We show, through the intermediate
value theorem that, while the equilibrium threshold can be derived from the
single-crossing property that characterises the net payo¤ of depositors, the lo-
cation of that threshold is a¤ected by the belief updating process by depositors
of bank B.
This creates a well-dened anatomical structure for the dynamic Bayesian
game that we describe in this chapter: we have two coordination games linked
by a Bayesian updating mechanics (game represented by depositors of bank A,
game represented by depositors of bank B, Bayesian updating process by depos-
itors of bank B.) In each coordination game, the private signals of depositors
playing in that game act as coordinating devices for their behaviour and de-
termine the net payo¤ structure of depositors (hence, having an impact on the
determination of the equilibrium threshold). For bank B, the updating process
underpinned by Bayesian mechanics, a¤ects the position of the payo¤ structure
for depositors of that bank (hence, having an impact on the location of that
equilibrium threshold for bank B). The location of the equilibrium thresholds
of banks A and B, is crucial in our analysis since it a¤ects the probability of
events in those banks (i.e whether banks succeed or fail).
To our knowledge, characterising the equilibrium pathway of a dynamic
Bayesian game with the aforementioned anatomy, is completely new to the
literature. Showing the equivalence between PBE and trigger equilibrium con-
cept in such a game, has also not been dealt with in the existing literature of
equilibrium characterisation of banking models.
The material embodied in this chapter will be taken further ahead in chap-
ter 5, to characterise the concepts of nancial contagion and correlation. In
chapter 5, we document specically how the mechanics of Bayesian reassess-
ment a¤ect the unconditional payo¤ function for depositors and, thus, the loca-
tion of the trigger equilibrium. We will describe the existence of two main states
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of the world: tranquilstate and non-tranquilstate. The former state is one
of autarkyi.e a state in which banks do not trade(depositors of the second
bank do not observe the event in the rst bank). The payo¤s of depositors of
either bank are not linked in that state and the equilibrium triggers in each
bank are independent of each other. The non-tranquilstate is one which the
event in the rst bank is observed and becomes public knowledge. This creates
an avenue for a cross-bank linkage by the Bayesian updating process. Upon
observing this event (which may be either a success or a failure), depositors of
bank B re-interpret the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental by
updating their priors of the state of the common macroeconomic fundamen-
tal. The trigger equilibrium of the bank B is adjusted such that it is more
likely to su¤er from the same fate as the rst. Determining which part of that
panic transmission is contagion and which part is correlation, is the treatise of
chapter 5.
Chapter 5
Modelling Banking
Contagion
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we build on the main paradigms developed in chapters 3 and 4
and discuss the main ndings of our results. As a quick reminder of the previous
two chapters, we introduced a banking environment in chapter 3 and narrated
on the specicities of our model environment. Our banking system consists of
two banks, bank A and B, and the banks have common investments in a risky
technology and are perceived to be connected to a common macroeconomic
fundamental that is not publicly observed but whose probability distribution
follows a Bernoulli distribution. Depositors in each bank are assumed to receive
a noisy signal of their banks idiosyncratic fundamentals and these fundamentals
a¤ect the returns on the risky investment. The banks are engaged in maturity
transformation i.e accept deposits from the public, decide on the optimal invest-
ment and o¤er demand deposit contracts to depositors. Depositors base their
decision to stay or withdraw on their private signals. The equilibrium structure
of the game is such that depositors in bank A, are assumed to move rst. The
event in bank A becomes public knowledge and then, depositors in bank B are
assumed to take their decision, after observing their private information and the
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public signal of the event that occurred in the rst bank.
In Chapter 4, we were interested in building on this banking environment
by characterising the equilibrium prole of the dynamic Bayesian game between
depositors of banks A and B. We assume that depositors in each bank follow a
trigger strategy i.e they decide to stay if their private signal is above a threshold
and withdraw if it lies below the threshold. We characterise the Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE) of the dynamic game by deriving the best-response corre-
spondences for depositors of either bank. Depositors in bank A decide on their
action by observing their type i.e their private signals and a prior estimate of
the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental. Those in bank B decide
on their action by basing their decisions to stay or withdraw on their private sig-
nals and the public event in bank A, which causes them to stochastically update
their posterior beliefs of the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental.
It is this statistical reassessment of the state of the common macroeconomic fun-
damental, which constitutes the informational spillover channel in our model.
An interesting prole of our dynamic Bayesian setup is that we can represent
it as coordination games for depositors of bank A and bank B, with each co-
ordination game being linked though the informational channel that is created
through Bayesian updating. Due to strategic payo¤ independence across banks,
depositorsprivate signals coordinate their decision and determine the equilib-
rium threshold. The Bayesian updating process by those depositors in bank B,
a¤ects the location of that threshold. Banks fail for fundamentals that lie below
the equilibrium threshold and succeed in the reverse case. Thus, the location of
the threshold equilibrium a¤ects the probability of bank failures or successes.
An interesting nding of chapter 4 was that, given our model specicity, the
threshold equilibrium can be represented as a PBE. This helps us to simplify
the analysis and allows us to focus on threshold equilibria for interpretation of
results and anything that follows. In particular, we show that, upon observing
a failure of bank A, the equilibrium threshold for depositors of bank B rises i.e
bank B fails for a longer range of its idiosyncratic fundamentals.
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In his chapter, we focus on the concept of banking panic transmission and
on the concepts of contagionand correlation. There is no one-size-ts-all
denition of nancial contagion given by the literature. The existence of a
common macroeconomic fundamental in our model, nonetheless, complicates
matters. There may be multiple bank failures due to an adverse macroeco-
nomic fundamental to which both banks are commonly exposed to. But that
does not necessarily mean that one bank failure is actually causing the other.
For instance, if the two banks have assets denominated in one currency and
liabilities denominated in another currency, a currency change will a¤ect both
banks together in a similar way. This common failure is merely due to a com-
mon exposure which exists in all states of the world, to the exchange rate and
is not what we are primarily concerned with here. Chapter 5 endeavours to
draw the line between instances in which a transmission of banking failure is
exclusively due to perceived deterioration of the state of the common fundamen-
tal (correlatedness) and instances in which this transmission of failures across
banks is due to changes in behaviour of depositors in bank B exclusively due to
the observed event in bank A (contagion). We investigate whether, for banks
with common exposure, these concepts are mutually exclusive or whether they
are indissociable from each other and arise from the same source.
An important di¤erence that we make in developing the concept of conta-
gion is that, unlike in the existing literature (Allen and Gale (2000), Dasgupta
(2004), Rochet and Tirole (1996), Chen (1999), Vaugirard (2005)) which fo-
cuses on contagion as interdependence, we develop a theoretical model of a
robust and more plausible concept of contagion - that of excess correlation.
In an empirical paper on the bonds market, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) assert
that interdependence may be regarded as a weak aspect of contagion. A more
plausible concept of contagion is one that focuses on excess correlation. In a
similar line of thought, Pesaran and Pick (2007) show, using interest rates in
European bonds market, that interdependence may not lead to econometrically
robust models of contagion. They argue that excess correlation provides a
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more robust account of contagion from an econometric perspective. The para-
digm we develop, is meant to be a theoretical adaptation of the empirical results
of Pesaran and Pick (2007). Our approach endogenises the concept of banking
contagion by representing it by discontinuities in the transmission mechanism of
a crisis across banks. It is similar to the idea of an endogenous state-contingent
change in cross-bank correlation. There is a positive range of the idiosyncratic
fundamental in which the second bank fails (succeeds) if and only if the rst
bank has failed (succeeded). Thus, the issue of causation that undepins con-
tagion in our setup, can be represented as one of excess correlation between
banks in some states of the world compared to others. Developing a theoretical
model of contagion based on a concept that has been proved to yield empiri-
cally plausible and robust results, has its merits. We are able to throw light
on the interplay between private and public signals in generating results and
to contribute to the debate on policy implementation in ways that cannot be
captured by single-bank models (or even by existing multi-bank models that
explain contagion from the narrower concept of interdependence).
A second notable contribution of chapter 5 to the literature is that we are
capable of characterising the occurrence of events across banks as a function of
the informational attributes of depositors. The interplay between relative im-
portance of private and public information for depositors of bank B, matters for
determining the exact nature of the banking panic transmission. In particular,
we can show that, for contagion to occur in equilibrium, depositors of bank B
must face public informational dominance i.e they attach greater importance
to the public event in bank A rather than to their own private information.
Instances in which bank B successfully resists a contagious ow from bank A,
are those in which there is private informational dominance. Here, the private
information of bank B depositors is given more attention than the public event
they observe about bank A. Here, bank Bs performance thus depends relatively
more on its idiosyncratic fundamentals and bank B successfully manages to ward
o¤ the biasedness that is created by the impact of the public news about bank
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A. Allowing for the interplay between private and public signals as a way of
triggering events that are conceptually (and empirically robust) is an important
contribution that we make.
Our approach is di¤erent to Hellwig (2002) who focuses on a static stylized
coordination game of incomplete information and who shows how the relative
importance of private and public information, may a¤ect the nature of equi-
librium (uniqueness as opposed to multiple equilibria). In our work, we are
interested in showing how this interplay a¤ects the events across banks rather
than the nature of equilibrium. Our interpretation of contagion as one rep-
resented by public informational dominance, is similar to the herding model
result of Banerjee (1992). However, unlike in heding models, there is no stop
in information aggregation in our setup. Depositors do not ignore their private
signals at any point. They simply place relative importance on one type of
signal relative to another. For instance, if contagion occurs, those of bank B
attach relatively more importance to the public news than to their own private
information. Also, unlike herding models in which there is only one outcome af-
ter information aggregation stops (i.e herding outcome), our model is consistent
with di¤erent permuations of outcomes, depending on the relative importance
of private vs public information in depositorsinformation set. For instance, if
private informational dominance occurs, bank B will still be able to avoid the
contagious impact that a failure of bank A entails.
Our theoretical modelling structure provides a robust account of contagion
which, while meticulous and articulate in its conceptual denition, yields results
and predictions that corroborate with empirical evidence and that are capable
of explaining key stylized facts. Prior to the East Asian nancial turmoil of
1997, there was little analysis of why country-specic crises could spread inter-
nationally. The Asian crisis of 1997 appeared with its conundrum: Why was
South Korea, a member of OECD and boasting strong economic fundamentals,
infectedby what was happening elsewhere in the region ? Why was Hong Kong
relatively less a¤ected than Malaysia ? How could the Asian turmoil have possi-
CHAPTER 5. MODELLING BANKING CONTAGION 158
bly spilled over to Russia ? How could the Russian sovereign debt default a¤ect
Brazil, despite the lack of trade and nancial ows between the two countries ?
Existing papers in the literature fail to provide a simultaneous explanation to all
three puzzles because they focus on interdependence. We provide the answers
to these puzzles in chapter 5.
Compared to one-bank models, our approach provides fresh and innovative
contributions to the art of policy administration orchestrated by Central Banks.
By being capable of distinguishing between contagion and correlation as equi-
librium phenomena, our model can provide useful guidance for the design of
microprudential and macroprudential regulations. While Macroprudential reg-
ulation is needed in case of correlation, microprudential policy is warranted in
case of contagion. In addition, we pioneer the concept of intertemporal bank-
ing substitution, as possible conjecture that may occur in a multi-bank setting,
when microprudential policy measures like Suspension-of-Convertibility (SOC),
are administered at a crisis catalyst bank.
As potential insurance against such intertemporal substitution, we ratio-
nalise the case for the adoption of condence safeguards throughout the econ-
omy, as economy-wide insurance mechanism designed to contain the e¤ects of
informational spillovers that result from enactment of prudential measures at
a crisis-catalyst bank. This constitutes a signicant improvement over exist-
ing multi-bank models in the literature. These models describe contagion as
interdependence and o¤er practically the same guidance to the nature of policy-
making, as single-bank models. The idea is that the conduit that spreads a crisis
across banks is the same channel that pre-empts the transmission if appropri-
ate policies are administered at the crisis-catalyst bank. For instance, in Allen
and Gale (2000), SOC at a crisis-catalyst bank will always prevent contagion
since, by denition, it helps to preserve the balance sheet of the crisis catalyst
bank. Our paradigm is di¤erent in that, with public information, a policy being
administered at one bank, may create a crisis channel of its own if the policy is
interpreted negatively by depositors in the rest of the banking system. We pro-
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vide some examples to illustrate the validity of this important point. Although
written with the East Asian turmoil in mind, we endeavour, where possible, to
relate the contributions of our research work to the contemporary nancial crisis
of 2007-2008. The Northern Rock crisis in the UK in 2007 is used as example
in chapter 5 to illustrate how our framework (embodied in chapters 3, 4 and
5) can be used to rationalise the occurrence of certain events that had occurred
in the current nancial turmoil.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.1 and 5.2 deal
with the nature of equilibrium nancial contagion and correlation and attempts
to determine their relative importance in a banking panic transmission event.
The section also relates contagion and correlation to the informational attributes
of depositors of bank B. The concepts of public informational dominance and
private informational dominance are introduced in section 5.3 and are formally
linked to the nature of events that occur. The section ends with some general
properties of contagion and correlation in equilibrium. An interesting fact here
is that, with uniform prior and posterior distributions of the common macro-
economic fundamental, the incidence of contagion and correlation in our setup
is zero. This di¤ers signicantly from Dasgupta (2004) whose model relates
the incidence of contagion to the size of interbank deposit contracts. Section
5.4 discusses the policy implications of our paradigm. Finally, section 5.5
concludes.
5.2 Financial Contagion as State-Contingent Change
in Cross-Bank Correlation
To be able to dene nancial contagion appropriately within the setup we have
adopted, it is important to stress on the cause-e¤ect relationship that underpins
the concept. Heuristically, we could view nancial contagion as an event that
occurs when the failure of bank A causes bank B to fail, when bank B would not
have failed otherwise. Note the importance of the second part of the statement
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....when bank B would not have failed otherwise....... This implies that, in
our denition, without bank A, bank B could fail for other reasons (e.g its
idiosyncratic fundamental is too low) or it could possibly not fail at all. What
the statement is really saying, is that the performance of bank A, by itself,
will increase the likelihood of failure of bank B over what could possibly have
happened without the presence of bank A. Before moving on further, we must
rst elicit the conditions under which this will hold true. Then we shall formalise
the concept of contagion through appropriate use of diagrams. Consider Figure
5.1.
Figure 5.1 highlights the unique threshold in each bank. For the moment,
let us forget about the dynamics that will cause A (u) and 

B (u) to vary and
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attempt to situate what we have learned in the previous topic in the above
diagram. Thus, initially, we set A (u) = 

B (u) and, with slight abuse of
language, shall refer to this as the autarky situation1 or as in the introduction,
the tranquil state. Quadrants 3 and 2 show similar results in both banks.
Quadrant 3 depicts the phenomenon of both banks failing (i.e A  A (u) ,
B  B (u) ) while quadrant 2 shows both banks succeeding or not failing(
i.e A > 

A (u) , B > 

B (u)). Quadrants 1 and 4 show mixed result. The
former depicts the success of bank B but failure of bank A ( i.e A  A (u)
, B > 

B (u) ) while the latter shows the reverse e¤ects ( i.e A > 

A (u) ,
B  B (u) ).
How would our concept of nancial contagion t into the diagram? Could we
possibly argue that contagion is an event that occurs in quadrant 3? Doing so
would merely show the joint occurrence of failures of bank A and B but there is
nothing to tell us about the causation of the crises. Any permutation of events
is possible in that quadrant. Bank B can fail for reasons other than failure of
bank A and vice versa. To get a proper representation of nancial contagion, we
abstract from what may commonly be driving the performance of both banks.
This is done by controlling for the level of the common macroeconomic funda-
mental. The aim is to assess mathematically how the failure of bank A, by itself,
can cause the failure of bank B after controlling for the common fundamental.
Thus, we must show that, whenever bank A fails ( i.e A  A (u) ), the
probability of bank B failing for a given level of macroeconomic fundamental,
will be higher than B (u): For each of the possible two realisations of the
common macroeconomic fundamental, this probability can be assessed. What
extra feature does the failure of bank A has on bank Bs threshold ? It was
shown in proposition 4.5 (of the previous chapter) that, upon failure of bank
A, the trigger of bank B is adjusted in such a way that depositors in bank B are
1Autarky typically refers to absence of trade but here, it means that there is no interraction
among the banks. Depositors of each bank behave as if the other bank did not exist. Due to
identical endowments and similar returns structure, it is obvious that A (u) = 

B(u ):
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more likely to share a similar fate to those of bank A. We denoted that trigger
FAB (u): Assuming that the common macroeconomic fundamental is in its bad
state, the cause-e¤ect relationship between failure of bank A and failure of bank
B can be represented as events Pr (B  B (u) j A  A (u) \ fu = uBadg).
Recall that Pr(B  B(u) j A  A (u) \ fu = uBadg)  FAB;uBad :We referred
to this as the threshold for bank B but computed with conditional probability,
Pr(u = uBad j FA) which we gave earlier as k 

A(uBad)
k A(uBad) + (1 k)A(uBad) : Clearly,
FAB;uBad > 

B (u), where 

B (u) is computed as the threshold of bank B in the
autarky case.
Similarly, we computed the event that bank B fails conditional on success of
bank A and the state of the common fundamental being bad as Pr(B  B(u) j
A > 

A (u) \ fu = uBadg)  SAB;uBad . This refers to the threshold of bank B
computed with conditional probability Pr(u = uBad j SA) which we gave earlier
as k (1 

A(uBad))
k (1 A(uBad)) + (1 k)(1 A(uG)) : Clearly, 
SA
B;uBad
 B (u); where B (u) is
computed for bank B as in the autarky case. We present the autarky thresholds
A (u) ; 

B (u); 
SA
B;uBad
and FAB;uBad in Figure 5.2(a) (please turn next page for
illustration).
The representation in Figure 5.2(a) enable us formalise the denition of
nancial contagion as follows:
Denition 5.1: (Formal) (Financial Contagion) For the part of the
game between  A;t=1 and  B;t=1 characterised by the existence of a unique
threshold in the depositorsgame, nancial contagion is said to occur when:
For A 2

uG ; uBad + z

, B 2

uG ; uBad + z

and conditional on state
u
Either (1) eventn
f A  A (u)g \ f B(u)  B  FAB;ug
o
for a given macroeconomic state
u
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The probability of contagion is a weighted average of the above event, with
each weight corresponding to the probability distribution underlying the particu-
lar state of the macroeconomic fundamental:
Pr(Contagious Failures)
= k

FAB;uBad   B(uBad)
  
A
 
uBad
  uBad+
(1  k)

FAB;uG   B(uG)
  
A
 
uG
  uG
Or (2) eventn
f A > A (u) g \ fSAB;u  B  B(u)g
o
for a given macroeconomic state
u
The probability of contagion is a weighted average of the above event, with
each weight corresponding to the probability distribution underlying the particu-
lar state of the macroeconomic fundamental:
P (Contagious Success)
= k

B(u
Bad)  SA
B;uBad
   
uBad + z
  A(uBad)+
(1  k)

B(u
G)  SA
B;uG
   
uG + z
  A(uG)
Notice that in Figure 5.2(a), each form of contagion is represented by the
two shaded segments of the graphs. It is only in these two segments that we can
reasonably have a cause-e¤ect relationship. For instance, assume that the state
of the common macroeconomic fundamental is bad. We have argued that when
bank A fails, the trigger of bank B is revised upwards taking into account the
fact that bad news have raised the trigger from B(u
Bad ) to FAB;uBad : This extra
increase in the trigger due to the event in bank A is what the shaded segment
on the left of Figure 5.2(a) is all about. Here, bad news about bank A has
altered the behaviour of depositors in bank B such that, given the level of the
common macroeconomic fundamental, bank B fails for a wider range of its own
fundamentals. The di¤erence FAB;uBad   B(uBad) represents this cause-e¤ect
relationship.
Point M in Figure 5.2(a) shows a case where failure of bank A can cause bank
B to fail. Without interactions between the two banks, point M would have
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represented an outcome such that depositors of bank A would have chosen to
remain invested, given the strategies they pursue. The possibility of interactions
between banks means that the failure of bank A leads to an updated assessment
of the prior states of the common fundamental by depositors of bank B such
that the threshold of bank B is raised relative to the autarkic level. Point M
thus represents a case of B being less than the new threshold 
FA
B;uBad
: Thus
depositors in bank B withdraw when they would not have done so otherwise.
Like point M, any point within the left shaded area of Figure 5.2(a), represents
a case of success of bank B in autarky case but failure with interaction case.
Notice that points below the horizontal (dotted) line B
 
uBad

represent failure
of bank B, even though bank A does not exist. Point N, thus cannot represent
nancial contagion because even though both banks A and B fail, bank B would
have failed anyway even without bank As presence.
By the same token, success of bank A will lower the trigger of bank B from
B
 
uBad

to SAB;uBad assuming that the common macroeconomic fundamental
is in its bad state. That extra fall in the trigger of bank B due to the event
of bank A also depicts nancial contagion (shown as the right hand shaded
segment of Figure 5.2(a)). Ostensibly, the arguments also run through if the
common fundamental was in the good state ( i.e u = uG ). Without interaction,
point P would have represented a case of bank B failure in the autarkic case.
Allowing for interaction between banks leads to an updated assessment of the
prior states of the common fundamental such that the new trigger becomes
SAB;uG : Point P represents a case of bank failure without interaction but a case
of no bank failure with interaction. Like point P, any point in the shaded area
on the right of Figure 5.2(a) represents a case of success of bank B exclusively
due to success of bank A.
Denition 5.2: (Informal) (Financial Contagion) Signicant change in
the co-movements of events across banks, conditional on an event occurring in
the rst bank.
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This concept of contagion is highly appealing and largely ts what is com-
monly perceived as a by-product of natural correlation: that the intensity of the
transmission mechanism channel is di¤erent after a shock plaguing one bank.
In all states of the world, the two banks are correlated but in the non-tranquil
state, there is an extra element to this transmission mechanism that appears in
the form of excessive correlatedness. This refers to investors of the second bank
changing their behaviour just because of the event in the rst bank and is what
constitutes contagion in our paper. By stressing on the quantitative element (
i.e signicant change), it conveys the notion of contagion as representing ex-
cessive co-movements, relative to some normal benchmark. The purpose of this
section was to dene this normalyardstick and to contrast the excesswith
respect to it.
Denition 5.3: (Formal) (Financial Correlation) For the game between
 A;t=1 and  B;t=1 characterised by the existence of a threshold equilibrium in
the depositorsgame, nancial correlation is said to occur when:
For A 2

uG ; uBad + z

, B 2

uG ; uBad + z

and conditional on state
u
Either(1) Negative Correlatedness
ffu  A  A (u)g \ f u  B  B(u)gg for a given macroeconomic state
u
The probability of negative correlatedness is a weighted average of the above
event, with each weight corresponding to the probability of a particular state of
the macroeconomic fundamental occurring:
P (Correlated Failures)
= k
 
B(u
Bad)  uBad   A  uBad  uBad+
(1  k)  B(uG)  uG  A(uG)  uG
Or (2) Positive Correlatedness
ff (u+ z) > A > A (u) g \ fB(u)  B  (u+ z)g gfor a given macro-
economic state u
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The probability of postive correlatedness is a weighted average of the above
event, with each weight corresponding to the probability of a particular state of
the macroeconomic fundamental occurring:
P (Positive Correlatedness)
= k
  
uBad + z
  B(uBad)   uBad + z  A  uBad+
(1  k)   uG + z  B(uG)   uG + z  A  uG
The presence of common exposure to the macroeconomic fundamental means
that the performance of bank A and bank B will inexorably be driven by common
factors and will follow the same cycle in all states of the world .
Our ability to explain contagion endogenously as a case of excessive corre-
lationdeparts fundamentally from the existing literature (Rochet and Tirole
(1996), Chen (1999), Allen and Gale (2000), Dasgupta (2004)), which models
contagion essentially as interdependence. Research on contagion in the bonds
market and on the stock market by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), showed that
interdependence could be interpreted as the weakest aspect of contagion. The
main reason for such an interpretation of contagion being regarded as weak
is that the conduit that connects entities remains the same in all states of the
world. Thus, in crisis-scenarios, the main channel that contagiously transmits
a crisis from one entity to another, is essentially the same channel that achieves
the benet of forming that connection between the two entities in a non-crisis
scenario. In Allen and Gale (2000), for instance, banks benet from cross-
insuring their deposits when regional liquidity shocks are negatively correlated.
In a crisis situation, this channel transmist a crisis from bank to bank if the net-
work structure that links banks, is incomplete. Similarly, in Dasgupta (2004),
banks engage in cross-holding interbank deposit contracts. The optimal inter-
bank contract trades o¤ the benet of regional liquidity insurance (which is
provided by the interbank connection between balance sheet of banks) and the
endogenous probabilit of a contagious failure across banks. In both, Allen and
Gale (2000) and Dasgupta (2004), interdependence is provided by the inter-
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bank channel that directly connects banks. This channel remains in all states
of the world.
More recently, Pesaran and Pick (2007) developed an empirical model of
contagion, to explain why contagion viewed as interdependencedoes not yield
empirically robust results. They argue that, using evidence from interest rates
in Europe, that models that explain contagion as excess correlationare most
robust. With excess correlation, there is an extra channel that exists in crisis
scenarios, relative to non-crisis scenarios. The issue of causation is important
as well. This extra channel is responsible for causing a second entity to fail (if
and only if a rst entity has failed), when no such second entity failure would
have occured otherwise. Our results corroborate the ndings of Pesaran and
Pick (2007). We show that when contagion occurs, the issue of causation is at
heart of the transmission mechanism. In the shaded areas in Figure 5.2(a) for
instance, bank B fails (succeeds) just because bank A ahs failed (succeeded).
Furthermore, the transmission conduit that leads to contagion across banks,
exists in particular states of the world only. For instance, in the state of the
world in which bank A fails, there is negative informational spillover on de-
positors of bank B. The latter will weigh this public signal with their private
signal before deciding whether to withdraw. If they do, then a channel has
been created by the public signal encapsulated by informational spillovers. The
same process works in an opposite fashion in a state of the world in which bank
A succeeds. Most importantly, whether positive or negative contagion occurs,
we can endogenously show contagion as a case in which the correlation be-
tween banks becomes excessive. Our approach of contagion thus satises the
robustness denition of contagion provided by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), and
can be represented as a theoretical representation of Pesaran and Pick (2007)s
empirical results.
With contagion being depicted as a case of an excess in natural correlation,
we next turn to rationalising the case for contagion as a function of informational
attributes of depositors.
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5.3 Public Informational Dominance vs Private
Informational Dominance
What constitutes the driving force behind the crucial di¤erence between con-
tagion and correlation ? Intuitively, the di¤erence in the results obtained can
be attributed to the relative importance of information in depositorsstrategy.
We know that, by construction, the banks have a correlated performance in
all states of the world. Thus, a boom in the performance of portfolios in the
hedge fund will drive their performance sky-high and a recession will result in a
lacklustre performance. The shaded rectangles in Figure 5.2(a) in the graphical
appendix represent cases of excess correlation. The location of a given point
reects the location of the idiosyncratic fundamental of each bank. With precise
private signals, the location of point M also signies the relative importance of
private signals in depositors strategy. Consider point M for instance. From
the perspective of bank A, M suggests that A  A (u) : Given their strategy,
depositors of bank A will withdraw and, by proposition 4.3 (of the previous
chapter), bank A fails since the set of signals that depositors receive will cluster
around A . From the perspective of bank B, point M suggests that a success
of bank B in the autarky case but a failure in the case in which depositors are
allowed to observe the event in bank A. The location of B at point M rela-
tive to the autarky case, reects the location of private signals of depositors of
bank B. Thus, the (vertical) distance of between the B at point M and the
autarkic threshold B (u) denotes the importance of private signals in deposi-
torsstrategy. Observing the failure of bank A leads all depositors of bank B
to update their beliefs about the state of the common macroeconomic funda-
mental, such that the threshold of bank B increases from B (u) to 
FA
B (u) :
The distance FAB (u)   B (u) represents the increased probability of failure of
bank B exclusively due to the observed public event in bank A. Thus, the dis-
tance FAB (u)  B (u) represents the importance of public signals in depositors
strategy.
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The classication of an event as correlation, contagion or neither of these
depends on the relative importance of private and public signals in bank B
depositorsdecision set. Point M, for instance, is a point at which the relative
importance of the private information is less than the relative importance of the
public infomation. We thus have public informational dominance here. Any
point in the shaded area is characterised by public informational dominance.
When this happens, an event in bank A will always contagiously spread to bank
B with the denition of contagion we adopted earlier. Point P, associated with
a success of bank A, is also characterised by public informational dominance
by virtue of the same features characterising the informational attributes in
depositorsdecisions (as in point M). Please refer to Figure 5.3 (next page) for
an illustration.
Point O in Figure 5.3, characterised by failure of bank A, is one in which
the vertical location of B relative to the autarkic threshold 

B (u) ; exceeds
the vertical distance FAB (u) B (u) :When this takes place, the private signals
of depositors of bank B are given relatively more importance than the public
signal emanating from the observed event in bank A. This is dubbed private
informational dominance. Any point in the quadrant that is north of the shaded
area containing point M, is characterised by private informational dominance.
Here, intuitively, the depositors of bank B attach more importance to their
private signals (which are high because they are clustered around a high B)
than to the publicly observed event. Thus, a strong idiosyncratic performance
of bank B may ward o¤ any informational attributes coming from a publicly
observed event such that no contagion occurs. In a similar line of thought,
any point in the quadrant south of the shaded area containing point P will be
characterised by strict private informational dominance. The intuition is that,
while bank A has succeeded (the relative importance of public information for
depositors of bank B being represented by vertical distance B (u)   SAB (u));
the relative importance of private information (measured by vertical distance
B (u)  B) is given more importance in the decision set of depositors of bank
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B. The performance of bank B is thus driven relatively more by the private
information of its depositors in this quadrant. Thus, bank B fails.
Points in any other quadrants (e.g point N in the south-west quadrant
(A  A (u) ; B  B (u)) or point Q in the north-east quadrant (A > A (u) ; B > B (u))
represent cases of natural correlation. Here, the performances of banks are
driven by their idiosyncratic fundamentals with or without interraction. Banks
register identical results in all states of the world. There is no di¤erence be-
tween autarky and interraction cases. Bayesian updating about the state of the
common macroeconomic fundamental has no bite on the results. To sum up:
General Corollary (Public Informational Dominance vs Private In-
formational Dominance) The performance space of the two banks can be seg-
regated into three main events for bank B: Correlation, Contagion and None.
(Correlation) Banks are naturally correlated in all states of the world due
to identical investment in a hedge fund a¤ected by some common macroeconomic
fundamental.
(Contagion) Contagion, derived as an excess in this natural correlation,
occurs due to public informational dominance in depositorsdecision set. Here,
depositors of bank B give relatively more importance to the public news emanat-
ing from the event in bank A than to their private information, such that bank
Bs performance follows the public news and su¤ers a fate identical to that of
bank A.
(None) The case in which bank B does not share the same fate as bank A
is a case in which there is private informational dominance. Here, the private
information of depositors is so strong (upwards or downwards) that it wards o¤
completely the public event of bank As performance. Bank Bs performance is
driven more by its idiosyncratic fundamentals.
In a static game of incomplete information, Hellwig (2002) derives the neces-
sary and su¢ cient conditions for there to be uniqueness as opposed to multiplic-
ity of equilibria. The occurence of the specic type of equilibrium depends on
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the specic realisations of the private signal and of the public signal. The dis-
cussion of the results we obtain above about th einterplay between private and
public information, can be thought as an adaptation of Hellwig (2002) to the
banking world. However, our approach di¤ers from Hellwig in three main ways.
We deal with dynamic Bayesian games (i.e sequential move games with incom-
plete information) that are applied to a banking context. In Hellwig (2002),
the game is stylized and static. Furthermore, our private signals and public
signal are on di¤erent variables. The private signals of depositors in each bank
concern the idiosyncratic fundamental of that bank only and the public signal
is related to an endogenously observed event in bank A. In Hellwig (2002), the
private and public signals are on the same variable. Lastly, we are interested in
the interplay between private and public informational attributes in triggering
events across banks. Hellwig (2002) deals with these attributes as a mechanism
for selecting the nature of equilibrium. We studied the nature of equilibrium of
our game in chapter 4.
Our fundamental result of contagion occurring when there is public informa-
tional dominance, is similar to the herding result obtained by Banerjee (1992).
In herding models, the informational attributes of the game evolve as an implicit
learning mechanism. Herding occurs as an equilibrium when information ag-
gregation stops and agents in the continuation game, ignore their private signals
and rely on public information alone. Our paradigm di¤ers from the herding
models in an important way. Unlike herding models, there is no stop in infoma-
tion aggregation. The issue of causation that underpins contagion in our setup,
simply occurs when depositors of bank B attach relatively more importance to
the public information of the event in bank A, than to their private informa-
tion. While both informational endowments are still being used, the e¤ect of the
public news overshadows that of the private signal, with the result that bank
B su¤ers a similar fate as bank A. Furthermore, we provide microtheoretic ac-
count for cases in which this kind of result may be prevented. For instance, bank
B may still avoid a failure (despite bank A failing) if its depositors have extra
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strong private signals that overpower the public news of bank As failure. Thus,
unlike herding models, in which only one result occurs after information aggre-
gation stops, in our model, di¤erent permutations in results are still possible,
depending on the relative importance of private vs public news in depositors
information set.
5.3.1 Properties of Contagion and of Correlation as Equi-
librium Phenomena
Property 5.1: Conditional on the state of the common macroeconomic funda-
mental being bad, the probability of having bad contagion (correlation) exceeds
that of having good contagion (correlation)
Illustration:
P(Contagious Failures) > P(Contagious Success)
FAB;uBad   B(uBad)
  
A
 
uBad
  uBad >
B(u
Bad)  SA
B;uBad
   
uBad + z
  A(uBad)
P( Correlated Failures) > P( Correlated Success) 
B(u
Bad)  uBad  A  uBad  uBad >  
uBad + z
  B(uBad)   uBad + z  A  uBad
Property 5.2: Conditional on the state of the common macroeconomic
fundamental being good, the probability of good contagion (correlation) exceeds
that of bad contagion (correlation)
Illustration:
P(Contagious Success) > P(Contagious Failure)
B(u
G)  SA
B;uG
   
uG + z
  A  uG > FAB;uG   B(uG)  A  uG   uG
P(Correlated Success) > P(Correlated Failure)  
uG + z
  B(uG) ( uG + z A(uG)) >  B(uG)  uG   A  uG  uG
The relative importance of contagion v/s correlation depends on the partic-
ular values that threshold parameters take.
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While properties 5.1 and 5.2 establish that we can unambiguously rank the
contagious failures and successes of a bank as well as the correlated failures and
successes, there is no light on the issue of comparing contagious performance and
a correlated performance. Judging whether a multiple bank shock is more a mat-
ter of correlation than of contagion, is entirely dependent on parametric values
that thresholds may have. To take an example, Figures 5.2(a) and 5.3 have been
drawn such that correlation is relatively more important than contagion. We
could well have illustrated an interpretation of banking performance using the
illustrations from Figures 5.2(b)-(d) in the section that immediately follows the
conclusion of this chapter. In this case, Figure 5.2(c) shows that, conditional on
the macroeconomic fundamental being in its bad state, for instance, contagious
bank failures have a higher probability than correlated bank failures (where the
relative importance depends on the relative area sizes, depicting their respective
probabilities). Similar interpretations can be derived from arbitrary constella-
tion of gures. Figure 5.2(d) in the same section, shows that, conditional on
macroeconomic fundamental being good, positive contagious probability may
exceed positive correlatedness. Gauging the size of a contagious event relative
to a correlated event is of primacy importance to policymakers since, compared
to correlation, contagion has di¤erent implications for policymaking. We return
to the implications for policymaking in the next section of this chapter
Property 5.3: (Incidence of Contagion is zero due to uniform dis-
tribution of fundamental and error technology)
Interpret Incidencehere as referring to Net Contagion weighted appropri-
ately by the prior probability distribution over the states of the common macro-
economic fundamental. The incidence of contagion is zero.
Proof. The incidence is given by:
k

FAB;uBad   B(uBad)
  
A
 
uBad
  uBad
 k

B(u
Bad)  SA
B;uBad
   
uBad + z
  A  uBad
+(1  k)

FA
B;uG
  B(uG)
  
A
 
uG
  uG
  (1  k)

B(u
G)  SA
B;uG
   
uG + z
  A = 0
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Property 5.4: (Incidence of Correlation is zero due to uniform
distribution of fundamental and error technology)
Interpret Incidencehere as referring to Net Correlation weighted appropri-
ately by the prior probability distribution over the states of the common macro-
economic fundamental. The incidence of correlation is zero.
Proof. The incidence is given by:
k
 
B(u
Bad)  uBad   A  uBad  uBad
 k   uBad + z  B(uBad)   uBad + z  A  uBad
+(1  k)  B(uG)  uG  A  uG  uG 
  (1  k)   uG + z  B(uG) ( uG + z  A  uG) = 0
The importance of a zero incidence in contagion or correlation has implica-
tions for econometric techniques designed to predict the occurrence of conta-
gious ows or correlated ows. A zero incidence simply asserts that over the
various states of the common macroeconomic fundamental, contagion or cor-
relation do not vary in a particular way with parameters of the model. Our
results di¤er from Dasgupta (2004) who claims that the incidence of contagion
is positively related to the size of the interbank market in deposits or loans with
the assumption of uniformly distributed fundamentals and error technology. In
Dasgupta (2004), the presence of the interbank market makes it a conspicuous
candidate for judging the size of contagious ows. While the interbank market
provides regional liquidity insurance, it also provides a channel which spreads a
failure from bank to bank. There is no direct payo¤ dependence in our model
- the only channel through which infomation ows is the public information
channel which a¤ects depositorsbeliefs and decisions. Our interpretation of
zero incidence follows from the fact that whilst we controlled for the states of
the common macroeconomic fundamental to gauge the specic cause-e¤ect re-
lationship, depositorsbeliefs net out over the di¤erent states of the common
fundamental. We opine that while econometric techniques may be helpful in
predicting the occurrence of contagious ows when there are well dened di-
rect links, they must be used with caution in models in which informational
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spillovers link events across banks.
5.4 Practical Relevance and Applications
Though the model of banking panic transmission highlighted in this chapter
is admittedly highly theoretical, it has practical relevance and can o¤er fresh
innovative insights into ways in which Central Banks and international insti-
tutions such as the IMF must go about designing the regulatory structure. In
the following subsections, we present the application of our paper to explain-
ing important puzzles in the literature and we go on to extol on the innovative
framework that may be used to analyse policy implications so as to improve on
the existing regulatory setting of banksactivities.
5.4.1 Demystifying Important Puzzles
Surveying the empirical literature on nancial contagion helps unearth three
puzzles about nancial contagion, which are inextricably linked to one another:
(Zero-Link Puzzle) The failure of one nancial intermediary sometimes
leads to the failure of another intermediary when there is no apparent physical
or direct link between them.
(Clustering Puzzle) Financial contagion may not arbitrarily spread from
one institution to another but rather seems to a¤ect identical institutions only.
(Avoidance Puzzle) Among a set of identical countries / institutions,
some can avoid a contagious ow whereas others cannot.
Models of nancial contagion that focus on direct links ( Allen and Gale
(2000) and Dasgupta (2004) ) do not explain the zero-link issue. The essence of
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these models of contagion is the existence of a direct link itself that lies at the
heart of spreading a crisis from one bank to another. In Allen and Gale (2000)
and Dasgupta (2004), the existence of a network of overlapping interbank claims
provides the key propagator channel, such that a bank failure means that an-
other bank will surely su¤er a loss of interbank claims. Hence, it is more likely
to su¤er from the same fate as the rst bank. If there were no nancial con-
tracts provided by the interbank market for deposits as a way of insuring against
regional liquidity shocks, there would no banking panic transmission. The im-
portance of the zero-link puzzle cannot be underestimated though as evidence
does seem to suggest that crises often propagate to institutions or countries
that share no similarities with the crisis-catalyst institution or country. In our
setup, we have shown that, even with no such direct nancial links between
banks, contagion may still occur in equilibrium. Our model can thus explain
why events in small economies like Thailand can a¤ect behaviour of investors in,
say, Russia, Argentina or Mexico, notwithstanding the insignicance of direct
trade or nancial links between them.
The second puzzle has been widely documented by Aharony and Swary
(1996) who conducted a study of 33 US banks in the mid 1990s and found
that the extent of negative impact of contagion is greater for banks that are
similar to the failed bank. Ahluwalia (2000) shows that, for a sample of 19
countries and three episodes of crises, a countrys vulnerability to contagious
crises depends on the visible similarities between this country and the country
actually experiencing the crisis. Allen and Gale (2000) and Dasgupta (2004)
do not explain the clustering issue because they focus on homogenous banks
throughout and the strength of connection provided by the direct link is same
for all banks. In our model, we do make the distinction between identical and
non-identical banks in that identical banks are those that share a common ex-
posure to the macroeconomic fundamental. If banks were not linked to the
common fundamental ( i .e were not identical), depositors of the second bank
would not have adjusted their beliefs about the macroeconomic fundamental
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and no crisis would have spilled over to the other bank. The clustering puzzle
of contagion was apparent in the Tequila crisis from Mexico to Argentina and
Brazil in 1994-95, the East Asian crisis of 1997-98 and the ripple e¤ect of the
Russian default in August 1998 on many emerging markets.
The third puzzle represents the antithesis of the clustering puzzle . Among a
set of identical countries or institutions, it may not necessarily be the case that
all countries su¤er a contagious ow when one is hit by a technological / liquidity
shock. Some do manage to avoid a contagious ow of nancial crisis. Countries
that succeed in pre-empting an overseas nancial crisis from a¤ecting them,
are those that inevitably have very strong idiosyncratic fundamentals. In our
model, a failure of bank A, for instance, may not contagiously spread to bank
B if depositors of bank B have strong private signals that dominate any public
signal they observe about bank A. For example, in Figure 5.3 above, point O
represents such a case. By contrast, point M is one in which the public signal
element dominates the private information of depositors (weak idiosyncratic
fundamentals) such that bank B su¤ers the same fate as bank A. Our model
will, thus, hypothesise point M as that of Malaysias case following the crisis
in Thailand in 1997. By contrast, point O will be the case of Singapore, Hong
Kong or Australia because these countries were immune from the contagious
impact from the rest of East Asia, despite the existence of strong economic and
nancial links with the region.
5.4.2 Regulatory Mechanism Design - Microprudential vs
Macroprudential regulations - Challenges for the IMF
and Central Banks
One of the challenges awaiting policymakers such as the IMF and Central Banks,
is the design of an appropriate regulatory system to ensure nancial stability.
A great part of the literature on banking regulation ( or the design of optimal
regulatory framework for banking) tends to focus on the specic means to pre-
empt the likelihood of nancial contagion. Whilst microprudential regulation
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has received much attention and theoretical support, macroprudential regula-
tion has often been ignored in debates over the most appropriate form that a
countrys regulatory framework should take.
Microprudential regulation concerns all the preventive measures taken at in-
dividual bank level designed to ward o¤ the possibility of a bank failure being
transmitted to the whole banking and nancial system. It consists mainly of
one-sidedpolicy measures2 either intended to protect the depositors of the bank
or as a general safety net designed to maintain the condence of all stakehold-
ers in the banking system. Deposit insurance schemes characterise the former
set. Suspension-Of-Convertibility (SOC) and Lender-Of-Last-Resort (LOLR)
characterise the latter set.
In direct linkmodels of nancial contagion, microprudential regulatory
measures would work in pre-empting the transmission of a banking panic. Since
contagious crises arise essentially because of interdependence and are transmit-
ted through channels that remain unchanged in all states of the world (non-
tranquil periods and tranquil periods), the commonly held Help one, Save all
syndrome works. Microprudential measures, however, do not work e¤ectively
if the main reason for bank failure is some commonly based fundamental that
links both banks. For example, as mentioned in the introductory section, sup-
pose two banks have received nancial contracts (lent) in euros and have issued
nancial contracts (borrowed from depositors) in dollars. A depreciation of the
dollar against the euro could negatively a¤ect the balance sheet of both banks
and lead to premature withdrawals by depositors in each bank. In this case, the
interbank market does not help as a liquidity reshu­ ing mechanism. One-sided
measures do not work here either. What is needed is some policy action de-
signed at targeting the common macroeconomic fundamental that is commonly
2We use the term one-sidedmeasure because we shall be assuming that the policy applies
only to the bank facing the crisis. There is no randomisation among the banks ( i.e good
banks or bad banks) and no economy-wide safety net. Forbes and Rigobon (2001) describe
these one-sided measures as isolation strategies.
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driving both banksperformance e.g limit the uctuation of the dollar against
the euro by designing some form of explicit exchange rate arrangement that will
achieve this goal of currency stability. In the South East Asian crisis of 1997,
the banking panic throughout the region occurred because of the banksexpo-
sure to extreme exchange rate changes, which softened their balance sheets and
made them much more vulnerable and prone to bank runs. In instances such
as these, macroprudential regulation should be given the overriding concern.
Microprudential regulatory measures in a one-bank setting (the current lit-
erature paradigm) still seem best at pre-empting the likelihood of a crisis from
existing in one bank by e¤ectively acting as a mechanism that coordinates the
beliefs of depositors of that bank on the right equilibrium. However, in a two-
bank setting with informational externalities, the mechanism implicit in the
transmission process of information may create feedback e¤ects that have reper-
cussions on depositors of other banks. Thus, tackling a liquidity crisis at a bank
(e.g Bank of Englands intervention to provide assistance to Northern Rock in
2007) may have a signalling value that a¤ects the behaviour of depositors of
other banks in the UK economy, such that the liquidity assistance becomes
counterproductive. The appropriate design of microprudential policy measures
by a Central Bank must take into account this signal spillover e¤ect. Clearly,
solving a liquidity crisis at one bank may be sub-optimal if other depositors
in the economy interpret this as a sign of panic and start worrying about the
medium-term prospects of their own banks. In this case, we have a intertem-
poral substitution of a nancial crisis across banks. A banking economy in
which, say, suspension is adopted as a policy instrument at the crisis-catalyst
bank, may send the wrong signals to depositors of other banks3 . By contrast, a
LOLR banking economy does better at eliminating contagious ows because the
LOLR measure at one bank may send a positive or negative signal to depositors
of the second bank4 . The optimal design of microprudential measures should
3See Note I in the Appendix (section A.4)
4See Note J in the Appendix (Section A.4)
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balance the contemporary positive impact of solving a liquidity-based crisis at
the cost of future information-induced crisis at other banks.
If the future costs weigh more than the current benets, does that sug-
gest that microprudential policy measures should never be implemented ? One
possible way of achieving pareto improvement will be for the Central Bank to
successfully maintain condence of depositors at a high level across banks, when
implementing a liquidity-based prudential measure at one bank. The Northern
Rock crisis of 2007 showed that this should have been the optimal response
of the Bank of England in its interventionist role to achieve nancial stability.
Ostensibly, how to maintain condence across banks is subject to disagreement
among practitioners. While our model does not tell us about the exact form
these safeguards should take, it does improve on the existing literature on (one-
bank) liquidity-based policy intervention measures in that it provides a logical
framework that rationalises the case for such appropriate safeguards to accom-
pany the conventional type of policy intervention. To sum up, we have three
cases that can be Pareto-Ranked:
General Corollary (Policy Intervention and Paretian Ranking) In
our model, we conjecture that microprudential liquidity-based measures admin-
istered by the Central Bank under the current paradigm, are not potent due
to the presence of intertemporal substitution of a banking crisis. A superior
outcome will be to accompany these liquidity-based interventionist measures by
appropriate condence safeguards throughout the rest of the nancial system.
These condence safeguards work as a pivotal mechanism that coordinates the
expectations of depositors across banks on the right outcome by ensuring that the
positive signals are sent to these other depositors in the economy. This mecha-
nism Pareto improveson the current paradigm and achieves the twinned aims
of containing a crisis at a catalyst bank and of preventing intertemporal substi-
tution. In case wrong signals are sent, these liquidity-based measures may help
create a channel of nancial contagion of their own. This outcome is Pareto
inferiorto the current paradigm.
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This new implication for microprudential policy design is important, because
it tells us that in sequential games with informational spillovers, there are dif-
ferent ways for depositors in an economy to interpret the implementation of a
given liquidity-based prudential measure at a bank: instead of acting as a coor-
dination mechanism for depositors of the same bank (as the current one-bank
paradigm will warrant), these measures need to coordinate the expectations and
beliefs of depositors across di¤erent banks on the correct equilibrium. For that,
it is imperative that positive signals through appropriately-designed safeguards,
are sent.
5.4.3 The Credit Crunch Crisis of 2007-2008 - The Special
Case of Northern Rock
How relevant are our ndings to the Northern Rock crisis of 2007 ?
Northern Rock, a former mutual savings and prime mortgage bank based in
the UK, became a prominent casualty of the nancial crisis that began to unfold
in 2007. To see the relevance of our ndings, we rst highlight the di¤erences
between our model setup and the banking structure of Northern Rock.
According to Shin (2009), the structure of the balance sheet of Northern
Rock di¤ered from that of conventional banks in bank run models such as Di-
amond and Dybvig (1983). Conventional banks have a balance sheet structure
characterised by maturity mismatch that we identied in our literature review
of chapter 2 i.e short-term liquid liabilities and long-term illiquid assets. The
liabilities consist essentially of (branch-based) retail deposits and equity. The
asset side consists of liquid cash (till cash, treasury bills, reserves held at Central
Bank) and illiquid assets (investments and loans). Our modelling structure fol-
lows this conventional paradigm. However, unlike traditional banks which have
a liability structure consisting mainly of retail deposits, a signicant proportion
of the liabilities of Northern Rock consisted mainly of wholesale deposits like
securitized notes, covered bonds, interbank deposits and lending from a wide
investor base that spans the globe.
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According to Shin (2009), that creates an irony. How did retail depositors
run on the bank? To understand this paradox, Shin (2009) provides a meticulous
analysis of the subtleties of Northern Rocks nancial structure and operations.
We will summarise the important elements here in order to better appreciate
how our paradigm, embodied in chapters 3, 4 and 5, can help explain what
happened in Northern Rocks case.
The main elements of fragility came when the common pool of liquidity in the
wholesale funding market (from which Northern Rock was relying greatly upon)
began to dry up. This event began to take shape when there were a series of
subprime mortgage defaults in the US and a number of European and US banks
started to register losses on their Structured Investment Vehicles (SIV) - which
invested in these banks securitized assets backed by short-term debt such as
Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP). Northern Rocks increasing reliance
of this common pool of funding, backed by ABCP, made it easily vulnerable
to the unwillingness of lenders in the wholesale market to lend. This idea is
similar, though not identical to our common investment story or that bank A and
bank B having risky investments that are a¤ected by the same macroeconomic
fundamental. Thus, it becomes apparent that reliance on wholesale funding led
to common vulnerability and had some element of correlatedness, attached to
it. An important di¤erence is that, in our model, the common exposure lies on
the asset side. In the Northern Rocks case, the source of vulnerability lied on
the liability side.
Unlike investment banks in Europe and in the US, Northern Rock was not
engaged in subprime mortgage lending. Furthermore, as aforementioned, while
US and European banks usually get their loans o¤ their balance sheet through
special conduits or SIV that hold mortgaged assets backed by short-term lever-
age such as ABCP, the activities of these special purpose leveraged entities
were consolidated within the balance sheet of Northern Rock. Thus, a failure
of lenders in the wholesale market to lend due to a tightening of their risk con-
straints, will directly impinge on the banks balance sheet. Thus, the degree
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of exposure that Northern Rock had to these vulnerabilities in the wholesale
lending market, could be re-interpreted as its idiosyncratic fundamentals. Here
again, an important di¤erence with our approach, is that our idiosyncratic fun-
damentals are modelled on the asset side whereas for Northern Rock, they would
appear on the liability side.
Shin (2009) identies a crucial fact about the behaviour of creditors (i.e
lenders in the wholesale funding market) of Northern Rock which corroborates
the behaviour of retail depositors in our paradigm. He argues that, unlike the
conventional Diamond-Dybvig (1983) story, in which depositors withdraw based
on their fears that others withdraw irrespective of fundamentals, those lenders
who withdrew their funding in the wholesale market, did not do so by fears
of othersbehaviour. These lenders were sophisticated investors and acted on
fundamentals. When economic conditions were good, prudent risk management
policy (as well as regulatory policy) relaxed risk constraints for lenders. As
a result, they could increase their lending. However, when signs of dramatic
turnaround in economic conditions started to hover, risk constraints became
binding and there was a general retrenchment of lending. This resulted in a
drying up of the pool of funding from which Northern Rock was quenching its
liquidity needs. This behaviour in lendersbehaviour suggests that, far from
being a panic-based story, there was a coordinating device that coordinated
behaviour of lenders in their decisions. A possible example that Shin (2009)
provides is the general decline in house prices which led to a series of defaults
in subprime mortgage in the US and to general de-leveraging. In our model,
due to supermodularities or strategic complementarities in the payo¤ structure
of depositors, depositors (the only source of creditors) withdraw because others
withdraw. But what is coordinating the behaviour of depositors is the presence
of low idiosyncratic fundamentals of the bank. Thus, like in Northern Rock,
fundamentals act as coordination device for the behaviour of creditors of the
bank. Unlike Northern Rocks case though, these fundamentals inour setup, lie
within our banking system itself.
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A further compelling argument that shows similarity of our setup with that
of Northern Rock, is that in our work, the run by depositors are a consequence of
some fundamental weakness as suggested by the presence of weak fundamen-
tals that directly a¤ect the banks. Bank runs are not a cause of banking failure.
Shin (2009) argues that the bank run by retail depositors of Northern Rock was,
in a similar way, a result of these retail depositors appraising the weaknesses
faced by their bank in its di¢ culty in securing liquidity in the wholesale market,
and anticipating its ultimate demise. He argues5 : ...The Northern Rock depos-
itor run, although dramatic on television, was an event in the aftermath of the
liquidity crisis at Northern Rock, rather than the event that triggered its liquidity
crisis.... (pp 102). This observation lends credence to the belief that the run by
retail depositors in Northern Rock, was essentially information-based. This is
similar to our setup. Our approach, by embedding the global games framework
within a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) setup, has the advantage of bridging the
gap between panic-based stories and information-based stories. While we can
explain a bank run as a panic-based story, unlike Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
who focus on extraneous variables such as sunspots as coordinating device for
depositorsbehaviour, we provide an endogenous explanation for behaviour of
depositors: each banks idiosyncratic fundamental acts as a coordinating device
for its depositorscollective behaviour.
A crucial similarity between Northern Rocks case and our work, lies with
our conjecture about policymaking. We mentioned earlier that our dynamic
Bayesian approach with informational spillovers, o¤ers fresh insights on the eco-
nomics of interventionist policies implemented at a crisis-catalyst bank. These
insights improve on the standard paradigm currently suggested by single-bank
frameworks. One of the key insights of our approach is that depositors pay
attention to the importance of public information in making decisions about
whether to stay or withdraw. We conjectured through the innovative concept
5"Reections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run that heralded the Global Financial Crisis",
Hyun Song Shin, Journal of Economic Perspectives (2009), Vol 23, No. 1, pp 101-119
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of intertemporal substitution of banking crisis, that any attempts to intervene
at a crisis-catalyst bank through some sort of liquidity support, may be inter-
preted in di¤erent ways by depositors of other banks. If they interpret this
public information as a sign of weakness, they may choose to withdraw from
their own banks. Thus attempts to solve a crisis at one bank, through public
support that galvanised media attention, have created a channel for spreading
the crisis to other banks, by causing depositors in otherwise healthy banks to
withdraw. In Northern Rocks case, even though the liquidity support from the
Bank of England did not concern another bank, the public signal of the Bank
of Englands intervention, did uncover an underlying weakness about Northern
Rockwhich caused its retail depositors to withdraw.
In Shins (2009) words6 , ...On September 13, 2007, the BBCs evening
television news broadcast rst broke the news that Northern Rock had sought
the Bank of Englands support. The next morning, the Bank of England an-
nounced that it would provide emergency liquidity support. It was only after
that announcement that is, after the Central Bank had announced its inter-
vention to support the bank that retail depositors started queuing outside the
branch o¢ ces..... (pp 101 ).
Thus, to adapt our conjecture specically to Northern Rock, lets assume that
the consolidated balance sheet of Northern Rock comprises of the activities of
two sub-banks: those of bank A (which deals with wholesale deposits) and those
of bank B (which deals with retail deposits). Using the results of our framework,
we can safely say that the public news of the intervention of the Bank of England
to ward o¤ a wholesale-based run in bank A, has created a crisis channel of its
own, by inducing retail-based depositors in bank B to run on their bank. [Please
turn over to next page for an illustration of this scenario in Figure 5.4(a)-(c) ].
6"Reections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run that heralded the Global Financial Crisis",
Hyun Song Shin, Journal of Economic Perspectives (2009), Vol 23, No. 1, pp 101-119
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Figure 5.4 (a) illustrates the balance sheets of our two banks, bank A and
B. Figure 5.4 (b) shows the consolidated group balance sheet of the two banks,
assuming that each is an a­ iate organisation of an underlying parent bank
organisation. Figure 5.4 (c) shows the equivalence of our consolidated bank
balance sheet with that of Northern Rock. In the consolidated balance sheet
in Figure 5.4 (b), we proxy the behaviour of depositors in bank A as that of
wholesale depositors (holders of interbank claims, covered bonds and securitized
notes) in Northern Rock and proxy the behaviour of depositors in bank B as
that of retail depositors in Northern Rock. Given common investments, the end
result will replicate the balance sheet of Northern Rock - which we show in Fig-
ure 5.4 (c). Since a balance sheet is essentially an identity, we can interpret the
behaviour of wholesale depositors of Northern Rock as a fundamental. Thus,
a weakening of this fundamental (represented by a drying up of the wholesale
liquidity pool due to, say, house price collapses), could lead retail depositors
(classic depositors in a bank run story) to infer a fundamental weakness about
their own bank and lead them to withdraw. The public signal that intervention-
ist policies represent for depositors in the rest of the banking system, can also
be explained. The Bank of Englands prompt intervention in injecting liquidity
in Northern Rock (due to non-availability of buyers for the bank) could equally
have signalled a fundamental weakness about the bank to these retail depos-
itors. The equivalence of this story in our paradigm is the Bank of Englands
intervention to help bank A nancially. This creates a channel of contagion of
its own on depositors of bank B as the public intervention is believed to reveal
a sign of weakness about their own banks. This is a typical example of the
intertemporal substitution of banking crisis story that we developed before !
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have attempted to build a theoretical model of contagious
bank runs which uses the informational spillover channel to explain the trans-
mission of failures from one bank to another. We go beyond the interdepen-
dence paradigm of Chen (1999), Allen and Gale (2000), Dasgupta (2004) and
Vaugirard (2005), by showing that, for banks with common macroeconomic ex-
posures, a multiple bank failure will contain elements of both contagious and
correlated banking failures and that these elements are indissociable from each
other. The characterisation of the trigger equilibrium which we derived in chap-
ter 4, enables us distinguish between the contagious and the correlated elements
in probability terms. We show that, while the banks are naturally correlated
in all states, contagion is an event of excess correlation in some states i.e it
represents an endogenous state-contingent change in cross-bank correlation. We
provide examples of empirical work (Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Pesaran and
Pick (2007)) in the literature that identify the robustness involved in describing
contagion as a case of excess correlation rather than of interdependence. We
go further by characterising the events across banks as a function of informa-
tional attributes of depositors of both banks. In particular, we show that, if
contagion exists in equilibrium, it is characterised by the existence of public
informational dominance in bank B depositorsdecision set. In other words, a
(negative) contagion from bank A to bank B, would be one in which a failure
of bank A, leads depositors of bank B to adjust their posterior beliefs of the
common macroeconomic fundamental, such that bank B now fails for a larger
realisation of its own fundamentals. Bank B now fails if and only if bank A fails
and not otherwise. We explain the di¤erences between our approach and that
of Hellwig (2002) and of Banerjee (1992).
Distinguishing between contagion and correlation is important for any Cen-
tral Bank since these concepts have di¤erent implications for policy implemen-
tation. Our ability to show the di¤erence between these two concepts puts our
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framework in a good position to o¤er suggestions about the need to implement
microprudential policy as opposed to macroprudential policy. We pioneer the
important concept of the intertemporal substitution of banking crisis as pos-
sible conjecture to what may possibly happen if microprudential measures are
administered at a crisis-catalyst bank when informational spillovers are present.
Our paradigm thus provides an important framework for analysing the eco-
nomics of policy implementation and o¤ers a fresh insight over the suggestions,
currently proposed in the literature, by single-bank models. We also use our
framework to explain the 2007 crisis that plagued Northern Rock in the UK.
In chapter 9, we summarise the main ndings of chapters 3, 4 and 5
and make valuable propositions as to how to implement the model in practice.
Chapter 9 highlights our specic contributions to the literature, as opposed
to the existing literature, and o¤ers a critical appraisal of our model ndings.
Please turn over for an illustration of Figures 5.2 (b)-(d) (supplementary graph-
ical notes for this chapter).
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Chapter 6
Financial Fragility in
Emerging Markets
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter and in the next two, we will address the second main question
we considered in the introduction of this thesis. As a reminder, the question we
will tackle is the following: "How can we embed a model of banking crisis within
an Emerging Market Economy (EME) framework in a way that enables us to
study theoretically the transmission mechanism between a banking crisis and a
currency crisis ?" In particular, we are interested in developing a theoretical
model that explains two transmission conduits: the contagious ows from a
banking crisis to a currency crisis and vice versa. This chapter will act as feeder
to the chapters 7 and 8, in that we will introduce the formal environment
for our banking model in this chapter. The methodological structure for each
transmission mechanism (and the underlying results) will be developed in each
of the next two chapters respectively.
Banking and currency crises were virtually unrelated in the 1970s when
nancial markets were highly regulated in industrial and developing countries
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alike. The old vintage literature on nancial crises documented the occurrence
of these crises in separate strands.
The "currency crisis" paradigm stressed on the existence of two generation-
models of crises: the rst generation developed by Krugman (1979) showed how
inconsistent domestic macroeconomic policy can lead to an attack on the cur-
rency by rational speculators and lead to a collapse of the xed exchange rate
regime. The rst generation was useful in explaining the crises of Mexico (1972-
73) and Argentina (1978-81). The second generation developed by Obstfeld
(1986) explained how, irrespective of the governments macroeconomic poli-
cies, shifts in market expectations can alter the governments trade-o¤ between
xed exchange rate and other objectives (e.g domestic employment and output),
thereby leading to self-fullling behaviour and multiple equilibria. The second
generation was helpful in explaining the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)
crisis of 1992. While both generations of models had legitimate applications,
neither was appropriate to explain the nancial crashes of the Emerging Market
Economies (EMEs) of the mid-1990s. In particular, in the case of the Asian
crisis of 1997, scal stances were moderately sound and these economies were
growing quickly. Instead, these nancial crashes unearthed the existence of -
nancial vulnerabilities in the form of troubled banks, contagious ows across
banks and increased susceptibility of these growing economies to sudden re-
versals of capital ows. Neither of the rst two generations incorporated the
banking sector and no allowance was made whatsoever for the microfoundations
of nancial intermediation.
The "banking crisis" paradigm evolved separately from the currency crisis
literature, to explain the role of banks in an environment in which the standard
Arrow-Debreu framework does not hold. The "panic-based" story of Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) stressed the existence of asymmetric information and illiq-
uid investment and on the existence of banks as liquidity insurers by o¤ering
demand deposit contracts. Due to the lack of determinacy of beliefs, there are
multiple Pareto-ordered Nash equilibria and bank runs arise potentially when
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the depositors collectively choose the pareto-dominated outcome, independently
of the performance of their banks. This fact has been proven not to hold em-
pirically as Gorton (1988), Calomiris and Gorton (1991) showed bank runs to
be related to the business cycles that directly a¤ect banksperformances. The
"information-based" bank run story developed as a consequence, to provide a
theoretical rationale for such observations, by postulating an environment in
which depositors receive some information about their banks performance. No-
table contributions in this area include: Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) and
Allen and Gale (1998, 2000a).
Financial innovations and increased integration in the global nancial mar-
ket in the past two decades, do appear to have introduced some new elements,
so that despite some similarities, crises of recent years have di¤ered in many
important respects from those of the distant past. Prominent among the new
features of modern nancial crises, are the contagious elements that they as-
sume and give shape to and the interconnections between banking and currency
crises. In the 1980s and early 1990s, industrial and developing countries alike,
embarked in a radical program of domestic nancial deregulation, with abo-
lition of interest rate controls, relaxation of controls on bank asset types and
gradual liberalisation of the domestic nancial markets, topping the agenda of
nancial sector reforms. One consequence of such liberalisation was the unre-
stricted ows of capital across borders. Dermiguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998)
document the strong association that exists in emerging markets between nan-
cial liberalisation and nancial fragility, with the association being stronger for
economies that do not have a strong infrastructure for regulation and super-
vision. Chang and Velasco (1998), in a similar vain, highlight the theoretical
association between increases in foreign capital (especially short-term) due to
liberalisation and illiquidity of banks. A separate result of this nancial glob-
alisation was that the relationship between banking and currency crisis became
more intimate. Evidence by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) and Schumacher
(2000) points in that direction. The close association between banking and
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currency crises suggests that a new theoretical paradigm, deeply rooted in -
nancial intermediation, is needed to provide an endogenous explanation to the
occurrence of nancial crises in an open economy context.
An analysis of the anatomy of nancial crises doctrine of the 1990s, helps
unearth a number of stylized factsof those countries experiencing the new
generationof nancial crises:
[1] They have a de facto pegged exchange rate regime.
[2] They are in receipt of substantial capital inows, often with short-term
maturity.
[3] These capital inows are intermediated through the banking system.
[4] They have embraced economy-wide domestic nancial deregulation and
wider capital account liberalisation without appropriate prudential regulation and
supervision.
[5] Bank balance sheets have assets denominated in the home currency and li-
abilities denominated in the foreign currency - these balance sheets are unhedged
against foreign exchange risks.
[6] There is an explicit form of governmental guarantee or insurance of -
nancial losses, that creates some form of moral hazard (implicit form of hidden
government debt).
We focus on an EME in this chapter and in the following two. Techni-
cally an emerging market may either be a developing country with substantial
inows of capital from abroad (i.e satises [1] -[5] above) and boasts of an im-
proved domestic nancial sector (relative to nancial repression) or an economy
which is in transition from a centrally planned system to free market capital-
ism and which faces moral hazard issues in the rst stages of the transition
process (i.e satises [6] predominantly). The material contained in this chapter
departs radically from the paradigm developed in the previous chapters in that
we construct a banking environment that considers the specicities of emerging
market economies (satisfying [1] -[5] above). It is our intention in this chapter
(and in the following two) to analyse how the complexities of emerging market
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economies may a¤ect the operation of an open-economy banking system where
banks are modelled a-la Allen and Gale (1998) as deposit-taking institutions.
One of the main features of banking models developed in the literature1 is
that they are developed without taking into account the specic nature of the
market structure or level of economic development of the economy in which
the banks operate. The existing literature on banking models has been more in-
clined to consider informational or contractual aspects related to banking crises.
From the seminal work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), research has inexorably
been bifurcated into theoretical work that gives attention to either aspect: ei-
ther by highlighting ways of getting rid of equilibria multiplicity through noisy
informational processes that act as coordination devices for depositorsbeliefs
(Allen and Gale (1998), (2000), (2004), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), Dasgupta
(2004), Morris and Shin (2000)) or by focusing on variants of demand deposit
contractual arrangements (Green and Lin (2003), Peck and Shell (2003), Gold-
stein and Pauzner (2005)) and determining how these variants a¤ect a deposit
contract as a risk-sharing tool. Existing literature work does not address the
pivotal issue of the nature of the economic system in which banks operate and
how this specicity a¤ects the ability of banks to full their roles. Clearly, a
banking crisis in a developing country carries symptoms that di¤er radically
from that which occurs in a developed economy. The level of economic devel-
opment is ostensibly considered to be exogenous to the banking system of these
economies. Nonetheless, they do have none trivial implications on the ability of
banks to perform their maturity-transformation and liquidity insurance provider
roles. Thus, the nature of an economic system and its level of development im-
pose a number of exogenous macroeconomic constraints on banks. How these
exogenous macroeconomic constraints a¤ect banking systems and the resulting
anatomy of nancial crises, is the treatise of this chapter and chapters 7 and
8.
One of the appealing features of our paradigm is that it brings to the fore-
1Refer to chapter 2 for a review of all key models.
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front, new issues that have, hitherto, not been discussed in the literature. A
prominent element of research that ceremoniously makes its appearance, is the
relationship between banking crises and currency crises. Whilst the literature is
replete with empirical papers that document the relationship, theoretical work
is still at its embryonic stage. Chang and Velasco (2000a) try to study the
nature of equilibrium (uniqueness or multiple equilibria) in an open economy
banking system, under di¤erent exchange rate regimes. Important di¤erences
with our work2 are that they do not study the exact cause-e¤ect relationship
from one type of crisis to another. In our setup, by getting rid of multiplicity
of equilibria, we can study the exact nature of causation by endogenising the
probability of events. Furthermore, Chang and Velasco (2000a) do not deal
with banks characterised by liability dollarisation whereas our setup incorpo-
rates banks characterised by liability dollarisation. Finally, we can analyse the
welfare properties of specic policy measures. Chang and Velasco (2000a) do not
discuss e¤ectiveness of policy due to indeterminacy of outcome in their setup.
To our knowledge, there is no theoretical paper that unearths the exact nature
of the transmission mechanism between banking and currency crises, taking
as backdrop the exogenous macroeconomic constraints or level of economic de-
velopment of that country. Our work, embodied by our separate contributions
inherent in chapters 7 and 8 (which both build on the environment we consider
in this chapter), is intended to bridge that gap.
Section 6.2 introduces the formal environment of our setup, which we will
develop further in chapters 7 and 8. Section 6.3 concludes.
Synopsis of our Theoretical Paradigm We consider an open economy
version of a banking model developed by Allen and Gale (1998). There are
two currencies: pesos (the home currency) and dollars (the foreign currency)
and three time periods: t = 0; 1; 2: All consumers are foreign investors who are
2Refer to Table 1.2 in chapter 1.
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endowed with 1 dollar each. They deposit their endowment of 1 dollar at the
bank. The bank is modelled as a mechanism that accepts deposits of dollars
from foreign investors and proceeds to convert these dollars into pesos at the
Central Bank and to invest some of these pesos in a safe storage asset (that yields
a return of 1 unit in period t+ 1 for each unit invested in period t). The bank
then invests the resulting pesos in a long asset that yields a return of R (> 1)
in period t = 2 for every unit invested in period t = 0: The long asset can be
liquidated in the intermediate period at a loss. One may think of the long asset
as a non-tradable good (e.g the housing sector, for instance), whose returns are
denominated in pesos. Since we are considering an EME with lack of nancial
sophistication and characterised by the absence of a nancial market other than
the banking system, it is assumed that, in the eyes of foreign investors, the
economy lacks credibility to o¤ering debt / deposit contracts denominated in
pesos. As a result, all deposit contracts are stipulated in dollars. The banks
problem is to choose a risk-sharing contractual agreement that maximises the
expected utility of depositors subject to a zero-prot constraint . It decides on
the optimal portfolio between short and long asset in period t = 0:
By encompassing features [1]   [5], there are two main sources of nancial
vulnerabilities in our setup: there is an asset-liability maturity mismatch3 as
in all bank run models - Bank liabilities (deposits) are essentially short-term in
nature and liquid while the bank asset (the long asset) is illiquid, with the added
feature that there is an inverse relationship between liquidity and viability on
the banks asset portfolio. A new extension that we provide to Allen and Gale
(1998) is that there is also an asset-liability currency mismatch in that, while
the main assets are denominated in pesos, all its liabilities are denominated in
dollars4 . Thus, as foreign investors will face a liquidity preference shock, they
3The composition of capital inows was an important factor in a number of nancial crises
in many EMEs, such as in Thailand in 1997/8 and in Mexico in 1994/5. In both cases, reliance
on short-term borrowings to nance huge current account decits, was the linchpin of nancial
crises.
4 It is ostensible that a portfolio choice (i.e the share of wealth held in pesos and in dollar-
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will withdraw from the bank in period t = 1 (if they are impatient consumers)
or in period t = 2 (if they are patient). In either case, the bank promises
to meet their contractual obligations in dollars. The two sources of nancial
vulnerabilities arise because at the time of investment and decision on optimal
portfolio choice, they are zero-probability events. It is in period t = 1 that
depositors know their types and that the precise nature of aggregate uncertainty
in the model becomes known.
In adopting this modelling structure, our aim is twofold. First, we want to
highlight the nature of the transmission mechanism from a banking crisis to
a currency crisis (and vice versa) and to analyse the necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for such a transmission process to occur. Second, we want to shed
light on the debate on the most appropriate form of the exchange rate regime
and the accompanying safeguards that may be adopted by an EME - where
the appropriate form of the exchange rate regime is the one that minimises the
probability of either form of crisis.
In general, the literature on banking panic transmission in an open econ-
omy context has taken o¤ mainly on the empirical side with contributions from
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). The existing literature shows that a banking
crisis5 may lead to a currency crisis when depositors running on the bank go to
the Central Bank to exchange their home-currency deposits for foreign currency
- the Central Bank loses reserves in the process, which makes it more likely that
a currency crisis will prevail. Since we assume that deposits are denominated
in dollars, this possibility will not arise in our setup; alternatively, resolving a
denominated bonds) depends on the risk-return characteristics of these securities, the structure
of shocks and on monetary and exchange rate policies. In our modelling of an EME, we shall
assume that all deposits are in dollars and all assets are in pesos. Thus, the choice of the
currency denomination of our asset portfolio is taken as exogeneous in our setup.
5 In this paper, any attempt to run on the bank is a case of capital ow reversal. We
may occasionally use the terms bank runs and capital ow reversals interchangeably.
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banking crisis by the use of explicit governmental bailouts (e.g Lender-of-Last-
Resort (LOLR)) requires the use of Central Bank reserves: a Central Bank that
uses reserves to defend a peg and to bailout illiquid banks, runs the risk of gener-
ating a currency crisis. A currency crisis may cause a banking crisis through the
e¤ects of a currency devaluation on the balance sheets of banks characterised by
liability dollarisation. Resolving a currency crisis may, by itself, lead to trouble
in the banking sector if it requires massive interest rate hikes which weaken
banks by inducing adverse selection and moral hazard in their asset portfolio.
Alternatively, a banking crisis and a currency crisis may have some common
exogenous source (e.g a recession). It is our aim to investigate the exact nature
of such relationships in chapters 7 and 8, based on the open-economy banking
environment we develop in this chapter.
6.2 The Model
6.2.1 Banking System
The economy consists of a small open nancial system with an international
monetary sector. There are three periods, t = 0; 1; 2: At the end of period 2,
the experiment stops and it is assumed that all agents in the economy (con-
sumers and institutions alike) do not exist. In the spirit of Chang and Velasco
(2000a), there are two main currencies, pesos (the homecurrency) and dol-
lars (the foreign currency). The nancial infrastructure comprises a system
of commercial banks (or nancial intermediaries), a Central Bank and a foreign
exchange market. There is no nancial market in our setup. Commercial banks
are assumed to operate in a perfectly competitive market structure.
The nancial system is liberalised and foreign investors are allowed to invest
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in home banks. There is a continuum of foreign agents6 in period t = 0, each
endowed with 1 dollar. As in the literature of bank runs, the set of depositors
can be represented by a unit interval [0; 1], with measure equal to one and the
fraction of agents in any subset is represented by its Lebesgue measure. The
endowment of 1 dollar can either be consumed or invested. Agents face a pri-
vately observed uninsurable liquidity preference shock, modelled à-la Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) and may be of two types: impatient agents (i.e those deriv-
ing utility solely from consumption in period t = 1; u (c1)) or patient agents (i.e
those deriving utility solely from consumption in period t = 2; u (c2)): Agents
derive utility from consuming in dollars only. We will assume that, in each re-
gion, a fraction  of consumers is impatient and a fraction 1  is patient. The
probability distribution associated with consumer types, is assumed to be com-
mon knowledge and there is no aggregate uncertainty about liquidity shocks.
Agents will know their types at the beginning of period t = 1. The utility func-
tions that agents face satisfy the assumptions of strict concavity and being twice
continuously di¤erentiable: u0 (:)  0; u00 (:)  0 as well as the Inada conditions:
u0 (0) =1 and u0 (1) = 0:
There are two investment technologies available, both denominated in pesos:
a short-term storage technology and a long-term technology. The storage tech-
nology transforms 1 unit invested at time t into 1 unit at time t+ 1: The long
technology represents some investment in the non-tradable goods sector (e.g the
housing market) and yields returns exclusively in pesos. It transforms 1 unit at
time t = 0 into an amount R measured in pesos, in period t = 2: If liquidated
prematurely, the long technology yields, R (< R),  < 1: Parameter  is an
exogenous element that captures the costs of early liquidation.
Agents form coalitions known as commercial banks in order to insure
against liquidity risks. Commercial banks are assumed to be maturity trans-
formers, whose task is to insure against liquidity preference shocks by transform-
6We assume that there are no home depositors. Thus, foreign depositors bring capital into
the nancial system in the form of deposits, which have short-term maturity.
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ing highly illiquid asset-payo¤ streams into more liquid liability payo¤s. They
do this by accepting deposits of money from foreign agents, pool these resources
collectively and invest in the two technologies described above7 . In return for
taking their endowments, banks compete with each other in o¤ering demand
deposit contracts to depositors. These demand deposit contracts specify the
term structure of deposit payments, c1 dollars in period t = 1 and ~c2 dollars in
period t = 2; according to the type of preference that the investor reports to
the bank. The banks then go to the Central Bank and exchange these dollars
for pesos8 , which they use to invest in the short and long technologies. Be-
cause of no aggregate uncertainty regarding liquidity preference shocks, banks
choose their portfolio strategy in period t = 0, and invest a fraction  in the
safe technology and 1   in the risky technology. We shall assume that, since
the banking system is a fractional reserve system, assets in the safe technology
can be viewed as reserves held at the Central Bank and that can be called-in at
short notice costlessly9 .
7Commercial banks are assumed to have a comparative advantage over agents in investing
in the two types of technologies. Furthermore, since there is no other domestic storage possi-
bility for agents, it is assumed that all agents must deposit their money in the bank in period
t = 0. Thus, banks implicitly satisfy participation constraints.
8The central bank owns the printing press and can print pesos costlessly. We assume that
any printing of pesos is done at the beginning of the experiment (i.e period t = 0) only when
the commercial bank deposits the depositorsendowment of 1 dollar at the central bank.
9The reserve requirement of this banking system is thus :We assume that the relationship
between ;  and  is as follows: 
1   1  (R) and that   21+ : Thus, from condition

1   1  (R) ; it follows that R has an upper bound:
(1 )
(1 ) (= Rmax): In a later
section, we shall show that this condition can be endogenously derived and holds the key to
many results in this paper.
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6.2.2 Foreign Exchange Market
In addition to its role as a liquidity insurer to foreign depositors and maturity
(and currency) transformer of streams of payments, the commercial banks ex-
change pesos for dollars at the Central Bank in periods t = 1 and t = 2 in order
to fulll their promise of repayment to depositors in dollars. The price of the
consumer good is assumed to be xed at 1 dollar in the international market.
The home price at time t is assumed to be pt: Thus, given absolute purchasing
power parity, the exchange rate at time t is given by10 et = pt: The exchange
rate (dened as pesos per unit of dollar) of pesos for dollars is initially assumed
to be11 : 1 : 1: The exact notion of a currency crisis will be dealt in a later sec-
tion when we formally introduce the concepts of international liquidity of the
economy and discuss in details the mechanics of the transmission mechanism.
6.2.3 Central Bank
The role of the Central Bank is to ensure nancial stability (i.e promote the
safety, soundness and stability of the banking system through the design of ap-
propriate safeguard facilities (e.g Lender-Of-Last-Resort (LOLR)) for banks in
trouble where the exchange rate regime permits and by enforcing the reserve
requirement policy of the fractional system. The bank is also responsible for
ensuring monetary stability through the appropriate design of monetary pol-
icy. Depending on the appropriate exchange rate regime, the Central Bank is
expected to carry out operations in the foreign exchange markets to safeguard
the rate at which pesos trade for dollars (according to the aforementioned rule).
We will be assuming, throughout this chapter and the subsequent two, that
the reserve component of the Central Bank consists of dollars only and that
10Thus, an initial exchange rate of 1 (i.e et = 1) implicitly implies that pt = 1 since pt = 1:
11We assume that any xed rate is overvalued so that breaking away from the straightjacket
of a peg, means that the currency will be devalued (i.e e > 1):
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no gold or Special Drawing Rights (SDR) or any other foreign currencies exist.
Furthermore, the Central Bank is credit constrained in that it cannot borrow
state-contingent loans from external agencies against future reserves. This may
be due to credit rationing in the international nancial market or due to the
risk of repudiation12 . However, in the fullment of its duties, the Central Bank
can sell dollar reserves in the international nancial market and buy pesos at
the prevailing exchange rate.
6.2.4 Timeline of Events
[PLEASE TURN OVER FOR AN ILLUSTRATION]
12Under credit constraint, there is policy conict arising from the need to maintain the peg
and the implicit guarantees associated with a xed exchange rate regime.
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6.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have endeavoured to construct an open-economy banking
system which faces a number of exogenous macroeconomic constraints that exist
due to the level of economic development of the country. We began this chapter
by highlighting a major lacuna in the existing theoretical literature in that there
is hardly any work documenting how sensitive the banking system is to the level
of economic development of that country. For this sake, we embed the Allen
and Gale (1998) banking system within a Chang and Velasco (2000a) set-up but
we calibrate the resulting nancial system to one that takes into account the
subtleties of emerging market economies. For the latters sake, we assume that
the exchange rate regime is a soft peg and that all short term foreign capital are
intermediated through the banking system as deposits (i.e the banking system
is well integrated in the global capital market)and that banks are engaged in
liability dollarization (i.e contracting demand deposit debt in a foreign currency
but holding assets in home currency). In addition, we assume that there is no
ex-ante regulation of the system. The novelty of this paradigm is that it puts us
in a good position to consider the dynamics of the interaction between banking
systems and emerging market complexities and how these realities a¤ect banks
role as liquidity insurance providers, maturity and currency transformers. A
resulting attribute is that the anatomy of nancial crises can be dissected and
may thus yield interesting insights that cannot be obtained when the level of
economic development is not accounted for. Our theoretical approach has the
virtue of enabling us to gauge the shape of any regulatory measures that may
be taken to limit the occurrence of the twin crises. Our set-up also explicates
on the mechanics of the transmission process between a banking crisis and a
currency crisis. Chapter 7 will analyse the transmission of a crisis from banks
to foreign exchange markets. Chapter 8 will document the causation process
from a currency crisis to a banking crisis.
Chapter 7
Information-Induced
Banking Failures
7.1 Introduction
We build on the open-economy banking environment considered in chapter 5
and consider the risk-sharing allocation of the banking system and the resulting
characteristics of bank runs in emerging market economies.
As a reminder, there are two currencies: pesos (the home currency) and
dollars (the foreign currency) and three time periods: t = 0; 1; 2: All consumers
are foreign investors who are endowed with 1 dollar each. They deposit their
endowment of 1dollar at the bank. The bank is modelled as a mechanism that
accepts deposits of dollars from foreign investors and proceeds to convert these
dollars into pesos at the Central Bank and to invest some of these pesos in a
safe storage asset (that yields a return of 1 unit in period t + 1 for each unit
invested in period t). The bank then invests the remaining pesos in a long asset
that yields a return of R (> 1) in period t = 2 for every unit invested in period
t = 0: The long asset can be liquidated in the intermediate period at a loss. One
may think of the long asset as a non-tradable good (e.g the housing sector, for
instance), whose returns are denominated in pesos. Since we are considering an
EME with lack of nancial sophistication and characterised by the absence of a
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nancial market other than the banking system, it is assumed that, in the eyes
of foreign investors, the economy lacks credibility to o¤ering debt or demand
deposit contracts denominated in pesos. As a result, all deposit contracts are
stipulated in dollars. The banks problem is to choose a risk-sharing contractual
agreement that maximises the expected utility of depositors subject to a zero-
prot constraint . It decides on the optimal portfolio between short and long
asset in period t = 0:
By encompassing features [1]-[5] as explained in chapter 5, our approach
enables us to highlight two main sources of nancial vulnerabilities that a¤ect
the banking system: there is an asset-liability maturity mismatch1 as in all bank
run models - Bank liabilities (deposits) are essentially short-term in nature
and liquid while the bank asset (the long asset) is illiquid, with the added
feature that there is an inverse relationship between liquidity and viability on the
banks asset portfolio. What is new to the literature from a bank balance sheet
perspective, is that there is also an asset-liability currency mismatch in that,
while the main assets are denominated in pesos, all its liabilities are denominated
in dollars2 . Thus, as foreign investors will face a liquidity preference shock, they
will withdraw from the bank in period t = 1 (if they are impatient consumers)
or in period t = 2 (if they are patient). In either case, the bank promises
to meet their contractual obligations in dollars. The two sources of nancial
vulnerabilities arise because at the time of investment and decision on optimal
1The composition of capital inows was an important factor in a number of nancial crises
in many EMEs, such as in Thailand in 1997/8 and in Mexico in 1994/5. In both cases, reliance
on short-term borrowings to nance huge current account decits, was the linchpin of nancial
crises.
2 It is ostensible that a portfolio choice (i.e the share of wealth held in pesos and in dollar-
denominated bonds) depends on the risk-return characteristics of these securities, the structure
of shocks and on monetary and exchange rate policies. In our modelling of an EME, we shall
assume that all deposits are in dollars and all assets are in pesos. Thus, the choice of the
currency denomination of our asset portfolio is taken as exogenous in our setup.
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portfolio choice, they are zero-probability events. It is in period t = 1 that
depositors know their types and that the precise nature of aggregate uncertainty
in the model becomes known.
How do we model the banking environment ? We assume that the Cen-
tral Bank, commercial banks and the foreign exchange market act as collective
mechanisms designed to implement optimal allocation of resources and liquid-
ity. The mechanism design approach yields a number of interesting results
that have, so far, not been discussed in the literature of open-economy bank-
ing environments. An important theoretical result that we get is the existence
of a pecking order in the ability of various mechanisms to implement optimal
allocation. We rst study as mechanism, the allocation implemented by the
Central Bank as a Planner, with the assumption that the Planner can observe
the stochastic fundamentals of the banking system. The resulting allocation is
First-Best in that the Planner can e¤ectively insure against all liquidity risks
and aggregate risks in the nancial system. The term structure of demand de-
posit payments to depoistors is non-contingent. We next analyse the Planner
under the assumption that it cannot observe the stochastic fundamentals of
the economy. We show that the best that the planner can do in this case, is
to o¤er an approximate incentive-compatible mechanism that implements the
Second-Best solution. Here, the Planner can only insure against liquidity risks
but not against aggregate risks. As a result, the term structure of demand
deposit payments to depositors becomes state-contingent i.e contingent on the
realisations of the idiosyncratic fundamental of the banking system. We then
move on to analyse the case for a decentralised banking system such as the one
described in chapter 5. We show that the banking system is weakly inferior to
the Planner under the second best allocation. With banking allocation, there
is a positive probability that banking failures may occur. We show this by
deriving the existence of a unique equilibrium in the banks idiosyncratic funda-
mental, below which it is dominant for depositors to withdraw (the bank fails)
and above which depositors stay (the bank succeeds). When banking failures
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are prevented, the banking allocation replicates that of the Planner under the
Second-Best solution. Conversely, if banking failures occur, the banking alloca-
tion results in an outcome that is strictly Pareto inferior to that of the Planner.
An interesting feature of this approach is that it enables us measure the success
of any policy measures designed to prevent banking failures, in welfare theoretic
terms. In particular, we are equipped to measure the e¤ectiveness of various
policy measures in their ability to restore the Planners second best solution.
Another important result and contribution that we make is that under the
outcome of banking failures, di¤erent sub-category of allocations can result,
depending on the order in which depositors present themselves to the bank.
When banking failures occur with positive probability, we show a bank run as a
consistent equilibrium feature that occurs when depositors receive a precise bad
interim information about bank fundamentals and they all run on the bank in
the intermediate period, which is forced to liquidate its asset at a loss. Since we
assume a Sequential Service Constraint (SSC), we show that there are di¤erent
categories of bank runs, each of which can be Pareto ranked on the basis of the
order in which depositors present themselves to the bank. In particular, a case
in which a run occurs but those who are rst in the queue are the impatient
depositors, can be shown to result in lower welfare losses than a case in which a
run occurs and those who are rst in the queue are patient depositors. The latter
case involves complete denial of liquidity to impatient depositors in addition to
involving long asset liquidation.
In adopting this modelling structure, our aim is twofold. First, we want to
extol on the nature of transmission process from a banking crisis to a currency
crisis and to analyse the necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which a crisis
will contagiously spread from the banking sector to the foreign exchange sector.
Second, we want to shed light on the debate on the most appropriate form of the
exchange rate regime and the accompanying safeguards that may be adopted
by an EME - where the appropriate form of the exchange rate regime is the one
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that minimises the probability of either form of crisis. An important benchmark
against which we measure the e¤ectiveness of policy measures is on their ability
to help restore the Planners Secon-Best solution. This, by itself, constitutes
an improvement over Chang and Velasco (2000a) whose multiple equilibria ap-
proach prevents them from undertaking any welfare-theoretic analysis of policy
issues.
Our analysis of the transmission mechanism takes place in a state of the
world in which banking failures occur in the banking system allocation. We
show that a bank run can lead to a currency crisis if and only if there is inter-
vention in the form of Lender-of-Last-Resort (LOLR), nanced out of Central
Bank reserves. This departs radically from the existing literature which focuses
on banks in a closed economy context and which suggests that LOLR is always
helpful in preserving banksassets in a crisis. We conjecture that in the context
of an EME, LOLR may be sub-optimal even it it succeeds in preserving the
value of assets at the crisis-catalyst bank. In particular, we show that any at-
tempt to solve an information-based bank run by earmarking LOLR funds (that
prevents the bank from liquidating its long asset) will have a negative externality
on the economys international liquidity position by depleting the level of foreign
exchange reserves. In a multi-period setting with multiple banks, we conjecture
that this results in a currency crisis and may eventually lead to balance sheet
e¤ects and to a (future) devaluation-induced bank runs across other identical
banks in the economy. Thus at the cost of preventing an information-induced
crisis at one bank, LOLR may end up creating devaluation-induced banking
failures elsewhere in the economy. This phenomenon is a completely new con-
tribution to the literature and is what we dub, the intertemporal substitution
of banking crisis, and is a conjecture which we considered in chapter 4 within
a closed-economy context.
How does our approach di¤er from other work in the existing literature ?
In the existing literature, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Chang and Ve-
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lasco (2000a) show that a banking crisis3 may lead to a currency crisis when
depositors running on the bank go to the Central Bank to exchange their home-
currency deposits for foreign currency - the Central Bank loses reserves in the
process, which makes it more likely that a currency crisis will prevail. In these
papers, bank deposits are denominated in home currency. Since we assume that
deposits are themselves denominated in dollars (which represents an important
departure from the aforementioned two papers), this possibility will not arise
in our setup. The theoretical literature lacks a convincing explanation for the
various channels through which LOLR may create a currency crisis. Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1999) conjectured that resolving a banking crisis by the use of
explicit governmental bailouts (e.g Lender-of-Last-Resort (LOLR)) requires the
use of Central Bank reserves: a Central Bank that uses reserves to defend a
peg and to bailout illiquid banks, runs the risk of generating a currency cri-
sis. However, this channel was not formally developed in a theoretical model.
Our contribution in this respect, is meant to become a theoretical adaptation of
Kaminsky and Reinharts (1999) idea. By endeavouring to formalise the con-
cept in a theoretical model, our approach enables us come across new interesting
welfare results of sub-optimality of LOLR through intertemporal substitution
of banking crisis - these results are completely new to the literature and o¤er a
fresh insight into the dynamics of Central Bank nance in EMEs characterised
by liability dollarisation.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 considers the
system of banks, Central Bank and foreign exchange market as a collective
mechanism designed to result in e¢ cient liquidity provision. We characterise
the rst-best allocation of the planner and show the planner provides insur-
ance against both, liquidity and aggregate risks. The second-best allocation of
the planner, however, hedges against liquidity risks only. We move on to show
a banking economy replicates the second-best allocation of the planner when
3 In this paper, any attempt to run on the bank is a case of capital ow reversal. We
may occasionally use the terms bank runs and capital ow reversals interchangeably.
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depositors receive a signal which is above the equilibrium threshold. When
banking crises occur (i.e when depositors receive a signal below the equilib-
rium threshold), the banking allocation results in a Pareto-inferior allocation
to the second-best allocation of the planner. Section 7.3 analyses the dy-
namics of nancial fragility in our setup. We show that, with no LOLR, the
Central Bank always has foreign currency reserves to meet demand for deposit
withdrawals during episodes of banking crises. Thus, there is no spillover to
the foreign exchange sector. In the presence of LOLR designed to solve an
information-induced banking failure, a crisis may spillover to the foreign ex-
change sector under certain parametric assumptions. It is the purpose of that
section to explicate on these parametric restrictions. Section 7.4 considers
some applications of our paradigm - in particular, we conjecture the existence
of intertemporal substitution of banking crisis in an extension of our model to
a multi-bank, multi-period setting. Finally, section 7.5 concludes.
7.2 Mechanism Design Problem for an EME
We explore the causality linkages between a banking crisis and a currency crisis
and starts with the assumption that the exchange rate regime is a soft peg.
The nature of aggregate uncertainty concerns the risky asset returns, for which
the foreign depositors receive a precise signal in period t = 1: One may think of
stochastic variations in the banks long asset returns as changes in global macro-
economic factors that may impinge on the banks performance e.g structure of
their nancial systems, global market conditions (terms-of-trade or global inter-
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est rates)4 and exchange rate misalignments5 . We rst develop two mechanisms
that act as a useful welfare theoretic yardstick against which the banking im-
plementation can be compared. We study the Central Bank as a Planner under
the assumption that it can observe all stochastic fundamentals of the economy
and under the assumption that it cannot do so. So-doing will enable us con-
trast the optimality of liquidity implementation in our banking environment. If
4The importance of global market conditions has been highlighted by Calvo, Leidermann
and Reinhart (1993). In particular, the banking systems of EMEs have become more sensitive
to uctuations in the terms-of-trade, to global interest rates and to reversals of current
account decits. On a separate note: [1] Terms-of-Trade a¤ects the performance of
the export industries and, with this, the loan performance of banks that have lent to these
industries; [2] Increases in the global interest rates make it harder for EMEs to pay their
external debt and aggravates the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in banksloans
portfolios. Declines in such rates increase the ability to pay external debt but, by increasing
the ow of capital towards EMEs, puts upwards pressure on the real exchange rate and
aggravate their current account. Since we argued earlier that the banks long asset may be
a non-tradable good like the housing sector, a good example of how it may be a¤ected by
global economic conditions can be provided by the US banking system and Chinas pegged
exchange rate policy. Many US banks have investment portfolios in the housing sector. Most
economists agree that Chinas policy of pegging its currency to the dollar is benign to the
US housing market because it keeps interest rate low in the US. A revaluation policy of
the Chinese currency, if signicant, may drag up US interest rates and adversely a¤ect the
US banking system portfolio by bursting house price bubbles; [3] Reversal of a current
account decit may, by itself, engender a nancial system fragility for an emerging market
economy in that it may require a currency devaluation, which induces balance sheet e¤ects for
banks engaged in liability dollarisation. Alternatively, such reversals may require a signicant
drop in output (lower home demand for tradable and non-tradable goods) and a decrease in
price of non-tradables. If banks have lent to the non-tradable sector, a decrease in the price
of the latter may lead to fragility and to non-performing loans.
Away from the developed world, the incidence of banking crises in many EMEs is systemi-
cally related to global nancial conditions.
5Since the bulk of international trade and nance is carried out in the monies of rich
industrial nations, many EMEs have an interest in how currency uctuates between these
nations.
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banking crises occur under the banking environment, an interesting feature of
the mechanism design approach that we develop is that it enables us charac-
terise the welfare properties of di¤erent policies designed to tackle the banking
failure. We measure the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent policy measures by their ability
to restore the optimal allocation of the Planner.
Bearing in mind the timeline of events as highlighted in the previous section,
we assume that, at the beginning of period t = 1; all depositors receive a perfect
signal of the banks portfolio performance. The signal structure is modelled à-la
Allen and Gale (1998) and is s = R in case the news concern the banks portfolio
performance. R is stochastic, with probability density function f

~R

; where
0  R  (1 )(1 ) ) and we will assume the exchange rate to be xed initially.
There is a sequential decision rule and in period t = 1, agents line up at their
banks demanding repayment of their deposits in a First-Come-First-Serve
(FCFS) basis. When it comes to receiving payments in period t = 2, the
remaining agents share the value of the remaining assets on a pro-rata basis
(with maximum serving of ~c2 dollars).
Assume that the Central Bank, commercial banks and the foreign exchange
market act as a collective mechanism designed to implement the Pareto optimal
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allocation of resources. Since the interim information concerns only the bank
portfolio performance, we will start with the assumption of a standard xed
exchange rate regime, dened as follows:
Denition 7.1: (Fixed Exchange Rate Regime for an EME (Soft
Peg6)) A monetary arrangement in which:
[1] The Central Bank is willing to engage in foreign exchange market in order
to maintain the parity between pesos and dollars, so long as foreign exchange
reserves are positive.
[2] The Central Bank can engage in providing emergency liquidity assistance
to banks in trouble through its Lender-of-Last-Resort (LOLR) facility.
[3] There is no ination adjustment mechanism, as long as the soft peg is
maintained. Monetary policy is determined by the assets available in the banking
system, rather than by liquidity needs of deposit payments. The liabilities of the
banking system represent implicit obligations in the international currency.
[4] There is no one-to-one relationship between changes in the volume of
pesos in public circulation and changes in the volume of dollars in the reserves
of the Central Bank.
7.2.1 First-Best Allocation (Central Bank acts as Social
Planner)
Consider a fully centralised case in which the Central Bank, as planner, ob-
serves all the economic variables and can costlessly rehu­ e resources within
the banking system and across time and states of nature. The planner aims to
maximise the expected utility of a (representative) foreign depositor by means
of a feasible mechanism. We shall assume that, due to ex-ante homogeneity of
foreign depositors, the planner restricts attention on feasible direct mechanisms
6The term Soft Peg is used because the exchange rate of pesos is xed in value to the
dollar, with some commitment for the central bank to defend it but with the value likely to
change if the currency comes under immense speculative pressure.
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that are symmetric only. The Revelation principle7 applies and, subject to the
feasible direct mechanism o¤ered by the planner, foreign depositors play a non-
cooperative withdrawal game, in which they report their type to the planner.
We construct a feasible mechanism that satises two main properties: (unique-
ness) the direct mechanism implements an allocation that is consistent with a
unique outcome of the withdrawal game of depositors (to be explained later) and
(optimal incentive compatible allocation) the direct mechanism implements an
allocation that is consistent with foreign depositors reporting their true types.
We conjecture that any feasible (direct) mechanism that satises these two con-
ditions, will implement the rst-best allocation of the game.
With a soft peg, as per denition 7.1, the exchange rate between pesos
and dollars is 1 : 1. The Central Banks ability to reshu­ e resources means
that it can carry out investments in pesos whilst fullling its promises to meet
contractual obligations in dollars. The optimisation problem for the Central
Bank, as planner, follows the solution of the following optimal design problem:
max
c1
U (c1) + (1  )U (c2)
s.t
c1  
c2 =
(1  )E (R) +   c1
1  
c1  c2
7The Revelation principle implies that the equilibrium allocation of the game that deposi-
tors play can be replicated as a truthful equilibrium of a game in which depositors are asked
to report their types directly. Because of no aggregate uncertainty about liquidity shocks, the
Law of Large Numbers (LLN) substitutes directly for the existence of such a direct mechanism.
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Claim 7.1: Given a continuous objective function and the existence of re-
source and incentive constraints that are compact and non-empty, there exists
a solution to the optimal program. The assumptions of concavity and twice
di¤erentiability of the objective function, ensure that the solution is positive.
The optimal program satises the following Euler equation: U 0 (c1) = E (R)U 0 (c2)
and a resulting non-contingent term structure of demand deposit repayment, rep-
resented as follows8 :
c1 =

 , c2 =
(1 )E(R)
(1 ) ; c1 < c2:
Thus, e = 1 in the foreign exchange market.
Proof. See Technical Appendix (Section A.5)
The rst expression following the main objective function, denotes the ag-
gregate resource constraint that the Central Bank faces as a planner. The last
expression is the incentive-compatibility (or truthtelling constraint). As proved
in the technical appendix, optimising with respect to the budget constraints
only, will automatically ensure that the incentive compatibility constraint is im-
plicitly satised. The planner here is assumed to know the proportions of early
and late withdrawals so that it devotes just the minimum required resources
needed to satisfy consumer needs9 . Thus, it provides a risk-sharing mechanism
that allocates resources according to the true liquidity needs of agents and pro-
vides a smoothing device for R, by making it non state-contingent. As such,
the planner provides insurance against both liquidity and aggregate risks and
agents have an incentive to report their types truthfully. The economic intuition
is that since it can observe and inuence resource movements across time and
states, it is the average return that accrues in all contingencies. The exchange
rate stays at the same level as it was at the beginning of the experiment. The
truthtelling behaviour of agents means that the aggregate demand for foreign
currency is as planned and the exchange rate stays xed.
8As mentioned before, c1 and c2 are stated in nominal (dollar) terms.
9Devoting fewer resources to the storage technology would increase the likelihood of a
bank run whilst devoting more resources would result in an opportunity cost since the storage
technology is unprotable to hold.
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7.2.2 Second-Best Allocation (Central Bank as Social Plan-
ner)
Now, assume that the Central Bank is still the supra-national authority that
re-allocates resources within the banking industry but that it cannot observe the
realisation of R: As in the rst-best case, we assume that the planner will restrict
attention to symmetric feasible (direct) mechanisms. Any feasible mechanism
will now satisfy two properties: uniqueness (same as in rst-best case) and
approximate optimality - because the planner cannot observe R, it chooses a
mechanism that attains a value for the expected utility of the depositor that is
arbitrarily close to that attained under optimal incentive compatibility.
The optimisation problem will be as follows:
max
c1
E[U (c1 (R)) + (1  )U (c2 (R))]
s.t
c1 (R)  
c2 (R) =
(1  )R+   c1 (R)
1  
Z (1 )
(1 )
0
c1 (R) f (R) dR 
Z (1 )
(1 )
0
c2 (R) f (R) dR
Claim 7.2: The optimal solution results in a state-contingent term structure
of demand deposit repayment of the following form:
c1 (R) = c2 (R) = (1  )R+  R  R10
c1 (R) =

 ; c2 (R) =
(1 )R
1  R > R

10The threshold is computed as follows: Let 

=
(1 )R
1  at the point of indi¤erence between
consuming early and late. This boils down to: R = (1 )
(1 ) : We know that c1 (R) =


:
Thus, R = c1(1 )
1  : This gives
c1 
1  with c1 = : Thus, R
 = c1 
1  : Note that here, when
R  R; the risky asset does not need to be liquidated. Since the Central Bank can reshu­ e
resources costlessly, it can bring some of its short-asset forward to supplement the low returns
in period t = 2 whenever R  R:
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with R =

c1 
1 

In the foreign exchange market, e = 1:
Proof. See Technical Appendix - similar to proof of claim 7.1
7.2.3 Banking Contract Allocation
From Figure 7.2, if the risky returns are too low, the Central Bank can re-
allocate resources across time so that part of the safe asset is carried forward into
the future to complement the low earnings of patient consumers. The planner
can provide insurance against liquidity shocks but not against aggregate shocks
related to uncertain asset returns. Thus, there is no smoothing device for R in
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that it becomes state-contingent. Now, assume that the system is decentralized
and that the Central Bank no longer acts as the social planner. The game is
now dened as in the previous section, with (foreign) depositors depositing their
money in their banks and the commercial banks choose an optimal portfolio
to invest these endowments, whilst o¤ering demand deposit contracts that are
denominated in dollars. The typical banks optimal design problem will be as
follows:
max
c1
Z (1 )
(1 )
0
[U (c1 (R)) + (1  )U (c2 (R))] f (R) dR
s.t
c1 (R)  
c2 (R) =
(1  )R+   c1 (R)
1  
Z (1 )
(1 )
0
c1 (R) f (R) dR 
Z (1 )
(1 )
0
c2 (R) f (R) dR
To get a better picture of the vulnerabilities inherent in the banks contrac-
tual obligations, we assume that, following the timeline of events as described
in the previous section, the strategy of each depositor in period t = 1, is de-
ned as a map from his typespace (including liquidity preference and interim
information about the banks performance) to his actionspace (to stay or to
withdraw). Depositors play a non-cooperative withdrawal game.
7.2.4 Anatomy of Financial Fragility
Given the above notion of strategy for depositors, we move on to describe the
withdrawal rule:
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Remark 7.1: (Withdrawal Decision Rule) Given that in period t = 1;
depositors receive a perfect interim signal of their banks risky asset performance,
they all choose to withdraw if R  R (dominant to withdraw) and choose to
stay if R > R (dominant for all depositors to stay). R =

c1 
1 

:
The above remark highlights the fact that bank runs are purely information-
related. Thus, our concept of bank runs follows the stream of Jacklin and
Bhattacharya (1988), Allen and Gale (1998), Gorton (1988), Calomiris and
Gorton (1991), rather than the sunspot-driven theories of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) and Chang and Velasco (2000a). This modelling has implications for
the distribution of impatient and patient depositors that the bank faces. In the
case when R > R; this distribution coincides with the liquidity preference shock
distribution highlighted above (truthtelling behaviour induced). In the case of
information-induced bank runs (R  R), there is violation of the truthtelling
constraint and it is in the interest of all depositors to announce that they are
impatient.
Remark 7.2: (Competitive Banking Structure) Banks operate in a
perfectly competitive environment. Thus, given the term structure of demand
deposit repayments (c1; c2); they choose an optimal portfolio allocation in period
t = 0; (; 1   ) for the safe and risky assets respectively. Given this opti-
mal portfolio, they choose a consumption allocation for depositors (c1; c

2) that
maximises the utility of consumers subject to the constraint that their expected
prots are zero11 .
Since  and 1    have been earmarked ex-ante, a bank run situation in
11As part of the banking contractual characterisation, we rule out run-proof contracts of
the narrow banking type (i.e contracts that perfectly match the maturity structure of assets
and liabilities e.g contracts that stipulate that the bank should hold storage assets at a level
that could cover short-term payments to all depositors, should they all decide to withdraw
prematurely). Such contracts are known to avoid bank runs at the cost of denting liquidity
insurance provision.
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which R  R means that the bank does not have enough to meet the demand
for all those who wish to withdraw. Crucially, it is forced to liquidate its risky
asset (at a loss) in order to pay those who are withdrawing12 . Given the se-
quential service rule, only a fraction of depositors will get back their due in a
bank run environment13 . Thus, the banking contract is made up of two parts:
a crisis-prone element in which an information-induced bank run occurs -
truthtelling is violated and all depositors queue up at the bank to demand re-
payment; a crisis-proofelement in which truthtelling is achieved and thus, the
distribution of early and late withdrawals coincides with the liquidity preference
shocks (no bank runs).
The banking contract allocation can thus be viewed as the sum of two main
elements:
max
c1; 
Z R
0
 U (c1 (R)) f (R) dR +
Z (1 )
(1 )
R
[U (c1 (R))+(1  )U (c2 (R))] f (R) dR
s.t
c1 (R)  
c2 (R) =
(1  )R
1  
where R = c1 1  ,
R R
0
 U (c1 (R)) f (R) dR is the crisis-prone ele-
ment of the contract ( 14 denotes the proportion of those who receive full
repayment under the sequential service constraint) and
R (1 )
(1 )
R [U (c1 (R)) +
12 In the rst and second best contract characterised earlier, costly liquidation was avoided.
13The bank will carry on servicing those who withdraw early their due repayments until it
has run out of resources completely.
14 =
+(1 )R
c1
: In a bank run situation, the amount available for payment is  +
 (1  )R where  (1  )R is the liquidated part of the risky asset. Under contractual
obligations, the bank has promised to pay c1 to those who withdraw in period t = 1: Thus,
whatever the bank has from its short asset and from its liquidated risky asset will be divided
by c1 to determine the proportion of depositors who queue up and who receive full payments.
CHAPTER 7. INFORMATION-INDUCED BANKING FAILURES 226
(1  )U (c2 (R))] f (R) dR is the crisis-proof element of the contract (and
truthtelling behaviour is induced). The banking contract allocation is weakly
Pareto-dominated by the second-best allocation of the Central Bank as a plan-
ner. Whilst the banking contract can replicate the second-best allocation when
there is no bank run, it clearly destroys risk-sharing mechanism when there are
bank runs. Thus, in the no-run phase, the banking contract provides insurance
against liquidity shocks but not against aggregate uncertainty about risky asset
returns. The allocation is the same as that of the planner under the second-
best plan. In the bank run phase, the bank just contends on providing full
contractual repayment to a proportion  of those who have queued up).
Note that while +(1 )R
c1
represents an aggregate proportion, it does not discriminate be-
tween the types of those withdrawing. Thus, if 1   < +(1 )R
c1
, and if all those who are
rst in the line of queue are patient depositors, it turns out that all patient depositors will
receive payments and only some impatient depositors will receive their due - other impatient
depositors will receive nothing. This crisis-proneelement of the contract leads to ine¢ ciency.
More about this later.
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7.3 Dynamics of Financial Crisis
We rst start with a couple of denitions:
Denition 7.2: (Banking Crisis)15 A situation in which the bank is
forced to liquidate its long asset to meet the demand for early withdrawals by
depositors. Unless bailout facilities are organised, the bank ceases to be a going
concern.
Denition 7.3: (Currency Crisis) A currency crisis is dened as a sit-
uation in which the international reserve level of the Central Bank falls to zero,
so that the Central Bank is forced to devalue16 .
The theoretical literature focuses on two main channels of transmission from
15To construct a denition of banking crisis in the case of an EME is a tricky exercise, given
the limited information availability on assets and liabilities. The notion of a banking crisis
ultimately boils down to one of causality: does failure originate on the asset side (following,
say, from deterioration of banks asset quality) or from the liabilities side (following, say, from
a run by depositors to withdraw) ? In the latter case, bank runs are the cause of the banking
panic. Large withdrawals of deposits were observed in EME nancial crises episodes of the
1980s and 1990s in Argentina, Phillipines, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela. In the former
case, the origins of banking crisis problem stem from the asset side ( i.e induced, say, by the
e¤ects of a currency devaluation on assets). Crises of industrial nations in early 1990s ( e.g
Norway, Sweden and Finland ) shared this feature. The issue of causality is important because
it a¤ects the construction of key indicators of banking crises. Denition 7.2 is exhaustive in
that it remains impervious to such causality issues in banking crises.
16 In the empirical literature, a currency crisis is dened as a situation in which the real
exchange rate depreciates below a certain threshold level. How to compute the threshold level
is a matter of debate among economists. Since we have assumed absolute purchasing power
parity, we rule out this denition. The theoretical literature argues that to assume that a
currency attack will take place when reserves fall to zero, would be to take a naive view of
currency crises. If speculators are rational, they will mount an attack well before reserves have
reached zero level, in order to take full advantage of arbitrage opportunities. See Krugman
(1979) for more.
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a banking crisis to a currency crisis. In its quest to supply dollars to deposi-
tors who withdraw, the Central Bank exchanges any home-currency proceedings
from the short and long asset for foreign currency in order to satisfy contrac-
tual obligations in foreign currencies - the Central Bank loses reserves in the
process, which makes it more likely that a currency crisis will prevail. Alterna-
tively, resolving a banking crisis by the use of explicit governmental bailouts (e.g
Lender-of-Last-Resort (LOLR)) may require the use of Central Bank reserves
if the Central Bank is credit-constrained. The Central Bank typically sells re-
serves in the international market in exchange for pesos - which it uses to supply
the domestic banking system in liquidity17 . A Central Bank that uses reserves
for the twinned task of defending a peg and of bailing out illiquid banks, runs
the risk of generating a currency crisis by depleting the stock of reserves.
Banking crises have preceded currency crises in EMEs such as Turkey and
Venezuela in mid-1990s. In this section, we unearth the exact nature of the
transmission mechanism that spreads a crisis from the banking system to the
foreign exchange market. We start with the case in which no lending policy is
designed by the Central Bank and we proceed on to analyse the nature of the
transmission process when such interventionist policy is possible. In both cases,
we provide necessary and su¢ cient parametric restrictions that will guarantee
the existence of any potential linkages.
7.3.1 No Interventionist Policy
With no interventionist policy administered by the Central Bank in the form of
LOLR; we show that, with an exchange rate of 1 : 1, the central bank has enough
reserves in its co¤ers in the form of dollars to meet the needs of depositors who
withdraw - no currency crisis (as per denition 7.3) is generated as a result.
17 In practice, the Central Bank refrains from printing pesos for this task because so-doing
will create ination and may a¤ect the macroeconomic credentials of the country.
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When R  R; the amount available for distribution to depositors will con-
sist of  (i.e the short asset) and  (1  )R (i.e the value of the liquidated long
asset). Thus, in the negotiation phase in period t = 1; the total amount of pesos
that the commercial bank will want to convert into dollars is:  +  (1  )R:
Under the contractual arrangement, the bank promises to pay c1 to those who
present themselves to the bank. Thus, proportion +(1 )Rc1 (i.e ) receive c

1.
Since the bank has liquidated its long technology, it is no longer a going concern
in period t = 2 (as per denition 7.2): The remaining proportion of depositors
(i.e 1 ) receive nothing. The Central Bank, in period t = 1; has 1 dollar in its
reserves. Given that R < 1, it follows that: 1 > + (1  )R: Thus, the total
dollar supply in the Central Banks reserves more than o¤sets the commercial
banks demand for exchanging pesos for dollars.
Proof. We know that 1 > R
Multiply both sides by (1  ) yields : 1   >  (1  )R
Thus, 1 > +  (1  )R
Q.E.D
We subsume two further lemmas that will be useful for future proofs, de-
pending on parametric restrictions that we have imposed earlier:
Lemma 7.1: Given parametric restrictions  < 2+1 and R < 1, it follows
that 12 < R
 < 1
Proof. See Technical Appendix (Section A.5)
Lemma 7.2: Given that 1   1  (R) ; it follows that: 0 < R < R
Proof. See Technical Appendix (Section A.5)
We conjectured the existence of assumption 1   1  (R) earlier. We now
show that these assumptions are natural and are consistent with the equilibrium
play of game of this model. First, a general proposition:
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Proposition 7.1: Bank runs occur if and only if R  R but in the ab-
sence of any interventionist policies, will fail to spread contagiously to the for-
eign exchange sector and to generate a currency crisis as per denition 7.3.
A necessary and su¢ cient condition that guarantees this result is assumption

1   1  (R)
Proof. See Technical Appendix (Section A.5)
7.3.2 Welfare Implications of Information-Induced Bank
Runs
Figure 7.4 (illustrated above) summarises the net payo¤ structure of depositors
as a function of bank fundamentals and as a function of the timing of their
withdrawal decisions.
If R  R; it is strictly dominant for all patient depositors to stay. The
sequential decision rule and the perfect signal act as coordination devices. The
only depositors who withdraw are those who have genuine liquidity needs. Thus,
the probability distribution of impatient and patient depositors is consistent
with the aggregate liquidity distribution of depositors. In multiple equilibria
models of Chang and Velasco (2000a) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983), each de-
positor is better o¤withdrawing conditional on others withdrawing even though,
as a whole, they would be better o¤ if they refrained from so doing. Conversely,
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if R < R; it is weakly dominant to withdraw - depositors get 0 if they choose
to stay since all assets are liquidated. If they choose to withdraw early, their
payo¤s will depend on whether they are among  in the queue.
Bank runs clearly lead to ine¢ cient allocation compared to rst and second
best allocations of the Central Bank as a planner. Given the existence of a se-
quential decision rule, it is possible to have several subcategories (depending on
the order in which depositors present themselves to the bank) such that several
ine¢ ciencies arise and can be Pareto-ranked. There are three possibilities18 :
Case 1: All impatient depositors are rst in the queue (they are all within
the  group). In this case, all impatient depositors receive c1. Of the patient
depositors, a proportion (1 )Rc1 receives c

1 while the rest receive nothing.
Case 2: All patient depositors present themselves rst in the queue. There
are two sub-possibilities here: while it is true that +(1 )Rc1 > , it is indeter-
minate as to whether +(1 )Rc1 is larger or smaller than 1  ;
[a] In the case in which +(1 )Rc1 > 1   , all patient depositors receive
c1: Some impatient depositors (fraction of
+(1 )R
c1
  (1  )) receive their
promised c1 while the remaining proportion of impatient depositors get 0;
[b] In the case in which +(1 )Rc1  (1  ) ; the rst proportion
+(1 )R
c1
of patient depositors receive c1: The remaining proportion of patient depositors
(fraction (1  )  +(1 )Rc1 ) receives nothing. All impatient depositors receive
nothing.
Case 3: Queue contains a mix of impatient and patient depositors and
the rst  of the line contains a mix of impatient and patient depositors) -
Intermediate case between cases 1 and 2.
Claim 7.3: While bank runs result in ine¢ ciency, there are three sub-
categories of runs that can be Pareto-ranked, depending on the sequence of order
18Bear in mind that  > :
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in which depositors present themselves to the queue. Case 2(b) is strictly Pareto
inferior to case 2(a), which, in turn, is Pareto inferior to case 1. In addition to
entailing liquidation of assets, case 2(b) results in complete denial of liquidity
to impatient depositors.
7.3.3 Interventionist Policy - How e¤ective is LOLR19 in
an EME?
The literature on LOLR was reviewed in section 2.4.2 of chapter 2. For an EME
characterised by liability dollarisation, a xed exchange rate regime means that
the liabilities of the banking system are implicit obligations in the international
currency. Using international reserves to defend the peg and to bailout troubled
banks, may lead to a drying up of international liquidity of the economy and
may provide a perfect recipe for a currency crisis (as per denition 7.3).
Lets assume that, instead of liquidating the long asset (yielding  (1  )R),
the Central Bank lends this amount to the commercial bank by depleting its
reserves of dollars from its co¤ers. Given a xed exchange rate of 1 : 1, the
amount of dollars that the Central Bank depletes is  (1  )R: It sells this
amount of dollars in the international market in return for pesos. To analyse
the role of the Central Banks LOLR function, we modify the timeline of events
described earlier, as follows:
19 In practice, Central Banks intervene using LOLR if the problem plaguing the banking
system is one of illiquidity (not of insolvency) and if it fears that the failure of the illiquid bank
will have a negative contagious impact on the whole banking system and nancial markets.
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Thus, when R  R under LOLR arrangement, the amount available for
distribution to depositors will consists of  (derived from the safe asset) and
 (1  )R (derived from borrowings from the Central Bank.) Under the con-
tractual arrangement, the bank promises to pay c1 to those who present them-
selves to the bank. Thus, a proportion +(1 )Rc1 (i.e ) receives c

1: Since
the bank is still a going concern (long assets are not liquidated), its returns in
period t = 2 ; will be (1  )R    (1  )R (or (1  ) (1  )R ), where
(1  )R is the return to the long asset and  (1  )R is the payment20 to
the Central Bank for having borrowed under the LOLR window in period t = 1:
The amount will be available to those (i.e proportion 1 ) who did not receive
payment in period t = 1. Thus, each depositor who was forcedto stay until
period t = 2; receives: (1 )(1 )R1  .
The Central Bank, in period t = 1; has [1   (1  )R] dollars in its re-
serves, where  (1  )R represents the amount it has lent to commercial bank
under the LOLR scheme. We know that 0 < R < R: By construction, if
0  R  12 (bearing in mind that 12 < R); the amount of dollars available
exceeds the amount of pesos supplied by commercial banks to the Central Bank
i.e 1    (1  )R >  +  (1  )R: If this is true, in period t = 2; the Cen-
tral Bank has 1   2 (1  )R    +  (1  )R dollars (i.e (1  ) (1  )R
dollars.) The proportion of depositors withdrawing is 1    and each deposi-
tor earns (1 )(1 )R1  amount of pesos supplied by those withdrawing in period
t = 2: Total amount supplied is: (1  ) (1  )R pesos. Given the 1 : 1 ex-
change rate between pesos and dollars, the Central Bank reserves exactly cover
the pesos it receives. Thus, the Central Bank does not run out of reserves at
any point of time in the game. This nding can be captured in the following
corollary:
Corollary 7.1: If 0 < R < 12 ; under the sequential decision rule and
given depositorsstrategy , LOLR prevents an information-based bank run from
20We assume that the discount rate is zero.
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contagiously spreading to foreign exchange sector and from generating a currency
crisis as per denition 7.3.
For the range of values of R, such that 12 < R < R
; the amount of dollars
available at the Central Bank in period t = 1 (i.e 1  (1  )R ) is less than the
amount of pesos available at the commercial bank (i.e  +  (1  )R ). The
Central Bank runs out of reserves to nance those demanding payment. An
international illiquidity problem arises at the macroeconomic level, which leads
to a currency crisis, as per denition 7.3. Our result that LOLR may, under
certain circumstances, be sub-optimal in EMEs, is an important contribution
we make to the literature. Closed-economy considerations of LOLR measures
show that, by preserving the value of assets of banks facing liquidity (but not
solvency) problems, a bank run is always avoided. Our paradigm suggests that
this may not necessarily be the case since LOLR may come at a cost to other
banks if the LOLR measure drains the international liquidity of the economy.
Thus, our paradigm advocates that alternative ways of nancing the LOLR
scheme need to be sought. Our hypothesis that LOLR may not always be
welcomed as a crisis management measure, rejoins the idea of some closed-
economy contributions such as Goodhart and Huang (2005). While adopting
a completely di¤erent approach, Goodhart and Huang (2005) argue that, in
a dynamic setting, the trade-o¤ between contagious probabilities and moral
hazard considerations, is crucial in determing the optimal policy in terms of
liquidity support that the Central Bank provides to banks (LOLR). As a result
of suboptimality, they rationalise the case for "constructive ambiguity" in the
intervention of the Central Bank, rather than systematic interventions when
banks need cash.
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7.4 Some Applications
7.4.1 Special Conjecture for LOLR - A Multi-Period Hy-
pothesis with Many Banks
In this section, we extend the reasoning behind our model predictions to a
multi-period setting of a nancial system with many banks and explore some
implications of our paradigm.
Assume that : 12 < R  R: What are the implications of LOLR for an
EME with liability dollarisation ? We conjecture the existence of some vicious
circle of nancial fragility as follows:
Corollary 7.2: (Illiquidity ExternalitySyndrome) Any bailout scheme
engineered ex-post by the Central Bank is ine¢ cient because of the externality
it creates for the international liquidity of the economy in general
The use of LOLR21 to bailout troubled banks creates a spillover e¤ect of its
21 In practice, LOLR a¤ects the monetary base of the nancial system and, hence, will
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own right on the countrys international liquididty position and, as such, may
impinge on the overall macroeconomic management goals (e.g defense of the
peg). Furthermore, bad macroeconomic policies, per se, may lead to currency
crises and will result in balance sheet e¤ects - which aggravate the banking crisis
to begin with and, thereby, a¤ect the likelihood of using interventionist policies.
Corollary 7.3: (Intertemporal Substitution of Banking Crisis) A
LOLR scheme engineered by the Central Bank may avoid a contemporary information-
based banking failure at the crisis-catalyst bank, at the cost of a larger devaluation-
induced banking failures across all other banks in the future
To analyse the welfare implications of LOLR scheme, a comparison must be
made between the welfare gains from preventing contemporary bank failure and
the welfare losses that result from spillover e¤ects on international liquidity of
the economy and the welfare losses that emanate from future banking failures
as a result of a devaluation-induced banking crisis in the future22 .
Corollary 7.4: LOLR is ex-post sub-optimal in an EME characterised by
liability dollarisation
Proof. See Technical Appendix (Section A.5) 23
impinge on the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy. Monetary policy, in its own right, may
a¤ect the stability, safety and soundness of the banking system through the banking or the
credit channel of the monetary transmission mechanism - thereby a¤ecting the probability of
intervening using microeconomic policies such as LOLR. The EME case is special because it
shows that these two distinct functions of a central bank, are interconnected, as per the above
illustration.
22See chapter 8 for more on devaluation-induced banking failures.
23The fact that a devaluation-induced bank failure results in greater welfare loss than a
purely information-based failure, has implications for the practical choice of macroeconomic
policy instruments available to an EME when it comes to defending the soft peg. EMEs prefer
to use interest rate policy to defend the peg rather than foreign market intervention.
The former policy will weaken the banking system through the adverse selection and moral
hazard arguments we outlined earlier. The latter will induce a currency devaluation (by
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The interconnections generated by LOLR, through illiquidity spillover e¤ects
and intertemporal substitution of banking crises (illustrated in Figure 7.7), sug-
gests that the interplay between nancial fragility and overall macroeconomic
aims, is strong for a EME with liability dollarisation. The cause-e¤ectchain,
through which a LOLR scheme is shown to have a contagious impact on inter-
national liquidity of the economy and future banking fragility, suggests that the
need to coordinate the nancial stability role (ensuring safety and soundness of
the banking system) and overall macroeconomic aims (ensuring monetary sta-
bility and exchange rate policy), is of fundamental importance for the Central
Bank of an EME.
Corollary 7.5: Assume that depositors receive interim news about the
banks portfolio peformance, devaluation (i.e currency crisis - as per denition
7.3) occurs if and only if R  R and if, under assumption 12 < R < R;
the Central Bank uses interventionist policies in the form of LOLR to bail out
depleting reserves) and will result in balance sheet e¤ects. Corollary 7.4 suggests that, in
welfare terms, it is less costly to bear the burden of higher interest rates than to bear the burden
of currency crisis induced by draining of reserves as a result of foreign market intervention.
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banks facing liquidity trouble.
7.4.2 Economics of Capital Controls and Application to
EME with Liability Dollarisation
In the wake of the East Asian crisis of 1997 / 8, Malaysia adopted capital
controls and the policy was successful in preventing the exodus of capital and
in shielding the economy from external shocks. We interpret capital ows here
as a quantitative restriction on the inux of foreign investors depositing their
endowments in the domestic banking system of an EME. Fischer (2001)24 argues
that the rationale for imposing capital controls is twofold:
[1] Controls on capital inows - prevent excessive capital inows from leading
to currency overvaluations or to inuence the distribution of capital inows
towards long term capital and away from short run disruptive capital inows.
[2] Controls on capital outows - prevent devaluation of the currency pre-
cipitated by a herding behaviour of depositors in moments of panic and to give
24Fischer, Stanley (2001): Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View correct ?, sum-
marised in Finance & Development, IMF Quarterly Publication, and full edition available in
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 2001
CHAPTER 7. INFORMATION-INDUCED BANKING FAILURES 242
allow country to have independent control over monetary policy25 with a xed
exchange rate regime.
The theoretical literature argues that Suspension-of-Convertibility (SoC) (or
the closed-economy equivalent of capital controls) successfully act as bank-run
preventing devices but that whether the socially optimal outcome will result
depends on the presence of aggregate uncertainty about liquidity shocks. In
the absence of such uncertainty, banks o¤ering demand deposit contracts with
suspension help achieve socially optimal allocation and help ward o¤ a bank
run. In the presence of this uncertainty, SoC eliminates a bank run but results
in sub-optimal allocation because it cannot allow for contingent allocation26 .
In this section, we assume that the exchange rate is a soft peg and that the
government is committed to maintain it at this level due to the fear of oating
argument that results from allowing the currency to oat. Thus, foreign depos-
itors receive information about the banks performance only and not about the
shadow exchange rate.
Recall the strategy of depositors as per remark 1: if R > R; is a dominant
strategy for depositors to stay (thus the proportions of early and late consumers
will coincide with the liquidity preference shock, (; 1  )): Conversely, if R 
R; it is dominant for every depositor to withdraw. Let us assume that R  R
and that, as part of its crisis-management measure, the government adopts a
quantitative restriction of capital that can ow out of the country. In particular,
let us assume that, under this capital control on outows, the bank promises to
service only the rst  of depositors who present themselves to the bank. The
25This is the impossible trilemmadoctrine in the literature that it is impossible to have
complete monetary autonomy, xed exchange rate and perfect capital mobility at the same
time. To enable an economy to have independent control over its monetary policy in a system
of xed exchange rate, capital controls on outows are necessary.
26This warrants the intervention of the government through the use of public measures,
such as deposit insurance schemes, because deposit insurance allows for contingent allocation,
and can replicate the socially-optimal allocation.
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main aim of imposing such capital controls is to prevent a bank run and help
restore the Planners Second-Best solution.
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Capital Controls27 can successfully act as bank-run preventing devices but
whether they can replicate the planners optimal allocation depends on the order
in which depositors present themselves to the bank. If all those who are rst in
the queue are impatient depositors, capital controls prevent runs and achieve an
allocation in which impatient depositors receive c1 and patient depositors receive
c2 in period t = 2 (banking contractual obligations satised). If the sequence
order is di¤erent (i.e patient depositors get paid rst due to them being rst
in the line of queue), controls on outows achieve a sub-optimal allocation e.g
when  < 1  , all impatient depositors are forced to consume in period t = 2
when consumption is of no avail to them.
An operational problem that arises with capital controls in our setup, is that
if the controls on outows are extensive, this may act as a deterrent to foreign
investors or depositors to deposit their money in the domestic banking system
to begin with. Given that we assumed that there are no domestic investors, this
may thwart nancial intermediation. Furthermore, for economies that have an
open capital market and that are signatories to free trade in goods and services
agreements (under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) accords), it is di¢ cult
to imagine closing the capital account of the Balance of Payments, whilst still
maintaining the current account open and fully convertible.
Corollary 7.6: Capital Controls act as potential and successful bank-run
preventing devices but:
27As mentioned before, the practical reasons for limiting outows of capital are essentially
macroeconomic in nature: to prevent outows from devaluing the currency and to allow mon-
etary policy independence to co-exist with a xed exchange rate regime. Monetary policy, in
the macroeconomic sense, is not the issue of the paper - thus, can be dropped down. Our
theoretical analysis of crisis ow from the banking sector to the external sector, shows that a
necessary and su¢ cient condition to generate a currency crisis, is the presence of intervention-
ist policies such as LOLR. Without interventionist policies, there are always su¢ cient reserves
in the Central Bank co¤ers to nance the needs of those who wish to withdraw. Thus, we can,
as well, dump down the benets of capital controls as pre-emptors of currency devaluation in
this paper.
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[1]They may result in mis-allocation of resources, depending on the sequence
order at which depositors present themselves to the bank.
[2] In a dynamic setting with perfectly foresighted foreign depositors, capital
controls on outows lead to ex-post prevention of bank failures and ex-ante dis-
incentive for depositors to deposit their money in the bank in the rst instance.
The optimal level of restriction will depend on the trade-o¤ between ex-post bank
run prevention and ex-ante nancial dis-intermediation e¤ects.
We review some other implications of our paradigm for the economics of
capital controls in the last section of the next chapter.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter studies a banking allocation in an emerging market economy char-
acterised by foreign inux of capital and by liability dollarisation. The main
contributions embodied in this chapter are manifold. We show that, using a
mechanism design approach, there is a pecking order in implementation of opti-
mal resource allocation. We show that a Planner who is assumed to observe all
stochastic fundamentals of the banking system, will o¤er a direct truthtelling
mechanism that implements the First-Best implementation of resources. The
Planner provides full insurance against liquidity and aggregate risks in the econ-
omy and the resulting term structure of demand deposit payments to depositors
is non-contingent. Under the assumption that the Planner is unable to observe
the stochastic fundamentals, the allocation becomes Second-Best and the Plan-
ner can only insure against liquidity risks. The term structure of payments
becomes contingent on the stochastic fundamentals of the banking system. A
decentralised banking system is characterised by positive endogenous probabil-
ities of banking failures. When these failures do not occur, banks implement
the Planners Second-Best allocation. When banking failures occur, the banking
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system results in an allocation that is Pareto inferior to that of the Planner. We
show that within this inferior allocation, there are a number of sub-categories of
banking allocation, depending on the order in which depositors present them-
selves to the bank.
Our next contribution is to analyse the nature of the transmission mechanism
from a banking crisis to a currency crisis under the assumption that a banking
failure has occured. In the banking allocation, we show that, when depositors
receive precise information about their banks stochastic fundamental, a unique
equilibrium in the banks fundamental, exists in depositors strategy. Given
that deposit contracts are denominated in dollars (and the fact that depositors
consume in dollars), the Central Bank will never run out of reserves to nance
contractual payments in dollars. The necessary and su¢ cient condition that
guarantees this is: 1  >

1  (R) : When this condition is violated, we move
on to analyse the nature of the specic conduit through which a banking crisis
may contagiously spread to the foreign exchange sector. Through our innovative
approach, one of our key results and contributions to the literature, is that we
show that LOLR may sometimes be the key channel that contagiously transmits
a crisis from banks to the foreign exchange sector. Thus, in an EME, we show
that LOLR can be sub-optimal, even if it succeeds in preserving the assets of
the crisis-catalyst bank. In particular, we show that if 12 < R < 1 , any ex-
post bailout strategy designed to prevent asset liquidation, will always lead to
a drying up of international liquidity and to an eventual currency devaluation.
Thus, we show that using the foreign reserves for the twinned task of defending
the peg and of bailing out illiquid banks through LOLR, may be destabilising.
An interesting conjectural application is that of a multi-period nancial system
with many banks. This setting leads to a completely new outcome to the litera-
ture in that we show that in an EME, ex-post bailout strategies such as LOLR
may lead to an intertemporal substitution of banking crisis: whilst helping to
ward o¤ a contemporary information-based banking crisis, they may lead to
future currency devaluations which induce balance sheet e¤ects and to eventual
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devaluation-induced banking failures. With devaluation-induced banking fail-
ures resulting in larger welfare loss than information-induced banking failures,
LOLR may thus be sub-optimal for the nancial system of an EME.
Our third contribution to the literature is to provide the theoretical tools to
conduct welfare analysis of various policy instruments for open-economy banking
systems. This departs fundamentally from Chang and Velasco (2000a) whose
contribution is to analyse nature of equilibrium (uniqueness or multiple equi-
libria) in open-economies. Chang and Velasco (2000a) argued that the main
limitation of their work, is that it cannot be used to assess the e¤ectiveness of
various policies. Our contribution is meant to address that gap. The appealing
feature of the mechanism design approach that we adopt, is that it enables us to
measure, in welfare terms, the e¤ectiveness of various policy measures designed
to tackle a banking crisis problem. The success of any policy depends on its
ability to restore the Planners Second-Best outcome. We consider the e¤ective-
ness of a a number of policies (e.g capital controls, state-contingent controls,
Chilean taxes) in this chapter.
In the next chapter, we will consider a related issue which builds on the envi-
ronment considered in chapter 6 but which documents the reverse transmission
process from a currency crisis to a banking crisis.
Chapter 8
Devaluation-Induced
Banking Failures
8.1 Introduction
This chapter builds on chapter 6 and considers an alternative question to the
one we considered in chapter 7. Our aim here is to highlight the nature of
the transmission mechanism from a currency crisis to a banking crisis and to
analyse the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for such a transmission process
to occur. We also want to shed light on the debate on the most appropriate
form of the exchange rate regime and the accompanying safeguards that may be
adopted by an EME - where the appropriate form of the exchange rate regime
is the one that minimises the probability of either form of crisis.
As we documented in chapter 6, the literature on the twin crisis is relatively
more tilted on the empirical side, with notable contributions from Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999). The main theoretical work comes from Chang and Velasco
(2000a). Chang and Velasco (2000a) extend the Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
framework to an open economy and analyse multiplicity of equilibria, with one
equilibrium depicting the occurrence of the twin crisesand the other equilib-
rium depicting otherwise. A natural outcome of their paradigm is to enunciate
the circumstances under which the twin crises occur as equilibrium phenomenon.
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We extend a banking system to an open economy by adopting an environment
that is similar to Chang and Velasco (2000a). Our work di¤ers from Chang
and Velasco (2000a) in two main respects: Firstly, we focus on Allen and Gale
(1998) banks rather than Diamond and Dybvig (1983) banks - which means
that, with an incomplete information structure, we automatically preclude mul-
tiplicity of equilibria. Secondly, we focus on the nature of the transmission
mechanism from a currency crisis to a banking crisis and explore the necessary
and su¢ cient conditions under which a currency crisis will give rise to a bank-
ing crisis. Real world examples as documented by empirical studies carried
out by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), show that a currency crisis may cause
a banking crisis through the e¤ects of a currency devaluation on the balance
sheets of banks that are characterised by liability dollarisation. In addition,
resolving a currency crisis may, by itself, lead to trouble in the banking sector if
it requires massive interest rate hikes which fragilise banks by inducing adverse
selection and moral hazard in their asset portfolio. Theoretical contributions
that document the exact nature of the transmission process, are lacking in the
literature and our work is meant to ll that gap.
Like in Chang and Velasco (2000a), there are two currencies: pesos (the home
currency) and dollars (the foreign currency) and three time periods: t = 0; 1; 2:
All consumers are foreign investors who are endowed with 1 dollar each. They
deposit their endowment of 1 dollar at the bank. The bank is modelled as a
mechanism that accepts deposits of dollars from foreign investors and proceeds
to convert these dollars into pesos at the Central Bank and to invest some of
these pesos in a safe storage asset (that yields a return of 1 unit in period t+ 1
for each unit invested in period t). The bank then invests the resulting pesos in
a long asset that yields a return of R (> 1) in period t = 2 for every unit invested
in period t = 0: The long asset can be liquidated in the intermediate period at
a loss. One may think of the long asset as a non-tradable good (e.g the housing
sector, for instance), whose returns are denominated in pesos. Since we are
considering an EME with lack of nancial sophistication and characterised by
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the absence of a nancial market other than the banking system, it is assumed
that, in the eyes of foreign investors, the economy lacks credibility to o¤ering
debt / deposit contracts denominated in pesos. As a result, all deposit contracts
are stipulated in dollars. The banks problem is to choose a risk-sharing con-
tractual agreement that maximises the expected utility of depositors subject to
a zero-prot constraint. It decides on the optimal portfolio between short and
long asset in period t = 0:
By encompassing features [1]-[5] as discussed in chapter 6, there are two
main sources of nancial vulnerabilities in our setup: there is an asset-liability
maturity mismatch1 as in all bank run models - Bank liabilities (deposits) are
essentially short-term in nature and liquid while the bank asset (the long asset)
is illiquid, with the added feature that there is an inverse relationship between
liquidity and viability on the banks asset portfolio. What our approach adds to
the existing literature is that there is also an asset-liability currency mismatch
in that, while the main assets are denominated in pesos, all its liabilities are
denominated in dollars2 . Thus, as foreign investors will face a liquidity pref-
erence shock, they will withdraw from the bank in period t = 1 (if they are
impatient consumers) or in period t = 2 (if they are patient). In either case,
the bank promises to meet their contractual obligations in dollars. The two
sources of nancial vulnerabilities arise because at the time of investment and
1The composition of capital inows was an important factor in a number of nancial crises
in many EMEs, such as in Thailand in 1997/8 and in Mexico in 1994/5. In both cases, reliance
on short-term borrowings to nance huge current account decits, was the linchpin of nancial
crises.
2 It is ostensible that a portfolio choice (i.e the share of wealth held in pesos and in dollar-
denominated bonds) depends on the risk-return characteristics of these securities, the structure
of shocks and on monetary and exchange rate policies. In our modelling of an EME, we shall
assume that all deposits are in dollars and all assets are in pesos. Thus, the choice of the
currency denomination of our asset portfolio is taken as exogeneous in our setup.
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decision on optimal portfolio choice, they are zero-probability events. It is in
period t = 1 that depositors know their types and that the precise nature of
aggregate uncertainty in the model becomes known.
Like in chapter 7, we begin our analysis by studying the optimality of re-
source allocation for a theoretical yardstick: the Central Bank as a Social Plan-
ner. We show that, under the assumption that the Planner cannot observe the
stochastic fundamentals of the economy (in this case, the shadow exchange rate),
the best the Planner can do is to o¤er an approximate truthtelling mechanism
that succeeds in insuring against liquidity risks only. Aggregate risks in the form
of stochastic variations in the shadow exchange rate are left unhedged and these
are reected in the term structure of demand deposit payments to depositors in
that they become contingent on these aggregate risks. This implementation by
the Planner results in the Second-Best allocation of resources. The Planners
mechanism succeeds in avoiding a nancial crisis under any circumstances. We
then study the nature of the allocation under a more decentralised mechanism:
that of a banking system. The banking allocation is characterised by positive
probability of bank failures. In fact, we are able to pin down the existence of a
unique equilibrium threshold in depositorsstrategy. When no bank runs occur
(depositors receive no news of an impending devaluation), the banking alloca-
tion replicates the allocation of the Planner under the Second-Best outcome.
When bank runs do occur (depositors receive news of an impending currency
devaluation), the allocation becomes Pareto inferior. Thus, while bank runs are
devaluation-induced with positive probability, we are interested in constructing
a set of asset values for which such a run will eventually result in a banking
failure.
More precisely, how do we model the banking allocation and depositors
strategy ? Here, we assume that the exchange rate is initially xed but we de-
part from chapter 7, in that, depositors are assumed to receive precise interim
information about the shadow exchange rate(the true value of exchange rate
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as dictated by macroeconomic fundamentals). Whatever follows is completely
new to the literature. We construct an equilibrium threshold, which will de-
lineate depositorsactions as a function of their precise interim information. If
depositors receive precise information that the current peg is overvalued, the
resulting currency devaluation will result in depositors withdrawing their de-
posits immediately. However, whether a bank run will occur or not will depend
on the value of the banks stochastic assets. We show that there is a unique
threshold of the shadow exchange rate above which, a currency devaluation oc-
curs and below which it does not occur. We are thus capable of exploring
the circumstances under which a currency devaluation (resulting in a bank run)
will eventually lead to a banking failure for a simulated range of the banks
fundamentals within a well-dened theoretical context. We can thus conrm
the nature of the conduit through which a crisis ows from the foreign exchange
sector to the banking sector.
The contributions enshrined in chapters 7 and 8 are essential to the de-
bate on the welfare properties of the e¤ectiveness of various policy measures
and choice of exchange rate regimes. As we will explicate, a currency crisis may
cause a banking crisis (and failure) through the e¤ects of a currency devaluation
on the balance sheets of banks characterised by liability dollarisation. Resolv-
ing a currency crisis may, by itself, lead to trouble in the banking sector if it
requires massive interest rate hikes3 or massive foreign exchange intervention
to defend the peg. In our environment, the former works by a¤ecting the as-
sets of banks and by resulting in stochastic variations in banksasset values.
As we studied in the previous chapter, stochastic variations in banks funda-
mentals may result in information-induced banking failures. The latter works
by depleting foreign exchange reserve level of the economy and by resulting in
possible currency devaluation and eventual devaluation-induced banking fail-
ures. Thus, while defending the peg may stabilise the exchange rate, this may
3 Interest rate hikes may fragilise banks by inducing adverse selection and moral hazard in
their asset portfolio.
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come at the cost of destabilising the banking system. We show in chapter 7
that information-induced banking failures may result in lower welfare loss than
devaluation-induced banking failures. Thus, our framework advocates the use
of interest rates rather than foreign exchange intervention as ways of defending
the peg.
We also intend to use our framework to shed light on the debate on the
most appropriate form of the exchange rate regime and the accompanying safe-
guards that may be adopted by an EME - where the appropriate form of the
exchange rate regime is the one that minimises the probability of either form
of crisis and that helps restore the Planners Second-Best solution. The cur-
rent macroeconomic paradigm suggests the adoption of exchange rate regimes
based on exogenous factors (e.g on the ability of the regime to anchor ina-
tionary expectations successfully). Furthermore, in the specic context of an
EME characterised by liability dollarisation and by inux of foreign capital as
deposits, the current macroeconomic paradigm struggles to provide some insight
about the most appropriate form of exchange rate regime. Liability dollarisa-
tion typically warrants a regime that is di¤erent from pure oats4 . Integration
in world capital market warrants a regime that is di¤erent from pegs5 . As
such, due to these o¤setting factors, current macroeconomic models fail to o¤er
temptative suggestions about the appropriate form of exchange rate regime in
EME.
Our model, deeply rooted in nancial intermediation, di¤ers from the cur-
rent paradigm in that we can contribute to the debate on choice of exchange rate
regimes based on the ability of the regime to minimise the probability of banking
and currency crisis (twin crisis) occurring. We bring value-added to the debate
about the appropriate design of exchange rate regimes by being able to compare
the e¤ectiveness of various structures on welfare theoretic terms. In particular,
4Due to the fear of oatingargument that is so common in EME circles.
5Due to speculative pressure instability and monetary policy impotency that accompany
soft pegs.
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our model suggests that if the aim of the policymaker is to keep exchange rate
stable, it may do so by using interest rate policy rather than foreign exchange
reserve policy to defend the peg. Interest rate policy, by a¤ecting a banks sto-
chastic fundamentals, may result in information-induced banking failures. For-
eign exchange intervention policy, by leading to currency devaluations through
depletion of foreign reserves, may lead to devaluation-induced banking failures.
An important corollary of our approach is to show that devaluation-induced
banking failures may result in greater welfare loss than information-induced
banking failures. Thus, while both policies succeed in keeping the exchange
rate xed at the cost of destabilising the banking system, interest rate policy
results in lower welfare loss than foreign exchange intervention. Thus, interest
rate policy seems to be a more prominent intervention for Central Banks policy.
Conversely, if the aim of the policymaker is to pre-empt the occurrence of both
crises (i.e eliminate the likelihood of both crises), some state-contingent struc-
ture in the exchange rate regime is important. The aim of the state-contingent
structure is to enable restore the Planners second-best allocation. A few propo-
sitions are studied e.g crawling peg systems, capital controls, managed oating
regime.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 8.2 considers the
interraction between banks, the foreign exchange market and the Central Bank
as a mechanism, designed to bring optimal allocation of resources. We show
that a banking system is Pareto inferior to the central planner which o¤ers the
second-best solution because it is prone to devaluation-induced runs from the
depositors in some states of the world, whereas the central planner does not
su¤er from that syndrome. In section 8.3, we document on the mechanics of
a crisis ow from the foreign exchange sector to the banking sector. Section
8.4 highlight some conjectural applications of our contribution to the areas of
optimal taxation design and contingent liabilities. Furthermore, we discuss the
implications of our paradigm to the choice of the exchange rate regime debate
in section 8.5. Finally, section 8.6 concludes.
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8.2 Mechanism Design Problem for an EME
The timeline of events is as in section 6.2.4 in chapter 6. We now assume
that the interim news that depositors receive, concern the shadow exchange
rate only. We still take the banks portfolio performance to be stochastic but
depositors are no longer assumed to receive interim signals about the banks
portfolio performance6 .
Concept of a shadow exchange rate: Let e denote the shadow exchange rate
and e denote the actual exchange rate. The shadow exchange rate, e; is a cti-
tious concept taken to mean the underlying strength of the currency as dictated
by external or domestic macroeconomic inuences or by any speculative pres-
sure from the nancial markets. Here, we take e to be a stochastic element, with
probability density, f (e) and with full support on [0;1] : Given the randomness
of the shadow exchange rate, there is a weak segment of the distribution that
tells depositors that the currency is facing speculative pressure ( and, thereby,
looks set to devalue) and a strong segment of the distribution that suggests
otherwise. We demonstrate the existence of such segments by rationalising the
existence of a unique e: Any s 2 [0; e] gives depositors news that the currency
is not under speculative pressure - in which case, no devaluation occurs (i.e the
actual exchange rate remains xed at e = 1): On the other side, any s 2 (e;1]
gives to depositors news that the currency is under immense speculative pres-
sure - in which case, a devaluation occurs and the exchange rate is dictated by
market forces and takes the same prole as the shadow exchange rate (i.e e = e
).
Claim 8.1: Let e denote the shadow exchange rate and let e denote the
actual exchange rate. Thus, e takes the following prole:
6Other features of R still hold as in chapter 5: it is measured in pesos and, if liquidated,
will yield a xed amount R;  < 1: Note that R can be anywhere between 0 and (1 )
(1 ) :
We shall later see that the specic range of the values of R will matter when discussing the
circumstances under which a currency crisis will lead to a banking crisis.
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e =
8<: 1 if s 2 [0; e]e if s 2 (e;1]
9=;
8.2.1 Anatomy of Financial Fragility
The following argument / example demonstrates that, due to asset-liability
unhedged currency risks, a devaluation will produce a balance sheet e¤ect by
a¤ecting the investment portfolios for periods t = 1 and t = 2: By so doing, the
amount available as payment to depositors will be reduced, as per the above
claim.
Example 8.1: (Devaluation-Contingent Payo¤ s) Assume that R has
a bernoulli distribution7 : RL with probability  and RH with probability 1  ;
where 0 <  < 1 and 0 < RL < RH : Lets assume that the ex-ante exchange rate
is normalised at 1. Due to uncertainty in the return of the risky technology, the
amount paid in dollars in period t = 2, is contingent on the particular realisation
of R and on the expected exchange rate.
Let ~c2 be the stochastic payment made to depositors if R = RH and if there
is no currency devaluation. If we are in a state of the world in which R = RL;
then the bank is declared insolvent in period t = 2 and will be assumed to be able
to pay only part of its promised payment. Thus, if there is no devaluation and
if R = RH ; then ~c2 = c2: On the other hand side, ~c2 = c2

RL
RH

if R = RL
(i.e depositors receive only a fraction RLRH (< 1) of the promised payments in the
bad state of the world.
The analysis, so far, has assumed that the exchange rate remains xed
throughout our experiment. To see how a change in the expected exchange rate
a¤ects the promised contractual payments to depositors, lets assume that there
is a devaluation in period t = 2 from 1 to e2 (e2 > 1) : In this case, investors
7Exceptionally, we assume that R can take two values here, to prove the argument.
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receive a proportion RH=e2RH=1 =
1
e2
of the promised payment if R = RH ; while
they receive Rl=e2RH=1 =
RL
e2RH
of their payments if R = RL:
Thus, with devaluation, ~c2 = c2e2 if R = RH , while ~c2 = c2

RL
e2RH

if
R = RL: In general, c2

RL
e2RH

< c2e2 < c2:
While the payo¤s to depositors will unambiguously be reduced, irrespective
of the realisation of the risky technology, a devaluation reduces the payments to
late depositors relatively more in the bad state than in the good state
8.2.2 Second-Best Allocation (Central Bank acts as Social
Planner)
Now, assume that the Central Bank is still the supra-national authority that
reallocates resources within the banking industry but that it cannot observe the
realisation of e. The optimisation problem boils down to:
max
c1
E[U (c1 (e)) + (1  )U (c2 (e))]
s.t
c1 (e)  
c2 (e) =
(1  ) Re +   c1 (e)
1  
Z 1
0
c1 (e) f (e) de 
Z 1
0
c2 (e) f (e) de
Claim 8.2: The optimal solution8 results in a state-contingent term struc-
ture of demand deposit repayment of the following form:
8Technically, c2 (e) =
(1 )R
(1 )e but we have assumed e = 1
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c1 (e) = c2 (e) = (1  ) Re +  e > e9
c1 (e) =

 ; c2 (e) =
(1 )R
1  e  e
with e = (1 )R(1 )
8.2.3 Banking Allocation
Remark 8.1: (DepositorsStrategy) The strategy of depositors is a map-
ping from their type space (information about liquidity preference and interim
news about the shadow exchange rate) to their action space (i.e to stay or to
withdraw)
Given the notion of a depositors strategy, we move on to describe the with-
drawal rule:
Remark 8.2: (Withdrawal Decision Rule) Given their strategy as de-
scribed above and the existence of devaluation-contingent payo¤s, depositors all
choose to withdraw if e > e (dominant to withdraw) and choose to stay if
e  e (dominant for all depositors to stay). e = (1 )R(1 ) :
Using similar analysis to that of the last chapter, the banking contract allo-
cation can thus be viewed as a sum of two elements:
max
c1; 
Z 1
e
	 U (c1 (e)) f (e) de +
Z e
0
[U (c1 (e)) + (1  )U (c2 (e))] f (e) de
9The threshold is computed as follows: Let 

=
(1 ) R
e
1  at the point of indi¤erence
between consuming early and late. This boils down to: e = (1 )R
(1 ) : Note that here, when
e > e; the risky asset does not need to be liquidated. Since the Central Bank can reshu­ e
resources costlessly, it can bring some of its short-asset forward to supplement the low returns
in period t = 2 whenever e > e:
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s.t
c1 (e)  
c2 =
(1  )R
e(1  )
where e = (1 )R(1 ) ,
R1
e 	 U (c1 (e)) f (e) de is the element of the banking
contract (	10 denotes the proportion of those who receive full repayment under
the sequential service constraint) that makes the bank vulnerable to the risks
of a currency devaluation and
R e
0
[U (c1 (e))+ (1  )U (c2 (e))] f (e) de is the
element of the banking contract that induces truthtelling behaviour. Thus, if
the shadow exchange rate moves in the [0; e] region and depositors receive a
perfect signal of it, the currency is viewed as strong by the nancial markets.
Thus the exchange rate stays xed. In this case, payments to patient depositors
amount to (1 )R1  (with e = 1) and those to impatient depositors amount to

 : Truthtelling behaviour is induced since
(1 )R
1  >

 . Conversely, if the
shadow exchange rate moves in the (e;1] region, the currency is viewed as
being fundamentally weak and subject to immense speculative pressure. All
depositors receive a perfect interim information of this and they all withdraw
in period t = 1; with only proportion 	 receiving full payment, as promised by
the contract.
10	 =
+(1 )R
e
c1
: Note that 	 <  (i.e +(1 )R
c1
)
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8.3 Dynamics of Financial Crises
Denition 8.1: (Currency Crisis)11 In the presence of a perfect signal about
the shadow exchange rate, we dene a currency crisis as a situation in which
depositors receive news about an imminent devaluation of the currency i.e s 2
(e;1]:
11Frankel and Rose (1996) in Currency Crashes in an Emerging Market: Empirical Indica-
tors, dene a currency crisis as one in which the exchange rate depreciates in nominal terms
by over 25% in a year, along with a 10% depreciation from the previous year. A sidenote:
the latter condition is taken so as to exclude the large long-term depreciation trends of high-
ination economies. The problem with viewing a currency crisis from the vantage point of
nominal depreciation is that it excludes episodes in which the currency came under immense
speculative pressures but was successfully averted by the Central Banks foreign exchange
intervention or by interest rate policy. As such, an index of speculative pressure may be a
more accurate description of a currency crisis.
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The literature identies three theoretical channels of transmission from a
currency crisis to a banking crisis: (interest rate channel) Resolving a currency
crisis often requires Central banks to increase interest rates sharply to main-
tain condence in the peg and to ward o¤ speculative attacks on the currency;
this may fragilise the banking system by distorting nancial intermediation12 ;
(balance sheet channel) A currency crisis (e.g a devaluation) may fragilise the
balance sheet of banks that su¤er from unhedged currency mismatches i.e banks
have liabilities predominantly denominated in foreign currencies - this balance
sheet e¤ect may be strong enough to lead depositors to anticipate the banks
failure and to run on their banks. On the same wavelength. the crisis cre-
ates a contingency liability for the government because it is forced to bailout
the bank when the e¤ects of a currency devaluation weaken the banks bal-
ance sheet. Such interventionist schemes can only quicken the evaporation of
foreign reserves, thereby making the problem more self-sustaining; (foreign re-
serve channel) Alleviating a currency crisis pressure by using foreign exchange
intervention to defend the peg, may deplete foreign exchange reserves and may
lead to a self-fullling currency crisis which, in turn, a¤ects the balance sheet
of banks that are engaged in liability dollarisation.
Since we have assumed that (foreign) depositors receive interim about the
shadow exchange rate, we use Figures 8.4 and 8.5 (please turn next page) as the
standard benchmark case. Here, e and R represent the archetypal thresholds
for the shadow exchange rate and the banks portfolio purformance respectively.
12As mentioned in the introduction, higher interest rates may lead to adverse selection (i.e
asymmetric information cases when only bad borrowers are willing to borrow at the going
(higher) interest rates) and moral hazard (i.e banks are willing to engage in riskier ventures
because they reap the full upside benets of these gambles but do not su¤er the downside
risks. Limited liability constraints, deposit insurance and relaxation of controls over bank
asset holdings, are all possible reasons validating this gamble for resurrection. See Mishkin
(1996) for more on adverse selection and moral hazard in nancial markets.
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We are interested in analysing a situation in which a currency crisis (or
devaluation), by its own, creates and leads to a banking crisis, where no such
banking crisis would have occurred otherwise. The transmission mechanism
from currency crisis to banking crisis will be through the balance sheet e¤ects.
In order to isolate cases in which a currency crisis can, by itself, generate a
banking crisis through balance sheet e¤ects, we consider a situation in which
there is no bank run to begin with ( i.e R > R - the upper segment in Figure
8.4). Thus, we assume that the banks fundamentals are strong to begin
with. Now, let us assume that depositors receive an interim information about
the shadow exchange rate and that they expect it to depreciate. In Figure
8.5, we are now looking at the rightward segment of the graph (i.e e > e): To
consider how a currency crisis may, by itself, lead to balance sheet e¤ects, it is
our intention to construct a set of values for the banks stochastic fundamentals
and explore the circumstances under which, balance sheet e¤ects will occur.
With interim information about the shadow rate, the point of indi¤erence
between staying and withdrawing, upon receiving information about the shadow
exchange rate only, was condition:  =
(1 )R
(1 )e where e
 = (1 )R(1 ) . Here,
when e > e;  >
(1 )R
(1 )e and all depositors present themselves to the bank.
To analyse the circumstances under which a currency crisis, by itself, leads to
a banking crisis, we consider a hypothetical case in which depositors receive
interim information about the shadow rate but that the value of the banks
portfolio investment will change to a new xed amount. To do this, we consider a
benchmark case in which, initially, R = R and e = e: The point of indi¤erence
between staying and withdrawing is thus:  =
(1 )R
(1 )e : Thus, in Figures 8.4 and
8.5, we are currently on the threshold lines for the shadow exchange rate and
for the portfolio investment. As stated above, our aim is to construct a range
of values of R for which a currency crisis may, by its own, lead to a banking
crisis where none would have existed otherwise. Thus, we allow e to depreciate
i.e e > e: By how much must the stochastic R rise above R in order to ensure
that investment (evaluated in dollars) remains una¤ected?
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Starting from the point of indi¤erence, it is clear that when e > e and with
R still remaining at R;  >
(1 )R
(1 )e . Thus, R must rise to
eR
e (we denote this
R) in order to take us back to the original point of indi¤erence between staying
and withdrawing i.e  =
(1 ) eR
e
(1 )e =
(1 )R
(1 )e : Thus, as long as R
 < R < R;
a devaluation a¤ects the investment value of the banks portfolio (measured
in dollars) and results in balance sheet e¤ects. The change in the value of
R from the originally xed R to the new xed R ( labelled Rfixed, where
R < Rfixed < R ) is not strong enough to o¤set the devaluation e¤ect. Thus,
when e > eand R < Rfixed < R, the banks portfolio investment is a¤ected
and consuming early yields a higher payo¤than consuming late (i.e  >
(1 )R
(1 )e ):
All depositors, given their strategy, will run to the bank to withdraw. If R lies
above R (i.e where R  Rfixed <1 ), the xed new value of investment is strong
enough to outweigh the e¤ects of the devaluation - investment (evaluated in
dollars) is una¤ected and  <
(1 )R
(1 )e . No bank runs result as patient depositors
decide to stay on the bank.
To summarise, in Figure 8.6 (please turn over), the rst quadrant depicts
the situation in which a bank run occurs just because the currency has been
devalued. A necessary condition for this is that R is above R but su¢ ciently
low. Note that such a run would not have occurred otherwise. This quadrant
is the one of theoretical interest when we shall examine the implications of
a devaluation for contingent liabilities of the government. Note that, if no
devaluation occurs ( i.e e  e), there will be no bank runs as long as depositors
receive the interim signal about the shadow exchange rate only.
In Figures 8.7 and 8.8 (please turn over), we demonstrate that, starting from
a point in which R = R and e = e; a currency devaluation raises the threshold
of the banks performance from R to R. The larger the currency devaluation
is, the higher is the new threshold of the banks performance. The shaded area
in Figure 8.8 was, prior to the devaluation e¤ect, a region of no-bank run. Now,
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with the e¤ect of a currency devaluation, the shaded area represents a case of the
devaluation e¤ect leading to a balance sheet e¤ect and eventually to a banking
crisis. Thus, the shaded region represents a case of a banking crisis occurring
exclusively due to the occurrence of a currency crisis, when none would have
occurred otherwise.
Corollary 8.1 A devaluation-induced banking crisis, due to balance sheet
e¤ect, occurs if and only if:
[1] e > e where e = (1 )R(1 )
[2] R < Rfixed < R where R = c1 1  and R =
eR
e =
e(c1 )
e(1 )
Condition [1] is necessary for the occurrence of devaluation. Condition [2]
is su¢ cient for the devaluatione¤ect to damage the balance sheet of the com-
mercial bank, after R has changed from R to Rfixed. The co-existence of both
conditions leads to a banking failure that is exclusively due to currency crisis
and is depicted in Figure 8.8.
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8.4 Some Applications: Analytical Afterthoughts
about Policy Implications
8.4.1 Revaluation and the IMF Recipe
The main stance of the paper that a currency crisis may, for a certain range
of fundamentals, induce a devaluation-induced banking crisis through balance
sheet e¤ects, suggests that a revaluation policy can be viewed as a bank run pre-
venting device in many emerging market economies. Because of the negative
impact that devaluation has on a banks balance sheet , it follows that a revalu-
ation policy will have an opposite e¤ect and will increase the banks net worth.
Revaluation policy was viewed as the IMFs recipe in the wake of the Asian crisis
of 1997. The IMF proposed interest rate hikes as policy measure. The balance
sheet e¤ect means that the setting of monetary and interest rate policy in an
EME, is a matter of great debate among economists. In the wake of the East
Asian crisis of 1997, the IMF, spearheaded by Stanley Fischer, contended that
restoring condence in the currency value and reversing the outow of capital
were mandatory. Evidence suggests that the IMF was unqualiedly right in
its insistence on high interest rates at the front end of economic stabilization.
The IMFs stance was criticized by Joseph Stiglitz, then chief economist at the
World Bank, but received resusitation by Krugman (1999), who argued that it
was balance sheet vulnerability that prevented a relaxed monetary stance and
currency devaluation in East Asia.
8.4.2 Economics of Contingent Liabilities - Areas for fu-
ture Research on Optimal Taxation Rules
Banking crises can be very costly, both in the scal costs of re-structuring the
nancial sector and restoring public condence and also in preventing the nan-
cial system from operating e¤ectively. The resolution costs of banking crises in
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many EMEs have been over 40% in Argentina and Chile in the 1980s. Balance
sheet e¤ects that lead to the existence of bank runs, when none would have
existed otherwise, leads to contingent liabilities for the public outlay. Contin-
gent liabilities have implications for the Central Bank. To highlight a particular
example, lets assume that the Central Bank is the manager of the governments
debt portfolio. We are interested in the rst quadrant of Figure 8.7 i.e the part
at which devaluation, by itself, leads to a bank run when there would have been
no bank runs otherwise.
Denition 8.2: (Contingent Liabilities) Liability to the government s
public nance that occurs in some states of the world but not in other states.
Contingent liabilities represent liabilities that did not exist before but that
get created articially due to some indirect e¤ects. The e¤ects of a currency
devaluation on the balance sheet of banks, represent a contingent liability to the
Central Bank because there was nothing wrong with the banks performance
to begin with. It is the indirect e¤ect of currency devaluation that leads to
balance sheet e¤ects and that weakens the banking system - thereby, urging
the policymaker to step in and to earmark public funding as part of a bailout
strategy. Thus, the liability is incurred in those states of the world in which a
currency devaluation occurs but not in other states13 .
The e¤ects of a currency devaluation on public nance through the cre-
ation of contingent liabilities is a challenge for debt sustainability and debt
management. The main conundrum that policymakers face is whether a fully-
funded tax system can contain the contingent liabilities and achieve the rst
and second-best outcome ? As in microeconomic model for insurance, in the
no devaluationstate of the world, the commercial bank is assumed to pay an
interest to the Central Bank. In the devaluationstate of the world, the com-
13From this exposition, it becomes clear as to why bailing out a failed bank, when the
origins of a crisis lie in the banking sector itself, cannot be regarded as contingent liabilities.
This is because such liabilities would have occurred in all states of the world ( R  R):
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mercial bank pays interest to the Central Bank as usual but the Central Bank
reimburses the full amount needed to keep promised payment as stipulated in
the bank contractual agreement. One interesting question pertaining to this
insurance scheme will be on its appropriate design and on the prerequisite in-
centives needed for agents to ensure the fulllment of its two main objectives:
(fully-funded tax system): the Central Bank charges a tax in all states of the
world , which is high enough to fully fund the banks resources to make a full ex-
pected payout in the case of the state of the world going bad; (sustainability of
bailout programs): the amount disbursed when the state of the world goes bad,
must be enough to pay commercial bank, such that it can fulll its promised
contractual payments to depositors over periods t = 1 and t = 2:
From the point of the policymaker, the aim is to raise su¢ cient revenue
whilst ensuring that the system is fully-funded and sustainable. The banks aim
is to maximise the welfare of depositors subject to:
[1] Its resource constraints in periods t = 1 and t = 2
[2] Its participation constraints i.e its incentive to
join the taxation scheme
[3] Its investment strategically chosen is to max-
imise the expected prots
[4] Its taxation being fully-funded and sustainable
for the policymaker
One interesting area of future research is to focus on the design of this bailout
scheme and on the nature of the optimal taxation that is required as a result.
8.5 Design of Exchange Rate Regime for an EME
- Fixed vs Floating Debate
We now turn to the study of the implications of our paradigm of chapters 7
and 8 for the choice of exchange rate regimes. We combine the knowledge
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accummulated from these two chapters to address this crucial issue about ex-
change rate regimes. While we do not plan to develop any new model, we just
intend to use our model predictions and ndings to contribute to the debate
about design of exchange rate regime. The choice of an appropriate exchange
rate regime14 for a country is one of the most important decisions for a gov-
ernment to make, given the fact that the exchange rate regime will dictate the
form of monetary policy of the Central Bank (and may implicitly a¤ect the
scal stance of the government) and will have consequences for nancial and
real variables that relate to businesses and households. Figure 8.9 (please turn
over) provides a broad classication of exchange rate regimes in practice.
The choice of exchange rate regimes has been debated by macroeconomists
over decades. The earliest (and probably, most successful) attempt has been
the Mundell-Fleming model15 . The simple Mundell-Fleming model extends the
IS-LM framework to allow for open economy considerations. Assuming perfect
capital mobility (and implicitly that home interest rates being constrained by
the world interest rate), the model studies how di¤erent monetary and real
shocks a¤ect output under di¤erent exchange rate regimes. The successof an
exchange rate regime is measured by its ability to minimise output uctuations
in the presence of these exogenous shocks. In the presence of monetary shocks,
a xed exchange rate regime has an embedded mechanism to minimise output
uctuations. Thus, a xed regime is preferred. In the presence of real shocks, a
14The most important factors suggested by the macroeconomic paradigm include: [a] the
degree of integration of the domestic nancial system in the international nancial system; [b]
the degree of domestic nancial sophistication; [c] ex-ante ination rate and ex-post credibility
in ghting ination; [d] level of international reserves; [e] wage and price exibility; [f ] labour
mobility; [g] pattern and degree of trade with partner country; [h] symmetry of external shocks
with that of the partner country; [i] domestic monetary v/s real (including supply) shocks.
Factors (e)-(h) are actually factors that determine whether it makes more sense for a group
of countries to form a currency area. See Figure 8.11 (a) for an illustration.
15The Mundell-Fleming model appears in any standard Macroeconomics textbook. Our
referencing here follows the textbook version.
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exible regime minimises output uctuations16 . Figure 8.10 (please turn over)
summarises the main ndings of the simplied Mundell-Fleming model for a
small open economy.
" (The Mundell-Fleming model) still serves as the default model for most
policy-makers. Further, the predictions of the model are so striking and intuitive
that they continue to represent the benchmark against which the predictions of
newer models are tested" (Andrew K. Rose17). Despite being a major workhorse
for policymaking in an open economy, the Mundell-Fleming model has a number
of limitations when it comes to choice of exchange rate regimes.
[1] It assumes the best regimeis the one that minimises the e¤ect of some
exogenous shock on output. While this approach may receive theoretical sup-
port, in practice, countries pay attention to more useful macroeconomic and
nancial considerations when they decide on their exchange rate regimes. Fig-
16Again, the interested reader is requested to read any (good) undergraduate textbook in
Macroeconomics for more on the Mundell-Fleming model.
17Quoted on Robert Mundells website.
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ure 8.11 (pp 279) summarises these main considerations. We will try to use our
paradigm to o¤er some suggestions about the choice of exchange rate regime,
based on some of these more realistic considerations.
[2] A major aw underpinning the Mundell-Fleming model is that it ignores
the microfoundations of nancial markets or of nancial intermediaries. This is
another weakness that we will try to address, using the specicities of our par-
adigm, to throw light on the debate. Thus, in our approach, we will endeavour
to measure the successof an exchange rate regime on its ability to prevent a
bank run and to help restore the Planners Second-Best solution.
[3] The Mundell-Fleming model does not allow for liability dollarisation
and for an analysis of the implications of liability dollarisation for conventional
policy. Some policies suggested by the paradigm, may not necessarily hold in
the presence of liability dollarisation. The structure of a banks balance sheet
characterised by debt contracts denominated in foreign currency and assets de-
nominated in the home currency, means that the bank will be wary of the
impact of a currency devaluation on its balance sheet. Depending on the nature
and structure of economic shocks a country faces, conventional macroeconomic
paradigm sometimes dictates that expansionary monetary policy (and the re-
sulting currency depreciation) is a necessary response to these adverse shocks.
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But with a high proportion of liabilities denominated in foreign currencies, a
weaker local currency can wreck the balance sheets of local banks18 . Indeed,
as we demonstrated in example 8.1, a currency devaluation weakens the banks
balance sheet and, if anticipated by depositors, may lead to an actual bank run.
Attempts by the Central Bank to bailout the commercial bank by using reserves
of international currency, will only precipitate the devaluation.
[4] For an EME such as the one we study, conventional paradigm will fail
to contribute to the debate about the choice of an appropriate exchange rate
regime since there are opposing forces dictating the choice of the regime. On the
one hand, we have complete nancial liberalisation due to unrestricted inow of
foreign depositors who invest in the banking system on a short term basis. On
the other hand, balance sheets of banks are characterised by liability dollarisa-
tion. The former argument warrants a move away from a xed exchange rate
regime to embrace a oating regime since pegging would invite trouble for the
countrys economic management: the countrys ability to control its monetary
policy will be lost and there will be invited speculative pressures on the cur-
18Balance sheet e¤ects constitute one of the key reasons as to why a currency devaluation
may be contractionary. Other reasons include: [1] deation - the deationary stance that
accompanies devaluation that may more than o¤set the positive e¤ect of the devaluation
- deation, itself, may either increase real interest rate or increase the real value of any
domestic currency indebtedness and lead to banking fragility, [2] income redistribution -
redistributive e¤ects from those with high marginal propensity to consume (mpc) to those
with low mpc, as a result of high anticipated ination accompanying the devaluation, [3]
de-collateralization - foreign lenders often require collateral in the form of a domestic non-
traded good (e.g land) to limit their loan exposure. An unanticipated devaluation may lower
the dollar value of the collateral and generate a credit sqeeze.
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rency19 . For the latter argument, the fear of oating20 argument holds sway
and the bank will prefer a xed exchange rate regime over a exible one21 . As
such, faced with the conicting features of our EME model, the conventional
macroeconomic paradigm will fail to provide a satisfactory answer about the
specic form of exchange rate regime.
The two opposing forces embedded in [4] provide an interesting and illumi-
nating debate about the choice of the exchange rate regime for an EME. What
is the dividing line in this choice ? Where do we draw this line ? If any one
particular regime is chosen, what appropriate safeguards must be instilled? Do
these safeguards succeed in improving welfare and simultaneously act as po-
tential bank run prevention devices ? Since our paradigm is rooted in solid
19Even though we do not provide for macroeconomic modelling of speculative pressures and
loss of monetary souvereignty, there are dangers that we highlight in this chapter about the
possibilities of nancial fragility that result from adopting the peg, that could potentially act
as a substitute. The dangers in the macroeconomic front, can be subsumed in the impossible
trilemma doctrine: that it impossible to have a xed exchange rate regime, perfect capital
mobility and an independent monetary policy co-existing simultaneously. For EMEs that still
seek on maintaining the peg, there is greater need for sound economic and nancial structures
capable of withstanding pressures from the defense of the peg.
20The fear of oating argument lies behind the reasons as to why the o¢ cially stated
positions of many Central Banks about their exchange rate systems, di¤er from actual practice.
21There is much dispute, in practice, about whether it is the fear of oating argument
that prompts the adoption of the peg or whether it is the pegged regime that encourages
countries to write up debt contracts in foreign currency. The latter perception arises because
of the belief that exchange rates will not change, thus lowering risks and eliminating the
need to hedge. Thus, in addition to encouraging borrowing in foreign currencies, pegs have
discouraged the development of hedging instruments and futures market. This makes the
costs of breaking away from the peg even more substantial for the economy as a whole. While
it would be wise to limit foreign exchange exposure by regulatory limits of positions, such
limits would discourage foreign investors from coming into the country - thus, leading to dis-
intermediation. Ize and Powell (2005) identify several problems of multiple equilibria, as the
fear of oating argument induces lenders and borrowers to transact in dollars, which, in turn,
exacerbates the fear of oating.
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microfoundations of nancial intermediaries, we contrast the successes of di¤er-
ent regime systems that we propose, on their ability to minimise the occurrence
of bank runs (where possible) and to help restore the Planners Second-Best allo-
cation. The shocks to the system depend on the underlying stochastic variables
that we study. They may be either information-induced (i.e to the idiosyncratic
fundamentals of the bank) or devaluation-induced (i.e to the shadow exchange
rate). While a complete comparison of xed vs exible regimes on the scale of
Mundell-Fleming model, is impossible, our paradigm can help cast light on the
debate about design of an appropriate regime. We propose three main regimes,
depending on the main aims of the regime:
[1] If the aim of the exchange rate regime is to minimise the occurrence of
bank runs, we popose a soft peg with capital controls. The big question
is whether achieving stability in the banking sector will always be optimal or
whether the Planners Second-Best solution will always be achieved ?
[2] If the aim is to achieve exchange rate stability, we propose a managed
oating system. The main conundrum here is that exchange rate stability
comes at the cost of destabilising the banking system. Which form of foreign
exchange intervention helps minimise the losses in the banking system in welfare
theoretic terms ?
[3] If the aim is to achieve nancial stability (i.e minimise banking and
currency crisis), a form of state-contingent crawling peg system is our
solution.
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Soft Peg with Capital Controls (Stability to Banking Sector)
We studied the implications of the economics of capital controls for our
paradigm in the last chapter. We began with the assumption that the exchange
rate is a soft peg and that the government is committed to maintain it at
this level due to the fear of oatingargument that results from allowing the
currency to oat. All foreign depositors were assumed to receive information
about their banks idiosyncratic performance only and not about the shadow
exchange rate. We arrived at the result that capital controls can successfully
act as bank-run preventing devices with a pegged regime but that whether
they can replicate the planners optimal allocation depends on the order in
which depositors present themselves to the bank. If all those who are rst in
the queue are impatient depositors, capital controls prevent runs and achieve
an allocation in which impatient depositors receive c1 and patient depositors
receive c2 in period t = 2 (banking contractual obligations satised). If the
sequence order is di¤erent (i.e patient depositors get paid rst due to them being
rst in the line of queue), controls on outows achieve a sub-optimal allocation
e.g when  < 1   , all impatient depositors are forced to consume in period
t = 2 when consumption is of no avail to them. Thus, a soft peg juxtaposed
with a capital control system, can help prevent bank runs but may or may not
result in optimal allocation, depending on the order in which depositors present
themselves to the bank. We now investigate two extensions for capital controls.
[1] The Special Case of a State-Contingent Capital Control22
The above analysis for capital controls draws on the material studied in
chapter 7. It assumes that the bank does not serve more than  of depositors
who wish to withdraw early when R  R: Let us now assume that the bank
22This section contains a variation of an assumption of the main text - I assume that no
Sequential Service Constraint (SSC) exists and all depositors who withdraw early decide to
share whatever is available equally.
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adopts a state-contingent capital control policy such that it promises not to serve
more than  + 1 (R) depositors in period t = 1: Let 1 (R) = +(1 )R  ;
where +(1 )R  represents the proportion of patient (foreign) depositors who
withdraw early. In this case, when R  R; the bank applies capital controls
on outows, according to rule: + 1 (R) : Thus, in the extreme case in which
R = 0; all patient depositors withdraw early i.e 1 (R) = 1   : The capital
control rule states that the bank promises to service all depositors who present
themselves to the bank. As R rises, the +(1 )R element decreases - meaning
that as R rises, fewer proportion of patient depositors withdraw; thus, the bank
promises to service a xed element  plus a decreasing element. This state-
contingent rule is consistent with the Second-Best allocation of the Planner
which we considered earlier.
Corollary 8.2: Under a state-contingent capital control rule  + 1 (R)
and assuming no liquidation of the asset is possible (and no SSC), the result-
ing allocation of the banking system of the EME replicates the socially-optimal
allocation of the Central Bank as a Planner.
[2] The Special Case of a Chilean-Type of Tax or a Tobin Tax
Experience suggests that, in the 1980s, emerging markets in Latin America
(e.g Chile) adopted a tax on capital inows - this policy was very successful in
allowing the country to maintain its crawling peg regime and this policy deliv-
ered an economic performance that was better than most of its south American
counterparts. The Chilean tax is engineered to inuence the distribution of
capital inows more towards the long-term stable elements (e.g Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI)) that remain impervious to episodes of economic turmoil, and
away from short-term disruptive capital inows.
A Chilean tax is essentially a tax on short-term capital outows23 . The
23Unlike the earlier case in which we concentrated in quantitative controls on capital out-
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tax works by making it more costly for depositors to withdraw early in crisis-
situations. It is a bank-run preventing device. To conjecture the application
of a Chilean-type of tax in our setup, the tax is designed in such a way that,
in tranquil times (i.e when R > R), it ensures that only impatient depositors
withdraw early and all patient depositors withdraw late. In crisis times ( i.e
R  R); when all depositors present themselves to the bank, the tax makes
it less attractive for patient depositors to withdraw early. Thus, overall aim of
the chilean tax is to prevent bank runs at the aggregate level, whilst ensuring
that, in all states of the world, it is in the interest of impatient depositors to
withdraw early and it is in the interest of the patient depositors to withdraw
late.
There are, nonetheless, operational problems with a Chilean tax. If the tax
levied on short term inows is excessively high (i.e the net after-tax return to
depositors is low), there is distortion of risk-sharing for the sake of preventing
bank runs. On the other hand-side, if the government adjusts the before-tax
returns to ensure that the after-tax return is una¤ected, it means that banks, in
their investment allocational functions, must devote more resources to the safe
asset and less resources to the risky asset. Lesser investment in the risky asset
results in an opportunity cost (due to the fact that it pays o¤ more than the
short asset) and results in nancial disintermediation.
Corollary 8.3 (Optimality of a Chilean-Tax) In addition to being a
bank-run preventing device, the appropriate level of a Chilean tax is one that
trades-o¤ the risk-sharing and the nancial intermediation elements of a banks
activities. More focus on risk-sharing leads to nancial disintermediation whilst
more focus on nancial intermediation leads to distortion of risk-sharing aims.
The optimal level of the Chilean tax is one that trades o¤ these two elements.
ows.
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Managed System With Implicit Bank-Run Preventing Devices
(Stability to Exchange Rate)
Whilst the choice of a soft peg was an important factor behind many EME
crises, some countries (e.g South Africa, Chile and Peru) did remarkably well
in averting crises by retaining a oating regime. In the case we are considering
(EMEs with liability dollarisation), we have highlighted the dangers with allow-
ing the currency to oat. Does managing the exchange rate do a better job by
juxtaposing the stability and exibility features of xed and oating exchange
rate regimes respectively? While a managed oat system may help preserve
exchange rate stability, our paradigm suggests that there will be a resulting
instability in the banking system, depending on the specic forms of foreign
exchange intervention.
As highlighted before, managing the exchange rate uctuations through the
use of foreign exchange market intervention, achieves stability of the exchange
rate in the short / medium run, at the cost of draining reserves. We studied
in the previous chapter that when the international liquidity pool dries up, a
currency crisis may follow. In this chapter, we show that if depositors receive
a perfect signal of an impending currency devaluation, they may run on their
banks (an eventual devaluation-induced bank run occurs at banks). Foreign
exchnage intervention brings stability to the exchange rate, at the cost of a
possible devaluation-induced bank run in the future.
Managing the exchange rate through interest rate achieves the same goal of
bringing stability to the exchange rate but at the cost of greater interest rate
uctuations and banking vulnerability through adverse selection and moral haz-
ard. We studied in the previous chapter that if interest rates a¤ect the banks
risky portfolio performance directly (stochastic idiosyncratic fundamentals), de-
positors who receive a perfect signal of their banks idiosyncratic fundamental,
may run on their banks. The result is that these uctuations may induce an
information-based bank run. Interest rate management brings stability to the
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exchange rate, at the cost of a possible information-induced bank run in the
economy.
Thus, no matter which specic form intervention in the foreign exchange
market takes, managed oats24 achieve short-term currency stability at the
cost of greater short term instability in the banking system (assuming inter-
est rate intervention ) or long term instability in the banking system (direct
intervention). In the previous chapter, our theoretical setup showed us that a
(future) devaluation-induced banking failure leads to higher welfare losses than
an information-induced banking failure. What implications does this have for
the use of policy instruments designed to stabilise the exchange rate of an EME
?
Corollary 8.4: An EME (characterised by liability dollarisation) that aims
to minimise banking instability and that decides to adopt a managed oating ex-
change rate system, will prefer to use interest rates rather than foreign exchange
reserves, to defend its exchange rate.
Due to our earlier result (corollary 7.3 and 7.4 of chapter 7) that an
information-induced bank run is less costly than a (future) devaluation-induced
bank run, our model paradigm supports the case for interest rate intervention as
mechanism for managing a soft peg for an economy with banking system char-
acterised by liability dollarisation. The growing adoption of managed oating
systems and use of interest rate as policy instrument by many EMEs, corrobo-
rates our ndings.
24An alternative to a managed oat is to adopt a crawling band - Crawling bands have
the same problems as soft pegs, especially when the exchange rate hits the lower or upper
band. The economies of Mexico (before December 1994), Indonesia (before August 1997) and
Russia (before August 1998) were all under crawling band arrangements, prior to experiencing
a nancial crisis.
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State-Contingent Crawling Peg (Stability to Financial System)
If the aim of the regime is to prevent the occurrence of both, a banking
and a currency crisis, some state-contingent structure is warranted. While our
paradigm remains ambiguous about the specic forms of that state-contingent
structure, a few examples can be used to illustrate our point and convey the
necessary inuitions.
One particular form that the regime can take is to combine a soft peg
with a state-contingent capital control system. We showed earlier that a capi-
tal control system can help prevent banking system instability. We also briey
touched the idea of state-contingent capital control earlier and argued that it
helps achieve the twinned goals of banking system stability and optimal alloca-
tion of resources. This regime helps bring nancial stability (i.e prevent both,
banking and currency crisis) when shocks a¤ect the idiosyncratic fundamen-
tals of banks. It fails to o¤er insurance against shocks that a¤ect the shadow
exchange rate system.
Earlier, we studied that a managed oating regime achieves the goal of ex-
change rate stability at the cost of destabilising the banking system, depending
on the particular form of intervention. Another regime that can minimise the
occurrence of the twin crises, is one that is essentially a managed oat but
with an embedded state-contingent structure that o¤sets the main sources of
uctuations that a¤ect the banking system. For instance, if interest rate in-
tervention is proposed to generate exchange rate stability, the resulting impact
can be information-induced bank runs through uctuations in the stochastic
fundamentals of the banking system. A managed oating regime that has an
embedded structure that can tract these stochastic elements in a way that ex-
actly o¤sets their impact, will prevent the resulting banking instability and
achieve the twinned goals of banking and exchange rate stability. While the
idea may seem intuitive, to design such a state-contingent regime is hard since
it requires perfect knowledge of the nature of the stochastic fundamentals in the
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economy.
A natural extension to future research is to develop a formal model that can
capture the above intuition. Figure 8.12 (after the conclusion of this chapter)
summarises the main characteristics that govern countries adopting particular
exchange rate regimes in practice.
8.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have attempted to build a completely new theoretical model
that outlines the transmission process from a currency crisis to a banking crisis.
As in the previous chapter, we use the mechanism design approach to show
that the banking allocation is only weakly inferior to the Planners second-best
solution. When no bank runs occur, the banking outcome replicates that of the
Planner but under the positive probability of bank runs occurring, the banking
allocation is strictly Pareto inferior to that of the Planner. For the banking allo-
cation, consumers are modelled as depositors in a bank characterised by liability
dollarisation. We show that when depositors receive some interim precise news
about the shadow exchange rate, there is a unique equilibrium in the shadow
exchange rate above which depositors withdraw (bank runs occur) and below
which depositors stay (no bank runs occur). As such, bank runs are devaluation-
induced due to the balance sheet e¤ects. However, under what circumstances
will the bank eventually fail ? We motivate the idea of the transmission process
as one in which a currency crisis, by itself, causes a bank to fail when no such
failure would have occurred otherwise. To this end, we construct a range of
simulated values of the banks idiosyncratic fundamentals and show that, for a
positive range only, the bank will be able to ward o¤ such devaluation-induced
bank runs.
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Whilst considering di¤erent orders of causation within a similar economic
environment, the last two chapters enable us to throw light about policy im-
plications of our paradigm for Central Banks. Because the material embodied
in both chapters deal with an identical banking system, the debate about the
main policy implications that draw upon the ndings of our work, may inter-
changeably make use of the rich ndings of both chapters. The last chapter,
in particular, shows that a funding policy organised by the Central Bank and
nanced out of foreign reserves, is sub-optimal. We conjecture that, in a multi-
period setting with many commerical banks (and assuming zero discounting),
the welfare gains from preventing a contemporary information-induced bank
run are less than the welfare losses emanating from future devaluation-induced
banking crisis. The LOLR story, which is a necessary condition for transmis-
sion process, suggests that for an EME characterised by liability dollarisation
and foreign capital inows, the need to coordinate the nancial stability role of
the Central Bank and the overall macroeconomic objectives of the government
(including monetary policy), is of fundamental importance to the Central Bank.
As far as policy recommendations are concerned, the contributions embod-
ied in chapters 6, 7 and 8 are innovative in two ways. Firstly, they show that
the conventional policy measures such as LOLR do have externalities on the
rest of the economy, under certain conditions; secondly, they have interesting
suggestions for the design of appropriate exchange rate regimes, using a model
with solid microfoundations of nancial intermediaries. Our approach thus de-
parts radically from the conventional macroeconomic paradigm. Furthermore,
the standard macroeconomic paradigm fails to provide a convincing answer as
to the exact form of exchange rate regime that must be adopted by an EME
characterised by liability dollarisation (argument against oating) and integra-
tion in the international capital markets (argument against xed). These two
features of EMEs seem to provide conicting views on the form of exchange rate
regime to be adopted. Our approach enables us bridge that gap and contribute
to that debate.
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In particular, our approach suggests that, in an emerging market with a
banking system characterised by liability dollarisation, the exchange rate regime
is one that helps restore the Planners Second-Best allocation of liquidity and
resources (i.e helps avoid the occurence of the twin crises, no matter which ow
of causation). If the main aim of the nancial system is to keep the exchange
rate stable and xed, using interest rate policy is preferred to using foreign
exchange intervention, from a welfare perspective. Both measures result in
instability of the banking system. However, interest rate policy only results in
information-induced bank runs. Foreign exchange intervention is shown to result
in a devaluation-induced bank run. Since infomation-induced bank runs are less
costly than devaluation-induced banks runs, we advocate use of interest rate
to defend the peg. Conversely, if the aim of the nancial system is to preserve
banking stability, a soft peg juxtaposed with an appropriate regime of capital
controls, will help prevent a bank run. However, whether the Planners Second-
Best outcome is achieved, depends on the order in which depositors present
themselves to the bank. Finally, if the aim is to contain the occurrence of both
crises (pre-empt the occurrence of a banking and currency crisis), some form of
state-contingent structure must be embodied within the exchange rate system
so that the Planners Second Best allocation is achieved. Although we do not
model these state-contingent structures formally, we provide some intuition that
helps the reader understand their shape and purpose. These measures contain
an implanted mechanism that always makes the economy resilient to banking
and currency crises and help maintain the Planners Second-Best solution.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Critical
Appraisal
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a nutshell of all the main ndings
and contributions of the research work embodied in the main chapters of this
thesis. It provides a comprehensive overview of our banking environment, the
modelling structure adopted and the nature of equilibrium concept that we
derive and use throughout the thesis. We contrast our ndings with existing
work in the literature where necessary and outline the specic contributions
we make to the literature.The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the main
limitations of our paradigm and suggests avenues for future research direction.
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the thesis. We begin by identifying
two main questions that the thesis intends to solve. These two questions emerged
after a comprehensive literature review which allowed us to critically assess
the strengths, weaknesses and opportunities in existing research work1 . We
identied a number of gaps in the literature, which we paraphrase in terms of
two main questions. The work embedded in this thesis is intended to bridge
these gaps and to bring answers to some unanswered questions.
The rst question addresses the issue of banking contagion and nancial
1This literature review forms the basis of chapter 2.
290
CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION AND CRITICAL APPRAISAL 291
crises. There are several major aws in current theoretical models of banking
contagion (Allen and Gale (2000), Dasgupta (2004), Chen (1999), Vaugirard
(2004), (2005)) and they can be subsumed as follows:
[1] (Conceptual) They focus on a narrow concept of interdependence to
explain contagion. This concept has been proved (on empirical grounds) to be
weak through the contributions of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and of Pesaran
and Pick (2007);
[2] (Methodological) Relative to single-bank models, they do not construct
new methodological structure to explain equilibrium concept of contagion;
[3] (Microfoundations) They do not make the di¤erence between contagion
and correlation and do not provide microfoundations for occurrence of contagion;
[4] (Empirical validity) They cannot simultaneously explain three stylized
facts of empirical banking contagion;
[5] (Policy-making) Relative to single-bank models, they do not add to
the literature on policy-making, following interventionist policies from Central
Banks.
We tried to subsume the above limitations of the literature in the form of the
following question: "How can we develop a model that can endogenously distin-
guish between banking contagion and correlation in probability terms, given that
they co-exist in a given banking panic transmission with two banks that have cor-
related investments?" To answer this question, we build a model that o¤ers an
explanation of contagion that is di¤erent from the concept of interdependence.
For this purpose, banks are assumed to have correlated risky investments. We
allow for informational spillovers as mechanism that transmits a crisis from
bank to bank. Cases involving contagious ow of a crisis across banks will be
those associated with the idea of causation, in which the underlying correlation
becomes somewhat excessive. Thus, while banks A and B have naturally corre-
lated performances, we are interested in de-lineating that part of performance
space in which the failure of bank A has, by itself, caused failure of bank B,
when no such e¤ect would have occurred otherwise. Based on the arguments of
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Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Pesaran and Pick (2007), explaining contagion
as excessive correlation would yield a more satisfactory concept of contagion.
The distinction between contagion and correlation in a banking panic transmis-
sion is important because it provides guidance for the Central Banks regulatory
policies. Because of the implicit causation mechanism, contagion warrants mi-
croprudential measures. Correlation warrants macroprudential measures.
On the methodological front, we design a dynamic Bayesian game setup for
our banks and allow the interractions between private signals of depositors and
an endogenous public signal, to guide the occurrence of particular events (con-
tagion or correlation). Because of strategic interractions between depositors
across banks, we develop a new methodological structure to solve for equilib-
rium of the game. The environment in each bank is calibrated to allow for
the global games methodology, as way of deriving the probability of events.
The dynamic Bayesian approach that underpins strategic interractions across
banks, induces us to investigate the specic links between the Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE) and the trigger equilibrium. On the basis of identifying the
trigger equilibrium as a PBE, we explore the results of our ndings. We are
able to draw the line between contagion and correlation in probability terms
and relate the occurrence of each event to some underlying features of the infor-
mational attributes of depositors. An improvement over the existing literature
that we o¤er, is the ability to simultaneously explain all three stylized facts of
banking contagion . We also provide some fresh insights about the implications
of adopting a two-bank dynamic Bayesian environment for the Central Banks
interventionist policies. We address the rst question in chapters 3, 4 and 52 .
The second question addresses the issue of banking systems in Emerging
Market Economies (EMEs) and international nance. The aws that we iden-
tied in the existing literature, are as follows:
2Please refer to Box 1.1 and Box 1.2 of chapter 1 for an idea as to how these chapters
are organised.
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[1] Models of bank runs are developed independently of the economic system
in which these banks operate;
[2] No theoretical papers in the literature have studied the specicities of
EMEs for the operation of banks;
[3] No theoretical papers in the literature have studied the implications of
EMEs constraints on the nature of policymaking for banks;
[4] Although the transmission channels between banking and currency crises
have been studied on the empirical front (Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)), there
is no theoretical work studying these specic links;
[5] The existing literature on choice of exchange rate regimes is devoid of
any microfoundations of nancial markets or intermediaries. No contributions
in the literature study the choice of monetary regimes on the basis of the ability
of regime to bring nancial stability.
We tried to subsume the above limitations of the literature in the form of
the following question: "How can we embed a model of banking crisis within
an Emerging Market Economy (EME) framework in a way that enables us to
study theoretically the transmission mechanism between a banking crisis and a
currency crisis ? " This constitutes the second main question this thesis tries
to solve. We rst embed a banking model of Allen and Gale (1998) within
a Chang and Velasco (2000a) framework. The rationale for using a version of
Allen and Gale (1998) is that it contains an implicit mechanism for getting rid of
multiplicity of equilibria. The occurrence of banking crises can be endogenised
in probability terms. The Chang and Velasco (2000a) environment allows us to
use mechanism design approach to solve for optimal allocation of liquidity. In
addition, we add two crucial features which provide an innovative touch to our
setup: [1] a completely liberalised nancial system with all depositors being for-
eign and [2] liability dollarisation. The mechanism design approach enables us
study some of the allocational features of our banking framework, compared to
some theoretical yardstick such as a Planner, and to characterise such allocation
on welfare theoretic grounds. From the banking allocation, we are in a position
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to study the transmission mechanism from a banking crisis to a currency cri-
sis (and vice versa). We derive su¢ cient conditions explaining the occurrence
of such contagious transmissions and o¤er new insights that have hitherto been
unheard of. For instance, lending to a crisis-catalyst bank has often been shown,
in the literature, to preserve the assets of the bank and to prevent a crisis. In
our setup, such lending may create a channel of crisis of its own on other banks.
Our approach also enables us to compare the welfare implications of di¤erent
policies and to design new structural features in exchange rate regimes so as
to minimise nancial instability. We address the second main question of our
thesis in chapters 6, 7 and 83 . We now turn to a detailed summary of our
approach and ndings in each chapter.
Chapter 2 reviews and categorises the literature on micro-systemic risks
and on optimal policies designed to mitigate these risks. We propose an analyt-
ical taxonomy that studies the existing literature within a well-dened anatom-
ical context. The novelty of this approach is that it helps us identify key areas
in the literature in which research work is missing. In fact, we endeavour to
provide answers to some of these missing questions in subsequent chapters of
this thesis. Thus, apart from being a comprehensive literature review, the ma-
terial embodied in this chapter helps as a valuable springboard for subsequent
chapters. Micro-systemic risks are risks to the nancial system that occur when
the interaction of a bank with other banks or with nancial markets, can prop-
agate an initially localised shock to the whole nancial system and can prevent
the latter from fullling its intermediation and distributional roles. The se-
vere episodes of nancial crises that have plagued economies - developed and
emerging markets alike - have made more compelling, the need for policymakers
such as Central Banks, to develop prudential tools as part of crisis prevention
and crisis management policies. We review the success of these policies under
di¤erent theoretical paradigms.
3Please refer to Box 1.1 and Box 1.4 in chapter 1 for an idea of how these chapters are
organised.
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We begin our study of the analytical taxonomy of a nancial crisis from a
crisis initiation and from a crisis propagation perspective. On the initiation
side, we review the literature for single-bank crises. The two major strands in
this literature are those that focus on coordination failure problems (ine¢ cient
bank run models e.g Diamond and Dybvig (1983)) and those that focus on
informational asymmetry problems on the asset side (e¢ cient bank run mod-
els e.g Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Allen
and Gale (1998)). With new development in economic theory in the 1990s,
subsequent research work in the area of banking crises has attempted to model
contractual nature of the demand deposit system (Peck and Shell (2003), Green
and Lin (2003)) or whereas others have focused on designing ways to get rid of
equilibria multiplicity (Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)).
The next part of the chapter focuses on the crisis propagation side. We
classify the literature embodied therein in two subsections. The rst subsection
deals with multiple banks but no nancial markets. Here, the nature of the
transmission mechanism that connects banks and that transmits a crisis from
one bank to the other, is extolled. We review those papers that study nan-
cial contagion across banks that are connected by [1] balance sheet connections
(Rochet and Tirole (1996), Allen and Gale (2000), Dasgupta (2004), Gai and
Kapadia (2008)), [2] by informational spillovers (Chen (1999), Archarya and
Yorulmazer (2008), Vaugirard (2005)), [3] by common assets (Cifuentes, Fer-
rucci and Shin (2005)). In this category, market failures exist on the trans-
mission conduit that connects banks. As a result, any policy attempt designed
to mitigate the occurrence of nancial contagion, focuses on the design of the
network architecture that connects banks. For instance, Allen and Gale (2000)
show that, with incomplete network of contracts, a crisis will always spread
across the nancial system. A complete network, on the other side, has the
bu¤er properties that prevents the trasnmission of a crisis across banks. The
second subsection deals with the interractions between banks and nancial mar-
kets. Financial markets exist to securitize bank assets, to enable banks to sell
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their assets when they need liquidity or to allow banks to insure against ag-
gregate risks in liquidity. We study how the presence of market failures in the
ability of nancial markets to fulll these roles, may deprive homogenous banks
of liquidity when they most need it (Allen and Gale (1998), Donaldson (1992)).
As a result, nancial fragility occurs. If banks are heterogenous (i.e face nega-
tively correlated liquidity shocks), they rely on interbank market for liquidity.
Market failures in the interbank market for liquidity, may again lead to nan-
cial fragility. A few examples include positively correlated shocks across banks
(which renders the interbank market futile) or coordination failure problems and
free riding in interbank market. These result in underprovision of liquidity from
cash-abundant banks to cash-strapped banks. Models in the second subsection
draw on solid microfoundations and they attempt to explain nancial fragility
from a welfare theoretic perspective. Developing theorems akin to the First and
Second theorem of Welfare Economics, Allen and Gale (2004) derive the neces-
sary and su¢ cient conditions for optimal, incentive-compatible solutions for the
nancial markets provision of liquidity to banks. They show that, with incom-
plete demand deposit contracts but complete nancial markets, the resulting
allocation will always be constrained-e¢ cient. Incomplete nancial markets al-
ways result in fragility. Thus, from a welfare theoretic perspective, the success
of any attempt to introduce policy measures to mitigate nancial fragility, de-
pends on the ability of these policy measures to restore the constrained-e¢ cient
allocation. Chapter 2 ends with a brief synopsis of nancial accelerator mod-
els which stress on how imperfections in nancial markets may magnify the
swings and intensity of business cycles and have a more entrenched impact on
the macroeconomy.
The framework we adopted to classify the existing literature in the rst chap-
ter, enables us to appreciate the voluminous amount of existing work and, at
the same time, identify those areas of the literature in which existing research
work is thin. A virtue of the taxonomy we adopted in the rst chapter, is that
it enables us to make informed judgements about how to develop models to ad-
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dress those gaps. An important weakness that we identied in existing models of
banking contagion, is that the concept of contagion is often inexorably confused
with interdependence. In an empirical work on contagion in nancial markets,
Pesaran and Pick (2007) explained why models of contagion based on the nar-
row concept of interdependence, may not yield plausible results. Furthermore,
existing models that explain contagion across banks from an interdependence
perspective, make suggestions for policy implementation that do not di¤er from
those advocated for single-banking crises scenarios. We wanted to develop a
microfounded model of banking contagion that addresses this vital element and
that o¤ers a completely new perspective on policy proposals for multiple-bank
scenarios as opposed to single-bank scenarios. Far from just explaining the
transmission of crisis across banks, we wanted to develop a model that could
endogenously explain contagion as a case of excess correlationin some states of
the world compared to others. At the same time, there are three stylized facts
or puzzles in the literature of empirical contagion which we identied: conta-
gion often occurs across unconnected banks or may be clustered across identical
banks only or may even be avoided by some banks but not by others. Existing
models in the literature cannot provide a simultaneous explanation of all three
stylized facts. This provided the drive to build the model embodied in chapters
3, 4 and 5.
Another important weakness that we identied, following the taxonomy we
developed in the rst chapter, is that banking crises models are often written
without taking explicit account of the level of development or macroeconomic
features of the economy in which they are operating. For instance, an econ-
omy with a particular exchange rate regime (which has been adopted for some
macroeconomic reason e.g disciplining device for anchoring inationary expec-
tations), may have structural features that a¤ect the operation of the banking
system in its role of liquidity insurance provision. How will the banking system
be a¤ected in the presence of these constraints? How di¤erent will the nature
of a banking crisis be if the exogenous specicity of the macroeconomy is taken
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into account ? Will a crisis in the banking sector spread to any other sectors
? From a policy perspective, what are the new insights to be provided, that
existing models fail to explain ? These temptative questions helped us build
the model embodied in chapters 6, 7 and 8. We next turn to a summary of
our ndings in each of the chapters following the rst chapter.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 build on the literature review paradigm of chapter 2,
by considering a banking panic transmission in a two-bank setting, in which the
main propagator of a shock across banks is the informational spillover channel.
Chapter 3, in particular, introduces the main banking environment of the
paradigm to be developed subsequently in the following two chapters. The
banking system consists of two Diamond and Dybvig (1983) banks, where banks
are modelled as deposit-taking institutions that invest depositorsendowments
in an investment technology in return for o¤ering demand deposit contracts
that promise to pay depositors when they withdraw according to their liquidity
preference. Each bank invests in a risky technology that is perceived to be
connected to some unobserved common macroeconomic fundamental. The latter
follows a Bernoulli distribution. Depositors of each bank observe a noisy signal
of their banks stochastic idiosyncratic undamental. Depositors do not observe
the common macroeconomic fundamental that connects the two banks.
The dynamic Bayesian setting that we develop, is a pivotal element of our
work and is of essence for subsequent analysis. We assume that depositors of one
bank move rst to withdraw from their bank after observing their private sig-
nal about their banks idiosyncratic fundamental. In addition, these rst-mover
depositors also take into accout the prior probability estimates of the common
macroeconomic fundamental. The event in the rst bank becomes public knowl-
edge. Then, depositors of the second bank make their decision about whether
they wish to stay or withdraw from their bank, based on their private signals of
their banks fundamental. In addition to their private signals, these depositors
have the informational advantage of observing the event in the rst bank. This
enables them to reassess their beliefs about the state of the common macro-
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economic fundamental, using Bayesian updating mechanics. This art of belief
updating constitutes the information externality channel that transmits a crisis
from one bank to the other. The novelty of this chapter is manifold. To begin
with, we have two banks, instead of one. Furthermore, the Diamond and Dy-
bvig (1983) environment has been richly augmented to take into account two
sources of asymmetric information for each bank: noises about the banksidio-
syncratic fundamentals and about the common macroeconomic fundamental.
For each bank, in order for the global games approach to work, we construct
dominance regions in the fundamental space of each bank and establish the
presence of supermodularities (or strategic complementarities) in depositorss
payo¤ structure. Finally, the sequential timing in the behavioural response of
depositors allows strategic interraction, both, within and across banks. The
dynamic Bayesian setting which we study, provides a perfect recipe for intro-
ducing a learning mechanism. The public signal of the event in the rst bank
allows depositors of the second bank to learn and make stochastic inferences
about the common macroeconomic fundamental. This may bias their decision
towards staying in their bank or withdrawing. Banks are not engaged in cross-
insurance deposits or in interbank loans market. Thus, there is no contractual
balance sheet connections across banks. Adopting the global games approach
within a dynamic Bayesian environment for multiple banks, in the presence of
infomational spillovers and a learning mechanism, is a completely new approach
to formalising banking environments and is our major contribution to existing
literature on design of banking environments4 .
Chapter 4 deals with the equilibrium characterisation of the sequential
move game with incomplete information between depositors of two banks. A
legitimate gap in the theoretical literature is that the relationships between dy-
namic equilibrium concepts such as Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) and
4Please refer to Box A.3.1 in Section A.3(b) at the beginning of this thesis for an overview
of the exact di¤erences between our work and the various papers in the existing literature.
Box A.3.1 enables the reader gauge the extent of our exact contribution to knowledge.
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the solution concepts of the global games approach, have not received atten-
tion. The contribution embodied in this chapter is meant to bridge that lacuna
and to establish any such connections. Using the same approach as Carlsson
and VanDamme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998), we begin the chapter by
assuming that depositors follow a switching strategy. For the bank whose de-
positors move rst, we show that these depositors play a best response to other
depositors of that same bank, given their privately observed signal about their
banks idiosyncratic fundamental and given their prior beliefs about the state
of the common macroeconomic fundamental. For those of the second bank, in
addition to their private signals about their banks idiosyncratic fundamental,
depositors of the second bank also observe the public signal about the event
in the rst bank. This causes them to update their beliefs about the state of
the common macroeconomic fundamental and to take these posterior beliefs
into account when making their decision to stay or withdraw. We show that
depositors of the second bank play a best response to other depositors of that
same bank, given their private signals and given their posterior beliefs about the
state of the common macroeconomic fundamental (after observing the event in
the rst bank). We next characterise the PBE of the game and derive the best
response correspondences for each depositor of either bank. The main lesson
of chapter 4 (which has, hitherto, not been established in the literature) is
that this PBE can be represented as trigger equilibrium in depositorsstrategy.
The trigger equilibrium in each banks idiosyncratic space, is one above which
all depositors stay (bank succeeds) and below which they all withdraw (bank
fails). Given the existence of dominance regions in each bank and the presence
of supermodularities in depositorspayo¤ structure, we show that such a trigger
equilibrium actually exists for each bank, using the global games approach of
Morris and Shin (1998). This innovative result enables us focus on trigger equi-
librium concept throughout the rest of the analysis. A legitimate advantage of
working with a trigger equilibrium is that it helps characterise the probability
of events in the idiosyncratic fundamental space. A few other properties of the
trigger equilibrium are also considered.
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Chapter 5 deals with the specic mechanics of the belief updating process
for depositors of the second bank and moves on to deal with the main conclu-
sions and ndings of the paradigm developed in the last couple of chapters. We
provide statistical structure to the beliefs adjustment process and show that, if
the public information about the event in the rst bank, is used for Bayesian
inference about the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental by depos-
itors of the second bank, then, in the equilibrium prole of the game, contagion
and correlation both occur with positive probability, with contagion modelled
as a state-contingent change in the cross-bank correlation. Since the two banks
are naturally correlated in all states of the world, we show that contagion is
a special case in which this correlation becomes excessive. It is also a state
which is characterised by causation i.e the failure of one bank causes depositors
of other banks to withdraw from their bank. This microfounded approach to
modelling contagion as excess correlation is appealing since it represents a rad-
ical departure to the narrower version of interdependence, currently described
in the literature (Allen and Gale (2000), Dasgupta (2004)). Our result is thus
a theoretical adaptation of the empirical work of Pesaran and Pick (2007). The
endogenous characterisation of probabilistic assessments of contagion and cor-
relation, enables us distil between these two concepts as equilibrium phenomena
and to assess their relative importance in a given banking panic transmission
setting.
One of the innovative results of chapter 5 is to characterise the relative im-
portance of contagion and correlation as a function of informational attributes
of depositors. Prominent papers in the literature that attempt to show how the
nature of equilibrium varies with informational structure include Hellwig (2002),
Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006), (2007). Our modelling structure di¤ers
fundamentally from these papers in that Hellwig (2002) deals a stylized static
coordination game with incomplete information whereas Angeletos et al (2006),
(2007) deal with the dynamic equivalent. Our approach is entirely adaptable
to the banking world and has been calibrated to take into account the specici-
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ties of deposit-taking institutions. Furthermore, in Hellwig (2002), Angeletos
et al (2006), (2007), the private and public signals are on the same variable. In
our setting, the private and public information reect inferences about di¤erent
economic variables5 . We coin the new concept of informational dominance
and show that contagion is characterised by public informational dominance in
depositors information set. Thus, we assert that a robust model of banking
contagion that relies on the informational channel, will explain the phenom-
enon of banking contagion when depositors in other banks give relatively more
importance to the publicly observed event about the rst bank than to their
private information about their own bank. While this result may seem similar
to the herding stories of Banerjee (2002), an important di¤erence is that there
is no pause in information aggregation in our setup. Furthermore, for contagion
to occur, depositors in the second bank do not ignore their private signals. They
simply give relatively more importance to the public signal reecting the event
in the rst bank than to their private signals.
A number of applications to real world issues are considered. We identify
several stylized facts in the literature of banking contagion - which existing mod-
els that focus on the narrower version interdependence, cannot satisfy - and we
show that our approach can simultaneously satisfy all three stylized facts or
puzzles : in particular, contagion may exist among banks that are not directly
connected (zero-link puzzle); contagion may cluster among identical banks only
or banks that have similar investments and liability structures (clustering puz-
zle); among identical banks, some can avoid a contagious crisis whereas others
cannot (avoidance puzzle). We can explain the rst puzzle through the presence
of informational spillovers. The second puzzle can be explained through com-
monality of investments and exposure to the same macroeconomic fundamental.
The last puzzle can be explained by the presence of extra strong idiosyncratic
5The private information of depositors is on the banks idiosyncratic fundamental whereas
the public information is on strategic inferences made on the common macroeconomic funda-
mental, as a result of depositors of the second bank observing the event in the rst bank.
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fundamentals, which lead to depositors attaching relatively more importance
to their private signals than to the public signal of the event in the rst bank
(private informational dominance).
On the policy side, being able to distinguish betwen contagion and correla-
tion is important since both events warrant di¤erent policy actions. Correlation
requires macroprudential regulation or macroprudential policy measures. Con-
tagion necessitates the use of microprudential policy measures. Thus, in policy
implementation circles, our setup enables us draw the line between micro and
macroprudential measures. A few contributions to the literature of micropru-
dential policy measures are also mentioned. In particular, our emphasis on
the concept of intertemporal banking substitution following policy externalities
when intervening at a crisis-catalyst bank, can help add a new dimension to
the way policymakers, like Central Banks, go about implementing policy. The
policy proposals currently implied by multi-bank models such as Allen and Gale
(2000), Dasgupta (2004), Chen (1999), Vaugirard (2005), are not di¤erent to
those implied by single-bank models such as Diamond and Dybvig (1983) since
they explain contagion from the existence of direct connections (i.e interdepen-
dence). Our framework for policy implementation is a contribution since, to our
knowledge, there are no other multi-bank papers in the literature that show the
dynamics of informational attributes on policy design and implementation.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 consider the special case of banking systems in Emerg-
ing Market Economies (EMEs). Banking models in the literature are developed,
regardless of the nature of the economy in which they operate. EMEs, for in-
stance, are characterised by a number of stylized facts that are not applicable
to rich / developed economies and that make the analysis of traditional banking
models futile. Chapter 6 provides an analytical afterthought of a banking crisis
model applied to an EME. Our aim is to appreciate how the complexities and
subtleties of an EME may interact with traditional features of banking crises
models and have implications for policy that would not otherwise be applicable
to developed economies. We are interested in studying how di¤erent the nature
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of banking crises will be when these features of an EME are duly taken into
account. We begin by constructing a small open EME with a liberalised domes-
tic nancial system which allows foreign money to be intermediated through its
bank. The banking system is characterised by the existence of Allen and Gale
(1998) banks. Unlike Allen and Gale (1998), all depositors are assumed to be
foreign investors. Each bank accepts deposits in a foreign currency (dollar) and
invests the resulting proceedings in a non-tradable asset denominated in a do-
mestic currency (peso). Banks obtain pesos by exchanging their dollar deposits
at the Central Bank for pesos. Thus, while the balance sheet of each bank is
characterised by standard asset-liability maturity mismatch, the innovative ap-
proach of this framework, compared to banking models in the literature, is that
it is also characterised by unhedged asset-liability currency mismatch.
The purpose of Chapters 7 and 8 is to analyse how a banking crisis
may contagiously lead to a currency crisis and vice versa. Using the mecha-
nism design approach6 , chapter 7 characterises the socially optimal outcome
that is obtained in our model if the Central Bank is assumed to be a Planner
who allocates resources across time and states of nature. An important con-
tribution that we make is that we show that the existence of a pecking order
in the implementation of optimal allocation of resources and liquidity, under
di¤erent classes of mechanisms. If the Planner observes the stochastic funda-
mentals of the economy, the Revelation Principle shows that, by o¤ering direct
incentive-compatible mechanisms, the resulting allocation implements the rst-
best solution. The term structure of demand deposit payment to depositors
is non-contingent in that the Planner succeeds in providing insurance against
liquidity risks and aggregate risks. If we make the more realistic assumption
of the Planner being unable to observe the stochastic fundamentals, the best
that the Planner can do is to o¤er an approximate truthtelling mechanism. The
allocation is second-best and the term structure of payments to depositors is
6The Central Bank, commercial banks and foreign exchange market are all considered to
be part of the mechanism implementation.
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state-contingent. Here the Planner can only o¤er insurance against liquidity
risks but not against aggregate risks. These mechanisms depicting the case of
the Central Bank as social Planner, represent a special case but they are es-
sentially used as theoretical yardstick against which we compare the banking
outcome. We show that the mechanism o¤ered by a decentralised banking al-
location, is weakly Pareto inferior to the allocation of the Planner under the
second-best outcome. With a decentralised banking system, we show the exis-
tence of a unique threshold in the banks fundamental space, which characterises
the probability of events (banking crisis or no banking crisis) in the bank. This
result departs radically from that of Chang and Velasco (2000a) who show mul-
tiplicity of equilibria in an open economy context. When no banking crisis
occurs, the banking allocation replicates that of the Planner. When a banking
crisis occurs, the allocation is strictly Pareto inferior. The success of any policy
designed to ward o¤ a banking failure, can thus be measured on the ability of
that policy to restore the second-best allocation of the Planner.
The banking outcome in chapter 7, is a decentralised case in which de-
positors receive some precise information about their banks idiosyncratic fun-
damental at some interim stage. We characterise the existence of a unique
dominant equilibrium in depositors strategy, above which it is dominant for
depositors to stay (no information-induced bank run occurs) and below which
it is dominant for depositors to withdraw (information-induced bank run oc-
curs). The outcome with no bank runs o¤ers insurance against idiosyncratic
risks only but not against aggregate risks. This outcome coincides with the
Planners second-best solution. However, the case in which a bank run occurs,
is strictly Pareto-dominated by the second best outcome of the Central Bank
as the social Planner. Thus, overall, the banking outcome is weakly dominated
by the Second-Best solution of the Planner. We then move on to explore the
mechanism that contagiously transmits a banking crisis to a currency crisis. To
begin with, we assume that the exchange rate regime is a soft peg. A notable
contribution that we make is to provide theoretical justication for Lender-of-
CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION AND CRITICAL APPRAISAL 306
Last-Resort (LOLR) in an EME context. Unlike standard bank run models that
provide the economic rationale for LOLR by showing the ability of LOLR to
help preserve the banks assets, we show that in an EME, LOLR may sometimes
be sub-optimal even if it manages to preserve the asset of the bank experienc-
ing liquidity problems. In particular, we show that under certain parametric
restrictions, LOLR may contagiously transmit a crisis from the banking sector
to the foreign exchange sector. Thus, it may be sub-optimal for the Central
Bank to use its reserves for the twinned task of defending a peg and for bail-
ing out illiquid banks ex-post. An interesting conjecture of our paradigm is
that, in a multi-period setting with many identical banks, interventionist policy
measures engineered by the Central Bank (e.g LOLR)) may be ine¢ cient due
to intertemporal substitution of banking crisis in the economy. We consider
the e¤ectiveness of various safeguard strategies (e.g capital controls) in improv-
ing the resilience of banking systems of emerging markets, by studying their
ability to restore the Planners Second-Best solution. A number of conjectural
applications are considered as extensions of the main model predictions.
Chapter 8 adopts a structural design feature that is similar to that of
chapter 7 and deals with the case of reverse causation from currency crisis to
banking crisis. We assume that depositors receive some interim precise infor-
mation about the shadow exchange rate. We characterise the existence of a
unique equilibrium above which depositors withdraw (devaluation-induced bank
run occurs) and below which depositors stay (no devaluation-induced bank run
occurs). In particular, we show that a devaluation-induced banking crisis may,
through balance sheet e¤ects, lead to bank insolvency for a simulated range
of its idiosyncratic fundamental values only. Some implications of our nancial
paradigm for the governments scal policy stance and for the design of exchange
rate regime, are also conjectured.
The last parts of chapters 7 and 8 study the design of prudential policy
options for EME. We come with certain proposals that have so far not been
identied in the literature but, which we believe, are crucial given the ndings
CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION AND CRITICAL APPRAISAL 307
of our framework. One of the appealing features of our paradigm is that it
is o¤ers a framework that is deeply rooted in microfoundations of nancial
intermediaries and in the economic realities of an EME, to study macroeconomic
issues. As a result, our approach can contribute in a novel way to the debate on
the design and choice of exchange rate regimes in EMEs, based on the ability
of the system to minimise the likelihood of banking and currency crises (twin
crises) occurring. As mentioned in the introduction, this departs radically from
the current macroeconomic paradigm that tends to focus on credibility issues
and on ability to control ination, as the overriding factor inuencing the choice
of exchange rate regimes.
The main implications for policy that we o¤er, depends on the aims and
objectives of the policymaker. A notable virtue of our approach is that we can
use our microfounded model of nancial intermediation in EMEs, to o¤er fresh
insights on the use of policy instruments and on the design of exchange rate
regime. If the aim of the policymaker is to keep the exchange rate stable, it
may do so by either using interest rate policy or by using foreign exchange inter-
vention policy. Current macroeconomic models fail to identify the e¤ectiveness
of these policy instruments in welfare terms. This is where our contribution be-
comes important. In this respect, the LOLR story that we develop in chapter
7, and that is entirely new to the literature, has potent welfare implications for
the choice of policy instrument that the Central Bank has to use, in its defense
of the peg. Interest rate policy may invite information-induced bank runs due
to induced stochastic changes in the value of banksassets. Foreign exchange
intervention may result in devaluation-induced bank run due to its e¤ect on the
international liquidity position of the economy. Thus, an important contribu-
tion that we make is that attempts to bring stability to the exchange rate in
an EME, may inevitably result in underlying instability in the banking sys-
tem. Because a devaluation-induced banking crisis results in a greater welfare
loss than information-induced banking failures, our paradigm in both chapters,
conjectures that using interest rates to defend the peg may be less costly than
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using foreign exchange intervention. The burden of higher interest rates in the
form of stochastic variations in the banks risky asset returns (induced, say,
by adverse selection and moral hazard), may be less than the burden of in-
creased currency pressure induced by draining foreign exchange reserves as a
result of intervention. Conversely, if the aim of the policymaker is to pre-empt
the occurrence of both crises (i.e eliminate the likelihood of both crises), some
state-contingent structure in the exchange rate regime is important. The aim
of the state-contingent structure is to enable restore the Planners second-best
allocation. A few propositions are studied e.g crawling peg systems, capital
controls, managed oating regime.
In the last part of this extended conclusion, we highlight some of the weak-
nesses of our paradigm and suggest some avenues that may prove helpful for
future research work. For chapters 6, 7 and 8, an interesting development
will be to extend our model to include multiple banks and allow for multiple
periods and include moral hazard. This approach will enable us formalise the
main conjectures we have developed. The formal development of the notion of
intertemporal substitution of banking crisis, seems promising since it has, hith-
erto, been unheard of, in the existing literature. In particular, it contains theo-
retical justication that LOLR may not always be benign in an open economy.
Furthermore, an interesting follow-up is the formalisation of state-contingent
structures in exchange rate regimes. In the main parts of the text, we provided
simple intuitive arguments depicting how such structures will operate. To de-
velop a theoretical model that embed these structures and that show how they
can help thwart the occurrence of the twin crisesand achieve the Planners
Second-Best solution, seems to be a prominent way forward.
One of the virtues of doing research in the fascinating area of nancial crises
is that it is a topic that never becomes obsolete. Each decade has seen the
emergence of a new form of nancial crisis with new stylized facts. In the 1980s,
for instance, nancial crises were mostly of developmental nature, especially with
the debt crisis problems, the hyperination of 1980s and the currency crises of
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1970s that led to the development of the rst generation model of currency crises.
The early 1990s witnessed a few form of currency crisis that did not have its roots
in woeful government economic mismanagement but rather, with self-fullling
beliefs and expectations of the nancial markets. The late 1990s witnessed
the East Asian debacle, with the East Asian economies, once paraded as the
paragons of economic virtue, teetering on the brink of economic disaster. The
East Asian turmoil brought new challenges to the front of economic scrutiny:
there was now, a growing awareness of the role of banks in nancial crises, the
speed with which a crisis can spread contagiously across countries, di¢ culties
with Moral Hazard and crony capitalism.
At the time of writing up this thesis, the world economy was sinking into
generalised global depression that has been unseen since the time of the Great
Depression of 1930s due to the credit crunch crisis of 2007-2008. Even though the
credit crunch crisis has vindicated the role that banks play in modern nancial
crises an aspect which has become the norm since the East Asian turmoil 
there are now new elements that have come into the limelight: banks are seen
as having common exposure to certain high risk sectors such as real estate and
the interaction between banks and nancial markets has encouraged risk-taking
behaviour by banks in a way that is not readily understandable by agents in the
nancial markets.
One of the most interesting facts about nancial crises is that they always
change in nature, speed and intensity each decade. However, while this attribute
represents an opportunity to potential researchers to showcase their academic
prowess, it makes papers based on the old vintage nancial crises rapidly obso-
lete. Fortunately, our main theoretical paradigm (embodied in chapters 3, 4
and 5 ) has escaped this ill-fated scenario (even without us knowing it). Our
theoretical paradigm was developed to have bite on the East Asian turmoil of
1997. However, aside of the fact that we have developed a theoretical model of
nancial contagion that o¤ers a di¤erent look at nancial contagion as a con-
cept, our model results are robust in that we provide theoretical justication
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of contagion as a function of informational attributes of agents in the economy.
For instance, we do purport, through the concept of intertemporal substitution
of banking crises, that policy measures administered at one bank may have ex-
ternalities on the behaviour of agents of other banks in the economy and may,
by itself, create a channel of contagion of its own. This phenomenon was con-
curred by Shin (2009) in his observation of the Northern Rock crisis of 2007 in
the UK. The Northern Rock crisis of 2007 erupted when depositors of the bank
decided to run on the bank, following fears of problems about the banks liquid-
ity position after the Bank of England intervened to assist the bank nancially.
This fact conrms the belief that depositors are wary and sensitive of public
news relating to their banks and that they do act in response.
While the reader appreciates that the main purpose of building the para-
digm in chapters 3, 4, and 5, was theoretical, an interesting follow-up of our
paradigm would be to test the model empirically. However, in so-doing, we
would face a number of ostensible constraints. We identify three constraints in
our route towards empirical modelling:
[1] A natural constraint we face is the fact that most banking systems of the
world have explicit deposit insurance schemes that partially covers depositors
exposures to potential bank runs. Our paradigm does not assume the existence
of such insurance. Thus, the theoretical gravity of banking contagion problem
in our paradigm, may be somewhat over-exaggerated.
[2] A second potential problems is about datasets that actually identify
episodes of multiple bank collapse in a banking system. Due to the prompt
intervention of Central Banks around the world to bailout commercial banks
in trouble, it becomes hard to identify an episode of banking failures arising
essentially from a bank run perspective. Central Bank intervention is mostly
designed to inject liquidity into banks, restructure their balance sheets, and re-
capitalise them (where necessary) in order to deal with liquidity and solvency
problems. As such, if a multiple banking collapse happens (if at all), it is usually
ephemeral in nature.
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[3] A third constraint is the fact that our model is micro-founded in nature.
It thus becomes a problem to model key micro-theoretical variables in prac-
tice. Key issues such as coordination failure, private information, public news
etc become di¢ cult to be constructed and identied without the development
of indices that, per se, may attract signicant controversies among empirical
economists and practitioners. In Box 9.1 (please turn next page), we endeavour
to provide a follow-up to our theoretical work by suggesting a practical way of
implementing and testing our model. However, due to the pertinent problems
that we have identied as aforementioned, the six-stepped approach can only
be applied to countries (rather than banks) experiencing nancial crises trans-
missions. In order to follow down that route, we would need to re-calibrate
our model specicity to account for country (rather than bank) subtleties. We
conjecture that transforming our analysis from one that involves banks to one
that involves countries, will not change the main theoretical predictions of our
paradigm.
An alternative extension to our approach one that will adapt our model
predictions to the credit crunch crisis of 2007-2008 - would be to analyse the
informational spillover channel in a context of commercial bank interactions
with nancial markets. As mentioned in chapter 1, banks can use nancial
markets to issue claims against their long assets (i.e engage in securitization).
Developing a multi-bank framework with a nancial market and moral hazard,
seems to be a prominent theoretical way forward in order to take our approach
to the next step.
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Appendix
A.1 Additional Notes for Chapter 3
A. The Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model was instrumental in concoct-
ing a microtheoretic account of bank balance sheets by allowing for liquidity
preference shocks modelled as uncertainty about the timing of consumption
preferences, asset-liability maturity mismatch and inverse relationship between
liquidity and protability. Banks are highly leveraged institutions that act as a
mechanism that provide insurance against liquidity preference shocks. By pool-
ing the endowments of the investor, they o¤er demand deposit contracts that
make promises of consumption contingent on the date of withdrawal of the in-
vestor. The latter achieves better combination of liquidity services and returns
on investment than alternative mechanisms such as nancial markets. A natural
result of a bank engaged in such maturity and liquidity transformation activity
is that it must have a balance sheet that makes it prone to various risks.
B. The optimal level of bank regulation is subject to debate. A new eld in
microeconomic theory of banks is that banking panics are viewed as a natural
consequence of a banking system fullling its allocational roles as highlighted
by the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) environment, highlighted in A above. Thus,
any attempt to deal with banking crises ex-ante through the adoption of ap-
propriate regulatory guidelines, will inevitably impinge on the ability of the
banking system to perform its roles e¢ ciently. Whether banking regulation is
desirable or not, crucially depends on the benets of such regulation exceeding
the cost of so-doing. These models trade-o¤ the ex-post benets of avoiding
bank failures with the ex-ante drawbacks of impinging on the banks ability to
fulll its allocational roles.
C. The concept of nancial contagion described here is a restricted version
of an all embracing general term: that of systemic risk. With nancial
contagion, we are concerned with a case involving multiple banks and there is
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no interaction of banks with nancial markets. One concept of systemic risk
allows for the interaction between a bank and a nancial market in an incomplete
market setup, and which leads to excess price volatility for the asset that the
bank holds. Excessive (endogenous) asset price volatility may prevent banks
from getting liquidity when they need it the most and may mean that the bank
is unable to meet its contractual arrangements to pay depositors and eventually
fails. Systemic risks may alternatively refer to the transmission of a crisis from
bank to bank (with transmission mechanism broadly dened) so that there is
an overall nancial meltdown. See Chapter 2 for more details.
D. Brief expose of Real Contagion Models: See Chapter 2 for more
details
E. Brief expose of Pure Contagion Models: See Chapter 2 for more
details
F. Di¤erences between Interdependence and Contagion
Interdependence
- channel of banking panic transmission (same with crisis as without crisis)
- cross-bank linkages before a nancial crisis (same after a crisis)
Contagion
- new channel of banking panic transmission emerges (conditional on event
observed in rst bank)
- cross-bank linkages after a crisis di¤er from those before
- represented by an endogenous change in correlation / co-movements of
events across banks, conditional on the event in rst bank
F.1 This lack of predictability as to which banking equilibrium will prevail
makes it di¢ cult to study how a bank failure may spread from one bank to
another. Put di¤erently, if a model can predict that, depending on depositors
beliefs formation, any outcome of Bank A can be an equilibrium but it remains
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silent about beliefs, it is hardly able to predict how the outcome of bank A can
a¤ect Bank B. Similar problems arise in any international nancial crisis model
with a strong element of self-fullling beliefs. The existence of multiple equilib-
ria makes it very di¢ cult to examine individual bank runs, which compounds
the di¢ culty involved in isolating contagious e¤ects in a multi-bank setting.
Quoting from Vaugirard (2005), ....indeed the key sticking point when trying
to display pure contagion in models of nancial crises with multiple equilibria
and based solely on self-fullling beliefs, is that the mechanism for jumps be-
tween equilibria, is not articulated. Therefore, these models fail to rigorously
capture contagious e¤ect in which a crisis in one country (i.e the particular
outcome among the set of possible equilibria) a¤ects the likelihood of a crisis in
another country....There are two theoretical ways out of the conundrum: (a)
identify a particular channel pinning down the cause-e¤ect relationship out of
the whole set of possible multiple outcomes; (b) use global games methodology
pioneered by Carlsson and VanDamme (1993) and reformulated by Morris and
Shin (1998) in a model of speculative currency attack to identify the existence
of an equilibrium.
G. Theoretically, this discontinuity in the international transmission mecha-
nism may be caused by panics, asymmetric information or learning. We subsume
the notion in the concept of change in behaviourof investors. The notion of
contagion as a state-contingent change in correlation, has implications for di-
versication benets of investors. Leaving aside the banking world and focusing
on nancial markets only, contagion would be viewed, from that perspective, as
a situation of excessiveasset price correlation during crisis times as opposed
to tranquil times. As the argument goes, this means that diversication may
fail to deliver exactly when its benets are needed the most.
H. Brief expose of Dominance Regions
(Strict Lower Dominance Region (SLDR))1 (Fundamental-Based Bank
1

i : minf [i < uG]; [i < uBad]g
	  i : [0  i < uG]	
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Failure)

i : [0  i  uG]
	 ) Region of the i   space, for which bank i fails
with probability 1, no matter what the state of the common macroeconomic
fundamental is. Associated with the idiosyncratic fundamental being Too Low
To Succeed.
(Weak Lower Dominance Region (WLDR))

i : u
G < i < u
Bad]
	)
Region of the i space for which bank i fails irrespective of the behaviour of its
patient depositors if and only if the common fundamental is in its bad state.
(Strict Upper Dominance Region (SUDR))2 (Fundamental-Based Bank
Success)

i : [i  uBad + z]
	 ) Region of the i   space, for which bank i
succeeds with probability 1, no matter what the state of the common macro-
economic fundamental is. Associated with the idiosyncratic fundamental being
Too Large To Fail.
(Weak Upper Dominance Region (WUDR))

i : u
G + z < i  uBad + z]
	)
Region of the i space for which bank i succeeds irrespective of the behaviour
of its patient depositors if and only if the common fundamental is in its good
state.
All four segments put powerful assumptions on the role of i as a driver of
bank is performance. The only di¤erence lies in the interpretation. For SLDR
and SUDR, the precise state that the common macroeconomic variable takes,
does not matter. For SLDR (respectively SUDR), i is so low (respectively
high) that the bank is guaranteed to fail (respectively to succeed). On the other
hand side, with WLDR and WUDR, the state of the common fundamental does
matter. For example, suppose that the state of the common fundamental is
bad. For bank i, any i lying between uG and uBad would be classied as part
of the lower dominance region. If the state of the fundamental was good, i
lying in the

uG; uBad

interval would be part of the segment of i , for which
the banks behaviour would depend on the behaviour of patient depositors. A
similar analysis can explain the rationale for WUDR and SUDR.
2

i : max

[i > u
G + z], [i > uBad + z]
		  i : [i > uBad + z]	
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A.2 Appendix for Chapter 3
PROOF OF REMARKS 3.1 AND 3.2
Remark 3.1: (No-Dominance signal segment) Attention will be re-
stricted to the segment of the signal space in which there is strategic interraction
(i.e Dominance is ruled out). This means that s lies in interval [sL; sU ] ; where
sL  uG   " and sU  uBad + z + ".
Remark 3.2: (Uniformity of Prior and Posterior distribution)While
the prior distribution of the idiosyncratic fundamental is common knowledge and
follows the uniform distribution law, the posterior distribution of the idiosyn-
cratic fundamental, through specic restrictions on the degree of precision of
the signals, will also follow the uniform distribution law. The necessary and
su¢ cient condition for that restriction on the noise structure is: 2" < uG:
Proof: While the prior distribution of the idiosyncratic fundamental is uni-
form, it only su¢ ces to impose su¢ cient structure on the noise technology in
order to be assured of uniformity in posterior estimates of the idiosyncratic
fundamental. We know that the error technology is uniformly distributed on
[ ";+"], with density rate 12" and that the prior distribution of the idiosyncratic
fundamental is uniform on [0; 1] : In order to guarantee that the posterior dis-
tribution of i, conditional on observing the private signal s; is uniform, we need
to ensure that the support of i, conditional on s, namely [s  "; s+ "], lies ex-
actly within the range that allows for strategic interraction among depositors
i.e [0; 1].
[1] We require that min [s  "; s+ "] > 0: Restriction uG   " > 0 implies
that " < uG: Furthermore, the assumption that s > sL is implied by setting
s > inffs : Pr ob( < L j s) < 1g: Thus, we are left with a restriction that
" < s: However, to allow for strategic interraction, s > uG   ": The fact that
" < s) " < uG   ": Thus, 2" < uG:
[2]We require that max [s  "; s+ "] < 1: This implies s+" < 1) " < 1 s:
With Restriction

uBad + z + "

< 1, the assumption that s < sU (to rule out
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dominance as per remark 6), implies that s < uBad+ z+ ": Since " < 1  s; we
can rewrite the whole expression as " < 1  uBad + z + ") 2" < 1 uBad z:
Thus, restriction

uG   " > 0 and restriction uBad + z + " < 1 imply that
2" < min[uG; 1  uBad   z]: By assumptions [a:1] ; [a:2] and [a:3] in chapter 2 ,
we know that 0 < uG < uBad + z < 1; implying that uG < 1  uBad   z: Thus,
restriction 2" < uG is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the uniform law
to be applicable to posterior distribution
A.3 Appendix for Chapter 4
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.1
Proposition 4.1: If the event in Bank A is used for Bayesian updating only,
then the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the dynamic game between  A;t=1 and
 B;t=1 can be represented as a trigger equilibrium.
Proof: (use of Intermediate Value Theorem)
Let assessments f (At=1); (Bt=1)g and f ; 0g denote the Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium of the game between  A;t=1 and  B;t=1 . Any depositor in  t=1
; will play a best-response to actions of predecessors and successors (where
applicable), with the best response function dened by 	A(:) = max[2P  
1]
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))(u j At=1)d and	B(:) = max[2P 1]
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))(u j
Bt=1)d; depending on whether he plays in  A;t=1 or in  B;t=1 :
For a depositor in  A;t=1; the expected utility, EU [s; ] = [2P 1]
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d;varies
continuously with s: High values of  are associated with low value of propor-
tion of early withdrawals, (s; ): Thus, net payo¤ to staying, (; (s; )
is high and greater probability is attached to staying in the EU [s; ] =
P
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d+ (1 P )
Z s
s "
(; (s; ))d expression elaborated in
the main text of chapter 3, where
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d > 0 and
Z s
s "
(; (s; ))d <
0. For low realisations of ; we have a reverse ordering: (s; ) is high and
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(; (s; ) takes a low (negative) value and greater probability is attached to
the negative element of EU [s; ]: Thus, generalising the argument to any de-
positor (no matter to which game he belongs to), we can argue that he will
stay if EU [s; ] > 0 and will withdraw if EU [s; ]  0 . Since EU [s; ] is
continuous and monotonically increasing in s; then by the intermediate value
theorem, 9 s such that 8s > s; EU [s; ] > 0 and 8s  s; EU [s; ] < 0: In
line with the best -response function 	A(:); 9 A(A;t=1) such that:
A(A;t=1) =
8<: W if s  sS if s > s
9=;
which corresponds exactly to the notion of switching equilibrium that we
stated in the main text.
.
For depositor in  B;t=1 ; the expected utility is given by expression: EU [s; 0] =
[2P   1]
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d: When bank A survives, 
 = fSAg ; and bank
B has a high idiosyncratic fundamental, (s; ) is low. Thus, the probabil-
ity of an individual depositor staying becomes high and EU [s; 0] has relatively
more of the
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d (> 0) component and relatively less of theZ s
s "
(; (s; ))d(< 0): Thus,EU [sB ; 0] > 0 when the idiosyncratic funda-
mental of bank B is high and when 
 = fSAg is observed.
When 
 = fFAg and bank B has a low idiosyncratic fundamental, (s; ) is
high. Here, EU [s; 0] has relatively less of the
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d (> 0) com-
ponent and relatively more of the
Z s
s "
(; (s; ))d (< 0): Thus, EU [s; 0] <
0 for low realisations of the idiosyncratic fundamental and when 
 = fFAg is
observed: Thus, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept will lead depositors
in  B;t=1; to follow a strategy along the following lines:
(Bt=1) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
W if ( 
A = fFAg) \ ( s  s)
S if ( 
A = fSAg) \ ( s > s)
S or W if
8<: either
 
( 
A = fSAg) \ ( s  s)
or
 
( 
A = fFAg) \ ( s > s))
9=;
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
which is exactly the trigger equilibrium we dened in the main text.
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.2(a)
Proposition 4.2(a): (Existence of a Trigger Equilibrium) In each
depositors game, there exists a threshold s such that he withdraws if s  s
and stays if s > s
Proof: (The following proof is valid for depositors of either bank - thus, we
remove any subscripts or superscripts )
We know that if s < uG   "; this means that  < uG: By the dominance
assumption we have elaborated in the main text, this implies that the net payo¤
to staying is negative in this region. In a similar line of thought, if s > uBad +
z + "; then  > uBad + z: We are here in the upper dominance region. Here,
the net payo¤ to staying is strictly positive. By remarks 1 and 2, we are not
interested in dominance regions however. The logic behind conceptualising the
lower and upper dominance regions means that for the tails of the signal spaces,
the net payo¤ structure takes unambiguous negative and positive values. Thus,
there is a point in the signal space lying in the

uG   "; uBad + z + " interval
at which the net payo¤ is equal to zero. Let this point be point s: We shall
proceed to explain the existence of s in two steps: (i) we will show that, for a
marginal depositor, the net payo¤ to staying is increasing and continuous in s
assuming that all depositors follow the switching strategy and (ii) we will show
that for any s  s; this net payo¤ is negative and for any s > s; it is positive.
Step 1:
Each depositor in  i;t=1; i = fA;Bg, faces a uniform posterior belief over i,
conditional on observing his private signal s: Thus, we can model that posterior
belief formally as : i j s  Uniform[s   "; s + "]; "  s  1   ". Assuming
that all other depositors in  i;t=1 follow a switching strategy, the proportion of
patient depositors withdrawing early can be modelled as follows:
[; s] =
8>>><>>>:
1  < s   "
1
2 +
(s )
2" s
   "    s + "
0  > s + "
9>>>=>>>;
Building on table 2, the net payo¤ to staying as opposed to withdrawing for
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each depositor in  i;t=1can be re-parameterised in terms of  and sas follows:
(; s) =
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d (= 0)
Recall that in chapter 4, we segregated the performance of a given bank into
a bankruptcy and a no-bankruptcy space. Using the terminologies employed, it
can be shown that:
In the Bankruptcy Condition Space, [; s] > r =) f[ 12+ (s
 )
2" ] > rg =)
f < s + "(1  2r)g
In the No-Bankruptcy Condition Space, [; s]  r =) f[ 12 + (s
 )
2" ] 
rg =) f  s + "(1  2r)g
Thus, we may partition (; s) =
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d into the Bank-
ruptcy Condition Space and the No-Bankruptcy Condition Space as follows:
(; s) =
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
fU
f(1 )  (1 )r gR(:)
(1 )(1 )

 U(1)g d+
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
fU(0) 
U
h
+r(1 )
+(1 )
i
g d
=
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
U
f(1 )  (1 )r gR(:)
(1 )(1 )

d 
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
U
h
+r(1 )
+(1 )
i
d + fU(0)[2"(1  r)]  U(1)[2"r]:
Now, let U
f(1 )  (1 )r gR(:)
(1 )(1 )

be denoted as (; s), let U
h
+r(1 )
+(1 )
i
be
denoted as (; s); let fU(0)[2"(1  r)]  U(1)[2"r] be a constant, : A much
simpler expression for (; s) would be as follows:
(; s) =
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
(; s) d+
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
(; s) d + 
We are interested in establishing how (; s) varies with s: Take deriva-
tives with respect to s throughout:
@
@s(; s
) = @@s
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
(; s) d + @@s
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
(; s) d
We proceed with the integrals separately:
@
@s
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
(; s) d = [(; s)]s
+"
s+"(1 2r)+
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
@
@s [(; s
)] d
@
@s
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
(; s) d =[(; s)]s
+"(1 2r)
s " +
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
@
@s [(; s
)]
d
The following properties hold for (; s) and (; s) : (1)@(;s
)
@ < 0;
(2)@(;s
)
@ < 0, (3)
@(;s)
@s > 0, (4)
@(;s)
@ < 0; (5)
@(;s)@s  = @(;s)@  :
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By (1) and (3), @(;s
)
@s < 0: By (1) and (4),
@(;s)
@ > 0: This gives rise
to the important property that:
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r
@
@ [(; s
)]d ;as represented by
[(; s)]s
+"
s+"(1 2r) , exceeds
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
@
@s [(; s
)] d . This implies that
@
@s
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
(; s) d > 0:
Repeating the same exercise for (; s); we can see that by (6) @(;s
)
@s < 0,
(7) @(;s
)
@ > 0:Given (5),(6) and (7), it can be established that
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
@
@s [(; s
)]
d =  
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
@
@ [(; s
)] d: Thus, @@s
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
(; s) d = 0: Through
the values of @@s
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
(; s) d and @@s
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
(; s) d , we can
establish that @@s(; s
) > 0: Thus, there exists a value of s that solves the
model for any (; s) = 0: We have thus proved that (; s) is continuous in
s over the [s   "; s + "] range.
Step 2:
Dene the net payo¤to staying for a marginal depositor(; s) =
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s])
d = 0 (assuming that all other depositors follow a switching strategy). Also,
dene (; s) =
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d as the net payo¤ to staying for a depositor
who receives a signal s: The assumption of continuity means that (; s) is con-
tinuous in s in the signal range that allows for strategic interraction between
depositors. Consider signals that are smaller than s : For extremely low realisa-
tions of signals, we will be in the lower dominance region and the net payo¤will
be strictly negative. For some s  s; the net payo¤ dened by the integral over
the range [s  "; s+ "] ; involves adding a negative element to the structure and
taking away part of the positive element. Thus, (; s) (
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d)
< (; s)
 

Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d = 0
!
: Thus, by a contagious element,
any s  s is compatible with negative net payo¤. Depositors withdraw un-
ambiguously when they receive a signal which is less than s: A similar line of
thought will show that when s > s; (; s) (
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d) > (; s)
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
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d = 0
!
: By a contagiou s element, any s > s is com-
patible with positive net payo¤. Depositors stay unambiguously when they
receive a signal which is more than s:
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.3
Proposition 4.3: (Existence and Features of ) By Propositions 4.2(a)
and 4.2(b), there exists a threshold in each bank, above which the bank succeeds
and below which the bank fails. In addition, for either bank, the location of 
has the property that (uBad) > (uG) with uBad > uG
Proof: The analysis is relevant for depositors of either bank (except where
otherwise stated). We proceed in two steps:
Step 1: Existence of 
We start with a marginal depositor in  i;t=1who observes s = s and who
believes that all other depositors in  i;t=1 will follow a switching strategy around
s: For any particular realisations of the state of the common macroeconomic
fundamental; there exists a critical value of  that ensures that, from the returns
technology given in table 1,
crit = u+z[; s] where [; s] =
8>>><>>>:
1 s >  + "
1
2 +
(s )
2"    "  s   + "
0 s <    "
9>>>=>>>;
Using the expression for [; s] , crit can be expressed as:
crit =
8>>><>>>:
u+ z s >  + "
u+ z2"f(s   ) + "g    "  s   + "
u s <    "
9>>>=>>>;
Thus,
crit( u) =
8>>><>>>:
u+ z s > u+ z + "
z(s+")+2"u
z+2" u  "  s  u + z + "
u s  u   "
9>>>=>>>;
Step 2: Features of 
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When we showed (; s) as being strictly increasing in s(as per propo-
sition 2(a)), we kept the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental as
constant. However, with the property depicted in gure 2(b) in the graphical
appendix of chapter 2, it turns out that whenever the common fundamental
moves from a good state to a bad one, (; s; uBad) lies below (; s; uG)
for any s: Thus, with the single-crossing property established in proposition
2(a) and 2(b), it turns out that s derived from (; s; uBad) lies to the right
of the s derived from (; s; uG): How does that a¤ect the threshold value of
the idiosyncratic fundamental ? We know thatconditional on the state of the
common fundamental, the critical threshold will be given by:
crit( uBad) =
8>>><>>>:
uBad + z s > uBad + z + "
z(s+")+2"uBad
z+2" u
Bad   "  s  uBad + z + "
uBad s  uBad   "
9>>>=>>>;
crit( uG) =
8>>><>>>:
uG + z s > uG + z + "
z(s+")+2"uG
z+2" u
G   "  s  uG + z + "
uG s  uG   "
9>>>=>>>;
Thus, with uBad > uG; it follows that 
 
uBad

> ( uG):
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.4:
Proposition 4.4: (Learning Mechanism) Upon observing the failure of
bank A, the probability that the common macroeconomic fundamental was in
its bad state is more likely than unconditionally. Thus, (1) Pr ob(u = uBad j
FA) > Pr ob(u = u
Bad) > Pr ob(u = uBad j SA) Similarly, conditional on
observing the success of bank A, the probability that the common macroeconomic
fundamental was in its good state is more likely than unconditionally. Thus, (2)
Pr ob(u = uG j SA) > Pr ob(u = uG) > Pr ob(u = uG j FA)
Proof:
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(1) With the all-important property that, if uBad > uG; then A(u
Bad) >
A(u
G); it can be inferred that A(u
Bad) > k:A(u
Bad) + (1   k):A(uG);
0  k < 1: Thus, A(uBad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k):A(uG) > 1 )
k:A(u
Bad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k):A(uG) > k:
This implies that: Pr ob(u = uBad j FA) = k:

A(u
Bad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k):A(uG) > k: Subse-
quently, Pr ob(u = uBad j FA) > Pr ob(u = uBad) where Pr ob(u = uBad) = k:
Similarly, if uBad > uG; then 1   A(uBad) < 1   A(uG): Thus, it must be
the case that 1   A(uBad) < k:[1   A(uBad)] + (1   k):[1   A(uG)]: Thus,
1 A(uBad)
k:[1 A(uBad)]+(1 k):[1 A(uG)] < 1 =)
k:[1 A(uBad)]
k:[1 A(uBad)]+(1 k):[1 A(uG)] < k: Sub-
sequently, Pr ob(u = uBad j SA) < Pr ob(u = uBad) where Pr ob(u = uBad) = k:
This establishes the general result that: Pr ob(u = uBad j FA) > Pr ob(u =
uBad) > Pr ob(u = uBad j SA)
(2) can be proved in a similar way. With A(u
G) < A(u
Bad) by propo-
sition 3 ) (1   k)A(uG) < (1   k)A(uBad): We can express A(uG) as
a linear function: A(u
G) < kA(u
G) + (1   k)A(uBad): This implies that
A(u
G)
kA(u
G)+(1 k)A(uB) < 1:Multiply both sides by (1 k) yields:
(1 k)A(uG)
kA(u
G)+(1 k)A(uBad) <
(1 k): But (1 k)A(uG)
kA(u
G)+(1 k)A(uBad) = Pr ob(u = u
G j FA) and (1 k) = Pr ob(u =
uG): This therefore suggests that Pr ob(u = uG j FA) < Pr ob(u = uG): With
A(u
G) < A(u
Bad)) 1 A(uG) > 1 A(uBad)) (1 k)[1 A(uG)] > (1 
k)[1 A(uBad)]: In turn, [1 A(uG)] > k

1  A(uG)

+(1 k)[1 A(uBad)];
which implies that [1 

A(u
G)]
k[1 A(uG)]+(1 k)[1 A(uBad)]
> 1: Multiplying both sides
by (1  k) yields (1 k)[1 A(uG)]
k[1 A(uG)]+(1 k)[1 A(uBad)]
> (1   k): As derived above,
(1 k)[1 A(uG)]
k[1 A(uG)]+(1 k)[1 A(uBad)]
= Pr ob(u = uG j SA) and (1 k) = Pr ob(u = uG):
This suggests that Pr ob(u = uG j SA) > Pr ob(u = uG): We have therefore
proved the general result for (2), that, Pr ob(u = uG j SA) > Pr ob(u = uG) >
Pr ob(u = uG j FA)
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.5:
Proposition 4.5: The posterior estimates of the state of the common macro-
economic fundamental by depositors of bank B retain all mathematical proper-
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ties of propositions 2(a), 2(b) and 3. Furthermore, observing the failure (suc-
cess) of bank A pushes the trigger of bank B upwards (downwards), such that
FAB (u) > 

B(u)

SAB (u) < 

B(u) respectively

: Thus, bank B now fails (suc-
ceeds) for larger realisations of its own idiosyncratic fundamentals.
Proof:
Recall that when we derived the properties of (; s) in propositions 4.2(a)
and 4.2(b), we took the state of the common fundamental as given. The analy-
sis was thus conned to some conditional payo¤ function, where the state of
the common fundamental was xed. For depositors in bank A, the uncondi-
tional payo¤ is a linear combination of the net payo¤ structure over the prior
probabilities of the state of the common fundamental. Thus, (; s) = 
(; s; uBad)+(1  ) (; s; uG): Logically, it follows that (; s) is increas-
ing in s and all analysis that we previously studied, will go through. There is
a unique s and a corresponding (u):
Depositors of bank B have the advantage that they can learn about the
state of the common fundamental by observing the event in bank A, where
the learning mechanism was explicated in proposition 4.4. Thus, upon ob-
serving bank As failure, they will infer that there is greater likelihood that
the common macroeconomic fundamental was in its bad state. Their uncondi-
tional payo¤ will be a linear combination of their conditional net payo¤ struc-
ture over the posterior probabilities of the state of the common fundamental.
Thus, =(; s) = Pr ob(u = uBad j FA) (; s; uBad) + Pr ob(u = uG j FA)
(; s; uG): It follows that =(; s) is increasing in s and that there is a
unique s for depositors in bank B as well. With the above assumption of
Pr ob(u = uBad j FA) >  and Pr ob(u = uG j FA) < 1   ; it turns out that
=(; s) lies below (; s): Let FAB (u) denote the new critical threshold of
bank B that is derived from =(; s). By the properties of Proposition 4.3,
step 2, it follows that FAB (u) > 

B(u):
Upon observing bank As success, depositors of bank B will infer that there
is greater likelihood that the common macroeconomic fundamental was in its
339
good state, as per proposition 4. Their unconditional payo¤ will be given as
follows: =(; s) = Pr ob(u = uBad j SA) (; s; uBad) + Pr ob(u = uG j SA)
(; s; uG): It follows that =(; s) is increasing in s and that there is a
unique s . With the above assumption of Pr ob(u = uBad j SA) <  and
Pr ob(u = uG j SA) > 1  ; it turns out that =(; s) lies above (; s): Let
SAB (u) denote the new critical threshold of bank B that is derived from 
=(; s).
By the properties of Proposition 4.3, step 2, it follows that SAB (u) < 

B(u):
A.4 Appendix for Chapter 5
NOTE ON TRIGGER EQUILIBRIUM
(A) FOLLOWING FROM THE EXISTENCE OF A TRIGGER EQUI-
LIBRIUM
Pr ob(FA j u = uB) = A(uBad)
Pr ob(FA j u = uG) = A(uG)
Pr ob(SA j u = uB) = 1  A(uBad)
Pr ob(SA j u = uG) = 1  A(uG)
(B) BAYESIAN UPDATING
1) Pr ob(u = uBad j FA) = P (FAju=u
Bad)P (u=uBad)
P (FAju=uBad)P (u=uBad)+P (FAju=uG)P (u=uG)
=
k:A(u
Bad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k)A(uG)
2) Pr ob(u = uBad j SA) = P (SAju=u
Bad)P (u=uBad)
P (SAju=uBad)P (u=uBad)+P (SAju=uG)P (u=uG)
=
k:(1 A(uBad))
k:(1 A(uBad))+(1 k)(1 A(uG))
3) Prob(u = uG j SA) = 1 Pr ob(u = uBad j SA) = (1 k)(1 

A(u
G))
(1 k)(1 A(uBad)) + k(1 A(uG))
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4) Prob(u = uG j FA) = 1  Pr ob(u = uBad j FA) = (1 k)

A(u
G)
(1 k)A(uBad) + kA(uG)
(C) CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES
5) Pr(FB j fu = uBadg \ FA) = FAB; uBad
6) Pr(FB j fu = uGg \ FA) = FAB; uG
7) Pr(FB j fu = uBadg \ SA) = SAB; uBad
8) Pr(FB j fu = uGg \ SA) = SAB; uG
Similarly,
9) Pr(SB j fu = uBadg \ SA) = 1  SAB; uBad
10) Pr(SB j fu = uGg \ SA) = 1  SAB; uG
11) Pr(SB j fu = uBadg \ FA) = 1  FAB; uBad
12) Pr(SB j fu = uGg \ FA) = 1  FAB; uG
(D) CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES (CONTD..)
13) Pr(FB j Bt=1; FA) = Pr(FB j fu = uBadg \ FA) Pr(fu = uBadg j FA)+
Pr(FB j fu = uGg \ FA) Pr(fu = uGg j FA):
=FA
B; uBad
h
k:A(u
Bad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k)A(uG)
i
+ FA
B; uG
h
1 

k:A(u
Bad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k)A(uG)
i
=

FA
B; uBad
  FA
B; uG
 h
k:A(u
Bad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k)A(uG)
i
+ FA
B; uG
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14) Pr(FB j Bt=1; SA) = Pr(FB j fu = uBadg \ SA) Pr(fu = uBadg j SA)+
Pr(FB j fu = uGg \ SA) Pr(fu = uGg j SA):
=SA
B; uBad
h
k:(1 A(uBad))
k:(1 A(uBad))+(1 k)(1 A(uG))
i
+SA
B; uG
h
1 

k:(1 A(uBad))
k:(1 A(uBad))+(1 k)(1 A(uG))
i
=

SA
B; uBad
  SA
B; uG
 h
k:(1 A(uBad))
k:(1 A(uBad))+(1 k)(1 A(uG))
i
+ SA
B; uG
Proof. Pr(FB j Bt=1; FA) > Pr(FB j Bt=1; SA)
Clearly, (i) k:

A(u
Bad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k)A(uG) >
k:(1 A(uBad))
k:(1 A(uBad))+(1 k)(1 A(uG)) as estab-
lished in main text
(ii) FA
B; uBad
  FA
B; uG
> SA
B; uBad
  SA
B; uG
(iii) FA
B; uG
> SA
B; uG
Thus, each of the component part of Pr(FB j Bt=1; FA) exceeds that of
Pr(FB j Bt=1; SA):This completes this mini-proof.
Similarly,
15) Pr(SB j Bt=1; SA) = Pr(SB j fu = uBadg \ SA) Pr(fu = uBadg j SA)+
Pr(SB j fu = uGg \ SA) Pr(fu = uGg j SA):
=1 
n
k(1 A(uBad))B(uBad)+(1 k)(1 A(uG))B(uG)
1 kA(uBad) (1 k)A(uG)
o
16) Pr(SB j Bt=1; FA) = Pr(SB j fu = uBadg \ FA) Pr(fu = uBadg j FA)+
Pr(SB j fu = uGg \ FA) Pr(fu = uGg j FA):
=1 
n
kA(u
Bad)B(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)B(uG)
kA(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)
o
Proof. Similarly, it can be proved that Pr(SB j Bt=1; SA) > Pr(SB j Bt=1; FA)
The proof is left to the reader.
17) Event probabilities - A summary
(i) Pr(FB j Bt=1; FA) =
n
kA(u
Bad)B(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)B(uG)
kA(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)
o
(ii) Pr(FB j Bt=1; SA) =
n
k(1 A(uBad))B(uBad)+(1 k)(1 A(uG))B(uG)
1 kA(uBad) (1 k)A(uG)
o
(iii) Pr(SB j Bt=1; FA) = 1 
n
kA(u
Bad)B(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)B(uG)
kA(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)
o
(iv) Pr(SB j Bt=1; SA) = 1 
n
k(1 A(uBad))B(uBad)+(1 k)(1 A(uG))B(uG)
1 kA(uBad) (1 k)A(uG)
o
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(E) UNCONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES
18) P (FA) = Pr(FA j u = uBad) Pr(u = uBad)+ Pr(FA j u = uG) Pr(u =
uG):
19) P (SA) = Pr(SA j u = uBad) Pr(u = uBad)+ Pr(SA j u = uG) Pr(u =
uG):
20) P (FB) = Pr(FB j Bt=1; FA)P (FA)+ Pr(FB j Bt=1; SA)P (SA)
21) P (SB) = Pr(SB j Bt=1; FA)P (FA)+ Pr(SB j Bt=1; SA)P (SA)
A.5 Notes for Chapter 5
I. The negative signal associated with SOC comes from the fact that de-
positors of the second bank may interpret the information in the following way:
if something is wrong in the rst bank and depositors wishing to withdraw are
not getting back their dues due to policy suspension, depositors of the second
bank may also not get back their dues in the future if their bank meets the same
fate tomorrow. After all, the two banks are positively linked to the common
macroeconomic fundamental - they are likely to share the same fate at a later
stage. Thus, the best response of those depositors of the second bank is to with-
draw now. By suspending convertibility in one bank to try to limit contagion,
preventive measures taken at one bank has led to a run on the second bank !
J. The signal could be described as thus: if depositors of the second bank
observe the rst bank receiving nancial aid in the form of LOLR, they may
interpret the information in the following two ways:
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(i) They may interpret this as a sign that something is wrong about the
rst bank. Since the two banks are perceived to be connected to the macro
fundamental, they may reckon that their bank (the second bank) may meet the
same fate in the future. So, they decide to withdraw now (Negative Signal)
(ii) They may alternatively interpret this LOLR intervention at the rst
bank as a sign that condence is being maintained in the rst bank through
LOLR and its temporary illiquidity problem is being solved. Therefore, no
spillover e¤ect will be felt in their bank (the second bank) (Positive Signal).
Notice that, in the case of the negative signal, the LOLR being given to the
rst bank has actually created a channel of contagion of its own to the second
bank.
A.6 Appendix for Chapter 7
PROOF OF CLAIM 7.1:
Claim 7.1: Given a continuous objective function and the existence of re-
source and incentive constraints that are compact and non-empty, there exists
a solution to the optimal program. The assumptions of concavity and twice
di¤erentiability of the objective function, ensure that the solution is positive.
The Optimal Program satises the following Euler equation: U 0 (c1) =
E (R)U 0 (c2) and a resulting non-contingent term structure of demand deposit
repayment, represented as follows:
c1 =

 , c2 =
(1 )E(R)
(1 ) ; c1 < c2:
Thus, e = 1 in the foreign exchange market.
Proof. We reproduce the optimization problem from the main text as follows:
max
c1
U (c1) + (1  )U (c2)
s.t
c1  
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c2 =
(1  )E (R) +   c1
1  
c1  c2
As in Allen and Gale (1998), (2004), we proceed in deriving the Euler equa-
tion, using a two-stepped approach:
Step 1:
Here, we maximise the objective function subject to the budget constraints
in periods t = 1 and t = 2; without the incentive compatibility constraints and
we show that, as part of the rst-order condition, the incentive compatibility
constraint will be satised. We set up the Lagrangian function without the
incentive-compatibility constraint and discuss the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
The Lagrangian Function is as follows:
L = fU (c1) + (1  )U (c2)g+ 1 [  c1] + 2 [(1  )E (R) +   c1   (1  ) c2]
where 1 and 2 are the lagrangian multipliers.
Kuhn-Tucker Conditions:
1.
(a) @L@c1 = U
0 (c1)  1   2  0
, U 0 (c1)  1 + 2
(b) c1  0
(c) c1 [U 0 (c1)  1   2] = 0 (complementary-slackness condition)
2.
(a) @L@c2 = (1  )U 0 (c2)  (1  )2 = 0
, U 0 (c2) = 2
3.
(a) @L@1 =   c1  0
(b) 1  0
(c) 1 (  c1) = 0 (complementary-slackness condition)
4.
(a) @L@2 = (1  )E (R) +   c1   (1  ) c2  0
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(b) 2  0
(c) 2 [(1  )E (R) +   c1   (1  ) c2] = 0 (complementary-slackness condition)
We know that since c2 =
(1 )E(R)+ c1
1  ; [(1  )E (R) +   c1   (1  ) c2] =
0: Thus, 2 > 0:
From conditions 1(c) and 2(a), it follows that: U 0 (c1)  1   U 0 (c2) = 0:
If 1 = 0;  > c1 i.e the budget constraint in period t = 1 is non-binding.
Thus, U 0 (c1) = U 0 (c2) , c1 = c2:
If 1 > 0;  = c1 i.e the budget constraint in period t = 1 is binding.
Thus, U 0 (c1)  U 0 (c2) > 1 , U 0 (c1) > U 0 (c2) : This implies that c1 < c2:
This completes proof of step 1.
Step 2:
Since c2 =
(1 )E(R)+ c1
1  ; replace in objective function as follows:
max
c1

U (c1) + (1  )U

(1  )E (R) +   c1
1  

First-Order Condition (FOC) with respect to :
(1  )U 0

(1 )E(R)+ c1
1 

:

1 E(R)
1 

7 0
Thus,  (i.e the value of the short technology) is non-zero. The planner
holds just the minimum amount needed to satisfy period t = 1 consumption
i.e  = c1:
The new optimization problem becomes:
max
c1

U (c1) + (1  )U

(1  c1)E (R)
1  

First-Order Condition (FOC) with respect to :
U 0 (c1) + (1  )U 0 (c2) :
n
 
1  E (R)
o
= 0
Thus, the Euler equation simplies to the following : U 0 (c1) = U 0 (c2) E (R)
with c1 =  and c2 =
(1 )E(R)
1 
Q.E.D
PROOF OF LEMMAS 7.1 AND 7.2
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Lemma 7.1: Given parametric restrictions  < 2+1 and R < 1, it follows
that 12 < R
 < 1
Proof. Given the optimal term structure of demand deposit payments (c1; c

2);
the banks optimal portfolio plan in period t = 0; (; 1  ) ; is chosen to max-
imise depositorsexpected utility subject to zero-(expected) prot constraint.
Condition  < 2+1 simply asserts that, whilst the proportion of early with-
drawals is , we assume in the paper that  is chosen such that it is less than
2
+1 ; with the optimal values of  substituted therein.
First part of proof: Given  < 2+1 , it follows that R
 > 12
Following on from the above inequality, it is obvious that varying the values
of  will keep  between 0 and 1.
For example, as  ! 1; the numerator and the denominator of quotient
2
+1 , will converge to 1: Thus, applying LHopitals Rule, it follows that:
Lim
!1
f()
g() = Lim!1
f ;()
g0() where f () = 2 and g () = +1: Thus, by LHopitals
Rule, Lim
!1
2
+1 = Lim!1
2
1 = 2:
We know that  is bounded i.e 0 <   1: Thus, as ! 1; the numerator and
the denominator of quotient 2+1 , will converge to the same constant, such that,
2
+1  ! 1: Similarly, as ! 0; the numerator and the denominator of quotient
2
+1 , will converge to a di¤erent constant, such that,
2
+1  ! 0: Thus, varying
the values of  between 0 and 1 will keep  between 0 and 1. Our assumption
that  lies below 2+1 ; with the optimal values of  substituted therein, thus
holds.
Manipulating conditions  < 2+1 =) +1 > 2 : Thus,  > 12 (+ 1) : From
the banks optimisation program, we know that c1 =  : Thus, c1 >
1
2 (+ 1) :
This condition simplies to c1   12 > 12 and eventually to: c1    > 12 (1  ) :
Thus, c1 1  >
1
2 : We know that for optimal portfolio values and optimal term
structure of payments, R = c

1 
1  : Thus,
c1 
1  >
1
2 is tantamount to writing
that R > 12 :
Second part of proof: Given R < 1 , it follows that R < 1
We hypothesised earlier if R > 1, the banks optimal portfolio strategy will
consist of investing all endowments in the long asset and to liquidate the long
347
asset prematurely in order to satisfy the liquidity needs of impatient depositors.
Such a strategy would yield a higher return than one which involves keeping
reserve requirements and satisfying impatient depositorsneeds out of the safe
asset. Under the hypothesis R > 1; the liquidated long asset yields more in
period t = 1 than the short asset.
Conversely, in order to guarantee that the bank will hold a positive amount
of the safe and of the risky asset ( i.e 0 <  < 1); R < 1: The upper bound
of R (i.e (1 )(1 )  Rmax): If R = Rmax; it follows that Rmax < 1: We know
that Rmax = (1 )(1 )  R: Since Rmax < 1; it follows that R < 1:
Thus, restrictions  < 2+1 and R < 1 ensure that overall,
1
2 < R
 < 1:
See illustration in the main text for the relationship between R , R and
boundedness of R
Q.E.D
Lemma 7.2: Given that 1  >

1  (R), it follows that: 0 < R < R
Proof. Given that 1  >

1  (R) ; we know that the upper bound of R is
(1 )
(1 ) ( Rmax) : Thus, 0 < R < (1 )(1 ) :Multiply throughout by  will yield:
0 < R < (1 )(1 ) ( R):
See illustration in (Graphical) Appendix for the relationship between R ,
R and Rmax
Q.E.D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7.1
Proposition 7.1: Bank runs occur if and only if R  R but, in the
absence of any interventionist policies, will fail to contagiously spread to the
foreign exchange sector and generate a currency crisis as per denition 7.3.
A necessary and su¢ cient condition that guarantees this result is assumption

1  >

1  (R)
Proof. With 1  >

1  (R) , we can re-arrange and simplify to get:  (1  ) >
 (1  )R:
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This boils down to:  > + (1  )R: Dividing everywhere by  yields:

 > +  (1  )R:
We know that c1 =

 : Thus, substituting c

1 in condition

 > + (1  )R
yields: c1 > +  (1  )R:
We can simplify and arrive at: 1 > +(1 )R:c1 : We know that
+(1 )R:
c1
=
 ( i.e the fraction of depositors withdrawing early and guaranteed to receive
c1 under the sequential service constraint (SSC) ). Assumption

1  >

1  (R)
enables us to go beyond and prove a yet more powerful result: We know that
each unit of dollar is converted into pesos at rate 1 : 1, assuming that the
soft peg is maintained. Each unit of dollar has been converted into pesos and
invested into  of the safe asset and 1    of the long asset. We also know
that R < R where R < 1: It thus turns out that + (1  ) R < 1: Thus,
each dollar in the central bank reserves is more than enough to compensate
proportion  of depositors who are promised c1 under the sequential service
constraint. The total amount of dollars to be provided is c1 ( i.e +(1  ) R
): At an exchange rate of 1 : 1, this equal to  + (1  ) R dollars. But we
have seen that if assumption 1  >

1  (R) holds, this is less than 1 (i.e
amount that the central bank has in its co¤ers). Thus, no currency crisis as per
denition 3 occurs.
Q.E.D
PROOF OF COROLLARY 7.4
Corollary 7.4: A devaluation-induced bank run leads to lower welfare than
a purely-information-based bank run
Proof. Assume that the discount rate is zero and that all other banks in the
economy can be modelled as a "representative bank". The proof is in two
steps: Step 1: We need to show that the banking contract allocation is Pareto
inferior to the second-best allocation and Step 2: we build on the analysis by
showing that welfare under an information-induced banking crisis is higher than
under a devaluation-induced banking crisis.
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Step 1: Banking Contract is Pareto-Inferior to Central Banks
Second-Best Program
WBanking =
R1
e 	 U (c1 (e)) f (e) de +
R e
0
[U (c1 (e)) + (1  )U (c2 (e))]
f (e) de
where e = (1 )R(1 ) ; 	 =
+(1 )Re
c and , as mentioned in the main text,R1
e 	 U (c1 (e)) f (e) de is the element of the banking contract that makes the
bank vulnerable to the risks of a currency devaluation and
R e
0
[U (c1 (e)) +
(1  )U (c2 (e))] f (e) de is the element of the banking contract that induces
truthtelling behaviour.
A close observation to the second-best allocation of the Central Bank as
planner, leads us to re-write welfare in the second-best program as follows:
WSecond =
R e
0
E[U (c1 (e))+(1  )U (c2 (e))] f (e) de +
R1
e E[U (c1 (e))+
(1  )U (c2 (e))] f (e) de
By comparing welfare under banking allocation and under the second-best
program, we arrive at the following: WSecond WBanking = R e
0
E[U (c1 (e))+
(1  )U (c2 (e))] f (e) de +
R1
e E[U (c1 (e)) + (1  )U (c2 (e))] f (e) de  R1
e 	 U (c1 (e)) f (e) de  
R e
0
[U (c1 (e)) + (1  )U (c2 (e))] f (e) de
This boils down to the much simpler representation:
WSecond WBanking = R1
e E[U (c1 (e))+(1  )U (c2 (e))] f (e) de 
R1
e 	
U (c1 (e)) f (e) de: When we focus on the (e;1] region, we remove the expec-
tations operator and we get:
WSecond WBanking = R1
e [( 	)U (c1 (e))+(1  )U (c2 (e))] f (e) de > 0
Now that we have proved that a banking contract, where depositors receive
interim news about the shadow exchange rate, is Pareto inferior to the second-
best, we are well placed to compare the welfare implications of an information-
induced run v/s a devaluation-induced run.
Step 2: Information-Induced Banking Crisis vs Devaluation-Induced
Banking Crisis
Under a devaluation-induced banking crisis, the welfare of depositors, who
under the Sequential-Service Constraint (SSC) rule, receive full contractual pay-
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ments of c1 is given by: Wdevaluation induced =
R1
e

+(1 )Re
c1

U (c1 (e))
f (e) de: By contrast, under a information-induced banking crisis, the wel-
fare of depositors, who under the Sequential-Service Constraint (SSC) rule,
receive full contractual payments of c1 is given by: Winf o induced =
R1
e
+(1 )R
c1

U (c1 (R)) f (R) dR: Since in both cases, those who are promised
contractual payment get the same amount c1 , comparison of welfare will boil
down to comparing the proportion of those depositors who receive full contrac-
tual payments for average values of e and of R:
Consider the proportion of individuals who receive full payment c1 in the case
of a devaluation-induced banking crisis: +(1 )
R
e
c1
: Recall that, in this case, R is
non-stochastic and e is what depositors receive interim news about. As e! e;
+(1 )Re
c1
! +(1 ) Rec1 ; as e!1;
+(1 )Re
c1
! c1 : Thus, as e rises from e

to 1, the proportion of depositors who receive full contractual payments under
the sequential service constraint changes at a rate of (1 )
R
e
c1
from +(1 )
R
e
c1
to c1 (where
+(1 ) R
e
c1
> c1
) . Let the graph (depicting the proportion of
those withdrawing early and who receive full contractual payments) be denoted
G(e): It shows how this proportion varies with e 2 (e;1]:
Consider the proportion of individuals who receive full payment c1 in the case
of a information-induced banking crisis: +(1 )Rc1 : Recall that, in this case, R is
stochastic and is basically what depositors receive interim news about. As R!
R; +(1 )Rc1 !
+(1 )R
c1
; as R ! 0; +(1 )Rc1 !

c1
: Thus, as R rises
from 0 to R, the proportion of depositors who receive full contractual payments
under the sequential service constraint changes at a rate of (1 )Rc1 from

c1
to +(1 )R

c1
(where +(1 )R

c1
> c1
) . This is shown in illustration (v)
in Appendix E. Let the graph (depicting the proportion of those withdrawing
early and who receive full contractual payments) be denoted H(R): It shows
how this proportion varies with R 2 (0; R]:
Using the theory of approximation, we can argue that since e knows no
upper bound, any arbitrary average value of e between e and 1; lies closer
to 1 than to e: Thus, the value of G(e) at an average value of e, lies closer
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to c1 than to
+(1 ) R
e
c1
: Lets hypothesise that this value is approximately c1 :
With the same language mode, we can argue that since R has an upper bound,
the average value of R lying between 0 and R is R

2 : Thus, the value of H(R),
evaluated at R

2 is:
+(1 )R2
c1
:
Since +(1 )
R
2
c1
> approx c1
; the average proportion of depositors receiv-
ing full contractual payments under the sequential service constraint is higher
for an information-induced bank run than for a devaluation-induced bank run3 .
The contractual payments to those who will end up receiving c1 being the
same, it turns out that (aggregate) welfare for those who receive c1 is lower in
a devaluation-induced bank run. This completes the proof.
Q.E.D
A.7 Notes for Chapter 7
Allen and Gale (2001) consider an open-economy equivalent of their 1998
paper and show that a planner, by trading state-contingent contracts in the
world market (characterised by risk-neutral agents), can replicate the rst-best
allocation, with depositors bearing no risks. They then consider how optimal
risk sharing can be reached with an open-economy version of the banking system,
in which the bank is allowed to trade bonds internationally i.e borrow in home
currency and invest the proceedings in the foreign currency. This is achieved
mainly by monetary policy, which, by changing the price level, introduces some
form of state-contingent variations in the relative values of bonds held. However,
borrowing in the home currency is a feature of rich industrial states. For an
EME, borrowing is mainly in terms of the foreign currency. As such, to shift
risks to the international market, bankruptcy (i.e positive liquidation of the risky
3This argument can be viewed from a di¤erent angle - the proportion of depositors who
do not receive anything under the sequential service constraint, is higher for a devaluation-
induced bank run than for an information-induced bank run.
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asset) must be allowed. Thus, in an EME, Allen and Gale (2001) conjecture that
the optimal risk-sharing arrangement does not eliminate all risks to depositors.
A.8 Notes for Chapter 8
Our ideology is similar to Allen and Gale (2001) in that we use Allen and
Gale (1998) as starting point . We use an equilibrium selection device to get rid
of equilibrium indeterminacy by using the concept of precise signals as poten-
tial belief coordinator device. In the rst variant, the signal is about the banks
stochastic fundamentals However, Allen and Gale (2000a) focus essentially on
risk-sharing contracts between two countries and on how, for a risk-averse coun-
try that has contracted debt in the home currency, exchange rate uctuations
may introduce state-contingent variations in the relative values of bonds and al-
low the country to export risk to the foreign (risk-neutral) country. By so-doing,
the banking system replicates the allocation of some ctitious planner who is al-
lowed to trade state-contingent contracts. Furthermore, Allen and Gale (2001)
explain the occurrence of the twincrises (banking and currency crises) as a
joint probability event that occurs when bank fundamentals go wrong. They do
not address causality issues between a banking crisis and a currency crisis. Our
approach to nancial fragility di¤ers from Allen and Gale (1998), (2001) in that
we do not focus on the notion of risk transfers across countries but rather, on
how, by o¤ering risk-sharing agreements to depositors, causality issues between
a banking crisis and a currency crisis may occur. We explicate clear conditions
under which a banking crisis may, by itself, lead to a currency crisis and analyse
the necessary parametric restrictions for this causality to arise. Addressing the
cause-e¤ect relationship theoretically gives us a comparative advantage in as-
sessing welfare implications of safeguard policies and of the appropriatedness of
di¤erent exchange rate regimes that may best suit an EME.
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A.9 A Theoretical Model of Twin
Crisis
In this section, we provide an illustration of our model ndings, through a
carefully worked example. The model that we shall use is drawn from Jacklin et
al. (1988)4 . Let the utility function be a square-root function: U (ctj) =
p
ctj ,
j; t = f1; 2g : ctj simply stands for consumption of individual of type j in period
t: Basically, in Jacklin et al (1988), there are two individuals (j = f1; 2g) and
each individual derives utility from consuming in both periods, (t = f1; 2g).
The utility of individual 1 is thus:
p
c11 + 1A
p
c12 where 1 is the discount
factor for individual 1 and A is some constant; the utility of individual 2 is
given by expression:
p
c12+2A
p
c22: Assume that 2 = 1 and that 1 =  < 1:
We assume that the aggregate distribution of type 1 and type 2 individuals is
(; 1  ) :
There are two technologies: a safe storage technology and a risky investment
technology. The risky technology is as described in example 1 of chapter 6. It
yields a stochastic return of R where R has a bernoulli distribution: RL with
probability  and RH with probability 1 ; where 0 <  < 1 and 0 < RL < RH :
The ex-ante exchange rate is assumed to be 1.
We assume that in period t = 0, investors do not know their type. In the
same period, the bank will decide on the optimal investment strategy - it decides
to devote  of resources to the safe storage asset and 1    to the risky asset.
Depositors receive interim information about R and about t = 2 (expected)
exchange rate at the beginning of period t = 1: The specication of the model,
other to what is described here, is similar to a typical bank run model. The
banks optimization problem is as follows:
4Actually, the model derived in this section is that of Jacklin et al (1988), applied to the
open economy. See Moheeput (2003) for more details.
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max  [
p
c11 + A
p
c11] + (1  ) [pc12 +Apc22]
s.t
c11 + (1  ) c12  
c21 + (1  ) c22  RH (1  )
c21

RL
RH

+ (1  ) c22

RL
RH

 RL (1  )
p
c11 + A
p
c21  pc12 + Apc22
p
c12 +A
p
c22  pc11 +Apc21
A = 1   + 
r
RL
RH
where c11 + (1  ) c12   denotes the resources constraint in period t =
1; c21 + (1  ) c22  RH (1  ) denotes the resource constraint in period
t = 2; assuming the good state of the world; c21

RL
RH

+ (1  ) c22

RL
RH


RL (1  ) denotes the resource constraint in period t = 2; assuming the bad
state of the world;
p
c11 + A
p
c21  pc12 + Apc22 denotes the incentive-
compatibility constraint for individuals of type 1;
p
c12+A
p
c22  pc11+Apc21
is the incentive-compatibility constraint for individuals of type 2. The solution
to the above optimization problem is, as demonstrated in Jacklin et al (1988):
c11 =
1
(1+2A2RH)+(1 )(21+A2RH22)
c12 = 
2
1c11
c21 = (ARH)
2
c11
c22 = (A2RH)
2
c11
355
where:
1 =
1+A2RH( (1 ))
1+A2RH(1 (1 )) and 2 =
1+A2R2H(1 (1 ))
1+A2RH(1 (1 ))
1 < 1
Remark: c11 > c12  The payment made, in period t = 1; to type 1
depositor is higher than that made to type 2 depositor
Thus, some type 2 depositors may prefer to type 1 withdrawal stream to
their own withdrawal stream. If this happens, then an information-induced
bank run occurs.
Su¢ cient Conditions for a Bank Run
In period t = 1; some type 2 depositors receive interim information that
leads them to update their beliefs about R or to expect a currency devaluation
(e2 > 1) or both. It will be assumed that, in the case in which the belief updating
mechanics is about R; depositors update their probability assessment of R = RL
from  to ^ (the new posterior belief about R): When this happens, the bank
will be unable to meet the demand for all type 1 withdrawals in period t = 1;
thus triggering a bank run.
The bank run conditions, in this example, will be as follows:
p
c12 +A1
p
c22 <
p
c11 +A1
p
c21 where A1 = 1  ^ + ^
q
RL
RH
p
c12 +A2
p
c22 <
p
c11 +A2
p
c21 where A2 = 1  
q
1
e2
+ 
q
RL
RHe2
p
c12 +A3
p
c22 <
p
c11 +A3
p
c21 where A3 = (1  ^)
q
1
e2
+ ^
q
RL
RHe2
The above conditions for a bank run imply that:
Ai <
p
c11 pc12p
c22 pc21 where i = 1; 2; 3:
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Using the above expression as well as the solution of the optimization pro-
gram, the following condition is obtained:
p
c11 pc12p
c22 pc21 =
1 1
ARH(2 )
By replacing the right hand side of the above expression by the relevant
expressions for 1 and 2 (as derived above), we obtain:
p
c11 pc12p
c22 pc21 = A
Thus, condition Ai <
p
c11 pc12p
c22 pc21 transforms itself into the more tractable:
Ai < A, i = 1; 2; 3
Mechanics of a Banking and Currency Crisis
CASE 1: Banking Crisis leads to a Currency Crisis
Hypothesis 1: Some type 2 depositors receive interim bad information
about R but no information about the exchange rate expected to prevail in period
t = 2
The su¢ cient condition for a bank run is: ^ > +(1  )
 p
RHp
RH 
p
RL

: Let
 denote +(1  )
 p
RHp
RH 
p
RL

: Thus, informed type 2 depositors prefer type
1 withdrawal stream to type 2 withdrawal stream if their updated assessment
of ^ gets above : This last condition guarantees the existence of a bank run. If
the Central Bank is forced to use its reserves to bailout the commercial bank,
this triggers a collapse of the currency, irrespective of whether there is interim
bad news about the expected exchange rate or not.
CASE 2: Currency Crisis leads to a Banking Crisis
Hypothesis 2: Some informed type 2 depositors receive interim bad in-
formation about the exchange rate expected to prevail in period t = 2 ; but no
interim bad information about the banks performance, R:
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The su¢ cient condition for a bank run is: (1  )
q
1
e2
+
q
RL
RH
< 

1   + 
q
RL
RH

:
Simplifying and rearranging, we get: e2 > 12 : Thus, if an economy engages in
liability dollarisationand o¤ers liability contracts denominated in the foreign
currency, an interim bad news about the expected exchange rate (condition
e2 >
1
2 ) will trigger a bank run through balance sheet e¤ects, irrespective of
the performance of the banks portfolio.
CASE 3: Co-existence of a Currency Crisis and a Banking Crisis
Hypothesis 3: Some informed type 2 depositors receive interim bad in-
formation about R (leading them to expect a re-adjustment of posterior beliefs)
and about the exchange rate expected to prevail in period t = 2 (leading them to
expect a currency devaluation)
The su¢ cient condition for nancial fragility is:

1  ^
q
1
e2
+ ^
q
RL
RH
<


1   + 
q
RL
RH

. Simplifying and re-arranging yields: ^ >
q
1
e2
 

1 +
q
RL
RH

q
1
e2

1 
q
RL
RH
 :
Note that
q
1
e2
 

1 +
q
RL
RH

q
1
e2

1 
q
RL
RH
 <  + (1  ) pRHp
RH 
p
RL

:
This suggests that when there is an unexpected currency devaluation, interim
bad news about R will more likely trigger a bank run, relative to the case in
which there is no such expectation.
Claim: The purpose of this section was to specify the robustness of the re-
sults developed in this paper, by using as illustration, a general open economy
model of Jacklin et al (1988). In EMEs with short-term debt contracts denom-
inated in foreign currency, devaluation may lead to non linear deterioration
in the balance sheet of commercial banks, with increased burden of indebtedness
and lower net worth. Thus, for EMEs that receive substantial capital inows and
that are characterised by liability dollarisation, a banking crisis and a currency
crisis are more likely to be interlinked. If the banking system is poorly managed
and su¤ers from lax regulation and supervision standards, then a banking and a
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currency crisis are more likely to occur if the countrys overall macroeconomic
management programme is also poor. The last illustration highlights this fact.
THE END
